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Introduction
Goethe (1749–1832) received Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s complete transla-
tion of the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ (ca. 1315–1390) in May,1 1814.2 Five years later, Goethe
published his poetic work West-östlicher Divan, a text clearly influenced by
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. Many studies have explored this literary encounter from numer-
ous perspectives. Yet the majority of these comparative literary investigations,
focusing solely on issues of influence and resemblance, are restricted in scope.
They are limited to comparisons between Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan and
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan,3 often against the background of Goethe’s study of the cultural
space of the Orient as he explains in Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem
Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans. Muḥammad Iqbāl’s productive reception
of West-östlicher Divan in his 1923 collection of poems Payām-i mašriqī offers a
different approach to understanding the literary encounter of 1814. In his poem
Ǧalāl and Goethe, Iqbāl expands the intercultural literary dialogue beyond
Ḥāfiẓ and Goethe by widening the textual field of observation beyond the two
Divans. Set in paradise, the poem depicts a meeting between Maulānā Ǧalāl ud-
Dīn Balḫī-yi Rūmī (Rumi) and Goethe, in which Goethe reads one of his works
aloud to Rūmī. Remarkably, the work in question is not West-östlicher Divan –
rather, it is Faust. Goethe’s reading of Faust to the Persian Sufi-poet kindles an
1 In this work, the rules of transliteration as established by the ‘Deutsche Morgenländische
Gesellschaft’ (DMG) are followed. This means, Arabic words and phrases are rendered accord-
ing to these rules for Arabic. Persian words, even if of Arabic origin, are rendered following
the rules for Persian. Arabic names in Persian are rendered according to Arabic rules. Oriental
words common in English are rendered according to English rules. Transliterations in older
publications are kept throughout in their original form. The names of authors who have pub-
lished in Western journals and publications are rendered in their original orthography
throughout. I have followed the rules of DMG for differentiation between classical Persian and
modern Persian, this is also applied to the names of authors. The word Divan in this work is
seen as an English word, unless it is a part of a longer Persian phrase. Goethe’s orthography of
the word Divan is identical with ours and is rendered as the original title of his work. Compare
to: Carl Brockelmann et al., ‘Die Transliteration der arabischen Schrift in ihrer Anwendung auf
die Hauptliteratursprachen der islamischen Welt’, in 19. internationalen Orientalistenkongreß
in Rom (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH, 1969), p. 10; 12; 17. In difficult
instances, e.g. Mazdayasnā, I followed Muʿīn: Muḥammad Muʿīn, Farhang-e Muʿīn, 6 vols.,
Selsele-ye farhanghā-ye Muʿīn (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1342–1352/1963–1973). I have also con-
sulted Dehḫodā’s Loġatnāme: ʿAlīakbar Dehḫodā, Loġatnāme (Tehran, 1325/1946–1352/1973).
2 Goethes Leben von Tag zu Tag: Eine dokumentarische Chronik von Robert Steiger und
Angelika Reimann, IX vols. (Zürich: Artemis, 1993), p. 71.
3 Henceforth, when I refer to the Divan without mentioning its author, I have in mind the
Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
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intellectual exchange between the two. Faust (and not West-östlicher Divan) re-
veals to Iqbāl’s Rūmī the following:
Du, der Wortes Geist erfaßt,
Die Engel jagst und Gott als Beute hast –
Dein Denken sich im Herz verborgen hält,
Erschafft aufs Neue dann die Alte Welt!4
Considering the author’s vast knowledge of both Islamic and Western philoso-
phy, Iqbāl’s poetic work lends credibility to the project of expanding our textual
scope of investigation beyond West-östlicher Divan. As Iqbāl shows us, the dia-
logue between the two cultural horizons in question is not limited to West-
östlicher Divan. Whatever the intentions of the historical Goethe may have
been, Iqbāl’s Goethe correctly locates this dialogue in Faust as well.
Several articles and short essays comparing Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan and Goethe’s Faust
provide the background for the project described above. In an article published
in 1966, for example, in the context of a more general comparison between the
two authors, Ṣādiq Reżāzāde draws attention to similarities between the respec-
tive mystical outlooks articulated in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ and Goethe’s Faust.5
Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Ḫorramšāhī, known for his commentary on Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan and
his translation of the Qurʾān into Persian, is another scholar who contributes to
an expanded comparative study of Goethe and Ḥāfiẓ. Ḫorramšāhī likewise com-
pares Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan and Goethe’s Faust (as well as West-östlicher Divan) in an
article from 1999 that more generally compares the two authors in terms of
their social and political situations, their learnedness within their respective so-
cieties, and their world-views. Ḫorramšāhī’s comparison between Faust and the
Divan of Ḥāfiẓ operates on multiple levels.6 On one level, reflecting the general
framework of the article, Ḫorramšāhī focuses on the two authors themselves,
arguing that the character Faust represents Goethe and the character ‘Inspired
Libertine’7 (rind) represents Ḥāfiẓ. The analysis then moves toward the textual
level. Ḫorramšāhī draws attention to the hypertextual aspect of the character of
4 Muhammad Iqbal, Botschaft des Ostens: als Antwort auf Goethes West-Östlichen Divan,
trans. Annemarie Schimmel (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 97.
5 Ṣādiq Reżāzāde, ‘Goethe va Ḥāfiẓ’, University of Tehran’s Interdisciplinary Journal of the
Department of Literature and Humanities, 53 (1345/1966), pp. 21–22.
6 Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast’, Zībā šenāḫt, no. 1 (1378/1999).
7 ‘Inspired Libertine’ is Lewisohn’s translation. It tries to capture the conflicting qualities of
sublime ambitions and mundane beauty in the character of rind of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. Leonard
Lewisohn, ed. Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (London & New York:
I. B. Tauris, 2010), p. xxi.
2 Introduction
Faust – half historical charlatan and trickster, half multifaceted hero – and ar-
gues for the similarity between this characteristic of Faust and the character of
rind in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. Rind, too, is a character with an ambivalent identity.
Interpreted literally and in accordance with social historic meaning, he appears
to be a base villain. Yet he also exhibits an antinomian heroic character with
semiotic roots in Sufi literature.8
Finally, on yet another level, Ḫorramšāhī observes a remarkable similarity
between the structures of the two works. Ḫorramšāhī offers a short explanation
of the style of the Divan that is based on his previous studies. He defines the
style of Ḥāfiẓian ġazal as scattered (pāšān) – the verses of a given ġazal do not
merely illustrate a linear development of a single theme. This style, according
to Ḫorramšāhī, is Ḥāfiẓ’s own innovation in ġazal and the result of the poet’s
studies of the Qurʾān. Ḫorramšāhī then points out that Goethe’s Faust also devi-
ates from classical unities; the thematic development of the scenes in Faust
does not follow a logical, linear structure. Notably, however, Ḫorramšāhī pro-
vides no support for this claim. Furthermore, Ḫorramšāhī observes that both
texts are filled with mythological, cultural, religious, and literary allusions. Yet
Ḫorramšāhī admits that the comparison between the two texts requires further,
in-depth investigation.9 His preliminary observations, particularly as they per-
tain to the German texts, lack sufficient textual support. Yet they suggest in-
triguing hypotheses and starting-points for further inquiry, such as the present
study. Though not fully developed, Ḫorramšāhī’s observation regarding the
similar ‘pāšān styles’ of the Divan and Faust was an original insight – and one
to which we will return.
After Ḫorramšāhī, who dedicated a small part of the aforementioned article
to opening the way for a comparison between Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, Moǧtabāʾī,
in the article Ḥāfiẓ in Goethe’s Faust, sets out to put the comparison between
Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s poems in the center of focus. The author’s aim is to trace possi-
ble reflections of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry in Faust and thematic resemblances between the
two works.10 He also aims to identify other Oriental, Iranian and Islamic lines of
influence.11 It is the first article exclusively dedicated to a comparison between
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan and Faust, and it makes a remarkable contribution to the field of
comparative literary studies. Yet the elements of Faust that the author selects to
compare to the Divan (and its cultural and intellectual background) are treated
8 Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ p. 133.
9 Ibid., pp. 132–133.
10 Fatḥullāh Moǧtabāʾī, ‘Ḥāfiẓ dar Faust-e Goethe’, Nāme-ye farhangestān, no. 38 (1387/
2008), p. 8.
11 Ibid., p. 9.
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without sufficient consideration of Faust’s own cultural, literary and intellectual
background. The author points out similarities between the two works but ne-
glects to reference studies carried out on the subject by German and international
scholars. His repeated identification of Mephisto with Satan,12 for example, disre-
gards Goethe’s explicit rejection of such an interpretation of the (much more com-
plex) character of Mephisto.13 Consequently, the author identifies Mephisto with
Satan without considering the drama’s historical context and Goethe’s own views
on the possibility of representing evil in literature. In Faust I, the author assumes,
Faust fights the temptations of Satan, and in Faust II, it is Satan who is overcome
by Faust and is at his service.14 Moǧtabāʾī’s moral judgment of Faust’s actions in
Faust I leads him to make general, ahistorical statements. And Moǧtabāʾī mis-
guidedly praises Faust’s project in the fifth act of Faust II as one in which Faust
seeks to improve the well-being and prosperity of his people.15 But this interpreta-
tion decontextualizes the drama from its historical context and neglects to pay
due attention to the scholarship on the subject and the theatrical context itself –
the blind Faust’s monologue is clearly meant to be ironic. Since the main objec-
tive of Moǧtabāʾī’s article is to search for and highlight possible similarities
between the two texts, the author does not follow any specific and clear thematic
approach. Thus, verses from Faust are picked out of context and juxtaposed to
verses from Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan in a way that decontextualizes both works.
Despite their shortcomings, the comparative investigations described
above pave the way for future investigation and advance hypotheses that can
be examined and critically evaluated in more comprehensive studies. These
early studies shed light on the similarities between Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan and Goethe’s
Faust, and they identify Ḥāfiẓ’s engagement with the intellectual and ethical
substance of Sufism – an essential part of Ḥāfiẓ’s historical, cultural and intel-
lectual world – as an important source of these similarities.
12 Ibid., p. 6.
13 Eggensperger describes Mephisto’s character in Goethe’s Faust as the ‘sicherlich schil-
lerndste’ of dramatic and narrative representations of Mephisto: Klaus Eggensperger, ‘Den
Bos̈en sind sie los. Überlegungen zu Mephistopheles und zum Bos̈en in Goethes Faust’,
Pandaemonium germanicum, no. 8 (2004), p. 190. Huber further elaborates on various aspects
of Goethe’s Mephisto by drawing attention to several of his ‘masks.’ He describes Mephisto as
‘the representation of a “schwankende Gestalt”’ to clarify his multifaceted identity. Peter
Huber, ‘Mephisto is the devil – or is he?’, in Goethe’s Faust, ed. Hans Schulte, John Noyes, and
Pia Kleber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 41. In §II.1.3.3 (‘Differentiating
between Mephisto’s Intentions and Deeds’), I will explore Mephisto’s character.
14 Moǧtabāʾī, ‘Ḥāfiẓ dar Faust-e Goethe,’ p. 10.
15 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
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Though written in different historical and cultural contexts, Goethe’s Faust
and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan were both composed during historical periods in which the
relation between body and soul was being reevaluated. Philosophical and theo-
logical speculations, new intellectual approaches, and debates concerning the
definition of ‘truth’16 as immanent (rather than radically transcendent in rela-
tion to the world and the seeker of truth) informed the authors’ respective his-
torical periods. Despite the historical and cultural distance between the two
texts, the present study concentrates on this resemblance. The main question
this study sets out to investigate is the following:
Is the change from a world-view based on transcendent truth to one based on
immanent truth reflected in the two works in question?
Several sub-questions follow from this guiding question:
Are there traces of the pursuit of transcendent truth in the two texts?
If so, how does the pursuit of transcendent truth reflect itself in the two works in
question? For instance, does it reflect in the manner in which the seekers of
knowledge evaluate their own bodies and souls?
Are there textual instances in the literary works that illustrate the experience of the seeker
of truth replacing a radically transcendent world-view with an immanent one?
Are there literary articulations of an immanent world-view in the two texts?
If so, what are the specific structural elements that form the immanent world-view
in each work?
As the radically transcendent world-view becomes an immanent one, does the
method or object of pursuit change as well?
The present study contains three chapters. Each chapter is divided into two sub-
chapters in which I separately explore different aspects of the questions posed
above relative to the specific intellectual, cultural and historical contexts to
which each text belongs. At the end of each chapter I will provide a close com-
parison between the two texts based on the detailed findings of that chapter.
Thus, we are able to pay close attention to the specific historical and cultural
contexts of each work, while illuminating the phenomenological resemblances
between the two texts so as to show possible underlying structural similarities
pertaining to the thematic focus of a given chapter.
Following the questions posed above, I remain focused on the intellectual
aspect of the views reflected in both texts. With regard to the Sufi views that
manifest in the Divan, my concentration will remain on the ethical, cosmologi-
cal and epistemological aspects of their intellectual content in relation to
16 It is of seminal importance to note that, in both contexts, truth is seen as identical with the
divine: see p. 19; 28; 40 below.
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questions of this study. A comparative analysis of both works with a focus on
theological perspectives – for instance, the influence of specific traditions of exe-
gesis of the Old and New Testament or the Qurʾān – lies outside the scope of this
study. Rather, the concern of this study is to trace the influence of the intellectual
views regarding the relation between the intelligible content of the corporeal
world (the soul) and the bodily realm upon the manner of evaluation of the body
and the soul in one’s life. To that end, I will follow the dramatization of the life of
the character Faust and the poetic descriptions of philosophical views concerning
forms of life in the Divan. But discussions of life after death in the Divan, as well
as the final scenes of Faust (Grablegung, Bergschluchten) that illustrate the
journey of Faust’s immortal soul after death, will not be the subject of this study.
They should be treated in a separate comparative study with a focus on Christian
and Islamic theological traditions and conceptualizations of life after death.
Furthermore, I only discuss those scenes of Faust pertaining to a horizon of
human episteme that is comparable to the intellectual horizon of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
The fourth and the fifth acts of Faust II, therefore, which relate to modernism and
Faust’s colonial projects, will not be included in this treatment. In other words, I
follow Faust only in his pursuit of knowledge and love; Faust’s third reincarnation
as the developer and colonizer remains outside of the scope of this study.
In the first chapter, I examine literary articulations of an ascending direct
approach to the acquisition of knowledge and truth and I trace the influence of
this epistemic view on the representation of body and soul in Faust and the
Divan. To that end, I am guided by Platonic and Neoplatonic theories of tran-
scendent truth; the relation between truth and the world; the manner of pursuit
of truth; and the relation between body and soul. In addition to discussing
these Neoplatonic views, in the context of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, I discuss the intellec-
tual and ethical teachings of early Sufis (who were, in fact, influenced by
Neoplatonism) in relation to the subject of the first chapter (i.e., the transcen-
dent truth). First, I dedicate a section to clarifying the mode of knowledge
present in the two texts, relative to their respective cultural and historical back-
grounds. I explain the relevance of Neoplatonic views in this context. In both
texts, I trace the influence of a world-view based on the radical transcendence
of truth from the natural and sublunary realm. I show that the pursuit of knowl-
edge within this world-view entails a Platonic exclusion of the material, bodily
and natural realms in which the purified seeker of knowledge directly ascends
to the extramundane truth. I demonstrate that this view manifests in metaphors
of light and representations of the sun and the moon. In both texts, I locate tex-
tual instances in which the sun represents, metaphorically, the transcendent
object of pursuit. Seekers of such knowledge, I argue, wish to fly directly to-
ward this object, leaving the natural and the bodily spheres behind. Regarding
6 Introduction
expressions of striving directly toward the extramundane source of knowledge,
I locate in both texts indications of the impossibility of a radically negative and
direct pursuit of the transcendent – an approach that is destructive to life itself
and that causes pain and alienation from the world. I argue that the Faust
drama exhibits a cycle of pain, escape into fantasy, and experience of disillu-
sionment. This cycle contributes to the text’s dramatic development, including
Faust’s attempt at suicide. The experiences of pain of the ascending seeker of
knowledge are interwoven with a growing awareness of the necessity of re-
thinking the natural and bodily spheres as well as the relation between divine
truth and the world. Assessing the critiques of the method of the pursuit of
truth in both texts is the subject of the second chapter.
In the second chapter, I investigate the literary illustration of the shift from
the pursuit of the transcendent truth to the pursuit of immanent truth in Ḥāfiẓ’s
Divan and Goethe’s Faust. To highlight the literary articulations of this process,
I first probe the texts for descriptions of the world constructed in accordance
with the view of truth as radically transcendent. Then, with a clear view of the
characteristics of this initial state – i.e., the state that will undergo the shift I’ve
described above – I focus on the process itself. I show how Faust’s academic
title (‘Doktor’) and his study (Studierzimmer) represent a world characterized
by an exclusive world-view as well as the practice of negation and purification
of the natural and the bodily spheres. I analyze Faust’s expressions of discon-
tent with the world that surrounds him. In this context, I point out the ways in
which Neoplatonic views are modified in both texts; in case of the Divan, I also
address Ḥāfiẓ’s polemics against elements of ascetic Sufism based on the radi-
cal transcendence of the divine truth. In this chapter, I trace Faust’s shifting
views regarding truth – namely, whether his pursuit of truth requires mediation
or not. I also explain the metaphorical role of colors in Faust and argue that
verse 1120 describes the emerging turn toward life and a mediated approach to
the object of pursuit in an immanent world-view. Furthermore, in this chapter,
I differentiate between Mephisto’s actions and the intentions that he voices in
Faust’s absence. Based on this differentiation, I advance an interpretation of
Mephisto as a mediating figure who, through his actions, guides Faust through
his own process of change. In both texts, the mediating figures help the respec-
tive character’s transition from an exclusive world-view to an inclusive one. I
argue that this function is vividly present in Ḥāfiẓ’s mediating figure, Pir-i
Muġān. Furthermore, I show that the mediating figures in Faust and the Divan
both make use of the potentialities of paradox to overcome the binary view that
anchors the practice of exclusion and negative ascension. Detecting the imma-
nence of the divine in the natural and colorful beauty of spring, I identify
spring’s beauty and its aesthetic appreciation as a component of the rejection
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of a radically transcendent world-view. The importance of beauty and love, a
central theme of the third chapter, is denoted in the title of this study. I argue
in the third chapter that the increasing importance of beauty does not mean
that the pursuit of knowledge loses its significance. The attempts to justify the
pursuit of beauty and its appreciation in love reflect that they are corollaries of
an intellectual turn toward a principally immanent world-view.
The third chapter explores the immanent world-views poetically articulated
in the two texts. Goethe’s studies of Spinoza’s Ethics that were influenced by
Herder inform my reading of Faust in this chapter. I show that, instead of di-
rectly pursuing the transcendent truth, Faust pursues beauty and love in the
drama by comprehending natural and human beings as reflections of the One,
the immanent divine, in the world. My analysis of Faust in this chapter also re-
fers to Goethe’s dramatic fragment Pandora, his lyrical works in West-östlicher
Divan, and other poems dedicated to the poetic articulation of his world-views.
As for Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, I investigate the relevance of the Sufi views regarding im-
manence of the divine in the world. I refer to instances in the early history of
Sufism in which Sufi adherents, worshipping beauty, integrate the adoration of
human beauty into their process of self-development and pursuit of knowledge
of the divine. Later, Sufism turned to reject an understanding of divine truth as
absolutely transcendent and began conceptualizing it as immanent in relation
to the realm of the multiplicity and nature. In the third chapter, I identify inter-
textual links between the poetry of Ḥāfiẓ, and two important Sufi treatises on
love written by Aḥmad Ġazzālī, and Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī. I trace this intertextual
link based on the terms that the Divan shares with the works of these two Sufi
masters. Furthermore, I describe the relation between the pursuit of beauty and
a mediated immanence of the One, the being that is referred to as the Beloved
in this context. In Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, I show that, in place of the quest of
ascension and separation of the body from the soul, the pursuit of beauty in-
volves the mediated immanence of the One in the form of its reflected images.
In this chapter, I show that the light metaphors function differently. In both
texts, I observe instances of hyperbole that denigrate the sun in the face of
physical, human beauty. In addition to pointing out the differences between
the two texts, I show the underlying structural similarities between their re-
spective representations of immanence. I show that the immanent world-view
in both texts is based on a monistic view that explains the relation between the
One and the many. This monistic view conceives the One as the ontological
ground of the many; in turn, the many are recognized to be mediated reflec-
tions and images of the One. The underlying structure of this world-view, I
argue, encompasses three sets of relation: the One and the world; the One and
humans; and humans and the world.
8 Introduction
The following study, however, does not investigate influences of Ḥāfiẓ’s
Oriental cultural space on Goethe’s Faust. The study at hand is a purely phenom-
enological literary study; it sets out to explore the two texts in their own contexts
and to find literary articulations relevant to the relation between body and soul
with regards to the acquisition of knowledge.
Before turning to the two texts, I briefly discuss the issue of genre in
Goethe’s dramatic work (written almost entirely in verse) and Ḥāfiẓ’s lyrical
Divan. Ḫorramšāhī’s study of the structural similarities between Faust and
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan is the first treatment of the difference of genre of these two texts.
In the following section, I further explore the problem of genre in Goethe’s
Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. I elucidate the structural features of these texts that
enable my cross-genre reading and comparison.
On the Structure of Goethe’s Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan
and the Problem of Genre
The earliest readers of Latin translations of Ḥāfiẓian ġazals, around the turn
of the eighteenth century, had difficulty understanding the connection be-
tween individual couplets and the poems they comprised. It is well known
that conventional notions of literary analysis such as unity of theme and lin-
ear development of a single subject do not apply to the Divan. William Jones’s
hasty critical description of Ḥāfiẓ’s poems as ‘simple lay’ and ‘[l]ike orient
pearls at random strung’ stems from his unfamiliarity with the style of Ḥāfiẓ’s
ġazals.17 The historical record suggests that the poet deliberately innovated
with his style of ġazal by abandoning the genre’s previous conventions of lin-
ear structure and development of a single theme.18 In fact, the poet’s innova-
tion was appreciated even in his own time and, to this day, his works are
considered to be the peak of Persian classical ġazal. In Fifty Poems of Ḥāfiẓ,
Arberry makes a significant contribution to our understanding of what he de-
scribes as Ḥāfiẓ’s ‘revolutionary’ innovation in ġazal. According to Arberry,
Ḥāfiẓ discovers ‘that a ghazal may treat of two or more themes and yet retain
17 A. J. Arberry, Classical Persian Literature (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 333.
18 Qāsim Ġanī, Baḥs ̱ dar āsā̱r va afkār va aḥvāl-e Ḥāfiẓ, 2 vols. (Tehran: Hermes, 1386/2007),
vol: 1, p. 61; Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Oslūb-e honarī-ye Ḥāfiẓ va Qurʾān’, in Ẕehn va zabān-e
Ḥāfiẓ (Tehran: Našr-e Nau, 1361/1982), p. 20; A. J. Arberry, ed. Fifty Poems of Ḥāfiẓ: Text and
Translations Collected and Made, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur J. Arberry (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1947), p. 30.
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its unity.’19 The peak of Ḥāfiẓ’s development of this style, according to
Arberry, occurred when he discovered that ‘it was not necessary to develop a
theme to its logical conclusion at all; fragments of themes could be worked
into the composition without damage to the resulting unity.’20 Arberry notes
that formation of this style was facilitated by the fact that ‘the convention had
produced a regular repertory of themes’ the slightest allusion to which would
be recognized by the audience.21
Responding to Arberry’s findings and reflecting that Ḥāfiẓ was an expert in
the Qurʾān and knew it by heart, Ḫorramšāhī draws our attention to the fact
that, in many cases, the Surahs of the Qurʾān do not adhere to unity of theme.22
For instance, following the story of a given prophet or group of people in the
Qurʾān requires that the reader jump around from verse to verse and Surah to
Surah. (The story of Joseph in the 12th Surah is an exception to this rule.)23
According to Ḫorramšāhī, the poet’s pāšān style in the Divan mimics that of the
Qurʾān. In both texts, independent verse-units act as contributing parts to the
whole. To grasp the way different themes are treated in one poem and repeat-
edly revisited in other ġazals in meaningful variations, Ḫorramšāhī argues, re-
quires reading the Divan more than one or two times. To go beyond enjoying
single verses or groups of verses in each ġazal and to appreciate and then ana-
lyze the ‘multidimensional’24 treatment of various themes across the Divan, one
needs to consider the whole Divan in relation to each theme. Achieving this
level of acquaintance with the Divan requires repeated readings.25
Considering (a) Arberry’s remark on the relevance of presence of the reper-
tory of themes in the literary convention, and (b-1) Ḫorramšāhī’s comparison of
the Qurʾān’s manner of non-linear thematic development with the pāšān style
of the Divan, and (b-2) Ḫorramšāhī’s mention of richness of literary, and textual
references in the Divan,26 it becomes clear that intertextuality plays a more
significant role in the Divan than Arberry recognizes. Belonging to a textual net-
work of hypotexts is essential for the pāšān form of narration. The Qurʾān suc-
ceeds in its pāšān form of narration only because it is in constant reference to
19 ———, Fifty Poems of Ḥāfiẓ: Text and Translations Collected and Made, Introduced and
Annotated by Arthur J. Arberry, p. 30.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 30–31.
22 Ḫorramšāhī first developed this view in the following work: Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Oslūb-e honarī-
ye Ḥāfiẓ va Qurʾān’.
23 ———, ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ pp. 132–133.
24 ———, ‘Oslūb-e honarī-ye Ḥāfiẓ va Qurʾān’, p. 24.
25 Ibid., p. 19.
26 Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ p. 132.
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the Old and New Testament. The Divan can treat multiple topoi in fewer than
ten verses, and enjoys its celebrated status in the Persianate world, because it
is a hypertext in constant reference to five hundred years of Persian literature.
Arberry describes this intertextual quality as ‘that “plagiarism” which all
Persian (and Arab) poets have practiced from the beginning, and none more
constantly or discriminately than Ḥāfiẓ.’27 This quality of the text necessitates a
specific manner of reading: for example, investigating the significance of spring
in the Divan (as I do in the second chapter) requires considering each separate
occurrence of the term ‘spring’. Furthermore, it is essential to consider the con-
text of the texts to which Ḥāfiẓ alludes and from which he borrows terms and
figures of speech. In describing spring, for instance, he borrows a phrase from
Rūdakī, a tenth-century poet, whose non-Sufi poems fit in the genre of seasonal
bacchanalian poems. By borrowing from Rūdakī, therefore, Ḥāfiẓ connects his
own work to that poetic tradition and its manner of appreciating nature.28 The
same is true regarding the topoi of piety, libertinism, asceticism, antinomian-
ism, love and wine. Ḥāfiẓ’s innovation occurred at a historical moment in
which he may have assumed that his readers had committed many verses from
famous poets to memory – the minds of his learned readers were archives of
lyrical poetry and themes.29 The poet himself (as the Divan proves beyond
doubt) committed an immense number of verses to memory in addition to the
Qurʾān. In allusion to these texts and topoi, Ḥāfiẓ produced poems that can be
described as texts produced by texts.30
In the poems of the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ abandons the principle of unity of theme.
By revisiting limited themes from different angles and in climactic, novel set-
tings, Ḥāfiẓ creates, in his well-polished verses, independent fragments contrib-
uting to the development of larger themes within the Divan as a whole. Thus, to
readers who are able to have the whole Divan present in their minds and who are
learned in Persian classical literature, the Divan becomes a tale of various famil-
iar characters and settings – often presented in conflict with one another.31
Specific world-views and spiritual and religious philosophies are brought into
27 Arberry, Classical Persian Literature, p. 325.
28 See §II.2.4.1 (‘The Repentance-Shattering Spring’).
29 Compare to: Lewisohn, Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry, pp. 11–12.
30 On multiple occasions, Ḫorramšāhī refers to Ḥāfiẓ (whose name literally means the protec-
tor, the safe keeper, and the one who has memorized something) as our (i.e., the Persianate)
collective memory and collective unconscious. Ḫorramšāhī, ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar
ast,’ pp. 122–123; ———, ‘Ḥāfiẓ dar farhang-e mā va farhang-e mā dar Ḥāfiẓ’, in Ḥāfiẓ ḥāfeẓe-ye
mā-st (Tehran: Našr-e Qaṭre, 1385/2006).
31 Compare to: Dārīūš Āšūrī, Mysticism and ‘Rindī’ in Poetry of Hafiz: A Hermeneutical
Interpretation. (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 2004), pp. 301–302.
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dialogue with each other through characters familiar to the readers: for instance,
the Shaikh (šayḫ), Pīr-i Muġān, the judge (qāżī), the lover, the morality police
(muḥtaṣib), the drunkard and the vintner, the zealot ascetic (ẓāhid), the libertine
(rind), faqih, and Ḥāfiẓ himself. Terms pertaining to followers of specific ways of
life, religious affiliations, and intellectual perspectives; local settings such as the
mosque, the pleasure-house (ḫarābāt), the oratory, the temple of the Magi, the
hermitage, the bazaar (bāzār), the madrasa, and the wine-house; and objects
such as the Sufi garment, the goblet, the prayer-rug, prayer-beads, the lyre, and
the lute all contribute to Ḥāfiẓ’s non-linear and polyphonic epic tale. This makes
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan an infinitely suggestive tale, which doesn’t have a single begin-
ning, but which invites the reader to enter through each couplet and each ġazal.
The following verses from the poem Unbegrenzt from West-östlicher Divan
shows that Goethe regards the quality of absence of beginning and endings as
a characteristic of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic style; it also reflects that Goethe has noted the
essential role of repetition in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ:
Daß du nicht enden kannst das macht dich groß,
Und daß du nie beginnst das ist dein Loos.
Dein Lied ist drehend wie das Sterngewölbe,
Anfang und Ende immerfort dasselbe,
Und was die Mitte bringt ist offenbar,
Das was zu Ende bleibt und Anfangs war.32
Staiger admits he cannot believe Goethe would read ‘solche Verse ohne Anfang
und Folge und Schluß mit größtem Entzücken’.33 He further remarks that the
poem Unbegrenzt elevates, as the Persian poet’s greatest accomplishment,
those very characteristics of Ḥāfiẓian ġazal that ridicule classical form – ‘die
aller klassischen Ordnung spotten.’34
The unconventional structure of Faust – namely, its quality of being
formed out of numerous literary genres and theatrical traditions – is a charac-
teristic of Goethe’s life-work. It is evident on the first reading of the text,
which takes the reader through the lyrical Zueignung, the Vorspiel auf dem
Theater (the fragment that treats the institution of theater),35 the Prolog im
32 J. W. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche, ed. D. Borchmeyer, 40
vols., Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher
Klassiker Verlag., 1985–1999), [Henceforth referred to as FA.] I, 3/1: p. 31 (my emphasis).
33 Emil Staiger, Goethe, 3 vols. (Zürich & Freiburg: Atlantis, 1959), p. 19.
34 Ibid.
35 J. W. Goethe, Faust Texte und Kommentare, ed. Albrecht Schöne, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am
Main: Insel, 2005). [Henceforth citations from ‘Faust’ will be from the first volume of this
12 Introduction
Himmel (a scene that invokes mystery plays) and, finally, the scene Nacht and
Faust’s first soliloquy.36 It seems that Faust provides a case-study of the mix-
ture of genres that Goethe discusses in Drei Natur Formen der Dichtung (his
notes to West-östlicher Divan). In this text, Goethe describes the three genres
of poetry – lyrical, epic and dramatic – in terms of three forms of poetic pro-
duction (‘drey Dichtweisen’): The first is enthusiastic, the second narrates in a
clear fashion, and the third illustrates people in action.37 More importantly,
Goethe asserts that ‘[i]n dem kleinsten Gedicht findet man sie oft beysammen,
und sie bringen eben durch diese Vereinigung im engsten Raume das herr-
lichste Gebild hervor’.38 They differ in their mode of articulation, and they
contribute to the formation of the whole work.39 Throughout Faust, we ob-
serve Goethe interweave the dramatic structure with poetic segments of high
lyrical quality – ‘lyrische Einlagen’, as Schöne describes them.40 These in-
clude the Zueignung, the song of the Archangels, the soliloquies in the scene
Nacht, the Easter song, the monologues in Osterspaziergang, the song of the
spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I], Gretchen’s songs, and Faust’s soliloquy
of gratitude in Wald und Höhle. This mode of articulation permeates the
drama from the beginning to the end – the last verse of the song of Chorus
Mysticus. Although these poetic segments are a fundamental part of the drama,
they also assume individual identities that transcend the work as a whole.
Composers such as Zelter, Schubert, Schumann, Wagner, Berlioz, and Mahler,
to name just a few, have put these poetic segments to music.41 Faust’s mono-
logue praising spring and the sun in the scene Osterspaziergang has become a
part of German culture. In 2017, I personally witnessed an Easter family gather-
ing in which verses 903–940 were recited to a rapt audience; as another exam-
ple, the slogan of the ‘dm’ drugstore chain plays on verse 940. The relation
between these lyrical pieces and the drama as a whole can be described as the
relation between the text and its semiotic units that form a hermeneutical circle.
These semiotic units, which may be appreciated independently of the larger
edition in case of reference to other verses outside the body of the drama it will be signified as
FT and the second volume is referred to as FK] FK, p. 155.
36 See: FK, pp. 18–19.
37 FA I, 3/1: p. 206.
38 FA I, 3/1: p. 206 (my emphasis).
39 To support his point, Goethe divides French tragedy and the performances of his contem-
porary improvisators in public markets into three parts – the beginning, the middle and the
end – and shows how each stage of the formation of the work makes use of a quality that is
present in one of the three natural forms of poetry. FA I, 3/1: p. 207.
40 FK, p. 19.
41 See: FK, pp. 19–20.
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context, nonetheless accompany the reader of the whole text and enrich the
reading experience. Faust contains many monologues and soliloquies that are
lyrical articulations of condensed and universal human experiences. Such
monologues and soliloquies are given not only to Faust, but also to Mephisto,
Helena, Lynceus, Gretchen, and even minor characters such as Erichto. These
universal lyrical poems are part of the Faust drama, but they also speak to the
reader on an individual hermeneutical level. For instance, we find one of the
most vivid articulations of Helena’s beauty in Lynceus’s lyrical monologue. Yet
the monologue also has a narrative function: it justifies Faust’s pursuit of
Helena. As I explain below, the role of lyrical poetry in Faust is one of the drama’s
structural characteristics.
As Schöne notes, Goethe and Schiller were in correspondence in 1797 on
the topic of dramatic and epic poetry. This correspondence may have informed
Goethe’s decision to structure the drama in the way that he did – a composition
of fragments that are graceful and intellectually engaging, independent enti-
ties,42 yet which contribute to the formation of the whole.43 In his account of
his conversation with Goethe on February 13, 1831, Eckermann recounts Goethe
reflecting on the structure of act four of Faust as follows: ‘Dieser Akt bekommt
wieder einen ganz eigenen Charakter, so daß er, wie eine für sich bestehende
kleine Welt, das Übrige nicht berührt, und nur durch einen leisen Bezug zu dem
Vorhergehenden und Folgenden sich dem Ganzen anschließt.’44 Here, the author
casts light on two important characteristics of his work: (a) the independence
of the parts; and (b) the allusive references that link them to the whole work.
Goethe suggests that these qualities apply to the whole drama – not only to act
four. Eckermann makes this point explicitly:
Er wird also, sagte ich, völlig im Charakter des Übrigen sein; denn im Grunde sind doch
der Auerbachsche Keller, die Hexenküche, der Blocksberg, der Reichstag, die Maskerade,
das Papiergeld, das Laboratorium, die klassische Walpurgisnacht, die Helena, lauter für
sich bestehende kleine Weltenkreise, die, in sich abgeschlossen, wohl auf einander
wirken, aber doch einander wenig angehen. Dem Dichter liegt daran, eine mannigfaltige
42 When discussing the presence of independent fragments in Goethe’s Faust, we should note
that different versions and sections of Faust was made available to readers at different times:
Faust Ein Fragment appeared in 1790; Faust I in 1808; Helena Act in 1827; and the first act of
Faust II in 1828. See FK, pp. 66–67,386–387.
43 FK, pp. 389–390. Citing Schiller’s letter to Goethe from April 21, 1797, Schöne brings to
light that this is a case in which Goethe’s intellectual and theoretical exchange with Schiller
informed the structure of his drama in a mixture with the genre of epic literature in which the
independence of the parts is characterized by the two authors as a main characteristic of the
genre.
44 FA II, 12: p. 433 (my emphasis).
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Welt auszusprechen, und er benutzt die Fabel eines berühmten Helden bloß als eine Art
von durchgehender Schnur, um darauf aneinander zu reihen was er Lust hat.45
In addition to supplying examples from parts I and II of Faust, Eckermann also
underscores the two qualities discussed above: the independent nature of the
separate parts and their integration into the whole through allusive references.
His further elucidation of the structure of the drama clearly assigns epical char-
acteristics (based on Goethe and Schiller’s theoretical collaboration) to the
drama. The tale of the ‘famous hero’ here functions as the string that unites the
scenes and settings of the drama and makes up the unity of the whole work.
Goethe agrees with Eckermann’s assessment of the structure of Faust:
Sie haben vollkommen Recht, sagte Goethe; auch kommt es bei einer solchen Komposition
bloß darauf an, daß die einzelnen Massen bedeutend und klar seien, während es als ein
Ganzes immer inkommensurabel bleibt, aber eben deswegen, gleich einem unaufgelösten
Problem, die Menschen zu wiederholter Betrachtung immer wieder anlockt.46
A work composed in such a style must be read several times, Goethe continues.
What he does not discuss is Faust’s relation to its hypotexts – a relation that
Eckermann alludes to when he describes ‘die Fabel eines berühmten Helden’ as
the string that runs through the drama.
For texts written in such a style, intertextual relations are crucial to under-
standing fragments individually and in relation to the whole. Referring to
Koselleck’s discussions of the subject, Schöne argues that Goethe’s view of his-
tory informed the non-linear structure of Faust – a structure more present in
Faust II, he claims, than in Faust I.47 Goethe, Koselleck explains, believed that
the structure of world-history (though not, of course, its specific events) was
circular, ‘so daß alles darauf ankommt, das Altbekannte im Neuen wieder-
zuentdecken und zu formulieren.’48 Here, Koselleck leaves no doubt that the
‘Altbekannte’ also includes human textual literary heritage and that the two
acts of recognition and formulation can be read as acts of reception and literary
production.49 Schöne finds traces of this view in the reoccurring stories of
Faust that, in new constellations and disguises, repeatedly unveil themselves
45 FA II, 12: p. 433.
46 FA II, 12: p. 433 (my emphasis).
47 FK, p. 388.
48 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Goethes unzeitgemäße Geschichte’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, 110 (1993), p. 36.
49 Goethe’sWilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Koselleck argues, shows that the poet viewed orig-
inality in literary production as the treatment of old topoi in new poetic articulations. See in:
FA I, 10: p. 772, 175. (3. Buch, Aus Makariens Archiv)
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to the reader.50 Based on Goethe’s view of history and deep knowledge of cul-
tural and textual literary traditions, Koselleck remarks:
Dreitausend Jahre der Kulturen, ihre Mythen und Sagen hatte er gespeichert, um sie her-
meneutisch, metaphorisch, ironisch, sarkastisch oder spöttisch, didaktisch, mutig oder
übermütig, zornig oder sanft und duldsam abzurufen: jedenfalls umzugießen in seine
Werke.51
In Faust, the epic genre and lyrical poetry are all dressed in the garment of a
verse drama that is, on many levels, deeply interwoven with its hypotexts and
embedded in its historical, intellectual, cultural background.
These qualities of Faust invite comparison to Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, another uncon-
ventional work of lyrical poetry. In the Divan, each ġazal contains multiple
threads of fragments that repeatedly allude to settings familiar to its Persianate
readers. Taken together, the ġazals, featuring well-known characters, suggest a
tale of epic qualities. These fragments are in constant reference to the body of
Persian literature and the textual intellectual heritage from the earliest works of
Persian lyrical and epic poetry to Ḥāfiẓ’s own contemporaries. Each fragment
acts as a monologue or a soliloquy from the point of view of one of the charac-
ters in the Divan. In some cases, well-known characters are placed in dialogue,
a literary technique that further embeds them in the setting of the poem. Rooted
in the historical, intellectual and spiritual context of his time, Ḥāfiẓ redefines
and rearticulates these well-known themes, characters and settings. He thereby
creates a story that conveys the poet’s critical views of the content of the cultural
and literary material that he engages with. These critical views are based on his
life experiences and his close observation of contemporary institutions and fig-
ures that were also historical extensions of his past. This story of the Divan in-
vites comparison to Faust.
50 FK, p. 388.
51 Koselleck, ‘Goethes unzeitgemäße Geschichte,’ p. 30.
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I Direct Pursuit of Knowledge of the
Transcendent Truth
I.1 Definitions and Contextualizations
In this chapter, I explore the textual articulations pertaining to a direct pursuit of
knowledge of the transcendent truth in both our texts. The first step will be to in-
quire into the presence of knowledge and its pursuit in both texts. Then I define
the form of knowledge in question. Furthermore, I define the boundaries of
knowledge and the quest for knowledge within which Goethe’s nineteenth-
century drama can be compared to the fourteenth-century Divan of Šams ud-Dīn
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ of Shiraz (Šīrāz). In this chapter, based on definitions discussed
below, I explore the significance of the pursuit of knowledge in regard to the way
the seeker of knowledge values and treats the body and soul. In the chapters that
follow, I explore possible modifications of the approach, object of pursuit, and sig-
nificance of the body and soul in Goethe’s Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
I.1.1 The Representation of Knowledge in the Beginning of Faust I
The reader starts to construct an image of Faust’s character from the following
verses in the Prolog im Himmel:
DER HERR
Kennst du den Faust?
MEPHISTOPHELES
Den Doktor?
DER HERR
Meinen Knecht!1
The Lord is the first one to mention Faust’s name; Mephistopheles immediately
recognizes him as ‘the doctor’.2 The co-presence of the Lord and Mephistopheles
in this scene highlights two aspects of Faust: as an individual, he is ‘der Doktor’;
but Faust is also ‘der Knecht’, a description that alludes to the Biblical story of
Job: ‘Der Herr sprach zu dem Satan: Hast du nicht acht auf meinen Knecht Hiob
1 V. 299.
2 This manner of introducing Faust is an allusion to the biblical story of Job. (Job 1: 6–12) See:
FK, pp. 170–171.
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gehabt?’3 While most of the drama depicts Faust as an individual free from a
predetermined destiny (‘der Doktor’),4 in the scene Bergschluchten, the other
aspect of Faust (‘der Knecht’) comes to the fore. It is, however, undeniable that
the mention of Faust’s name in the Prolog im Himmel – a scene in which all the
archangels as well as Mephistopheles are gathered in a heavenly assembly –
opens the way for the reader to form interpretations that are of a trans-
historical and archetypical nature.5 Yet this does not justify a reading that ap-
proaches the text as an account of a predetermined fate written in heaven.
Rather, the drama goes through its chain of events in accordance with the logic
that the work itself constructs as it unfolds.
Mephistopheles describes Faust as an individual full of longing and
restlessness: ‘Und alle Näh’ und alle Ferne | Befriedigt nicht die tiefbewegte
Brust.’6 Yet the cause of his discontent is unknown. The curious reader who car-
ries this question with him to the scene Nacht finds Faust no less restless and
lost than he was (as Mephistopheles describes him) in the Prolog im Himmel,
but at least in the scene Nacht the reasons for Faust’s agonies are explained. In
his opening soliloquy, Faust makes it known that he is a polymath, ever long-
ing for more knowledge. Four branches of knowledge are mentioned. The first
is philosophy and the last, named with explicit irony, is theology – or as Faust
says, ‘leider auch Theologie!’ It is clear why the drama is considered a
‘Gelehrtentragödie’.7 While introducing Faust I as oriented around two main
themes,8 Trunz rightly points out that what Faust expects to achieve is ‘durch
3 Hiob 2,3. In: ‘Die Bible oder die gantze Heilige Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments /
nach der Übers. Martin Luthers. Neu durchges. nach dem Dt. Evang. Kirchenausschuss gen-
ehm. Text,’ (Stuttgart: Privil. Württemb. Bibelanstalt, 1954), p. 520.
4 Compare to FK, p. 164.
5 Günter Niggl, ‘Biblische Welt in Goethes Dichtung’, in ‘Im Anschauen ewger Liebe’: Von
Goethe lernen, ed. Wolfgang Böhme (Karlsruhe: Tron KG., 1982), pp. 65–66.
6 V. 306–307
7 J. W. Goethe, Goethes Werke: Hamburger Ausgabe, 9th. ed., 14 vols. (München: C.H. Beck,
1981), vol. 3: p. 470. [Henceforth referred to as HA.] Regarding the possible reading of Faust,
and specifically the scene Nacht, as a ‘Gelehrtensatire’ see the following work: Alexander
Košenina, Der gelehrte Narr: Gelehrtensatire seit der Aufklärung (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003),
pp. 227–229. Here Košenina clarifies that Goethe’s detailed discussion of the historical views
and problems pertaining to the various fields of knowledge (in the case of Faust) and philology
(in case of Wager) lessens the satiric effect of the work. Košenina constantly refers to the treat-
ment of the theme at hand as ‘Gelehrtenkritik’: ‘Diese gelehrteste Gelehrtenkritik mindert die
satirische Wirkung’. Ibid., p. 228.
8 Trunz suggests that Faust I is constituted of two main thematic lines, which are
‘Gretchentragödie’ and ‘Gelehrtentragödie’. HA, vol. 3: p. 470.
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Erkenntnis über sich hinauszugelangen’.9 Here, we approach and analyze
Goethe’s Faust in respect to one thematic aspect – the longing to go beyond the
existing definitions of self through self-knowledge and knowledge of the world.
Yet first we must define the form of knowledge in question.
I.1.2 Knowledge and Self-knowledge in Faust
To explain the relation between knowledge and self-knowledge in Goethe’s
Faust, it is first necessary to understand the author’s view of knowledge in rela-
tion to the human being.
The most important feature of Goethe’s theory of knowledge is that it views
truth, the object of pursuit, as identical with the divine. The relation between
the divine source of intelligible content in the world, on the one hand, and the
world itself and the seeker of knowledge, on the other hand, must be consid-
ered in this light. This does not mean that Goethe considers the natural world
to be devoid of intelligible divine content. On the contrary, as the following
quote from his Versuch einer Witterungslehre explains – and as I will further
demonstrate in the course of this study –, the One and the many are intimately
related. The former is perceivable in the latter in an indirect manner:
Das Wahre mit dem Göttlichen identisch, läßt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen, wir
schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten
Erscheinungen; wir werden es gewahr als unbegreifliches Leben und können dem
Wunsch nicht entsagen, es dennoch zu begreifen.10
Bearing this fact in mind, we now turn to Goethe’s pursuit of knowledge of
nature.
After controversial debates in the late nineteenth century regarding the sig-
nificance of Goethe’s contribution to science, contemporary scholarship sees the
writer of Faust as a researcher of natural sciences as well as a poet with a horizon
of knowledge encompassing meteorology, physics, geology, morphology of
plants and comparative osteology.11
9 J. W. Goethe, Faust: der Tragödie erster und zweiter Teil: Urfaust, ed. Erich Trunz (München:
Beck, 1991), p. 477.
10 FA I, 25: p. 274 (my emphasis).
11 See for instance here a short history of alteration of evaluations of Goethe’s scientific
achievements and specifically methodology in: D. Peter Smith, ‘Was die Welt im Innersten
zusammenhält: Scientific Themes in Goethe’s Faust’, in A Companion to Goethe’s Faust: Part 1
and 2, ed. Paul Bishop (Columbia: Camden House, 2006), pp. 194–195.
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Philological facts reflect the difficulties that Goethe faced in his pursuit
of the natural sciences. He struggled to earn the recognition he expected for
contributions such as his Farbenlehre and his findings in the field of compar-
ative osteology. As Dane demonstrates, on multiple occasions Goethe ex-
pressed his discontent ‘[d]aß seine naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen in
der zeitgenössischen Öffentlichkeit nicht die Wertschätzung erfuhren, die
Goethe sich gewünscht hatte, wußte er und bedauerte es außerordentlich’.12
Considering the circumstances13 in which Goethe persistently carried out his
research in the natural sciences, we ask ourselves ‘warum hat Goethe sich
nicht auf die so genannte schöne Literatur beschränkt?’14 The answer is sim-
ple: Goethe did not believe, as modern science does, in clearly delineated
borders between different fields of knowledge. More importantly, he did not
recognize natural science as fundamentally distinct from culture and human-
ities.15 As macrocosm and microcosm, natural science and humanities are in-
timately related, Goethe thought.16 In his letter to Zelter on January 29, 1831,
Goethe writes, ‘Hätt ich mich mit den Naturwissenschaften nicht abgegeben,
so hätt ich die Menschen nie kennen lernen.’17 As Dane explains, ‘Der
Wunsch nach Menschenkenntnis, Wissen über den Menschen – darin liegt
eine Motivation für seine Naturerforschung.’18 As he makes clear in his letter
to Zelter, Goethe viewed knowledge of the natural world as a prerequisite for
anthropological knowledge. Dane emphasizes that this view was one of the
main motivations for Goethe’s pursuit of knowledge of nature.
For Goethe, humanities, natural science and literary work were deeply re-
lated. In his speech Zum Shakespears [sic] Tag (1771), Goethe explains how he
finds in the works of the English poet a sort of knowledge of nature that had
been neglected by many great philosophers. This knowledge of nature, Goethe
argues, manifests in the plots and characters of Shakespeare’s dramas.19 In
12 Gesa Dane, ‘Unerhörte Begebenheiten. Was lesen wir, wenn wir Goethe lesen?’, in ‘Göthe
ist schon mehrere Tage hier, warum weiß Gott und Göthe’ Vorträge zur Ausstellung ‘Der gute
Kopf leuchtet überall hervor’ Goethe, Gottingen und die Wissenschaften, ed. Elmar Mittler
(Göttingen: Niedersächs. Staats- und Univ.-Bibliothek, 2000), p. 14.
13 Schiller remarked that, if Goethe had published his research under a pseudonym, he would
have had more success reaching his readers. See Schiller’s Letter to Goethe 23 Nov. 1795 ex-
plained and cited in: ibid., p. 12 & 14.
14 Ibid., p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 12.
16 Ibid., p. 17.
17 FA II, 2: p. 363.
18 Dane, ‘Unerhörte Begebenheiten. Was lesen wir, wenn wir Goethe lesen?’, p. 16.
19 FA I, 18: pp. 11–12.
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Farbenlehre, Goethe opines that the scientist should abandon an essentialist ap-
proach toward light and colors; he supports this methodological claim with an
example taken from the realm of anthropology – a field that he viewed as insep-
arable from the literary field of narratology, let us recall.
Denn eigentlich unternehmen wir umsonst, das Wesen eines Dinges auszudrücken.
Wirkungen werden wir gewahr, und eine vollständige Geschichte dieser Wirkungen
umfaßte wohl allenfalls das Wesen jenes Dinges. Vergebens bemühen wir uns, den
Charakter eines Menschen zu schildern; man stelle dagegen seine Handlungen, seine
Taten zusammen, und ein Bild des Charakters wird uns entgegentreten.
Die Farben sind Taten des Lichtes, Taten und Leiden.20
Here, we observe that the relation between literature and knowledge of nature is
reciprocal in Goethe’s view.21 In the speech Zum Shakespears Tag and in the
passage above, Goethe shows anthropology and poetics to cast light on scientific
horizons. Now we can inquire about the relation between knowledge and self-
knowledge. In Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort, Goethe
reflects on the famous injunction to know thyself:
Hiebei bekenn ich, daß mir von jeher die große und so bedeutend klingende Aufgabe: erk-
enne dich selbst, immer verdächtig vorkam, als eine List geheim verbündeter Priester, die
den Menschen durch unerreichbare Forderungen verwirren und von der Tätigkeit gegen
die Außenwelt zu einer inneren falschen Beschaulichkeit verleiten wollten. Der Mensch
kennt nur sich selbst, insofern er die Welt kennt, die er nur in sich und sich nur in ihr ge-
wahr wird. Jeder neue Gegenstand, wohl beschaut, schließt ein neues Organ in uns auf.22
This quote articulates the view that self-knowledge and knowledge of the world
are interconnected. Pursuing knowledge of the world, Goethe argues, has an
additional purpose: it creates a space within which self-knowledge can unfold
and grow.
The author’s view of the interrelation of knowledge of the world and self-
knowledge can be traced to verses 354–357 of Faust’s opening monologue in
the scene Nacht. In these verses, Faust expresses discontent with knowledge
that is abstracted from the real world and its intersubjective, social and commu-
nicative aspects. His own knowledge, he admits, though vast by some meas-
ures, is bereft of worldly intelligence. Here, Faust gestures toward the inner
20 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
21 See also: Dane, ‘Literatur zwischen Natur- und Kunstlehre: Goethes Erzählung Der Mann
von funfzig Jahren’. Here, Dane expounds on the presence of the reciprocal relation between
natural science and literary work in Goethe’s Der Mann von funfzig [sic] Jahren.
22 FA I, 24: p. 595–596.
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relation between knowledge of the world and self-knowledge that we know to
be such an essential part of Goethe’s own world-view.23
Bilde mir nicht ein was rechts zu wissen,
Bilde mir nicht ein ich könnte was lehren
Die Menschen zu bessern und zu bekehren.24
Throughout this study, we will return again and again to how a character’s un-
derstanding of knowledge informs his or her ethical personality and how char-
acters change their conceptions of knowledge in the course of the drama. There
is a noticeable difference between an abstract conception of knowledge that is
irrelevant to the ethical aspect of a person’s life and the ethically embedded
kind of knowledge which Faust strives for and which he introduces in his open-
ing monologue.
In Faust, knowledge (in its different fields) is present as a literary element in
the drama. In other words, the work ‘never propagandizes but instead reflects
the intricate mystery of nature and the complexity of the human relation with the
material realm’.25 Furthermore, the drama contains references to the scientific
scene of Goethe’s time and problematizes various assumptions and theories. The
debates between Anaxagoras and Thales are a good example of this aspect of the
literary work.26
Though alchemy is not among the four branches of knowledge in the open-
ing of the scene Nacht, multiple allusions to alchemy can be found in the text.
As the eighth book of the second part of Dichtung und Wahrheit informs us, the
young Goethe invested a certain amount of time in reading sources of alchemy
and conducting experiments.27 Dorothea Kuhn situates Goethe’s interest in al-
chemy within his larger world-view:
Die Magia naturalis entsprach in ihrer Einheit, die sich bis ins Theologische erstreckte, einer
Einheit suchenden Grundveranlagung Goethes, und so sind in seine Naturanschauung
unauslöslich Elemente dieses merkwürdigen Kosmos eingegangen.28
23 See also Gaier’s comments on the first scene of Faust I and the historical relevance of
knowledge and anthropology here: Ulrich Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, 3
vols. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), vol. 2: p. 83.
24 V. 371–374.
25 Smith, ‘Was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält: Scientific Themes in Goethe’s Faust’,
p. 196.
26 See Schöne’s comments in FK, pp. 506–507; p. 768.
27 FA I, 14: pp. 376–378.
28 Dorothea Kuhn, Typus und Metamorphose: Goethe-Studie (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche
Schillergesellschaft, 1988), p. 108 (my emphasis).
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Studies have explored Goethe’s acquaintance with alchemy in great depth,
and Goethe’s knowledge of the subject appears in many of his works – not
least of all, Faust. The young Goethe aspired to study alchemy in Frankfurt in
1768 and 1769 influenced by his friendship with Susanne Katharina von
Klettenberg.29 Alchemy, in its own way, paints a picture of the cosmos in
which the human being and nature – the microcosm and the macrocosm – are
deeply interrelated and in which boundaries between disciplines of knowledge
are softened.
In the case of alchemy, Faust explicitly articulates his views in conversa-
tion with Wagner in the scene Osterspaziergang. In the context of discussing
his father, who helped the people during an outbreak of the plague, Faust
portrays alchemy as an illegitimate manner of pursuit of knowledge of the
natural world.
Mein Vater war ein dunkler Ehrenmann,
Der über die Natur und ihre heil’gen Kreise,
In Redlichkeit, jedoch auf seine Weise,
Mit grillenhafter Mühe sann.
Der, in Gesellschaft von Adepten,
Sich in die schwarze Küche schloß,
Und, nach unendlichen Rezepten
Das Widrige zusammengoß.30
In verse 1034, Faust expresses his disagreement with his father’s approach
through his ironic tone: ‘auf seine Weise’. Faust denigrates his father’s work as
unoriginal and describes his father’s dabbling in alchemical experiments as
nothing more than reproduction of recipes of the past, carried out ‘nach unendli-
chen Rezepten’. Furthermore, as Schöne explains, referring to Johann Heinrich
Campe’s Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, the word ‘grillenhaft’, found in
verse 1037, expresses ‘thoughts and impressions that lack any support but bring
about unrest’ and may be translated into English as ‘capricious’ as opposed to
‘systematic’.31
Astrology also comes under criticism in Faust. In Faust II, we learn the true
source of an astrologist’s insights. In the ironic scene Kaiserliche Pfalz Saal des
29 Ibid., p. 197.
30 V. 1034–1041 (my emphasis). Also see Schöne’s detailed explanation of the terms and
codes of alchemy in the verses 1038–1049 in FK, p. 239.
31 See the original comment of Schöne in his comments on Faust p. 236 and compare to:
Johann Heinrich Campe, Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, ed. Johann Heinrich Campe, 5
vols. (Braunschweig: Schulbuchhandlung, 1808), p. 455. ‘Seltsame herbeigesuchte Gedanken
und Vorstellungen ohne Grund, und die nur Unruhe verursachen.’
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Thrones, the astrologist, seemingly hypnotized by Mephisto, inanely echoes
whatever Mephisto whispers in his ear.32 A passage from Goethe’s Versuch einer
Witterungslehre comes to mind:
[W]ir wagten den Mond, die Mitplaneten und ihre Monde, zuletzt die gegeneinander unbe-
weglichen Gestirne als mitwirkend zu betrachten, und der Mensch, der alles notwendig auf
sich bezieht, unterläßt nicht, sich mit demWahne zu schmeicheln, daß wirklich das All, des-
sen Teil er freilich ausmacht, auch einen besondern merklichen Einfluß auf ihn ausübe33
In each of the instances mentioned thus far, we find critiques of certain kinds of
knowledge with respect to the human realm. In particular, as we see in the quote
above, Goethe criticizes astrology as a faulty manner of understanding the relation
between the human and cosmic realms – one in which the human being, acting
irrationally, follows his disposition to reconstruct everything in relation to himself,
as though the cosmos exerted a special influence on him.
In his comments on Faust, Schöne writes, ‘Die Möglichkeit einer umgreifen-
den “Weltformel” freilich hat Goethe lebenslang beschäftigt.’34 Faust shares his
author’s ambition and likewise views universal knowledge as encompassing
the realms of cosmology and anthropology. For Goethe and Faust alike, the re-
lation between self-knowledge (‘know thyself’) and knowledge of the world is
not confined to a specific field of knowledge – the unity of knowledge erases
the modern scientist’s arbitrary boundaries.
This broad and philosophical view of knowledge is as old as the ancient
Greek philosophers. But it also has a place in literary texts – not only philosophi-
cal treatises. As I demonstrated earlier, knowledge in Faust extends itself to the
life of the seeker and other human agents; crucially, moreover, as I argue later,
the manner of pursuit of knowledge informs how the seeker of knowledge con-
ceives the relation between body and soul. Assessing Goethe’s view of knowl-
edge, however, is only the first step toward exploring possible ways in which
Faust poetically discusses the pursuit of knowledge as an indispensable part of
human life and, specifically for the purposes of this study, informs our under-
standing of the relationship between the body and soul.
In comparing Faust with Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan from the fourteenth century, a ques-
tion arises: to what extent are the natural sciences, based on experiment in the
modern sense, present in Faust? As I demonstrated in this section, Goethe did
32 V. 4955–4970.
33 FA I, 25: pp. 275–276.
34 FK, p. 214.
24 I Direct Pursuit of Knowledge of the Transcendent Truth
not view knowledge as modern science does. And if any doubt about that point
remains, consider that Goethe disparaged the instruments of contemporary sci-
ence as ‘das größte Unheil der neuern Physik’.35
Turning now toward the Faust text itself, we find that ‘knowledge’ in the
modern experimental sense does not appear. Wagner’s invention of a machine
that would make sexual intercourse superfluous for reproduction is the closest
we come to a modern experimental view of knowledge. Yet the motivation for
this enterprise has to do with Wagner’s evaluation of natural reproduction, a
view that reflects his own idiosyncratic anthropological standpoint and that ap-
pears far removed from the modern consensus. Mayer correctly describes
Wagner as follows:
Ein gütiger, dankbarer, nicht sehr vitaler Mensch. In der Menge fühlt er kaum sich wohl,
die Natur betrachtet er ohne Geduld, der Zeugungsvorgang ist ihm tierisch, so daß sich
die Wissenschaft die Aufgabe stellen muß, Fortpflanzung zu humanisieren.36
Furthermore, the method that Wagner practices is not what the modern science
would consider ‘scientific experiment,’ despite its appearance as such – ‘äußere
Anschein trügt’.37 Mayer explains:
Wagner verhält sich durchaus nicht fragend und in wissenschaftlicher Neugier experi-
mentierend. Er besitzt Gewißheiten. Die verdankt er den überlieferten Rezepten. Auch
hier stellt er seine Quellen nicht kritisch in Frage. Da er alles gelesen hat, weiß er jetzt,
auf welche Mischungen es bei Menschenschöpfung ankommen muß.38
As I demonstrated above, the form of knowledge whose pursuit is dramatized
in Goethe’s Faust is a unified knowledge that is intrinsically connected to self-
knowledge and that hearkens back to ancient Greek philosophy. Defined in this
way, the pursuit of knowledge and self-knowledge in Goethe’s Faust invites
comparison to the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
35 See Goethe’s letter to Zelter of June 22, 1808, explained and cited in: Kuhn, Typus und
Metamorphose: Goethe-Studie, pp. 90–91.
36 Hans Mayer, ‘Der Famulus Wagner und die moderne Wissenschaft’, in
Gestaltungsgeschichte und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, ed. Helmut Kreuzer, Gestaltungsgeschichte
und Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Literatur-, Kunst- und Musikwissenschaftliche Studien (Stuttgart:
Metzler, 1969), p. 177.
37 Ibid., p. 192.
38 Ibid. See also in: Smith, ‘Was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält: Scientific Themes in
Goethe’s Faust’, p. 198.
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I.1.3 Knowledge in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
I.1.3.1 Terms that Represent Knowledge in the Divan
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, we find several terms that all translate, roughly, as
‘knowledge,’ but with important semantic differences. The Persian word dāniš
and the Arabic word ʿilm both translate to ‘knowledge’ in a general sense.
Since Arabic was the language of scholarly writing and teaching of the time,
Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry uses terms with Arabic roots to differentiate various aspects of
knowledge in a more specialized context. Ḥikmat (‘wisdom’) and ḥakīm (‘a
wise person’) are used frequently in the Divan.39 In addition, the word ʿārif
(‘gnostic’ – a seeker of knowledge learned in Sufism, but not necessarily a fol-
lower of any particular school) appears thirteen times in the Divan.40 Sufism
as a form of attaining knowledge of the divine and its relation to the world,
permeates the Divan and forms the cultural backdrop to the text’s representa-
tion of the pursuit of knowledge – the word ‘Sufi’ appears thirty-five times in
the Divan.41 For further elucidation concerning the multiplicity of terms
related to ‘knowledge’ that were used in Ḥāfiẓ’s time, we turn to an encyclope-
dia written in Shiraz by one of Ḥāfiẓ’s contemporaries, the renowned poly-
math Šams ud-Dīn Āmulī.
I.1.3.2 Ḥikmat and Sufism in Šams ud-Dīn Āmulī’s Encyclopedia
Šams ud-Dīn Āmulī (d. in Shiraz 753 H/1352 CE) was the writer of the encyclope-
dia Nafāʾis ul-funūn fī ʿarāʾis al-ʿuyūn. After years of teaching in the Sulṭānīya
Madrasa, he immigrated to Shiraz due to increasing instabilities in Il-ḫānīs’
rule over Āẕarbāyǧān. He lived, taught, and finished Nafāʾis ul-funūn in Shiraz
during the short period of the relatively peaceful reign of Šāh Šayḫ Abū Isḥāq
(ruled ca. 1342–1353) of the Īynǧū dynasty (ca. 1325–1353),42 who was in fact the
royal patron of Ḥāfiẓ.43 In Āmulī’s definition, ḥikmat consists of:
39 The word ḥikmat (‘wisdom’) appears seven times; ḥakīm (‘a wise person’) eight times; and
ḥakīmāna (‘wise’ adj. and ‘wisely’) once in the Divan: Mahīndoḫt Ṣeddīqīyān and A. Mīrʿābedīnī,
Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1366/1987), p. 378. See: Ahūr’s comments re-
garding different aspects of the term ḥikmat and a list of couplets in which this term appears:
Parvīz Ahūr, Kelk-e ḫīyālangīz, 4 vols. (Tehran: Asāṭīr, 1382/2004), pp. 805–808.
40 Ṣeddīqīyān and Mīrʿābedīnī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ, p. 801.
41 Ibid., p. 777.
42 John Limbert, ‘Inju Dynasty’ In Encyclopædia Iranica, Ehsan Yarshater, XIII, pp. 143–147,
(New York: Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation, 2006), p. 143.
43 Šams ud-Dīn Āmulī, Nafāʾis ul-funūn fī ʿarāʾis ul-ʿuyūn comment and research Abū ‘l-Ḥasan
Šaʿrānī, 3 vols. (Tehran: Eslāmīye, 1381/2002), p. 14. vol. 1. Introduction by Abū ‘l-Ḥasan Šaʿrānī
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1. Practical ḥikmat (ḥikmat-i ʿamalī), which in turn consists of ethics, politics and house-
hold management (οἰκονομία).
2. Theoretical ḥikmat (ḥikmat-i naẓarī):
a. Logic: Īsāġūǧī (Isagoge of Porphyry), Qāṭīġūrīyās (Aristotle’s Categories), Bārīrimīnās
(Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias), Sūlūǧīmūs (Syllogism), Anūlūṭīqā (Analytica) on art of
argumentation, Ṭūbīqā (Aristotle’s Topics) on disputation, Sūfasṭīqā (Aristotle’s
Sophistical Refutations) on fallacies, Rīṭūrīqā on rhetoric, Abūṭīqā [Aristotle’s Poetics]
on poetics.
b. First Philosophy (falsafa-yi ūlā): Metaphysics
c. Theology: including knowledge of the Necessary Existent; knowledge of praise of its
magnificence; knowledge of the manner of emanation of its influences and care; and
knowledge of intellects and their influence in the realm of soul and matter. This, ac-
cording to Āmulī, can be pursued in nature and the divine realm based on the seeker’s
perspective.
d. Knowledge of natural objects: the realm of generation, decay and minerals.
3. Mathematics: including geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music – in this exact
order.
4. Secondary nature: a. medicine, diagnosis and pharmacy; b. alchemy, the occult knowl-
edge and knowledge of talisman.44
As we see, ḥikmat covers a wide range of knowledge, and one who masters it all
rightly deserves to be called a polymath (ḥakīm). It is clear that the definitions of
knowledge above were influenced by ancient Greek philosophy and science. In
other words, ḥikmat covers the full spectrum of knowledge encompassed by phi-
losophy in the ancient Greek sense of the term. More importantly, for our present
purposes, ḥikmat denotes the unity of the branches of knowledge listed above by
Āmulī.
Āmulī’s writings also provide valuable information regarding the level of
education expected of a man of letters. Such a person was expected to be profi-
cient in rhetoric, astronomy, music, chess and backgammon, and would have
been able to converse knowledgeably about each of these subjects.45 The
learned person should practice poetry, but not too much. It was a temptation to
be resisted, given the adoration that elites and masses alike accorded to poets.
Āmulī warns, lest he be remembered merely as a poet, and not as a ḥakīm.
Āmulī offers Nāṣir Ḫusrau, Anvarī and Sarāǧ ud-Dīn Qumrī as cautionary exam-
ples: ‘each one [of these men] was one of a kind in sciences, accomplishments,
and author of unique books, but as they have devoted much time to poetry,
they were categorized as poets and not men of other sciences.’46
44 Ibid., vol. 1: pp. 19–20 (my summary and translation).
45 Ibid., vol. 2: p. 139.
46 Ibid., pp. 138–139 (my translation).
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Āmulī’s definition of the path of the wayfarer in Sufism, too, bears a close
resemblance to Platonic views concerning the abstraction of the bodily and natu-
ral realms from the sublime, extramundane truth that is identical with the divine.
The path of a Sufi, according to Āmulī, is one of self-mortification and self-
purification pursued with the aim of ascending to the transcendent truth (ḥaqq
taʿālā). To this end, fasting, sleep deprivation and meditation in solitude and
darkness are prescribed as a way to weaken the outward senses and open the
inward ones.47 At the core of Sufism, Āmulī explains, lies knowledge of the truth
(ʿilm-i ḥaqīqat),48 defined as re-cognizing the simple known (maʿlūm-i muǧmal)
in the multiplicity (ṣuvar-i tafāṣīl).49 To explain the meaning of the lower-soul
(nafs), the soul, and the hierarchy that links them – all part of knowledge of the
truth –, Āmulī constantly appeals to Neoplatonic views of emanation.50
The influence of Platonic and Alexandrian philosophy, particularly as they
explain the relation between the transcendent divine truth and the natural,
human realms, is constantly present in Sufi works from the twelfth century.
Later in this chapter, I briefly discuss how Greek philosophy was introduced to
the Islamic world and I point out how Platonic views on love found their way
into hagiographic Sufi books.51
Ḥāfiẓ’s intellectual and poetic dialogue with Sufi views will be an important
part of our work in the following chapters. In the next sub-section, I give a brief
account of the presence of various branches of ḥikmat in the Divan in order to
cast light on the poet’s vast erudition.
I.1.3.3 Branches of ḥikmat in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ mentions several branches of ḥikmat that Āmulī defines in
Nafāʾis ul-funūn. In one poem of the Divan, the poet flaunts his knowledge of
logical terminology52: ‘O wine-boy, how long the delay in circulating the cup? |
When the round falls to lovers it must be uninterrupted.’53 In Arabic-Persian
47 Ibid., vol. 2: p. 5.
48 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 18.
49 Ibid., vol. 2: p. 43.
50 Ibid., vol. 2: pp. 45–51.
51 See pp. 36–38 below.
52 ʿAbd ul-Ḥusaīn Zarrīnkūb, Az kūče–ye rendān (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1382/2003), p. 62.
53 The Collected Lyrics of Háfiz of Shíráz, trans. Peter Avery (London: Archetype, 2007),
[Henceforth cited as Avery, ġazal, couplet, page number], CCLXXI, 7, p. 340 (my emphasis).
Since Avery follows Ḫānlarī’s edition of the Divan, the number of the ġazal and the couplet are
identical between the two: Ḫvāǧa Šams ud-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ, Dīvān-e Ḥāfiẓ ġazalīyāt,
qaṣāʾed, masṉavīyāt, qaṭaʿāt va robāʿīyāt, ed. Parvīz Nātel Ḫānlarī, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Tehran:
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logic terminology, the logical concept of a ‘vicious circle’ translates literally as
‘uninterrupted circulation’ (‘daur-i tasalsul’). In the poem above, Ḥāfiẓ decon-
textualizes this term as though he were addressing fellow scholars. He invites
them to experience the term in the context of bacchanalian lyrical poetry.54
The poems of the Divan also reflect that the poet was an expert minstrel
with vast knowledge of Iranian modal music (mūsīqī-yi dastgāhī).55 One of the
branches of ḥikmat, music appears in the Divan through the poet’s naming of
different gūša (melodic types) and dastgāhs (organized yet modifiable musical
compositions made of coherent gūšas).56 Knowledge of Persian music is indeed
a prerequisite for appreciating the many verses in the Divan in which the emo-
tional mode of the musical motif or composition is referred to. And another
level of meaning becomes accessible if one reads the names of these musical
units literally. Bearing in mind the poet’s expertise as a minstrel, consider the
following verses from the Divan: ‘Love’s murmur, into Ḥejāz and ʿErāḳ, casteth |
The melody of the strain of gẖazals of Ḥāfiz̤ of Shīrāz.’57 Here, Ḥiǧāz and ʿIrāq
are musical terms denoting the melodic peak (auǧ) of a given musical composi-
tion, but if we take the terms literally, they also convey the metaphorical
‘peaks’ that the poet’s fame reached during his lifetime.58
Pythagoras’s conviction that the movement of the heavenly bodies creates
a cosmic music is also reflected in Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry. In the following cases of
Ḫvārazmī, 1362/1984). [Henceforth referred to as Ḫānlarī, number of the ġazal, couplet]. The
citations and references to the Divan will be to Ḫānlarī’s edition, unless mentioned otherwise.
See also the Persian couplet in: ———, Dīvān-e Ḫvāǧa Šams ud-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ, ed.
Qāsim Ġanī; Muḥammad Qazvīnī (Tehran: Zawwār, 1320/1941). [Henceforth referred to as
Qazvīnī & Ġanī, number of the ġazal, couplet], 276, 7.
54 Compare to: Muḥammad Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan (Tehran: Bongāh-e Bāzargānī-ye Parvīn,
1319/1940), p. 88.
55 See also: ibid., pp. 93–94.
56 See: Jean During, ‘Dastgāh’ In Encyclopædia Iranica, Ehsan Yarshater, VII, pp. 104–105,
(Costa Mesa, California: Mazda, 1996).
57 Khwāja Šamsu-d-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiz̤, The Dīvān: Written in the Fourteenth Century by
Khwāja Shamsu-d-Dīn Muḥammad-i Ḥāfiz̤-i Shīrāzī otherwise known as Lisānu-l-Ghaib and
Tarjumānu-l-Asrār. Translated for the first time out of the Persian into English prose, with critical
and explanatory remarks, with an introductory preface, with a note on Ṣūfī,ism, and with a life of
the author by H. Wilberforce Clarke., trans. H. Wilberforce Clarke (London: Octagon Press,
1974), 299, 7, p. 521. [Henceforth referred to as Clarke, ġazal, couplet, page number.] Fikand,
zimzima-yi ʿišq dar Ḥiǧāz u ʿIrāq | Navā-yi bāng-i ġazalhā-yi Ḥāfiẓ az Šīrāz. In: Qazvīnī & Ġanī,
259, 7.
58 Note that Ḥiǧāz also refers to an area including Mecca and Medina, which are far from
Shiraz and ʿIrāq (Here ʿIrāq-i ʿAǧam or Persian Iraq is meant – an area that included Isfahan,
Ray, Hamadān.)
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hyperbole, the Pythagorean view is turned upside down. Marveling at the
poet’s mastery of the form of ġazal and art of minstrelsy, the heavenly bodies
themselves begin to dance:
The song is sung and the pearl is strung;
Come hither, oh Hafiz, and sing again!
And the listening Heaven above thee hung
Shall loose o’er thy verse Pleiades’ chain.59
In another instance, we read the following: ‘On the sky, –what if, of Ḥāfiz̤’s utter-
ances | Zuhra’s [Venus] singing should bring to dancing the Masīḥā (Christ).’60
Joachim Wohlleben offers a helpful commentary on the above verse: ‘Nach
muslimischer Lehre ist Jesus nicht gestorben, sondern als besonders reiner
Mensch in den Himmel erhoben worden, und zwar in die vierte Himmelssphäre,
in der auch Sohre weilt.’61 Wohlleben’s comment is correct in so far as it describes
the ascent of Christ; however, Venus is not in the fourth heavenly sphere, but
rather in the third. The fourth sphere houses the sun, associated with Christ. Later
in this study I address the relation between the sun and Christ in greater detail62;
for the time being, it suffices to note the poet’s knowledge of the Ptolemaic astro-
nomical arrangement of the heavenly spheres and the intimate connection, made
apparent in music, between the realm of anthropology and the heavenly spheres.
The Divan also displays the poet’s knowledge of astrology and astronomy.
In several poems, we find verses in which different constellations, conjunctions
and planets act as metaphors corresponding to their respective astrological sig-
nificance. When describing the beauty of his beloved’s eyebrow, the poet can-
not help but recall the bow of Jupiter; and he describes her gaze as dominating
59 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, trans. Gertrude Lowthian Bell (Bethesda, Maryland:
Iranbooks, 1995), 5, p. 71. See also this couplet’s translation in: Clarke, 8, 7, p. 43; Hafiz, Die
Ghaselen des Hafiz: Neu in deutsche Prosa übersetzt mit Einleitung und Lesehilfen, trans. Joachim
Wohlleben (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004). [Henceforth the citations from
Wohlleben’s translation are referred to as Wohlleben, ġazal, couplet, page.], 3, 9, p. 51. Consider
that Wohlleben follows Ḫānlarī’s edition of the Divan and therefore the number of ġazals and cou-
plets are identical with that edition. The Persian couplet in my transcription: ġazal guftī u dur suftī
bīyā u ḫuš biḫvān Ḥāfiẓ | Ki bar naẓm-i tu afšānad falak ʿiqd-i s̱uraīyā rā.
60 Clarke, 9, 9, p. 45. Dar āsimān na-ʿaǧab gar ba gufta-yi Ḥāfiẓ | Surūd-i Zuhra ba raqṣ
āvarad Masīḥā rā. Transcription according to Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 4, 8.
61 See Wohlleben’s footnote on p. 52.
62 See this work p. 78.
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the lion of the sun (the astrological term for the sun when it enters the constel-
lation of Leo and reaches the peak of its power).63
Describing auspicious events, Ḥāfiẓ uses astrological conjunctions that sig-
nify luck and happiness (such as the moon and Jupiter) as a literary instrument.
The comparison underscores the rarity of the event and thus conveys how pre-
cious the moment is for the poet: ‘I asked: “When will the master be going to
the bridal chamber?” | He answered: “The time when Jupiter and the moon are
in conjunction.”’64
Despite his use of astrological terms as a poetic device, the poet was critical
of astrology outside of the poetic sphere. Viewing astrology as superstition, he
strongly disputed that the planets and their movements influence human life,
and its fortunes and misfortunes: ‘Catch hold of the curl of the moon-cheeked
one and do not repeat the fable. | That good luck and ill are from the effect of
Venus and Saturn’.65 Ġanī demonstrates that superstitions were strongly pres-
ent not only among the masses, but also among the elites; political astronomy
played a major role in the lives of educated kings, such as Šāh Šayḫ.66 After his
great defeat at the hands of Amīr Mubāriz ud-Dīn, he openly admitted that his
dependence on astrology compromised his decisions on important matters and
blinded him to the facts.67
Medicine is another branch of ḥikmat that appears in the Divan.68 In one
poem, the poet displays his erudition by mentioning the names of Ibn Sīnā’s
two major books: Qānūn (The Canon of Medicine) and Šifāʾ (The Book of Healing
on philosophy, logic, and natural sciences). Yet the poet plays on words, invit-
ing us to read the titles literally (qānūn: canon, law; and šifāʾ: cure, healing):
63 Zarrīnkūb, Az kūče–ye rendān, p. 62. See the following verses: Avery, CCCXCI, 5, p. 476;
CCIX, 9, p. 273 see also Hammer-Purgstall’s comment on the later couplet in: Mohammed
Schamsed-din Hafis, Der Diwan, trans. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (Hildesheim New York:
Georg Olms Verlag, 1973). [Henceforth the citations from Purgstall’s translation are from this
source] vol. 1: XCVI, pp. 345–346.
64 Avery, CXCIII, 8, p. 253. The Persian couplet is the following: Guftam ki ḫvāǧa kiy ba sar-i
ḥiǧla mīravad | Guft ān zamān ki muštarī u mah qarān kunand
65 Avery, XLVI, 6, p. 79. The Persian couplet is the following: Bigīr ṭurra-yi mah čihra-ī u qiṣṣa
maḫān | Ki saʿd u naḥs zi taʾsī̱r-i Zuhra u Zuḥal ast
66 The ruler of Shiraz of Īynǧū dynasty 1342–1354 and Ḥāfiẓ’s patron.
67 Ġanī, Baḥs ̱ dar āsā̱r va afkār va aḥvāl-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 182–183.
68 As an example of medicine in Divan see in the following article Mahdī Moḥaqqeq’s elabo-
ration on the first couplet of the ġazal 422, in Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, ‘Gozāreš-e yekī az taʿbīrāt-e
pezeškī dar šeʿr-e Ḥāfiẓ’, in Soḫan-e ahl-e del: Maǧmūʿe-ye maqālāt (Tehran: UNESCO-Iran,
1371/1992), pp. 709–712.
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‘Yesterday out of concern when he saw me, the physician said, | “Alas, your
sickness is beyond the canon of healing.”’69
In another instance, the poet refers to a standard medical procedure of the
time – daily examination of the color of an unhealthy person’s urine. He juxta-
poses the function of the ‘urine glass’ used for this purpose to that of the wine
glass in joyous times of drinking. ‘He who has conferred the never-ending glass
on me for the sake of keeping me alive, | Why does he keep taking my specimen
glass to the doctor?’70 In the Divan, terms of medicine are employed to convey
poetic thoughts and emotions. Furthermore, they contribute phonetically to the
musical flow of the work. The transliteration of the seventh couplet of the ġazal
375 illustrates the phonetic function of the word ‘glass’ (šīša): ‘Ānki mudām
šīša-am az pay-i ʿaīš dāda ast | Šīša-am az či mībarad pīš-i ṭabīb harzamān’. The
letter šīn, ringing three times in each line, evokes the sound of glasses of wine
in bygone times of joy.
The terms of ḥikmat (discussed above) and Sufism (to which I turn in the
following chapters) form a necessary backdrop for appreciating Ḥāfiẓian verses.
For example, in the verses where the poet refers to two important and world-
renowned works of Ibn Sīnā, only the reader who is familiar with these works is
able to access a layer of meaning of the poem in which it critiques a system of
thought. That said, these terms are used in such a way that, even when the
reader is unaware of their significance, the text still stands, and influences the
reader with other poetic elements such as rhythm and onomatopoeic effect.
I.1.3.4 Neoplatonism in the Cultural Horizon of Ḥāfiẓ
As we have seen, ḥikmat and the different branches of knowledge in the cul-
tural space of the Divan were deeply influenced by Greek philosophy. In this
section, I briefly discuss the presence of the Greek philosophy and Neoplatonic
views in this cultural space.
When Justinian closed the Academy in Athens in 529 CE, the Neoplatonists
sought refuge in Ctesiphon,71 the capital city of the Sassanid Empire. There,
under the rule of Ḫusrau I (Ḫusrau Anūšīravān), the environment was ripe for
69 Avery, LXXXII, 8, p. 122. See also: Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan, p. 90. The Persian couplet is
the following: Dī guft ṭabīb az-sar-i ḥasrat ču ma-rā dīd | Hiyhāt ki ranǧ-i tu zi qānūn-i šifāʾ raft.
70 Avery, CCCLXXV, 7, p. 458. See also this couplet in Wohlleben’s translation: ‘Derjenige,
der mir ständig eine Flasche zur Erfrischung gebracht hat, | wieso trägt er (jetzt) immer wieder
meine Flasche zum Arzt?’ In: Wohlleben, 375, 7, p. 482.
71 Located 32 kilometers southeast of the modern city of Baghdad
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dialogue between the Zoroastrian theologians and their Neoplatonist guests.72
The use of Persian Zoroastrian terms in Greek philosophy, however, predates
Plotinus’s time; as early as the second century, Platonists such as Plutarch (ca.
45-120 CE) and his contemporary Atticus would make reference to the disor-
derly motion in the ‘Indefinite Dyad’ as ‘Ahrīman’ and described the Good as
‘Ahūrā Mazdā.’ Their use of these terms speaks to a longstanding tradition of
intellectual exchange between Persia and Greece.73
Soon after the advent of Islam and capture of Mecca in 630 CE at the hands
of Muslim armies, the era of Arab conquest began.74 In the years 632–650 CE,
Muslims expanded their originally small territory to an empire. Yet their rulers
lacked the knowledge and experience necessary for this sudden change. The
challenges of ruling peoples of so many cultures and world-views became appar-
ent with the uprisings during the time of the second Caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb;
these problems ‘were too complicated to be solved within the political and social
framework of the existing system.’75 Uprisings and conflicts continued as the
Umayyad dynasty expanded the empire further. The system collapsed when a
revolution engineered in Kūfa, a city near the former capital of Ctesiphon, ex-
panded to Marw and Ḫurāsān in the Northeast of today’s Iran and, in 750 CE,
finally put an end to the Umayyads’ rule. This was the revolution that brought
the ʿAbbāsids to power.
The ʿAbbāsids inherited a vast empire and all of the problems that came
with it. They were aware of their need to educate themselves about how to gov-
ern such a vast empire. To attain the expertise they sought, the ʿAbbāsids gave
key positions and considerable power to Iranians. The most renowned Iranian
families in the royal court were the Naubaḫtīs and the Barmakīs (Barmakids).
In response to social and political pressures caused by the empire’s territo-
rial expansions, al-Manṣūr’s rule (752-774 CE) saw a remarkable increase in pa-
tronage for translation and scholarship.76 Books of astronomy, medicine and
other sciences were eagerly collected from all around the empire to be translated
72 Alexander Pletsch, ‘Der Schein des Guten und das wahrhaft Gute bei Boethius’, in
Platonism im Orient und Okzident: Neuplatonische Denkstrukturen Im Judentum, Christentum
und Islam, ed. Raif Georges Khoury (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2005), p. 61.
73 John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London:
Duckworth, 1977), pp. 208 & 254.
74 John Bagot Glubb, The Great Arab Conquests (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), p. 102.
75 M. A. Shaban, The ʿAbbasid Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 14.
76 For an introduction to the pre-ʿAbbāsid translations from Greek see: Dimitri Gutas, Greek
Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad in Early
ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries) (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 20–25.
I.1 Definitions and Contextualizations 33
into Arabic.77 As a way to provide a methodological basis for theological
debates, al-Mahdī, al-Manṣūr’s successor, commissioned the translation of
Aristoteles’s Topics from the Syriac translation of the work.78 In addition, Hārūn
ar-Rašīd (r. 786-809), continuing his grandfather’s legacy, added to the collec-
tion of works of Greek philosophy, and supported the translation of these sour-
ces. Al-Masʿūdī, a renowned historian of the tenth century, recounts the events
in the time of Hārūn ar-Rašīd in his book The Meadows of Gold. He dedicates a
special part to the intellectual activities of Yahyā ibn al-Ḫālid al-Barmakī,79 the
vizier of Hārūn ar-Rašīd. Here he describes how leaders of different schools of
thought would gather in the vizier’s own house80:
Yahya [Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḫālid al-Barmakī], the son of Khalid ibn Barmak, an enlightened
man, learned and fond of discussion and philosophical inquiry, gathered at his house for
symposiums a number of famous controversialists chosen from among Muslim theolo-
gians, free-thinkers and divines of various sects.81
In one of these gatherings, the vizier suggested ‘love’ as the topic of the day’s
discussion. Masʿūdī recounts the various views on the subject – the origin of
love and its effect on lovers – advanced by the eminent guests in attendance.82
Remarkably, despite that these guests represented opposing schools of thought,
they shared the view that likeness is the source of love. At the end of his
77 See also: ibid. In the first part, Gutas addresses the social and political backgrounds of the
translation movement.
78 Compare to: ibid., p. 69.
79 In the Sassanid era, the ancestors of Barmakīs were both leaders and organizers of the tem-
ple of Nau Bahār in Balḫ. Goethe points to the influence of the Barmakīs in rule of ʿAbbāsids
and mentions their high status in the Sassanid era in his Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem
Verständnis of the West-östlicher Divan. Goethe’s source, as Mommsen informs us, was Joseph
von Hammer-Purgstall’s Geschichte der schönen Redekünste Persiens mit einen Blüthenlese aus
zweyhundert persischen Dichtern published in Wien, 1818. See: FA I, 3/1: p. 152; p. 161.;
Katharina Mommsen, ‘Die Barmekiden im West-östlichen Divan’, Goethe: Jahrbuch der Goethe-
Gesellschaft, no. 14/15 (1952/53), p. 281. See also: I Abbas, ‘Barmakids’ In Encyclopædia
Iranica, Ehsan Yarshater, III, pp. 806–809, (New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2000).
80 Ǧ. Sattārī, ʿEšq-e ṣūfyāne (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 1392/2013), pp. 271–272.
81 Masʿudi, The Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids, ed. Paul Lunde, trans. Paul Lunde (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 109. See also the original text in: ʿAlī ibn al-Hụsaīn al-Masʿūdī, Murūǧ ad-̱
ḏahab wa maʿādin al-ǧawāhir, 7 vols. (Beirut: Manšūrāt al-Ǧāmiʿa ‘l-Lubnānīya, 1973), vol. 4:
p. 236.
82 The diversity of views in this gathering was so important that the gathering had an expert
(muġ) Magian to speak for their views as the thirteenth speaker. See: Masʿudi, The Meadows of
Gold: The Abbasids, p. 111.
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account of the gathering, Masʿūdī gives voice to the philosophical views of
Galen and Plato83:
According to Galen, sympathy is born between two intelligent beings because of the very
similarity of their intelligences, but it cannot exist between two stupid people with limited
minds, because of the stupidity which they share. ‘Indeed,’ he said, ‘intelligence follows
a regular path and it is possible for two beings following the same path to meet, while
stupidity moves in a completely unpredictable way, which renders all encounters
impossible.’84
Masʿūdī also quotes Plato85: ‘I do not know what love is. I only know that it is a
divine madness, a passion which is neither to be praised, nor is worthy of
blame.’86 Masʿūdī’s account of the gathering underscores the role of Greek phi-
losophy in the intellectual milieu of the time; no serious discussion of theoreti-
cal and philosophical issues could ignore the views of Greek philosophers. In
his book ʿEšq-e ṣūfyāne (Sufic Love), Ǧalāl Sattārī demonstrates incontrovertibly
the influence of Plato’s views among the Sufis. He provides evidence that
Plato’s Phaedrus, alluded to by Masʿūdī in the quote above, reappears in the
writings of Šayḫ Aḥmad-i Ǧām-i Nāmiqī (1046–1141 CE). In his hagiographic
work Taḏkarat ul-aulīyāʾ, ʿAṭṭār (1145/46–1221 CE) attributes Plato’s words to
Imam Ǧaʿfar Ṣādiq, the sixth Imām of the Shia Muslims87: ‘and he [Ǧaʿfar
Ṣādiq] said, love is divine madness, not the object of praise or blame’.88
The importance accorded to translations during this time was based on the
view that knowledge is one and divine, regardless of the language in which it is
produced: languages and cultures must be bridged in order to attain knowl-
edge.89 In his tenth-century work al-Fihrist,90 Ibn an-Nadīm elaborates on the
process of acquisition and assimilation of this wide spectrum of human knowl-
edge. He begins the seventh chapter of al-Fihrist, dedicated exclusively to philos-
ophy and philosophers, by recounting a myth that illustrates the universality
and divine nature of knowledge. According to the myth, people were once
83 al-Masʿūdī,Murūǧ ad-̱ḏahab wa maʿādin al-ǧawāhir, vol. 4: p. 243.
84 Masʿudi, The Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids, p. 113.
85 al-Masʿūdī,Murūǧ aḏ-ḏahab wa maʿādin al-ǧawāhir, vol. 4: p. 245.
86 Masʿudi, The Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids, p. 114.
87 Sattārī, ʿEšq-e ṣūfyāne, p. 274.
88 Farīd ud-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, (Tehran: Ketābḫāne-ye Markazī, 1336/1957), p. 24 (my translation).
89 Hayrettin Yücesoy, ‘Translation as Self-Consciousness: Ancient Sciences, Antediluvian
Wisdom, and the ‘Abbāsid Translation Movement’, Journal of World History, 20, no. 4 (2009),
p. 524.
90 This source contains a bibliography of books and authors know to Ibn an-Nadīm in the
tenth century CE.
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governed by a council of seven wise men. When a prophet appeared among
them, however, they refused to follow the wisdom of the seven wise ones. The
seven wise ones went their separate ways, teaching wisdom to people in different
lands across the world:
Among them [the seven] there was a wise man named Hermes. He was the most thoroughly
intelligent, the most strikingly wise, and the most refined in discernment among them. He
went to the land of Egypt, where he ruled over the inhabitants, making the land prosperous,
improving the conditions of the people, and manifesting his wisdom among them.91
Later in the book, the writer of al-Fihrist suggests that the Caliph al-Maʾmūn’s
interest in Greek philosophy was not merely an interest in something foreign;
rather, Aristotle, portrayed as the successor of Hermes, comes to al-Maʾmūn in a
dream and awakens his interest. Ibn an-Nadīm describes one reason why books
of philosophy and ancient sciences were available in large numbers in Baghdad:
al-Maʾmūn saw in a dream the likeness of a man white in color, with a ruddy complexion
broad forehead, joined eyebrows, bald head, bloodshot eyes, and good qualities sitting
on his bed. Al-Maʾmūn related, ‘It was as though I was in front of him, filled with fear of
him. Then I said “Who are you?” He replied, “I am Aristotle.” Then I was delighted with
him and said, “Oh sage, may I ask you a question?” He said “Ask it.” Then I asked, “What
is good?” He replied, “What is good in the mind.” I said again, “Then what is next?” He
answered “What is good in the law.” I said, “Then what next?” He replied “What is good
with public.” I said, “Then what more?” He then answered, “More? There is no more.”’92
Against this backdrop, Ibn an-Nadīm recounts al-Maʾmūn’s correspondence
with the Byzantine emperor:
[al-Maʾmūn] sent forth a group of men, among whom were al-Ḥajjāj ibn Maṭar; ibn al-Baṭrīq;
Salmān, the director of the Bayt al-Ḥikmah; and others besides them. They brought the
books from what they had found. Upon bringing them to him, he ordered them to translate
[the manuscripts], so that they made the translation.93
Al-Fihrist provides a list of books by Plato, Euclid, Ptolemy, Hippocrates,
Porphyry and Aristotle available in Bagdad at the time, as well as names of
91 The Fihrist of al-Nadīm: a Tenth-century Survey of Muslim Culture, trans. Bayard Dodge, 2
vols., Records of civilization (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), vol. 2: Chapter VII,
pp. 573–574.
92 Ibid., p. 583.
93 Ibid., p. 584.
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over fifty translators.94 Furthermore, Ibn an-Nadīm provides a detailed list of
dialogues of Plato available in translation and the names of their translators
and commentators.95
The Abbasid Caliph sought a rational mode of argumentation that would
help Islamic theologians answer questions posed by a wide spectrum of theolo-
gies and philosophies.96 Islamic philosophy flourished in this abundance of
textual sources. At the heart of the philosophic enterprise, Plato, Aristotle and
Plotinus were given special attention.
Fārābī (870–950 CE) was one of the earliest influential Islamic Neoplatonists –
his epithet was The Second Teacher.97 He followed Plotinus’s emanative system.
His choices of terminology illustrate the central place of metaphysics in his
thought. He describes the One as ‘the First Existent,’ an attribute that Plotinus also
identified as the central characteristic of the One.
A group called Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā (The Brethren of Purity) developed an
‘ethico-spiritual’ community for the élites that engaged deeply in philosophy,
science and epistemological theory. Yet its ultimate purpose was not merely to
acquire knowledge, but rather to build ‘a refuge from the struggle that was rag-
ing among religious congregations’ for those who believed in unity and brother-
hood in the name of knowledge and philosophy.98 It is indisputable that the
brotherhood’s philosophy and cosmogony were systematically influenced by
Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and the Stoics.99
Ibn Sīnā (980–1037 CE) carried Fārābī’s philosophy further by attributing
to the One the predicate of ‘Necessary Existent.’100 Ibn Sīnā was the first philos-
opher in the Islamic tradition to reconcile philosophy with Sufism. In his trea-
tises Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān and Salāmān and Absāl, elements and terms from his
and Fārābī’s cosmological metaphysics appear in the Sufi context.
94 Ibid., pp. 586–590.
95 Ibid., pp. 592–593. For a detailed bibliography of translations of Greek works see: Gutas,
Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad in Early
ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries), pp.193–196.
96 Compare to: R. B. Haris, ‘Preface’, in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parviz
Morewedge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. viii.
97 The First Teacher, of course, was Aristotle.
98 Omar A. Farrukh, ‘Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 289.
99 See in ibid., pp. 294–298.
100 Parviz Morewedge, ‘The Neoplatonic Structure of Some Islamic Mystical Doctrines’, in
Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parviz Morewedge, Studies in Neoplatonism, Ancient
and Modern (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1992), p. 55.
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Šahāb ud-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhravardī (548–569\1154–1191 CE) also followed
Neoplatonic cosmogony and its hierarchy of existence. Furthermore, he offered
a specific reading of the history of philosophy in which wisdom is seen as the
path to truth, rather than mere ‘rational systematization’.101 In his view, similar
to that articulated in al-Fihrist by Ibn an-Nadīm,102 philosophy begins with
Hermes and Agathodaimon and then goes in two directions: a Greek path tread
by Asclepius, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Neoplatonists and Ẕū un-Nūn
Miṣrī; and an Iranian path that starts with Gayūmars,̱ the first human being in
the Zoroastrian mythology, and continues through Firiydūn, the king of the
Pīšdādī era,103 Kay Ḫusrau, and great Sufi masters such as Ḥallāǧ, Bāyazīd of
Bastām and Abū ‘l-Ḥasan Ḫarqānī.104 Suhravardī articulated a philosophy that
combined Neoplatonism, Mazdaism and Sufism to form the school of the
‘Ḥikmat ul-išrāq’ – Philosophy of Illumination.
The fundamental concepts of Plotinus’s philosophy – emanation, the indi-
vidual soul’s pursuit of reunion with the One, Plato’s unity of the Good, the Just
and the Beautiful – influenced all of these philosophers, Sufi and non-Sufi alike.
I.1.3.5 Historical Controversies Concerning ḥikmat and Ḥāfiẓ’s Position
in the Divan
To grasp the significance of Ḥāfiẓ’s position regarding ḥikmat and ḥakīm in the
Divan, we must consider the historical backdrop against which his work was
produced. Firdausī (940–1019/1025 CE), the author of Šāhnāma,105 describes
Aristotle as a ḥakīm when Aristotle mourns over the coffin of Alexander, his for-
mer student.106 Aristotle voices Firdausī’s own ethical views – namely, the view
101 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ‘Shahāb al-Din Suhrawardi Maqtūl’, in A History of Muslim
Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 376.
102 See p. 36 above.
103 Behramgore Tehmuras Anklesaria, ‘Zand-ākāsih: Iranian or greater Bundahišn / translitera-
tion and translation in Engl. by Behramgore Tehmuras Anklesaria,’ (Bombay 1956), Chapter: I, a,
12. & 13. pp. 25–26. The scholarship categorizes the Pīšdādī kings as mythological and the Kings
of the Kayānī era as historical. It should also be mentioned that Zoroastrian believers consider the
Pīšdādī kings to be also historical. In Zoroastrian texts, extraordinary attributes have been as-
signed to Kayānī Kings such as Kay Ḫusrau.
104 Nasr, ‘Shahāb al-Din Suhrawardi Maqtūl’, pp. 376–377.
105 Also known as The Book of Kings, this book of Persian history told in verse traverses
three eras – mythological, prehistoric and pre-Islamic history of Persia up to the invasion of
Persia by the second Caliph ʿUmar ibn Ḫaṭṭāb.
106 Abu’l-Qasem Ferdowsi, The Shahnameh (The Book of Kings), ed. Djalal Khaleghi-Motlagh
and Mahmoud Omidsalar, 11 vols., Persian Text Series (New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1384/
2005), p. 125.
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that pursuing dominance and power is unwise, given the transience of the
world. In the eleventh century, following the historical confrontation between
orthodox Islam and the rationalism of the Muʿtazilids, the religious orthodoxy
tried to purge Islamic thinking from non-Islamic influences; Greek philosophy
was disparaged as a foreign element.107 The Ẓāhirids, the school of theology
that opposed the Muʿtazilids, held that the Qurʾān and the ḥadīṯ (sayings of
the prophet) are the only sources of knowledge. They viewed the Qurʾān and
the ḥadīṯ as native to Islam; ḥikmat and philosophy, on the other hand, were
seen as foreign elements and thus non-Islamic. These views were reflected in
the literary representation of ḥikmat and philosophy in the centuries that fol-
lowed. In one of his qaṣāʾid (odes),108 for instance, the first great Sufi-poet,
Sanāʾī (d. 1131 CE),109 writes the following:
Till when, out of negligence in prayer you bad tempered ḥakīm,
Will have the beliefs of the Greeks like the lowly?
Abandoning the truthfulness of Būbakr,110 and adeptness of Ḥaydar111;
Then falling for Pharaoh and Hāmān!112
Reason is not reading philosophy in hope for accomplishment.
What is reason? To have a Qurʾān willing and Qurʾān reading soul.113
107 See in: Muhammad Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia: A Contribution to
the History of Muslim Philosophy (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel publications, 2004), p. 53
108 Qaṣāʾid is the plural of qaṣīda, a verse form consisting of 15 to 70 couplets in which the
first verse of the first couplet rhymes with the second verse of all the couplets of the poem.
109 The earliest of the three prominent Sufi-poet’s, followed by ʿAṭṭār (ca. 1142–1220 CE) and
Rūmī (1207–1273 CE). See in: E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, IV vols. (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1951), vol. 2: p. 317.
Among these poets Rūmī’s works differentiate between philosophy as true pursuit of
knowledge and purposeless fallacies, which he believed some practiced in the name of philos-
ophy. Rūmī expresses his utter respect for Plato and Galenus, while distancing himself from
partaking in endless abstract discussions. Manūčehr Mortażavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame
bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī (Tehran: Ibn Sīnā, 1344/1965), Introduction, p. 69.
110 The first Caliph after Muḥammad, famous for his honesty – hence his epithet ṣiddīq
(truthful).
111 Ḥaydar (lion) is the epithet of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, cousin of the prophet Mohammed and the
fourth Caliph after the prophet; he is also the first Imām according to the Shia Muslims.
112 Pharaoh’s vizier according to Qurʾān (28: 8)
113 Abū ‘l-Maǧd Maǧdūd ibn Ādam Sanāʾī, Dīvān, ed. Modarres Rażavī, 3rd ed. (Tehran:
Ketābḫāne-ye Sanāʾī, 1362/1983), pp. 460–461 (my translation).
Tākiy az kāhil-namāzī iy ḥakīm-i zišt ḫū | Hamču dūnān iʿtiqād-i ahl-i Yūnān dāštan
Ṣidq-i Būbakrī-yu ḥizq-i Ḥaydarī kardan rahā | Pas dil andar zumra-yi Firʿaun u Hāmān
dāštan
ʿAql nabvad falsafa ḫvāndan zi bahr-i kāmilī | ʿAql čibvad ǧān nuby ḫvah u nuby ḫvān dāštan
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This rejection of ḥikmat and philosophy as foreign elements corrupting Islamic
orthodoxy can be seen in Sanāʾī’s direct mention of the Greek philosophical
roots of ḥikmat. Sanāʾī names Greek philosophy alongside a series of elements
signifying the otherness of the subject as Pharaoh and Hāmān. ʿAṭṭār of the
twelfth and the thirteenth centuries advanced the same view of ḥikmat and phi-
losophy. In his Muṣībatnāma, he writes:
Become the man of religion and confidant of the secrets
Loathe the philosophers’ fantasy
Farther from the Sharia of the prophet of Hāšimīs (the prophet Muḥammad’s tribe),
Other than the philosopher no one can be.114
It must be mentioned that not all attacks made by Sufi poets against philosophy
and ḥikmat were motivated by enmity against the teachings of Greek and
Alexandrian philosophers; in fact, as I discuss later, the views of Neoplatonists
make up the core of Sufi theosophical teachings regarding emanation. In many
cases, Sufi opposition to philosophy was directed against radical rationalistic
thinkers who held human reason to be sufficient to understand nature, meta-
physics and even the essence of the divine. Since Sufis thought that intuition
was the only way to understand the divine, they rejected the role ascribed to rea-
son by rationalist philosophers.115 Furthermore, despite the hostility of early Sufi-
poets against ḥikmat and philosophy, some of the most important philosophers
of the Islamic Peripatetic and Neoplatonic traditions considered Sufism to be a
part of philosophy. Moreover, the growing trend on the part of Sufis and Sufi phi-
losophers toward speculation and discursive representation obscured the bound-
aries that separated Sufism, theology, philosophy, and metaphysics.
Throughout the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ never claims to be a polymath (ḥakīm) on par
with Ibn Sīnā, Ḫvāǧa Naṣīr ud-Dīn Ṭūsī and Āmulī. Yet the presence of different
aspects of ḥikmat in the Divan proves that the poet was a seeker of such knowl-
edge. The following couplet gestures toward the poet’s view of ḥikmat and,
more importantly, of the relationship between philosophy and life: ‘Ḥāfiz̤! From
114 Farīd ud-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Muṣībatnāma, ed. ʿAbd ul-wahhāb Nūrānī Wiṣāl (Tehran: Zawwār,
1338/1959), p. 54 (my translation).
Mard-i dīn šau, maḥram-i asrār gard | Az ḫayāl-i falsafī bīzār gard | Nīst az šarʿi nabī-yi
Hāšimī | Dūrtar az falsafī īak ādamī
115 Compare to: Naǧm ud-Dīn Rāzī, Risāla-yi ʿišq va ʿaql (Miʿyār ul-ṣidq fī miṣdāq ul-ʿišq), ed.
Taqī Tafaḍḍulī (Tehran: Bongāh-e Tarǧome va Našr-e Ketāb, 1345/1966), pp. 45–48. Naǧm ud-
Dīn Rāzī is knowledgeable about the views of the Peripatetic Philosophers – see p. 69.
However, his true debt to Alexandrian and Platonic views concerns his explanations of emana-
tion of the divine and the hierarchic levels of benefiting from divine emanation, which is con-
stantly present in his interpretative Qurʾān citations. See for instance p. 56; 58.
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the fountain of Philosophy, bring to hand a cup (of wisdom) | It may be that
from the heart’s tablet, the picture of ignorance goeth.’116 In this couplet, the
poet clearly acknowledges his respect for ḥikmat as a remedy for ignorance.
Translated by Clarke as ‘philosophy’ and by Wohlleben and Hammer-Purgstall
as ‘Weisheit’,117 ḥikmat refers to that aspect of the knowledge that overcomes
ignorance and extends into life itself. In this respect, ḥikmat and Sufi teachings
overlap.
Ignoring the wide range of meaning and practical orientation of ḥikmat,
Clarke incorrectly translated ḥakīm – a person who is accomplished in ḥikmat –
as ‘physician’ in the following couplet. In the following poem, we find ex-
pressed the Platonic view regarding the equivalence of the Truth, the Right and
the Good (ṣavāb and ḫayr). Here are Wohlleben’s and Clarke’s translations:
Der Rat des Weisen ist genau das Richtige und schlechthin Gute;
glücklich, wer ihn hört und akzeptiert.118
The essence of good and essentially good, is the physician’s counsel:
Happy that one’s fortune, who, with the ear of resignation, ––
heard119
The poet views ḥikmat (at least in its practical aspect) as a source of clarity – a
spring, as he describes it in the first quote above, from which to quench the
thirst for knowledge and clear away the ignorance that clouds the faculty of
judgment.120
Yet, as the following verses show, ḥikmat does not quench the poet’s thirst
entirely.
116 Translation from: Clarke, 244, 7, p. 440. The Persian couplet is the following: Ḥāfiẓ az
čišma-yi ḥikmat ba kaf āvar ǧāmī | Bū ki az lauḥ-i dilat naqš-i ǧihālat biravad. In: Qazvīnī &
Ġanī, 222, 7.
117 ‘O Hafis, aus der Quelle der Weisheit schöpfe mit der Hand ein | Wässerchen, | Kann sein
daß von der Tafel deines Herzens das Bild des | (Gott-) Nichtwissens schwindet.’ In:
Wohlleben, 217, 7, p. 300. Also see: Hammer-Purgstall, vol. 1: CXXX, p. 401.
118 Wohlleben, 238, 11, pp. 323.
119 Clarke, 215, 11, p. 397. The original Persian couplet is the following:
Pand-i ḥakīm maḥż-i ṣavāb ast u ʿayn-i ḫayr | Farḫunda ānkasī ki ba samʿ-i rażā šinīd. In:
Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 243, 11.
It is important to note that what Clarke translates as ‘resignation,’ the Arabic word rażā,
literally means ‘contentment’ and ‘satisfaction.’ If we insist on reading it in Sufi context then it
would mean inner and spiritual contentment. It is does not, however, denote surrender or res-
ignation (taslīm) or predestination (ǧabr). I should clarify that in the whole Divan there is not
one instance of usage of the term ǧabr as a doctrine. For submission (taslīm) in the Divan see:
Ibid, 59, 6, p. 146; Ibid, 169, 8, p. 324.
120 For another instance see in: Clarke, 524, 13, p. 858.
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Brave tales of singers and wine relate,
The key to the Hidden ’twere vain to seek;
No wisdom of ours has unlocked that gate,
And locked to our wisdom it shall be.121
It is in verses such as the above that we grasp that in the Divan ḥikmat is subject
to problematization. In other words, ḥikmat itself has its limits. In the couplet
that follows, the poet addresses ḥikmat, represented by Plato. ‘Save Plato, jar-
sitter with wine, | To us, the mystery of philosophy, who uttereth –again?’122
The philosopher who chose his house to be a vat (pithos) was Diogenes of Sinope
of the fourth century BC. By alluding to this attribute of Diogenes and specifying
that the jar in question is jar of wine, the poet seamlessly embeds Plato, who rep-
resents ḥikmat, into Ḥāfiẓian bacchanalian ġazal and the poet’s quest for knowl-
edge. This is evident in the poet’s mention of wine and Plato together in a single
line. By suggesting that Plato’s house is a jar of wine, Ḥāfiẓ implies that Plato is
the wine itself, and vice versa, thereby elevating Plato to the sole source of acqui-
sition of knowledge (ḥikmat) for Ḥāfiẓ. Moreover, by linking wine and Plato,
Ḥāfiẓ also shows that the reception of Platonic philosophy is interwoven with
Sufi wine metaphors – one example of the inner-connection between ḥikmat and
Sufi views in the Divan.
I.1.4 Neoplatonic Views as the Starting Point for the Study of the Relation
Between Body and Soul in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
The most reliable sources on Ḥāfiẓ’s views regarding the body, the soul and the
pursuit of truth are the Divan itself as well as writings of Ḥāfiẓ’s contemporar-
ies. As we saw earlier, Āmulī viewed proficiency in multiple branches of knowl-
edge as a prerequisite for all poets; Ḥāfiẓ would never have achieved his rank
as a poet without the wide range of knowledge he possessed and to which the
Divan testifies. We know from the Divan itself and from Gulandām, who assem-
bled its poems, that Ḥāfiẓ had been a lecturer of theological texts and Qurʾān
interpretations. In particular, he held lectures on Kaššāf, a comprehensive
121 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 5, p. 91. Transcription of the original Persian
couplet:
Ḥadīs ̱ az muṭrib u maī gū u rāz-i dahr kamtar ǧū | Ki kas nagšūd u nagšāyad ba ḥikmat īn
muʿammā rā. In: Ḫānlarī 3, 5.
122 Clarke, 306, 3, p. 530. See also in Wohlleben, 256, 5, p. 345. The Persian couplet: Ǧuz
Falāṭūn-i ḫum-nišīn-i šarāb | Sirri ḥikmat ba mā ki gūyad bāz
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commentary on the Qurʾān written in the twelfth century by the theologian
(ahl-i kalām) Zamaḫšarī, who belonged to the school of Muʿtazilids, which was
deeply rooted in the rational tradition that flourished as Greek philosophy was
becoming accessible through translation to Islamic world.123 As Dādbeh asserts,
lecturing on Kaššāf requires knowledge of philosophy and kalām. Ḥāfiẓ’s per-
sonal acquaintance with the founder of the philosophical school of Shiraz,
ʿAḍud ud-Dīn Īǧī, and his knowledge of his work Mawāqif (The Stations) further
testifies to the poet’s knowledge of philosophy.124
The term ḥikmat and most of its branches are present in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. As I
showed above, Ḥāfiẓ follows Āmulī’s understanding of the term as philosophy
in the broadest sense. Furthermore, as I showed and as I will further demon-
strate throughout this study, knowledge of the truth, self-knowledge and self-
development were pursued through ḥikmat and Sufism alike, both of which
were influenced by Neoplatonism.125 Since, during Ḥāfiẓ’s time, questions con-
cerning the pursuit of knowledge and the relation between body and soul were
viewed through a Neoplatonic lens, answers to these questions advanced in the
Divanmust likewise be understood in light of Neoplatonic views.
As far as Goethe is concerned, we benefit from textual documentation of
Goethe’s study of Platonic and Neoplatonic texts. This documentation allows us
to more easily approach Faust as an instance of the problematization of
Neoplatonic views in the context of the relation between the body and the
soul in the pursuit of knowledge.
The sixth book of the second part of Dichtung und Wahrheit provides useful
information regarding Goethe’s familiarity with Platonism and Neoplatonism.126
Here, Goethe notes that, as a young man, he considered that ‘eine abgesonderte
Philosophie sei nicht nötig, indem sie schon in der Religion und Poesie vollkom-
men enthalten sei.’127 He read Johann Jakob Brucker’s history of philosophy with
this view of philosophy in mind.128 Regarding the earliest philosophers, Goethe
writes: ‘An den ältesten Männern und Schulen gefiel mir am besten, daß Poesie,
123 See pp. 32ff above.
124 Aṣġar Dādbeh, ‘Ḥāfiẓ’, in Dāyerat al-maʿāref-e bozorg-e eslāmī (Tehran: Markaz-e Dāyerat
al-Maʿāref-e Bozorg-e Eslāmī, 1367/1988), pp. 604–605. On Īǧī and Ḥāfiẓ see pp. 182–183 below.
125 See my brief note on the process of translation of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world
and the influence of Neoplatonic views on philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and Sufi-
philosophers Suhravardī in §I.1.3.4 (‘Neoplatonism in the Cultural Horizon of Ḥāfiẓ’).
126 FA I, 14: pp. 242ff.
127 FA I, 14: p. 243.
128 Ibid.
I.1 Definitions and Contextualizations 43
Religion und Philosophie ganz in Eins zusammenfielen’.129 Koch clarifies that
Neoplatonic thinkers caught young Goethe’s interest during the early stage of his
studies of philosophy.130 Furthermore, Koch explains that Goethe studied the
texts in Latin and that one of his sources may have been Marsilio Ficino’s
(1433–1499 CE) translation of the Enneads of 1486.131 In his Ephemerides, Goethe
responds to a passage in Bibliographia antiquaria by Johann Albrecht Fabricius
in which Fabricius condemns Spinoza’s cosmology and that of Zeno, Aristotle
and Plotinus132; the author then expresses his support for the position that views
God and Nature as separate. Goethe critiques these passages of Bibliographia
through an ontological perspective; he expresses his strong disagreement with
the separation of God and Nature, asserting that ‘the whole’ is in the state of
unity based on the one true being that is God, which is the ontological ground of
the multiplicity. Furthermore, he clarifies that this view has its roots in antiquity
and goes back to Plotinus.133
The Ephemerides also proves that Goethe studied Moses Mendelssohn’s
Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele in the period between September,
1768 and March, 1770. He read this text in comparison with Plato’s Phaedo and
attempted to identify differences between them.134 As the title indicates, this
work of Mendelssohn’s focuses on providing philosophical arguments for the im-
mortality of the soul. The line of argument in Plato’s Phaedo and Mendelssohn’s
modifying translation of it, as Goethe also notes, has the ontological and episte-
mological elements as basic components contributing to their philosophical sys-
tem. These spheres then determine the ethical aspect of the dialogue.
Goethe saw in Phädon the interwoven threads of multiple critiques of the
method of the acquisition of knowledge – i.e. the epistemological, ethical and
ontological aspects of the work. Goethe’s first note highlights the ethical aspect
129 Ibid.
130 Franz Koch, Goethe und Plotin (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung J. J. Weber, 1925), pp. 19–20.
Koch casting light on this fact, cites from the following source: J. W. Goethe, Goethes Werke:
Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau,
1887–1919). I, 27, Aus Meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, zweiter Teil p. 382.
131 Koch, Goethe und Plotin, pp. 22–24.
132 Martin Bollacher, Der junge Goethe und Spinoza: Studie zur Geschichte des Spinozismus in
der Epoche des Sturm und Drangs (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 17–19.
133 J. W. Goethe, Der Junge Goethe: Neu Bearbeitete Ausgabe in Fünf Bänden, ed. Hanna
Fischer – Lamberg, 5 vols. (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co, 1963), p. 431. Compare to: Bollacher,
Der junge Goethe und Spinoza: Studie zur Geschichte des Spinozismus in der Epoche des Sturm und
Drangs, p. 18.
134 Goethe, Der Junge Goethe, pp. 437–439.
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of the dialogue: ‘Ein Weiser stirbt gerne.’135 The next note in the Ephemerids
that is of importance for this study concerns the ontological realm.
Mendelssohn, like Plato, believed that there existed a gap between the states
of being and non-being and that the realm of natural perpetual change cannot
escape or step outside of this gap. In other words, in the realm of nature, as
Mendelssohn and Plato understand it, there is no coming to be and ceasing to
be in an ontological sense. Rather, there is only perpetual change, as the fol-
lowing passage in Phädon makes clear:
So lassen sich auch, im Ganzen betrachtet, die Tage der Woche nicht unterscheiden;
denn das Stetige und Aneinanderhängende läßt sich nur in der Einbildung, und nach
den Vorspiegelungen der Sinne, in bestimmte und abgesonderte Theile zertrennen; der
Verstand aber siehet gar wohl, daß man da nicht stehen bleiben muß, wo keine wirkliche
Abtheilung ist.136
It is in this context that Goethe quotes the following passage from
Mendelssohn’s Phädon: ‘Zwischen seyn und nicht seyn ist eine entsetzliche
Kluft, die von der almählig wirkenden Natur der Dinge nicht übersprungen wer-
den kann.’137 According to this line of argument, the influence of the transcen-
dent realm on the realm of nature and perpetual change can be explained
through an ontological perspective. After this ontological remark, Mendelssohn
describes the soul’s journey toward knowledge and wisdom. It is only in the
radical independence of the soul from the body that the soul can be recognized
as eternal. This view, as Goethe notes, extends to an epistemology of indepen-
dence from the body, according to which philosophy is the practice of abstrac-
tion of the body from the soul: ‘Kann die Seele ohne Sinne empfinden. Sie wird
die erhabne, heilige, geistische Gefühle von Schönheit, Ordnung und also von
Gott haben.’138 In addition, Goethe’s letter to Herder from 1772 speaks to
Goethe’s study of Greek philosophy and literature, specifically Plato and
Xenophanes.139 Werner Keller points out that Goethe’s studies of Plotinus took
135 Ibid., p. 437.
136 Moses Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, in Gesammelte
Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe Moses Mendelssohn (Stuttgart & Bad Cannstatt: 1972), pp. 68–69.
Compare to: Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
137 Der Junge Goethe, p. 438. Also in: Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele’, p. 70.
138 Der Junge Goethe, p. 438. See also in ———, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele’, pp. 53–54. (Goethe must have taken this note from Cebes’s mention of Philolaus’s view
within Socrates’s arguments.)
139 FA II, 1: pp. 255–258 especially p. 256.
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an important turn in the summer of 1805, when Goethe spent his fifty-sixth birth-
day in Lauchstädt.140 During this short period of seclusion, he dedicated some
time to reading Plotinus’s Enneads. During this time, Goethe was in frequent corre-
spondence with Friedrich August Wolf, a philologist friend known for his expertise
in Greek texts. Goethe’s letter on August 30, 1805 to F. A. Wolf reveals that, during
this time, Goethe tried to study the Greek texts.141 The most celebrated fruit of
these studies are the four verses cited below. Keller dedicated an article to these
verses in which he tried to read them in connection with Plotinus’s views regard-
ing the emanation of the transcendent in the world and the unity of the knower
with the known. As Keller states, the chronological order of appearance of the
verses is as follows: ‘im Notizheft und als Widmungsblatt vom 1. September 1805,
als zentrales Bekenntnis in der Einleitung “zum didaktischen Teil” der Farbenlehre
(1810) und als “Zahmes Xenion” in der Ausgabe von 1827.’142 In Farbenlehre, these
verses appear in the context of a series of discursive arguments regarding the rela-
tion between the perceiving organ (the eye) and the light. Considering Goethe’s
knowledge of the philosophical origin of these verses, there is no doubt that they
were influenced by Neoplatonic views that, in turn, were inspired by Empedocles
(ca. 495–435 BCE).143
Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt’ nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt’ uns Göttliches entzücken?144
These verses, as Keller notes, are a loose translation of Plotinus’s Ennead I. 6. 9. In
Farbenlehre, Goethe credits the source of these verses: die ‘Worte eines alten
Mystikers, die wir in deutschen Reimen folgendermaßen ausdrücken möchten’.145
140 FA II, 6: Goethe’s letter: An Herzog Carl August 28.8.1805
141 FA II, 6: p. 27.
142 Werner Keller, ‘Variationen zu: Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft . . . ’, in Prägnanter
Moment, ed. Peter-André Alt (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), pp. 439–461. Here
p. 439.
143 Goethe specifically mentions the view of knowing the like by the like ‘nur von Gleichem
werde Gleiches erkannt’, which reminds Goethe of ‘der alten ionischen Schule’. FA I, 23/1:
p. 24. On Empedocles and the idea of likeness in cognition and perception in a critical context
of Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’s introductions and interpretations of Empedocles’s view, see
the following article: Rachana Kamtekar, ‘Knowing by Likeness in Empedocles’, Phronesis, 54,
no. 3 (2009), pp. 215–238.
144 FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
145 Ibid.
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The interwoven cosmological and epistemological aspects of these verses
lead to an articulation of the view of immanence in the world in Goethe’s poetic
adaptation of the above Ennead; they also motivate the metaphor of the sun in
a context in which the sun and the human being stand in a cosmological and
epistemological relation. We should also note that these words testify to an
inner connection between mysticism and philosophy, a view expressed by
Goethe at various points throughout his study of philosophy.
Goethe was constantly in dialogue with Platonism and Neoplatonism.
Furthermore, Goethe’s problematization of Neoplatonic views was inseparable
from his conception of light and the sun; his exploration of questions regarding
the human being’s ontological and epistemological dimensions; and his inter-
est in the way the human being lives and pursues knowledge. This context is
suitable for exploring Faust within the outlines of the problematization of the
pursuit of knowledge and its reflection on the body and soul relationship.
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the relevance of Platonic and
Neoplatonic views to understanding Hafiz’s Divan and Goethe’s Faust. We are
now in a position to understand the intellectual and historical adaptations
that these basic views undergo in the respective cultural spaces reflected in
our two texts.
I.1.4.1 Becoming Sun-like or Being Sun-like
‘Were not the eye sun-like, how could we behold the light?’146 This poem is
Goethe’s modification and translation of a sentence in the Ennead I. 6. 9.147 But
146 FA I, 23/1: p. 24 (my translation). ‘Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, | Wie könnten wir das
Licht erblicken?’
147 On likeness of the eye and the sun, as well as the inner relation between the eye and the
sun in the Republic, we read the following:
Neither sight nor the organ in which it resides, which we call the eye, is the sun?
No.
Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
By far the most like.
And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the
sun?
Exactly.
Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?
True, he said.
In: Plato, ‘Republic’, in The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analysis and
Introductions. Translated by B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprint, Reprinted lithographi-
cally at the University Press, Oxford from corrected sheets of the fourth edition 1964, 1968),
pp. 370–371. Book VI. 507 d–508 c.
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what is it that Goethe modifies here? The answer to this question shows us
where, according to Goethe, the Neoplatonic view needed to be corrected.
The Ennead I. 6. 9 expounds on a process of gaining the ability to see with
an eye other than the sensory one. This is apparent in the last sentence of the
Ennead I. 6. 8: ‘Shut your eyes, and change to and wake another way of seeing,
which everyone has but few use.’148 Plotinus is referring to a kind of sight that
can be awakened – one that is not, like sensory perception, already active.
Opening this inner eye requires going through a process of purification: ‘But if
anyone comes to the sight blear-eyed with wickedness, and unpurified, or weak
and by his cowardice unable to look at what is very bright, he sees nothing,
even if someone shows him what is there and possible to see.’149 The question
in Plotinus’s Ennead I. 6. 9 concerns becoming and not being sun-like: ‘No eye
ever saw the sun without becoming sun-like, nor can a soul see beauty without
becoming beautiful.’150 The process that one has to undergo to open the inner
eye, according to Plotinus, concerns only the soul. Furthermore, it is a process
of ascent: ‘First the soul will come in its ascent to intellect and there will know
the Forms, all beautiful’.151 Unlike in the Ennead I. 6. 9, however, Goethe views
the inner eye as already active. He describes it as an ontological characteristic
of the human being. The eye and the sun are already similar, Goethe thought.
Furthermore, Plotinus’s process of purification or ascent is absent from
Goethe’s version of the theory. Goethe’s critical interpretation of the above
Ennead problematizes one of the most cardinal aspects of Neoplatonic meta-
physics – namely, the transcendent nature of the truth and the ascending
method of pursuit of the truth. In Goethe’s poem, the sun stands in an immedi-
ate relation to ‘Gottes eigne Kraft’. It is an active principle in human beings that
does not need to be ‘awoken’.
148 Plotinus, Plotinus in seven volumes, trans. A. Armstrong, Henry, P. & Schwyzer, 7 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press W. Heinemann, 1966), I. 6. 8, vol. 1:
p. 259. [Henceforth citations from the Enneads are from this translation.]
149 Ibid. I. 6. 9, p. 261.
150 Ibid., (my emphasis).
151 Ibid. Compare to the same sentence modified in Goethe’s poem in Harder’s German
translation of the Ennead I. 6. 9: ‘Man muß nämlich das Sehende dem Gesehenen verwandt
und ähnlich machen, wenn man sich auf die Schau richtet; kein Auge könnte je die Sonne
sehen, wäre es nicht sonnenhaft; so sieht auch keine Seele das Schöne, welche nicht schön
geworden ist.’
In: Plotin, Plotins Schriften in Zwölf Bände Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und
Anmerkungen, trans. Richard Harder, 12 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956), vol. 1:
p. 25.
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I.1.4.2 A Brief Note on the Presence of the Sun and Its Light in Plotinus’s
Theory of Emanation
The Neoplatonic theory of emanation claims that the cosmos emanates from a
simple, unchanging and incorporeal principle named the One. As the highest
principle in Plotinus’s system, the One inherits the qualities that Plato,
Plotinus’s predecessor, thought the highest principle must have: the One is the
Good, the True, the Beautiful, the Real and the Just all at once. Whenever any
of these aspects of the One is addressed, all the others are immediately and
necessarily implied. The emanation itself can be described, in short, as a pro-
cess in which the One bestows existence upon the multiplicity of the phenom-
ena. Yet it is of utmost importance to note that, by definition, the One is
immutable. Therefore, the two related concepts of time and movement are ir-
relevant to the One and its emanation; the stages of the emanation occur in an
eternal continuum.152
Emanation, as Plotinus understands it, goes through the following stages:
Intellect emanates from the One; the Soul of the World emanates from Intellect;
and, finally, the Soul of the World imparts the intelligible, never-changing
forms to heavenly bodies. The body appears for the first time at the level of
heavenly bodies; prior to this stage, emanation is conceived to be a purely spiri-
tual process. By Plotinus’s definition, the body is the meeting place of the spiri-
tual and the material.153 The aversion of Plotinus’s system toward matter
becomes apparent from the fact that heavenly bodies are held to be made of
ether and are untouched by change and decay.154
Bearing in mind these qualities of the One, we may now address the place
of the sun in Plotinus’s system. Plotinus argues that the One must emanate the
universe without itself being moved and changed. In the Ennead V. I. 6 (On the
Three Primary Hypostases), Plotinus reasons that, if the One were moved, then
anything that came from it would be two steps removed (rather than one) from
the origin of the movement – yet the origin of moment, as per definition, is the
One. How can something create movement without itself being moved? Here is
152 For the timelessness of the emanation process see: Ennead V. 1. 6 and in: Christia Mercer,
‘Platonism in early Modern Natural Philosophy’, in Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature,
ed. James Wilberding and Christoph Horn (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 103–126.
Here p. 112
153 Ennead III. 4. 1. Thus, the intelligible has no other origin than the intellect, which in turn
has no origin and existence other than that of the One. In short, there are no qualities or quan-
tities which have any origin other than the One, via Intellect and the World Soul. Therefore,
the intelligible is the continuum of the One in accord with the capability of the body.
154 On the hierarchic levels of the emanation see: Ennead II. 3. 17 and V. 1. 6.
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where Plotinus appeals to the metaphor of the sun. Its rays of light represent a
form of begetting that (a) does not require any movement from its originating
cause and (b) illustrates emanation as the necessary essence of the One: ‘It
must be a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of
the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it
remains unchanged.’155 The sun represents the One and the rays of light repre-
sent the Intellect, the first emanation. In other words, the sun stands for the
necessity of emanation that is presupposed by the essence of the One. Thus,
the One emanates freely, yet at the same time necessarily and inexhaustibly,
and it remains unchanged in the process.156
These are the cosmological principles that Plotinus aspires to illustrate via
the sun metaphor. As I pointed out above, one of the clearest instances of the
cosmological implementation of the analogy of the sun is the Ennead V. 1. 6.157
Though not as illustrative as the metaphor of the sun and its rays, Plotinus also
saw the transmission of scent as a metaphor for emanation theory. Scent as a
metaphor for Intellect and perfume as a metaphor for the One can be seen, for
instance, in the Ennead V. 1. 2. These metaphors will also play a role in the
analysis of our two texts.
Each stage of the emanation, Plotinus thought, is in love with the stage
above it. This love is explained as the love of the child for its parents; the lower
stage directs its quest toward the Beautiful and the Good in the stage above. This
view is rooted in Plato’s Symposium and the teachings of Diotima, who defined
love as poverty and the recognition of need. ‘Every thing longs for its parent and
loves it, especially when parent and offspring are alone; but when the parent is
the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him
only in otherness.’158 Yet Plotinus modifies this view and extends it to the One
itself. Armstrong clarifies that, according to Plotinus, the One is not only ‘self-
155 Ennead V. 1. 6.
156 Arthur Hilary Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of
Plotinus: an Analytical and Historical Study, Cambridge classical studies (Amsterdam: Hakkert,
1967), p. 51.
157 See in Republic the sun juxtaposed to the source of the forms, expressed by the following
simile:
‘You would say, would you not that the sun is not only the author of visible in all visible
things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generated?
Certainly.
In like manner you must say that the good not only infuses the power of being known into
all things known, but also bestows upon them their being and existence, and yet the good is not
existence, but lies far beyond it in dignity and power.’ Plato, ‘Republic’, p. 372. Book VI. 509 b.
158 Ennead V. 1. 6.
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sufficient’ and ‘self-directed’. It also has a unique characteristic: ‘the One does
not only think itself, it wills and loves itself.’159 Plotinus explains the process of
reunion in terms of the One’s self-willing and self-loving, and he claims that the
human soul contains a spark of the One itself; I will explore this view in greater
depth later, when I turn to the analysis of the body and soul relation in Faust.
I.2 The Sun, Heavenly Bodies and the Call for Ascent in Faust
The Prolog im Himmel commences with the sun. Following Pythagorean theory,
Raphael’s ode celebrates the rotation of the sun as the source of a tune that the
angels perceive and enjoy.
Die Sonne tönt nach alter Weise
In Brudersphären Wettgesang,
Und ihre vorgeschrieb’ne Reise
Vollendet sie mit Donnergang.
Ihr Anblick gibt den Engeln Stärke,
Wenn keiner sie ergründen mag;
Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke
Sind herrlich wie am ersten Tag.160
The sight of the sun gives the angels strength and nourishment. It reminds us
of the Stoic conception of the sun as the source of energy and nourishment in
the cosmos – a source of ‘undiminished giving.’161 The archangels’ inability (by
self-admission) to comprehend the sun recalls the Platonic and Neoplatonic
metaphor of the sun as the source of emanation of all that is intelligible and
which stands beyond the Intellect. The philosophical representation of the sun
in the Prolog im Himmel highlights the significance of the sun to the drama as a
whole.
In his first monologue, Faust characterizes the object of the knowledge he
wishes to attain in several ways. It is the ‘indwelling entity’ that holds the
world together; the seed from which the world springs; and the force that influ-
ences the world:
159 Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus: an
Analytical and Historical Study, p. 12.
160 V. 243–250.
161 Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus: an
Analytical and Historical Study, p. 53.
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Daß ich erkenne was die Welt
Im Innersten zusammenhält,
Schau’ alle Wirkenskraft und Samen,
Und tu’ nicht mehr in Worten kramen.162
In these verses,163 there is no mention of an upward path that might lead to a
source of knowledge and being. Furthermore, there is no mention of a ‘hierarchy
of being’ as a characteristic of the transcendent source of truth. Rather, Faust
describes a triad – forces, seeds and the world – that creates a whole. This can
be understood either as a modification of the Platonic emanation theory or as an
articulation of Spinoza’s substance/attribute/mode triad of monistic Nature.164
(Recall that these lines were written after Goethe’s study of Spinoza and his
speech Zum Shakespears Tag.) This controversial issue, however, is not the sub-
ject of this study. For the purposes of tracing the problematization of Platonic
views in Faust, it suffices to note that Faust appears to view the acquisition of
knowledge in terms of a world that is principally immanent.
I.2.1 Direct Approach to the Transcendent: Pain, Escape and Fall
In the following verses, Faust fixes his gaze on the moon and recalls many
nights in which the moon and its gloomy light were his only friends:
O sähst du, voller Mondenschein,
Zum letztenmal auf meine Pein,
Den ich so manche Mitternacht
An diesem Pult herangewacht:
Dann, über Büchern und Papier,
Trübsel’ger Freund, erschienst du mir!165
Remarkably, Faust’s summoning the presence of the moon coincides with an
expression of pain and alarm. Yet the pain turns into a delirious ecstatic fantasy
of bathing in the moon’s dew – a mystical urge for direct ascent and union that
is described in sensual language:
162 V. 382–385.
163 These verses were part of the drama since the Faust frühe Fassung, which, as Schöne in-
forms us, can be traced back to the years 1776 and 1777. See in: FK, p. 81.
164 For a comprehensive account of the relation between Goethe and Herder and the speech
On Shakespeare’s Day of 1771 see Bollacher, Der junge Goethe und Spinoza: Studie zur
Geschichte des Spinozismus in der Epoche des Sturm und Drangs, pp. 167–175 & pp. 234–237.
165 V. 386–391.
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Ach! könnt’ ich doch auf Berges-Höh’n
In deinem lieben Lichte gehn,
Um Bergeshöhle mit Geistern schweben,
Auf Wiesen in deinem Dämmer weben,
Von allem Wissensqualm entladen
In deinem Tau gesund mich baden!166
Faust’s escape into his fantasy of reaching directly for the moon is followed by
a fall back to reality – the ‘Kerker’, as Faust describes it. Verses 398-409 depict
the state of Faust’s life in a world that he inherited from his forefathers, practi-
tioners of alchemy and magic. Faust had restrained himself from these activi-
ties up until this point:
Weh! steck’ ich in dem Kerker noch?
Verfluchtes dumpfes Mauerloch,
Wo selbst das liebe Himmelslicht
Trüb’ durch gemalte Scheiben bricht!167
This world contained within these walls is the location where Faust suffers this
pain. Initially, Faust conceptualizes his pain as a call that conveys his longing
for the truth, a concept that is articulated poetically via light metaphors – these
metaphors are consistent with ‘the ascending tradition’ that we discussed ear-
lier. The scene’s gothic room is constructed in such a way that light only pene-
trates its stained-glass windows.
In the scene Nacht Faust expresses another wish for escape – an urge to get
out immediately and flee to faraway lands: ‘Flieh! Auf! Hinaus in’s weite
Land!’168 Evidently, this urge for escape takes the form of an urge for ascent,
thereby paving the way for Faust’s first speculative fantasy in pursuit of ascent –
the path to which, according to Faust, is described in the book of Nostradamus.
I.2.1.1 Escape in Speculative Fantasy
Faust’s inclination toward a world-view built around a principally immanent
system emerges as he reads the macrocosm sign. Faust immediately integrates
the microcosm into the macrocosm (‘Bin ich ein Gott?’) as he forms an under-
standing of the macrocosm.169 His senses are the first to experience the specula-
tive vision:
166 V. 392–397.
167 V. 398–401.
168 V. 419.
169 V. 434–439.
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Ha! welche Wonne fließt in diesem Blick
Auf einmal mir durch alle meine Sinnen!
Ich fühle junges heil’ges Lebensglück
Neuglühend mir durch Nerv’ und Adern rinnen170
Following the moon, which appeared at the beginning of the Nacht scene, the
sun – likewise a heavenly body – now appears in Faust’s reading of the macro-
cosm sign. The sun is represented by the metaphor of golden buckets, a meta-
phor that is taken from everyday life and that, therefore, brings the scene closer
to its audience. Here, an emanative system is described in a manner that resem-
bles the Platonic and Neoplatonic similes of light and scent. In accordance with
the Platonic tradition, the emanation proceeds from above; rays of light ema-
nate from heaven and resonate through existence, as though ‘passing’ golden
buckets from one person in line to the next. However, even at this early point in
the drama, we discern a clear difference between Faust’s speculative vision and
Platonic and Neoplatonic views – namely, there is no sign of any resistance to-
ward the flow of this heavenly Goodness in Faust’s account. In this moment of
envisioned speculation, as if under the magical influence of the macrocosm
sign, the above difference allows Faust’s body – his ‘Nerv’ und Adern,’ and not
merely his intellect – to be influenced as well. Body and the soul both partici-
pate in the appreciation of the moment. This speculative vision includes ‘Blick’,
‘schauen’ and ‘erkennen’ of what ‘die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält’ in
Faust’s vision171:
Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt,
Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen!
Mit segenduftenden Schwingen
Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen,
Harmonisch all’ das All durchklingen!172
The only hindrance here is on the receiving end – namely, the human’s incapa-
ble ‘sense’ and dead ‘heart’:
Jetzt erst erkenn’ ich was der Weise spricht:
‘Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen;
Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist tot!
170 V. 430–433.
171 V. 430; 440; 442; 382–385. Also compare to: Hans Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1982), p. 86.
172 V. 447–453.
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Auf, bade, Schüler, unverdrossen
Die ird’sche Brust im Morgenrot!’173
In the words of the ‘Wise One,’ ascension and purification are necessary for us
to make the ‘earthly bosom’ capable of appreciating this light.174 Yet we face a
discrepancy: although the immanence of the One is homogenous and uninter-
rupted, its appreciation by ‘Sinn’ and ‘Herz’, as Faust says, is neither uncondi-
tional nor universal. At first glance, it may appear that there is no way to
describe how the senses and the earthly bosom open to ‘die Geisterwelt’; none-
theless, it is suggested that the ‘Schüler’ bathes the earthly bosom in the red
light of dawn, thereby imagining the sensual (‘Sinn’) and spiritual (‘Herz’) ex-
perience of revolving around the sun. The rhetoric of negative and purifying
ascent to transcendent truth is clearly present in the description of this bath-
ing. These four verses are clearly different from the one written in 1805 in
Lauchstädt. In verses 443–446 even in the midst of this joyous moment, the
eye and the senses are depicted as ‘closed’ and the heart as ‘dead’. This de-
scription highlights the necessity of purification. The exhortation to profound
purification was also at the core of the Ennead I. 6. 9, yet Goethe’s poetic re-
construction of the Ennead (in all of its variations since 1805) ignored this
point.
For Faust, who zealously yearns for a sensual experience of immanent
Nature, all these visions are deemed to be one magnificent spectacle – and
nothing more. Bathing in the ‘Morgenrot’ only leads to another painful fall:
Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!
Wo fass’ ich dich, unendliche Natur?
Euch Brüste, wo? Ihr Quellen alles Lebens,
An denen Himmel und Erde hängt,
173 V. 442–446.
174 Regarding the figurative meaning of ‘Brust’ and ‘Herz’, we turn to Adelung’s dictio-
nary, which glosses ‘Brust’ as ‘Die untern [sic] Kräfte der Seele, die man sonst auch das
Herz nennet, weil dasselbe seinen Sitz in der Brusthöhle hat, besonders bey den Dichtern.’
Johann Christoph Adelung, Versuch eines volständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch
der Hochdeutschen Mundart, 5 vols. (Leipzig (1774–1786)), vol. 1: p. 1105. On the figurative
meanings of ‘Herz’ he writes: ‘Am häufigsten die Seele des Menschen und deren besondere
Fähigkeiten.’ He also clarifies that this usage appears in Luther’s translation of the Bible.
See, for instance, Job 12. 3, where the word ‘Herz’ is used figuratively instead of ‘Gehirn’. In
this regard, Adelung further explains: ‘Im Deutschen ist es in diesem Sinne nicht üblich,
wo man es theils [sic] noch von den Gedanken des Menschen, theils aber auch, und zwar
am häufigsten, von dem ganzen Empfindungs- und Begehrungsvermögen und dessen
Äußerungen in besondern Fällen braucht.’ ibid., vol. 2: p. 1146.
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Dahin die welke Brust sich drängt –
Ihr quellt, ihr tränkt, und schmacht’ ich so vergebens?175
As we saw, Faust longs to appreciate the immanent presence of the transcen-
dent as boundless nature; yet he does not know how to grasp nature in such a
sensual unity. Faust’s self-criticism doesn’t do him any more good than open-
ing yet another page of the book of Nostradamus. Now the ‘Erdgeist’ is in front
of him: ‘Du, Geist der Erde, bist mir näher’.176 Faust deems this soul to be at ‘a
lesser level of transcendence’ and therefore closer to him:
In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm
Wall’ ich auf und ab,
Wehe hin und her!
Geburt und Grab,
Ein ewiges Meer,
Ein wechselnd Weben,
Ein glühend Leben,
So schaff’ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.177
The ‘Erdgeist’ introduces itself as an active and organic unity that contains mul-
tiple polarities: ‘auf und ab’, ‘hin und her’, ‘Geburt und Grab’. In this scene,
Nature can be best understood in the context of Goethe’s Zum Shakespears
Tag:
[D]as was wir das bös nennen,178 ist nur die andre Seite vom Guten die so notwendig zu
seiner Existenz und in das Ganze gehört, als zona torrida brennen und Lapland einfrieren
muß daß es einen gemäßigten Himmelsstrich gebe.179
In this part of the speech, Goethe first describes Good and Evil as two poles or
sides of a unique whole. He then expands his view by stressing the necessary
polar coexistence of countless binary extremes in ‘das Ganze’. It must be noted
that the ‘Erdgeist’ has the qualities attributed to the All.
175 V. 454–459 (my emphasis).
176 V. 461.
177 V. 501–509.
178 Seen in the context of the text, it becomes clear that Goethe immediately distances himself
even from recognizing anything as Good and Evil. Consider the way he refers to these two
poles: ‘Das was wir [. . .] nennen.’
179 Zum Shakespears Tag. In: Ästhetische Schriften 1771–1805, FA I, 18: pp. 9–12. Here p. 12
(my emphasis).
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I.2.2 The Problematization of a Method
The cosmic order of nature that Faust envisioned in his reading of the macro-
cosm sign appears before him as the incarnate ‘Erdgeist’. Yet the immanence
and the unity of the dichotomies contradict Faust’s wish to be recognized as
‘göttergleich’. At this stage, the discrepancy between Faust’s separation from
the world (as an observer) and his vision of immanence that integrates the
human being into nature becomes problematic.180 This, however, cannot be un-
derstood as unnatural – Goethe’s dramatic plot seems to share a characteristic
that he praises in Shakespeare’s works181:
[S]eine Stücke drehen sich alle um den geheimen Punkt (den noch kein Philosoph gese-
hen und bestimmt hat) in dem das Eigentümliche unseres Ichs, die prätendierte Freiheit
unseres Wollens mit dem notwendigen Gang des Ganzen zusammenstoßt.182
The willing subject strives for unity with the All, but knows that it is impossible
to achieve: Goethe sees this conflict in Shakespeare’s characters and explains it
as a conflict between the pretended freedom of will in the face of the necessary
flow of the whole. Being human in this paradoxical state does not diminish the
dramatic construct of the work. In fact, as a philosophical principle about na-
ture it accounts for Goethe’s remark concerning Shakespeare: ‘Und ich rufe,
Natur, Natur! nichts so Natur als Shakespeares Menschen.’183
In the scene Nacht, we observe a seeker in his loneliness with a book opened
before him. He is talking to the moon, speculating and dreaming. Isolated from
all that is natural, he wishes to experience an immanence in which the all and
the All are in unity – or as he says, ‘Harmonisch all’ das All durchklingen.’184 In
this setting, Faust forces the ‘Erdgeist’ to appear in his dark ‘Kerker’: ‘Du mußt!
du mußt! und kostet’ es mein Leben!’185 As soon as Faust is free of Wagner’s
questions, he criticizes himself for having forced nature:
180 See in: Bollacher, Der junge Goethe und Spinoza: Studie zur Geschichte des Spinozismus in
der Epoche des Sturm und Drangs, pp. 168–170; p. 174. Bollacher explains Goethe’s views re-
garding the immanence and titanic views in relation with Goethe’s Spinoza studies, his monis-
tic world-views, and their relation to integration of the human into nature.
181 ‘Wir ehren heute das Andenken des größten Wanderers und tun uns dadurch eine Ehre an.
Von Verdiensten die wir zu schätzen wissen haben wir den Keim in uns.’ In: Zum Shakespears
Tag. In: ‘Ästhetische Schriften 1771-1805ʹ FA I, 18: p. 9.
182 Ibid., p. 11 (my emphasis).
183 Ibid.
184 V. 453.
185 V. 481. See also the words of the ‘Erdgeist’ as it mocks Faust for being awed in its sight:
v. 483–485.
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Läßt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.186
This aggressive method of acquisition of knowledge is treated by Goethe in his
Farbenlehre.187 Goethe criticizes the stage that Newton sets up for his experi-
ment.188 Faust’s dark room, which Mephisto later describes as a ‘Marterort’
(v. 1835), does not seem to be any different from the ‘Marterkammer’ and ‘die
dunkle Kammer’189 that Schöne addresses in Goethes Farbentheologie. For in-
stance, we read in the Zahme Xenien VI of 1827:
Freunde flieht die dunkle Kammer
Wo man euch das Licht verzwickt,
Und mit kümmerlichstem Jammer
Sich verschrobnen Bilden bückt.
Abergläubische Verehrer
Gab’s die Jahre her genug,
In den Köpfen eurer Lehrer
Laßt Gespenst und Wahn und Trug.
Wenn der Blick an heitern Tagen
Sich zur Himmelsbläue lenkt,
Beim Siroc der Sonnenwagen
Purpurrot sich niedersenkt,
Da gebt der Natur die Ehre,
Froh, an Aug’ und Herz gesund,
Und erkennt der Farbenlehre
Allgemeinen ewigen Grund.190
The words of the first stanza are the same as those used to describe Faust’s
‘Marterort’.191 And the second part of the verses above follows the first in a man-
ner that reminds us of the words of the Wise One in the scene Nacht. Yet this
poem reflects Goethe’s re-interpretation of the Ennead I. 6. 9; accordingly, there
186 V. 673–675.
187 On the relevance of Goethe’s criticism of scientific methods to this scene in Faust, also see
Schöne’s comments on these verses in FK, p. 225.
188 See poems and fragments from 1806, 1823 and 1827 that orbit around Goethe’s critique of
method of acquisition of knowledge and torturing of the phenomenon in: Albrecht Schöne,
Goethes Farbentheologie (München: Beck, 1987), pp. 63–67.
189 Ibid., p. 64.
190 FA I, 2: pp. 677–678.
191 Compare to: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, p. 64. These verses can also be found in
Appendix 52 of Schöne’s book. In: ibid., p. 209.
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is no purification required to acquire knowledge. It suffices to observe nature
with the naked eye. In this context, Faust’s self-criticism in verses 673–675 can
be understood as his critique of a method of pursuit of knowledge that manufac-
tures a vision of the All that cannot include the seeker of knowledge.
I.2.3 Suicide as a Way of Transcending the Body
After reflecting on his failed experience with the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust comes to a
conclusion regarding his suffering: he credits it to the opposing directions to-
ward which the soul and the body strive.192 Faust blames the corporeal realm
for thwarting his efforts whenever he attempts to ascend toward the absolute.
Dem Herrlichsten, was auch der Geist empfangen,
Drängt immer fremd und fremder Stoff sich an;
Wenn wir zum Guten dieser Welt gelangen,
Dann heißt das Bess’re Trug und Wahn.
Die uns das Leben gaben, herrliche Gefühle,
Erstarren in dem irdischen Gewühle.193
The complaints of Socrates in Phaedo come to mind. In the Ephemerides, Goethe
mentions the Platonic notion of the separation of body and soul as a condition
for acquiring the truth. Faust appears to share this Platonic view: ‘Für den Leib
sorgt der Weise nicht. Denn er ist ihm vielmehr beschwerlich. Die Seele kann
sich schweer [sic] zur betrachtung [sic] der geistigen Wesen erheben.’194
The seeker of knowledge, Plato’s Socrates says, should ‘rid as far as he can,
of eyes and ears, and so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion
distracting elements which when they associate with the soul hinder her from
acquiring truth and knowledge’.195 The body disparages the higher aspirations
of the soul as ‘Trug und Wahn’ and the soul, after many failures, learns to be
content with the meager space of the body. ‘Sorge’ is introduced as the body’s
way of attaching itself to the soul.
Die Sorge nistet gleich im tiefen Herzen,
Dort wirkt sie geheime Schmerzen,
192 Compare to: FK, p. 224.
193 V. 634–639.
194 Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
195 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, in The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analysis and
Introductions. Translated by B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprint, Reprinted lithographi-
cally at the University Press, Oxford from corrected sheets of the fourth edition 1964, 1967),
p. 416. 66 a.
I.2 The Sun, Heavenly Bodies and the Call for Ascent in Faust 59
Unruhig wiegt sie sich und störet Lust und Ruh;
Sie deckt sich stets mit neuen Masken zu,
Sie mag als Haus und Hof, als Weib und Kind erscheinen,
Als Feuer, Wasser, Dolch und Gift.196
In other words, the body is actively involved in leading the soul astray and ob-
structing its ascending quest. As we read in verses 647–651 of Faust, an active
will engineers these fears and masks them with the mundane to keep the soul
concerned and attached to the body. ‘Du bebst vor allem was nicht trifft, | Und
was du nie verlierst das mußt du stets beweinen.’197
Matter is to blame for all of these misdeeds. Fire is the element used to
forge iron into daggers, Faust reflects; and water is the essence of poison, a
symbol of treason and deception. Socrates, too, identifies the body with seduc-
tion, want and distractions of ‘Haus, und Hof’ and ‘Weib und Kind’. In Phaedo,
we read the following:
For the body is a source of countless distractions by reason of the mere requirement of
food, and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the pursuit of truth:
it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kind [. . .] Whence come
wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?
All wars are occasioned by the love of the money, and money has to be acquired for the
sake of the body and in slavish ministration to it198
Schiller read the Faust drama against the background of the seeker of knowledge
and the relationship between body and soul.199 In his doctoral dissertation, which
provided a brief history of various conceptions of the body and soul relation, he
addressed a commonly held view of his time – namely, that the body is a ‘distrac-
tion’ for the thinker because it has needs and desires. He invites the reader to un-
derstand these ‘interruptions’ as a call from Mother Earth that awakens the
dreamer and reminds him of his attachment to the earth. These complaints are
196 V. 644–649 (my emphasis).
197 V. 650–651.
198 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 417, 66 b & c (my emphasis).
199 In Schiller’s letter to Goethe from June 23, 1797, a time at which Goethe was concentrated
on filling the great gap in Faust I, we read the following: ‘Die Duplizität der menschlichen
Natur und das verunglückte Bestreben das Göttliche und das Physische im Menschen zu verei-
nigen verliert man nicht aus den Augen, und weil die Fabel ins Grelle und Formlose geht und
gehen muß, so will man nicht bei dem Gegenstand stille stehen, sondern von ihm zu Ideen
geleitet werden.’ In: Friedrich Schiller, Briefwechsel Schillers Briefe 1.11.1796–31.10.1798, ed.
Lieselotte Blumenthal & Benno v. Wiese, 42 vols., Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe (Weimar:
Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1977), pp. 86–87.
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strikingly similar to those found in Faust and Phaedo. Schiller’s words may be read
as the body’s answer to Faust’s complaint in verses 634–651:
Der Geist, wenn er einmal in den Geheimnissen einer höhern [sic] Wollust eingeweiht
worden ist, würde mit Verachtung auf die Bewegungen seines Gefährten herabsehen,
und den niedrigen Bedürfnissen des physischen Lebens nicht leicht mehr opfern wollen,
wenn ihn nicht das thierische [sic] Gefühl darzu [sic] zwänge. Den Mathematiker, der in
den Regionen des Unendlichen schweifte, und in der Abstraktionswelt die wirkliche
verträumte, jagt der Hunger aus seinem intellektuellen Schlummer empor, den Physiker,
der die Mechanik des Sonnensystems zergliedert und den irrenden Planeten durchs
Unermessliche begleitet, reißt ein Nadelstich zu seiner mütterlichen Erde zurück; den
Philosophen, der die Natur der Gottheit entfaltet und wähnet, die Schranken der
Sterblichkeit durchbrochen zu haben, kehrt ein kalter Nordwind, der durch seine
baufällige Hütte streicht, zu sich selbst zurück, und lehrt ihn, daß er das unselige Mittelding
von Vieh und Engel ist.200
The heavenly bodies and their light are associated with the wish to fly and tran-
scend earthly boundaries. As Faust fixes his gaze on the poison, a fantasy of
moonlight in the forest kindles his desire for lightness and flight. The poison
promises release from failure and suffering:
Doch warum heftet sich mein Blick auf jene Stelle?
Ist jenes Fläschchen dort den Augen ein Magnet?
Warum wird mir auf einmal lieblich helle,
Als wenn im nächt’gen Wald uns Mondenglanz umweht?201
Suicide as a means of ascent to the heavenly realm is a subject of Phaedo. In fact,
Goethe’s notes on Phädon begins with precisely this issue: ‘Ein Weiser stirbt
gern. So beginnt das Gespräch. Eine kleine Abhandlung über den Selbstmord.’202
In the short section to which Goethe refers in this note, both Plato and
Mendelssohn advance arguments against suicide. They argue that suicide is an
unacceptable way to bridge transcendent truth with life in the body, a state that
both authors view as equivalent to ignorance. ‘Ein Weiser, fängt er an, lernt
seine ganze Lebzeit durch sterben. Der Tod setzt er voraus sey eine Trennung des
Leibes und der Seele.’203 These notes refer to the most controversial passage of
Plato’s Phaedo, represented with caution in Mendelssohn’s work: ‘In fact the true
200 ———, Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner
geistigen (Stuttgard 1782: Cotta [Faks.-T.].) (Ingelheim: Boehringer, 1959), pp. 9–10 (my
emphasis).
201 V. 686–689.
202 Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
203 Ibid.
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philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying’.204 If philos-
ophy is the practice of separating the soul from the body, then it follows that phi-
losophy is a lifelong practice of preparing for death. Yet there is an important
distinction between advocating for suicide (Plato most certainly doesn’t) and ar-
ticulating a way of life that emphasizes the abstraction of the soul from the body
and that outlines the ascending pursuit of truth. This manner of pursuit of truth
finds its metaphorical articulation in the parable of the cave in the Republic. As
Smith points out, Porphyry offers a Neoplatonic explanation of this method of
life and pursuit of knowledge. Porphyry describes the spiritual death of the true
seeker as one ‘in which the soul may, in a positive sense, distance and thus sepa-
rate itself from the distractions of the body.’205 Logically intertwined with the
ethic of ascent in the Platonic tradition, this epistemology is a way of life. Yet,
considering Phaedo’s portrayal of Socrates as welcoming of death and the fact
that the dialogue has difficulty refuting arguments in favor of suicide,206 we can-
not deny the strong association between the negative pursuit of truth and death.
Faust’s attempts at ascension repeatedly fail. In desperation, he now re-
solves to leave the earthly realm behind and to flee the cycle that traps him –
the cycle of pain, escape into fantasy and falling back to reality. Each time he
sees or thinks of heaven and heavenly bodies – made of ether, according to the
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophies –, Faust’s urge burns again. Thus,
Faust’s only wish is for upward movement – ‘Auf neuer Bahn den Äther zu
durchdringen’.207 Yet unlike that of the biblical Elijah,208 Faust’s ascent is hor-
rific: ‘Nach jenem Durchgang hinzustreben, | Um dessen engen Mund die ganze
Hölle flammt’.209 Before he reaches for the poison, Faust thinks of the sun. He
regretfully encourages himself to turn his back to the earth’s precious sun in
the hope of reaching the incorporeal realm of ether210: ‘Ja, kehre nur der holden
204 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 418. 67, e. See also ibid. p. 435. 80, e.
205 Sententiae, Sent. 8 In: Andrew Smith, ‘The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry’, in
Neoplatonism and the philosophy of nature, ed. J. Wilberding and C. Horn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 32.
206 See in Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 412. 62 b & c. Cited on p. 85 below.
207 V. 704–705.
208 Schöne points out the biblical allusion that Goethe utilizes here as he refers to the
Elijah’s ascent to heaven. FK, p. 226.
209 V. 716–717.
210 It is worth mentioning that, for Plato in Republic, the sun is the most precious thing in the
visible world: ‘And this, you must understand, is he whom I call the child of the good, whom
the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the
things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of
mind’ in: Plato, ‘Republic’, pp. 370–371. Book VI. 507d–508c.
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Erdensonne | Entschlossen deinen Rücken zu!’211 Once again, Faust prepares
to force himself beyond his human limits: ‘Vermesse dich die Pforten
aufzureißen, | Vor denen jeder gern vorüber schleicht.’212 Earlier in the scene
Nacht, Faust resorted to force to summon the ‘Erdgeist’, and thereby risked his
own life: ‘Du mußt! du mußt! und kostet’ es mein Leben!’213 Now he is willing
to risk his life again: ‘Zu diesem Schritt sich heiter zu entschließen | Und wär’
es mit Gefahr, in’s Nichts dahin zu fließen.’214
Earth and heaven are juxtaposed as the ascent toward the heavens meets
with heavenly songs. This unfolds in three stages: first, Faust complains about
his failure to conceive of himself as immanent and God-like. His complaint
highlights his feelings of rejection as he, metaphorically speaking, knocks on
the doors of the immanent divine nature215: ‘Was sucht ihr, mächtig und gelind,
| Ihr Himmelstöne, mich am Staube?’216 This complaint then leads to an admis-
sion: ‘Zu jenen Sphären wag’ ich nicht zu streben, | Woher die holde Nachricht
tönt’.217 Finally, Faust’s skepticism is overwhelmed by emotions caused by
memories of childhood: ‘Und doch, an diesen Klang von Jugend auf gewöhnt, |
Ruft er auch jetzt zurück mich in das Leben.’218
Again, heaven and earth are mentioned together as Faust returns to earth.
In the following verses, the circularity of Faust’s actions is remarkable. In long-
ing for ascent, Faust strives downwards toward what he recognizes as hell219;
yet from above, heavenly songs awaken his childhood memories and return
him to earth.
Erinnerung hält mich nun, mit kindlichem Gefühle,
Vom letzten, ernsten Schritt zurück.
O tönet fort ihr süßen Himmelslieder!
Die Träne quillt, die Erde hat mich wieder!220
211 V. 708–709 (my emphasis).
212 V. 710–711.
213 V. 481.
214 V. 718–719.
215 Faust’s endeavor to grasp the limits of his individuality continues to be present in the
Pact Scene: ‘Ich habe mich zu hoch gebläht; | In deinen Rang gehör’ ich nur. | Der große Geist
hat mich verschmäht, | Vor mir verschließt sich die Natur.’ (V. 1744–1747). This quest for the
place of the ‘Ich’ will be explored further in this study.
216 V. 762–764.
217 V. 767–768.
218 V. 769–770 (my emphasis).
219 See v. 717.
220 V. 781–784.
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Though overwhelmed, Faust is able to critically evaluate his emotions: he de-
scribes them as childish feelings rooted in childhood experiences. It is no wonder
therefore, that the series of curses Faust casts in the so-called Pact Scene begins
with cursing these feelings (v. 1585–1589). In the poem Prometheus, there is a re-
markable passage in which the sun joins with the wish for ascent and childish
hopes and thereby introduces part of Goethe’s poetic critique of religion:
Da ich ein Kind war,
Nicht wußte wo aus noch ein,
Kehrt’ ich mein verirrtes Auge
Zur Sonne, als wenn drüber wär’
Ein Ohr zu hören meine Klage,
Ein Herz wie mein’s,
Sich des Bedrängten zu erbarmen.221
In this instance, the sun and the wish for ascent are in direct connection. In
these rebellious verses, moreover, Prometheus admits that, as a child, he too
had hoped for sympathy from the heavens. The awakened Titan depicts this
sentiment as childish folly.
I.2.4 Flying toward the Setting Sun
After his suicide attempt, Faust exits his dark cell for the first time in the drama
and walks in nature. On this stroll, he experiences the outside world introspec-
tively. Two well-known poetic monologues from this scene focus on the sun. In
this section, I address the second monologue. (I explore the first monologue in
the chapter Toward Life.)
Near the end of the scene Vor dem Tor (v. 1069–1099), the sight of the set-
ting sun offers Faust respite from his grief concerning his lack of knowledge.
The sight of the sun kindles in him the wish for ascent; he yearns for wings
with which to fly toward the sun: ‘O daß kein Flügel mich von Boden hebt, | Ihr
nach und immer nach zu streben!’222 Faust dreams with his eyes open and fixed
on this natural spectacle. In his fantasy, he flies toward the sun. The fantasy
continues until the sun vanishes from the horizon. Suddenly, the old wound –
the urge to ascend – reopens. Once again employing a light metaphor, Faust
articulates this tendency as the desire to drink from the eternal light of the sun
221 FA I, 1: p. 329–330 (my emphasis).
222 V. 1074–1075 (my emphasis).
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while floating between the darkness of matter and the spiritual light (night
and day, and the waves and the heaven).
Doch scheint die Göttin endlich wegzusinken;
Allein der neue Trieb erwacht,
Ich eile fort ihr ew’ges Licht zu trinken,
Vor mir den Tag, und hinter mir die Nacht,
Den Himmel über mir und unter mir die Wellen.223
The direction of Faust’s ascent here is the same as the ascent in Plato’s allegory
of the cave. If the macrocosm vision was a spectacle – ‘ein Schauspiel nur’ –, in
this scene, Faust interprets his experience as a dream: ‘Ein schöner Traum, in
dessen sie entweicht.’224 Since the soul’s wings are like fantasy’s ‘kühnem Flug’
(v. 640–641) and are again sabotaged by the ‘körperlicher Flügel’, Faust directs
his complaints to the body once again. This time, the complaint commences
with an expression of great loss and pain: ‘Ach! zu des Geistes Flügeln wird so
leicht | Kein körperlicher Flügel sich gesellen.’225
Faust turns toward justifying the longing in his soul that ‘hinauf und
vorwärts dringt’.226 He explains the origin of these urges in a manner suggestive
of the anamnesis. There is an innate yearning, he asserts, that stirs in human
beings whenever their gaze falls on phenomena that remind them of their tran-
scendent nature. Illustrating this point, Faust provides three examples that
draw attention to the heavens: the resonating song of a lark flying in the empty
sky; the depths below an eagle’s widely-spread wings; and finally, the image of
striving back home227:
Doch ist es jedem eingeboren,
Daß sein Gefühl hinauf und vorwärts dringt,
Wenn über uns, im blauen Raum verloren,
Ihr schmetternd Lied die Lerche singt;
Wenn über schroffen Fichtenhöhen
Der Adler ausgebreitet schwebt,
Und über Flächen, über Seen,
Der Kranich nach der Heimat strebt.228
223 V. 1084–1088.
224 V. 1089.
225 V. 1090–1091.
226 V. 1093.
227 Compare to Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe, Classical Texts (Warminster: Aris &
Phillips, 1986), p. 67. 249 d 5ff.
228 V. 1092–1099 (my emphasis).
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Faust’s words connect the dots between noticing the heaven; ascending as high
as possible; and then striving to return back home. In the Ennead I. 6. 8, the pro-
cess of ascent culminates in reunion. This reunion is articulated as a call to fly
back to ‘our homeland’ and ‘our Father’.229 In his comments on this passage,
Armstrong points out that Plotinus’s description of the path of ascent refers to
The Iliad 2. 140, when Agamemnon tries to convince his comrades to sail back to
their homeland. This is a call for the reunion of the undescended part of our
souls – as Plotinus describes it in the Ennead V. 1. 10–12 and which Inge names
the ‘divine nucleus’230 – with the One. ‘Our country from which we come is there,
our Father is there. How shall we travel to it, where is our way to escape?’231
In the following verses, the first line of which is interrupted by an outburst
of grief, the dichotomy between body and soul finds its clearest articulation:
Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;
Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.232
Faust acknowledges the existence of two souls residing in his chest: one devoted
to the material body and its needs; the other striving for ascent. More impor-
tantly, Faust also asserts that one of these two souls is determined to separate
itself from the other. The verses that follow allow us to identify which of the two
souls seeks to separate itself. Faust describes the modes of activity characteristic
of each soul. Inclusion is the essential characteristic of the first soul: it grabs
hold of – ‘hält’ – and clings with its ‘klammernden Organen’ to the world.
Separation is the essential characteristic of the second soul: it wants to ascend
forcefully – ‘hebt gewaltsam sich’233 – and exclude and separate itself from the
constellation of which it is a part.
These verses describe the body as an active willing soul whose forces are di-
rected downwards. The divine soul, on the other hand, is directed ‘Zu den Gefilden
hoher Ahnen.’ The activity of the body’s will is resistance; it clings to life’s prom-
ises and pleasures. The will of the other soul reflects a movement directed upwards
229 Ennead I. 6. 8. On the quotation from The Iliad see Armstrong’s comments: op. cit. Vol. 1:
p. 256.
230 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Green Wood Press,
1968), Vol. 1: pp. 261–262.
231 Ennead I. 6. 8 (my emphasis).
232 V. 1112–1117.
233 V. 1116.
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and beyond this world. The resisting force here acts as an impediment to the pro-
cess of reunification and purification. As the Ennead I. 8 mentions, matter in its
incorporeal form (prime matter or hyle) stands against the One’s first emanation,
the Intellect. The resistance of prime matter against the One is called the prime evil
in the Ennead I. 8.234 The resistance the divine nucleus faces on its path of ascent
is the secondary evil.235 Near the end of the Osterspaziergang, Faust acts as ‘der
Weise’ of the Ephemerides is expected to. Faust sees his being as an arena of con-
stant struggle of the soul trying to separate itself from the corporeal and the force
whose attention is devoted to the bodily. In the Platonic tradition that Plotinus fol-
lows, the body is the meeting place of the soul and matter. All the faculties of the
soul are embedded in the body except for the direct presence of the One in the
human soul. As the Ennead V. 1. 10–12 explains, this direct presence makes possi-
ble the recognition of beauty and goodness and stands in connection with the
lower stages of the human soul.236 This connection between the divine nucleus
and the other faculties of the soul weakens as the other stages turn their attention
to the bodily realm instead of practicing purification and going through the pro-
cess of abstraction:
First of all, this kind of soul is not outside matter or by itself. So it is mixed with unmea-
suredness and without a share in the form which brings order and reduces to measure,
since it is fused with a body which has matter. And then its reasoning part, if that is dam-
aged, is hindered in its seeing by the passions and by being darkened by matter, and in-
clined to matter, and altogether by looking towards becoming, not being; and the principle
of becoming is the nature of matter, which is so evil that it infects with its own evil that
which is not in it but only directs its gaze to it. For since it is altogether without any share
in good and is a privation of good and a pure lack of it, it makes everything which comes
into contact with it in any way like itself.237
Faust, like Plotinus, recognizes in the body a will (soul) that inclines toward
matter, clings to distractions and prefers stagnation to ascension. This soul’s
corruption is due to its excessive attachment to the corporeal realm.
234 See Carroll’s explanation of the prime evil in Ennead I. 8 in: William J. Carroll, ‘Plotinus
on the Origin of Matter’, in Neoplatonism and Nature: Studies in Plotinus’ Enneads, ed. Michael
F. Wagner, Studies in Neoplatonism, Ancient and Modern (Albany: State Univ. of New York
Press, 2002), p. 199.
235 Ennead I. 8. 4.
236 In the human soul as microcosm the divine nucleus represents the One. For all other
stages of emanation, there is a corresponding stage in the intellectual faculty. Therefore, the
Intellect and the reproductive and nourishing aspects have their likeness to the Soul of the
World and the demiurgic aspect of the emanation. See the microcosm argument in Ennead
V. 1. 10.
237 Ennead I. 8. 4 (my emphasis).
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As I discussed above, we find multiple instances early in the drama in
which Faust attempts to ascend beyond his earthly boundaries. On each such
occasion, the sight of heavenly bodies – either the sun or the moon – provides
the impetus for Faust to ascend. And in each case the body and its worldly at-
tachments are seen as active impediments. In the form of houses, land, children
and wives, these worldly attachments hinder the fulfillment of Faust’s wish to
reach the sun – ‘ihr ew’ges Licht zu trinken’.238
In each stage of the process analyzed thus far, we noticed that the transcen-
dent truth, represented to Faust as the macrocosm sign, must have a homogenous
immanence in the cosmos. Yet, compared to the Platonic view of the transcen-
dence of truth, this view of homogenous immanence does not appear to have
deep roots in Faust. This dominance of transcendence becomes clear when Faust
faults his bodily and human condition for his failure to grasp the ‘Erdgeist’ – the
personification of the immanence of the transcendent in nature. Faust’s contempt
for the body reappears in the scene Vor dem Tor. The view of transcendence of the
intelligible content of the world from the bodily realm seems to be deeply seated
in Faust’s mind. Therefore, up to this point, we find no clear instance of a concep-
tion of the world in which those two spheres – to which his two souls, respec-
tively, are attracted239 – were seen as parts of that one infinite harmony. In other
words, Faust does not see himself as already part of the whole. Thus, he cannot
grasp the place of the individual, the ‘Ich’, in his pursuit of knowledge.
The paradoxical state between Plotinus’s call for purification and Goethe’s
view of immanence in his reinterpretation of the Ennead I. 6. 9 sets the stage for
the beginning of Faust’s journey. In this paradoxical state, we begin to see the
problematization of the Platonic view of the ascending pursuit of knowledge;
the valorization of the body and soul relation; and the dramatization of ‘Es irrt
der Mensch so lang’ er strebt.’240
I.3 Direct Approach to Knowledge of the Transcendent Truth
in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
One important characteristic of the Divan is that Ḥāfiẓ edited each poem’s form
and content, again and again, over the course of his life.241 Therefore, although
some historical characters are recognizable in his works, these characters
238 V. 1086.
239 V. 1112.
240 V. 317.
241 Zarrīnkūb, Az kūče–ye rendān, p. 57.
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cannot be used to reliably construct the development of the poet’s intellectual
life. Scholars have not yet succeeded in categorizing the poet’s works into dis-
tinct periods or stages. At best, historical facts within a given poem suggest
when the ġazal was first written; in a few cases, moreover, a poem’s mood
along with the king or patron named in the poem points to circumstances be-
hind its initial composition. Yet Ḥāfiẓ is almost certain to have edited the poem
at a later time. The problematization of different views and approaches takes
the form of dialogues between opposing views. As we will see in the course of
this study, Ḥāfiẓ often practices self-criticism – the poet’s multiple standpoints
have a polyphonic effect. This characteristic of the Divan invites comparison to
Faust, which, as we saw in Faust’s reading of the macrocosm sign and sum-
moning the ‘Erdgeist’, also contains constant coexisting paradoxical views –
sometimes even in one character and in a single moment.
Ḥāfiẓ considered himself a seeker of a form of knowledge relevant to the
ethical dimension of life. The ascending negative approach to the acquisition of
knowledge is an important part of the world-views that were handed down to
him. As I explained earlier, Platonic views were one of the main sources of this
approach. Intertwined with ḥikmat and Sufi theoretical discourse, Platonic
views influenced interpretations of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīṯ.
In the Divan, there are several poems that reflect the dominance of the ab-
stract and ascending direct approach toward the transcendent truth. This ap-
proach includes self-denial and striving for the separation between body and
soul – a condition for seeking and appreciating the truth. The small number of
these poems and their discernible poetic style of linear form brings Arberry to
conceive of an early phase in the poet’s career.242 Falakī dedicates a section of
his dissertation to exploring this putative early phase in the poet’s life – a phase
in which Ḥāfiẓ’s ġazals show traces of Sufi views.243 As far as poetic style is con-
cerned, the comparison between linear and pāšān form does suggest that these
poems were written when the poet was young. Yet if this argument leads to the
conclusion that the young poet was a follower of a Sufi order, we should be skep-
tical – there is no evidence for Ḥāfiẓ’s belonging to any Sufi order. Even the great
Sufi poet Ǧāmī (1414–1449 CE) admits in his Nafaḥāt ul-uns that Ḥāfiẓ’s interest
in Sufi terms did not reflect membership in a specific Sufi order.244 In fact, there
242 Arberry, Fifty Poems of Ḥāfiẓ: Text and Translations Collected and Made, Introduced and
Annotated by Arthur J. Arberry, pp. 29–30.
243 Maḥmūd Falakī, ‘Goethe und Hafis – Verstehen und Missverstehen in der Wechselbeziehung
deutscher und persischer Kultur’ (Hamburg, Univ., 2012), pp. 72–79.
244 Nūr ud-Dīn ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns (Tehran: Ketābforūšī-ye Saʿdī, 1336/
1957), p. 614.
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is substantial textual evidence in the Divan suggesting that the poet disapproved
of such membership. But as Ǧāmī correctly explains, Sufi terminology and the
theoretical and ethical aspects of ḥikmat that are shared with Sufi theory are
present in poetic form in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
I.3.1 Escaping the Cage of the Body
The body as an impediment to the soul’s path to ascension and reunion – a
topic discussed in Platonic and Neoplatonic sources245 – appears in the verses
that follow:
[1] The dust of my body is becoming the veil in front of the face of the soul.
Oh happy the moment when from off that face I cast the veil aside!
[2] A cage like this is unworthy of a sweet singer like me.
I will go to the rose bed of Paradise, because I am the bird of that Garden.
[3] It is not clear why I came, where I was;
Pain and woe, that of my beginning and end I am unaware.
[4] How can I make my circuit in the space of the World of Holiness,
When, in the enclosed world of contrivance,246 I am tied to the plank of my body?
[5] If from the blood of my hear the scent of yearning comes,
Do not be surprised: I am the musk pod of the fellow sufferer of Khotan.247
[6] Have no regard for my candle-like gold-laced tunic of Taráz,
Because hidden under my shirt the burning are.
[7] Come and from him snatch away Háfiz’s being:
With your being, nobody will hear from me, ‘I am.’248
The ġazal begins by defining the body in relation to the soul: the body is ac-
cused of being confusing, distracting and distorting, like dust that is kicked up
from the earth as a person walks quickly or as a caravan leaves the gates of a
city, depriving the lover of the sight of his or her beloved. The dust hides the
face of the soul, and Ḥāfiẓ impatiently waits for the joyous moment at which he
may cast this veil aside. In the next couplet, the body is illustrated as a cage in
which the nightingale of the soul feels imprisoned, longing for escape and as-
cent. The imprisoned soul then expresses its regrets for having forgotten its
245 Ennead I. 6. 8.
246 Clarke’s translation – the mixed abode – is closer to the word Ḥāfiẓ employs in this verse.
Sarāča-yi tarkīb means the abode of mixture that in contrast with fażā-yi ʿālam-i quds (the
space of the World of Purity) denotes the realm of mixture of body and the material. See:
Clarke, 385, 4, p. 661; and Ḫānlarī, 334, 4.
247 According to the literary tradition, Ḫutan is known as the habitat of the musk-deer.
248 Avery, CCCXXXIV, p. 413.
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home and its purpose in the narrow cage. There is an unexplainable wish to
leave this worldly sphere behind and ascend to higher levels. Only the body im-
pedes the wings of longing, for the soul now is in the abode of mixture. The
term ‘abode of mixture’, sarāča-yi tarkīb, directly refers to the bodily realm, a
mixture of four opposing elements, and the soul.
In the fifth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ turns to a form of argumentation strongly reminis-
cent of the anamnesis doctrine, which is articulated in elements and metaphors
native to his cultural space. The argument employs the metaphor of the musk-
pod and its fragrance. This metaphor requires a brief elucidation. The musk-pods
that one found in the bazaars during Ḥāfiẓ’s time were severed musk glands of
the musk-deer. In the couplet above, the scent of this severed organ represents
the memory of its far away home. Furthermore, its desirable and unique scent
was believed to derive from droplets of blood that the heart-broken deer poured
into this severed gland. The poet finds in his own bleeding heart the scent of
musk as well; like the musk-pod, the poet’s heart has been taken far away from
its home, and this scent is a constant reminder that he is not from this sphere of
mixture.249 As an incorporeal presence in the epistemic horizon of the poet, the
scent activates the anamnestic process – an urge to elevate the segregated, indi-
viduated human and separate the body from the soul.250
The sixth couplet reveals a noteworthy aspect of Ḥāfiẓ’s self-image as a
human with all his longings: the body, the object under consideration, is not
exhausted or famished by abstinence and self-denial. Rather, it is so graceful
that the poet feels the need to explain that an ‘inner burning passion’ consumes
his heart – even though he appears to be ‘an ornamented candle’ from the out-
side. Having started with metaphysical concepts of body and soul, the poem
arrives at the metaphorical imagery of the candle. The candle burns throughout
the night and gives to the beloved the light that she had kindled at the begin-
ning of the night; as it burns, the candle waits for the moment at which it is
extinguished by the beloved at sun-rise. In this moment, the candle can see its
beloved one last time before it is annihilated. In the last couplet, the poet aban-
dons his desire to forcibly remove the beloved’s veil. He waits for her to come,
expecting that her presence will resolve his individuality. In the end, the desire
to see her face dominates the poem, but not as a personal wish for ascent; the
poet depicts himself as a candle at midnight that awaits dawn.251
249 We must consider here the significance of scent and light in the Platonic context.
250 On anamnesis in the Divan see the following verses: Avery, XXXVII, 4–5, p. 68;
Wohlleben, 335, 5–6, p. 437; Avery, CCCXXXV, 5–6, p. 414.
251 The metaphor of candle has many aspects, one of which I explained above. But we should
note that this element of this literary tradition, like many others, goes through Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic
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The following ġazal illustrates the relation between body and soul on an
ascending path to truth:
[1] You without the news, strive to be its possessor.
So long as you are not a wayfarer, how can you be a guide?
[2] In the school of the Truths, before one versed in love,
Hey son, make an effort to become one day a father.
[3] Like the valiant of the Path, cleanse your hands of existence’s copper,
To discover love’s alchemy and turn it into gold.
[4] Sleeping and eating have distanced you from your proper rank.
You will come into your own when you get above sleeping and eating.
[5] Were the light of God’s love to fall upon your heart and soul,
By God, you would be finer than the sun in heaven!
[6] Be drowned in the ocean of God a moment. Do not suppose
That by so much as a hair you will be wet from the waters of the Seven Seas:
[7] From head to foot all the light of God will be yours,
Once, headless and footless, you are on the path of the Lord of Glory.
[8] If the countenance of God should become the object of your sight,
From then on no doubt will remain that you are the master of insight.
[9] When the foundations of your being are turned topsy-turvy,
In the heart do not suppose that you will ever again be on top.
[10] If, O Háfiz, you have a mind for union,
At the door of the virtuous you must become dust.252
In the verses above, a goal is defined and a process is outlined for reaching it.
Following the tradition of Plato’s Symposium and Ibn Sīnā’s Treatise on Love,253
love is the teacher who guides lovers on their journey. Yet love requires that
lovers first recognize the lack of their goodness – i.e., they must admit that they
are ‘without the news’ so that their appreciation for higher-level goodness puts
in motion the process of ascent.
In the third couplet, Ḥāfiẓ invites the reader to undergo a process of trans-
formation through which the reader relinquishes the ‘copper’ of his existence.
The metaphor of ‘existence’s copper’ refers to the individuated soul within the
productive process in which multiple allusions are combined in one instance. For further instan-
ces of the candle as a metaphor see: Avery, CCCXVII, 1, p. 394.; Clarke, 378, 1, p. 652.; Wohlleben,
317, 1, p. 415; and Avery CCCXX, 2, p. 397.; Clarke, 386, 2, p. 662.; Wohlleben, 320, 2, p. 418.; and
Avery, CCLXXXIX, p. 360.; Clarke, 347, pp. 594–595.; Wohlleben, 289, p. 376.
252 Avery, CCCCLXXVIII, p. 579 (my emphasis).
253 Ḥusaīn ibn ʿAbdullāh Sīnā, ‘Resāle-ye ʿIšq’, in Rasāʾel-e Ibn Sīnā. Translated by Ḍīyāʾ ud-
Dīn Dorrī, ed. Ḍīyāʾ ud-Dīn Dorrī (Tehran: Markazī, 1360/1981), p. 123. Ibn Sīnā sees love as an
existential and intellectual matter that stands in relation to the Goodness that is the Necessary
Existent. All beings pursue it since they are attracted to the perfection in the Good in relation
to their relative poverty of it.
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boundaries of the body.254 This process of ascent and purification is described
as analogous to the process of turning worthless copper to gold through al-
chemy. The current state of ignorance and forgetfulness in which Ḥāfiẓ sees
himself has its roots in what the Enneads describe as ‘the secondary evil’.255 In
the fourth couplet, sleep and eating keep us away from original purity; only by
abandoning them our self will realize itself in the Self.
As the most precious objects in the visible world, the sun and its light are the
destination for the process of ascent. If the light of God permeates his existence,
the seeker may ascend beyond the goodness of the sun. The fifth and seventh
couplets describe a light that is beyond what is aesthetically perceivable – the
light of God as the Lord of Glory. Lord of Glory or Ẕūl-ǧalāl refers to an aspect of
the divine that is absolutely transcendent. Ǧalāl describes the awe and fear that
strikes the person who comes close to perceiving the divine.256 In contrast to the
fear-inspiring divine majesty that is dominant in this ġazal, the divine beauty
(ǧamāl) inspires bliss.
In the eighth couplet, the seeker relinquishes his ability to see the visible
world but gains the ability to look directly toward the transcendent. By focusing
exclusively on the radically transcendent divine, it is possible to become ṣāḥib
naẓar – master of insight. We should note the importance of the term ṣāḥib
naẓar. The poet uses this combination of ṣāḥib (lord, possessor) and naẓar
(view, vision, theory) when speaking within the horizon of exclusion and nega-
tive ascent to the truth. As the poem shows, this term belongs in the context of
transcendence and majesty, rather than immanence and beauty.257 We can now
go back to the Ennead I. 6. 9 and observe how the eye becomes like the sun and
how, after the soul’s purification, truth is perceived in an excluding manner
that transcends the particulars. There is a deep resemblance between these
views and the intellectual content of the two ġazals analyzed above.
These two ġazals are characterized by their seriousness and absence of
irony. In the Divan, however, Ḥāfiẓ frequently employs sarcasm to criticize reli-
gious puritanism and Sufi zealot asceticism – it is one of the Divan’s defining
features. The term ‘master of insight’ fits with the general ascetic Sufi tone of
this poem. As the two ġazals above prove, the poet was proficient in the theory
254 Muḥammad Esteʿlāmī, Dars-e Ḥāfiẓ, 2 vols. (Tehran: Soḫan, 1382/2003), vol. 2: p. 1228.
255 Ennead I. 8. 4. See also the explanations of this point in the analysis of Faust p. 67 above.
256 Ṣādiq Goharīn, Šarḥ-e eṣṭelāḥāt-e taṣavvuf, ed. Ṣādiq Goharīn, 10 vols. (Tehran: Zawwār,
1368/1989), vol. 4: pp. 45–47
257 See Āšūrī’s elaboration on the semiotic differences between ṣāḥib naẓar and naẓar-bāz in
the following: Dārīūš Āšūrī, ‘Rindī va Naẓrbāzī’, in Parsehā va porsešhā: Maǧmūʿe-ye maqālāt
(Tehran: Našr-e Āgah, 1388/2009).
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of negative, direct ascent and the Sufi views that correspond to it. Considering
the ubiquity of light metaphors and specifically the sun in the analysis that fol-
lows, I briefly discuss the significance of the sun for Islamic Neoplatonists. I
then discuss the presence of the sun in the Divan as a metaphor for extramun-
dane divine truth.
I.3.2 The Presence of the Sun in Islamic Neoplatonism
According to Ptolemy, there are nine spheres that revolve around the earth.
This view influenced Fārābī’s theory of emanation, according to which ten
levels of Intellect emanate from the First Existent.258 In Fārābī’s emanative
system, the sun analogy explains the ‘Active Intellect’,259 a level of hierarchy
of intellect comparable to that of Plotinus’s Soul of the World. Active Intellect
emanates the intelligibility of the cosmos and the power of apprehending it;
the sun and the eye are the best analogies for the Active Intellect, Fārābī
suggests.
The significance of the sun as the source of life for the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā sug-
gests that they were influenced by the Stoic and Pythagorean views. Al-Nafs al-
kullīyah (the World Soul) is a simple essence emanated from the Intellect. The
power emanated in the World Soul ‘manifests’ in the sun and then animates
sublunary, material beings.260 Furthermore, the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā hold that the
sun has a direct role to play in the formation of the human soul in the last stage
before its natural birth. Farrukh explains the stages that a soul passes through,
from its descent from the One to its human birth:
When a soul falls, it enters the ovum which happens to be impregnated at the time of its
fall. This soul in the ovum comes soon under the regimen of the planets. All planets, be-
ginning with the farthest one, Saturn, influence the incubation of the soul turn by turn
for a whole lunar month. After the completion of the third month the fetus comes under
the influence of the sun, the king of the planets, and life is breathed into it.261
In this manner, they conceive the bond between human beings and the sun to
be existential.
258 Ibrahim Madkour, ‘Al-Fārābi’, in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 458.
259 Fārābī takes this name and the modified material of the levels of intellect from Aristotle’s
De Anima III. See: Majid Fakhry, Al-Fārābi, founder of Islamic neoplatonism, Great Islamic
thinkers (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), p. 73.
260 Farrukh, ‘Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, p. 295.
261 Ibid., p. 298.
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InMetaphysica, Ibn Sīnāmentions the sun in the context of an analogy for the
process of emanation. He concisely explains his reasons for using this analogy:
It has become evident, therefore, that there is a primary entity (awwalī) in the world
which is not in the world (ʿalam nīst) though the being of the world comes from It. Its
existence, which is necessary, is due to Itself. In reality It is absolute being (hast-i maḥḍ)
and absolute existence (wujūd-i maḥḍ). All things exist due to It in the same manner as
the light of the sun (āftāb) is due to itself, whereas the illumination all other things re-
ceive from the sun is accidental.262
In this section, I discussed the significance of the sun for the philosophers of
the Islamic tradition. I also briefly explained the intellectual and ontological as-
pects of what the sun represents. I expand on these topics in the analysis of
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan that follows.
I.3.3 The Mote and the Sun
Just as we saw in the early scenes of Faust, the sight of the sun in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan
kindles a longing for ascent and unity with the source of illumination. But un-
like the two ġazals that we analyzed above,263 the verses that follow are poly-
phonic; they include multiple voices and paradoxes. These verses thereby resist
any single interpretation. This quality is evident in the following ġazal, in
which the poet alludes to wine and juxtaposes the Arabs with the Persians:
[1] Happy that day when I go from this ruined stopping place.
I seek the soul’s repose and I’m going in pursuit of the darling.
[2] Although aware that the stranger might not get anywhere,
I am proceeding by the perfume of that disheveled tress.
[3] With ailing feet and a powerless heart, like the breeze
I move in longing for that swaying cypress.
[4] Of the terror of Alexander’s prison my heart sickened.
Let me pack my bags and go to the realm of Solomon.
[5] In his way, if going must be like a pen with the tip of my head,
With wound-enduring heart and weeping eye will I go.
262 Avicenna, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā): a Critical Translation-Commentary and
Analysis of the Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the Dānish Nāma-i ʿalāʾi
(The Book of Scientific Knowledge), trans. Parviz Morewedge, Persian heritage series (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 60.
263 The perfection of style and majority of these ġazals in the Divan strengthens the scholarly
speculations that suggest the two ġazals in question belong to the early stages of the poet’s career.
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[6] I vowed, should I one day emerge from this grief,
I would go to the wine temple in glee and singing a song;
[7] In desiring him, like a dancing mote
To the lip of the source of the dazzling sun I would go.
[8] The Arabs have no sorrow for the grief of the heavy laden;
O Persians, some help that I may go happily and with ease,
[9]And if like Háfiz I do not follow the route out of the desert,
I will go in the companionship of the party of the Ásaf of the Ages.264
An urge for escape permeates this ġazal. The poet wishes to leave the world
that he perceives as a ruined abode in which the soul (ǧān) feels encaged. The
expression of this overwhelming discontent finds explicit articulation in the
radīf of this ġazal ‘biravam’ repeating the wish for escape.265 This soul seeks a
path to the beloved (ǧānān). In the second couplet, the seeker expresses that he
feels like a stranger, yet he recognizes clues that he hopes will lead him to his
homeland. In describing these clues, Ḥāfiẓ uses the Persian word bū, which de-
notes both ‘perfume’ and ‘hope’.266 The scent metaphors, like the light meta-
phors, represent the continual presence of the transcendent in the timeless act
of emanation. The imagery of a disheveled tress from which this perfume per-
meates the world illustrates the seeker’s attraction toward the object of pur-
suit.267 This attraction is intellectual insofar as it is based on the ability to
appreciate higher goodness. In the fifth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ illustrates the difficulties
that the seeker encounters on his path. It is important to note that, although
this intelligible trace of the incorporeal realm is perceivable in the natural
world, it cannot be fully enjoyed there. The interruption of immanence of the
transcendent in the world makes the world resemble a prison for the soul – the
Prison of Alexander (zindān-i Sikandar), as Ḥāfiẓ describes it. The poet wishes
to flee to the kingdom of Salomon (mulk-i Sulaīmān)268 – a metaphor either for
poet’s literal place of origin (Shiraz) or his extramundane homeland.
264 Avery, CCCLI, p. 431.
265 Making use of a complete word as radīf (rhyming word) shows the poet’s readiness to sac-
rifice aesthetic perfection for direct communication of emotion.
266 Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Tehran: ʿElmī va Farhangī, 1384/
2005), vol. 2: p. 1013.
267 On scent metaphors in Neoplatonic tradition see p. 50 above.
268 Interpreters who take historical approaches read these two metaphors as a reference to
the two cities of Yazd (Alexander’s Prison) and Shiraz (Kingdom of Solomon) See: Ḥusaīn ʿAlī
Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, 4 vols. (Tehran: Našr-e Nau, 1367/1988), pp. 1479–1489. And,
Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan, pp. 119–124. However, the fact remains that these assumptions lack
sufficient historical support, as Esteʿlāmī shows in his comment on this ġazal: Esteʿlāmī, Dars-
e Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 2: p. 921. Furthermore, it should be noted that, even if this poem had been written
only to encourage a patron to help the poet move from Yazd back to Shiraz, it is the rhetoric of
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In the eighth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ uses a play on words to change the tone of the
poem. The two words tāzyān (‘the riders’ or ‘the Arabs’) and pārsāyān (‘the vir-
tuous’ or ‘the Persians’) are juxtaposed to each other. Whereas the poet expects
to receive no sympathy from the first group, he anticipates assistance from
the second. The mention of a wine-house (translated above as ‘wine temple’) in
the sixth couplet colors the word pārsāyān. This couplet brings remarkable var-
iation to the ġazal by suggesting that the path to the transcendent can be
enjoyed.269
After the sixth and eighth couplets change the tone of the poem, the form
of the journey is modified as well. In the seventh couplet, Ḥāfiẓ employs the
motif of the mote, an object that strives for the sun. The desire to reach the sun
is expressed in the metaphorical imagery of the sun as a fountain toward which
the mote strives and from which it wishes to drink.270 The intoxicating influ-
ence of wine transforms the upward movement into a joyous dance.
In another ġazal in the Divan, the imagery of the mote and the sun appears
again. In accordance with its intellectual context, love is described as motivat-
ing the act of elevation: ‘You are not less than a mote. Do not be degraded.
Practise love, | So that whirling now this side up, now that, to the private cham-
ber of the sun you might arrive.’271 In the couplet above, wine, love and the nat-
ural beauty are present, whereas pain is absent. Even the sun is connected to
love through the choice of the verb. The compound verb that Ḥāfiẓ uses here is
‘mihr varzīdan.’ In Persian, one of the words that signifies the sun is mihr. Yet
mihr also means ‘love’, and ‘mihr varzīdan’ means ‘making love’. In his choice
of words, the poet articulates how natural it is that practicing love and ascend-
ing to the sun are one and the same.
As we have seen thus far, it is only in the first two ġazals that the element
of pleasure is absent in the poems.272 In the ascending process of abstraction,
ascent to the transcendent that is employed to make the poet’s point – without this, the poem
doesn’t make any sense. It should be noted that allegorical poetic usage of these metaphors
after Ḥāfiẓ can be seen in Ṣāʾib of Tabriz 17th CE. He explicitly uses the metaphor of
Alexander’s Prison for the realm of matter. See in: Ṣāʾib Tabrīzī, Kollīyāt-e Ṣāʾib Tabrīzī, 2nd
ed. (Tehran: Ḫaīyām, 1373/1994), pp. 508–509. Ġazal: 1415, couplet: 2. The twofold meaning of
these metaphors has been used in Persian literature, but the presence of other metaphors in
this poem supports the possibility of a reading that goes beyond the mere expression of per-
sonal problems.
269 In the second and third chapters of this study we examine this aspect of the Divan.
270 In Faust v. 1086, we saw Goethe’s illustration of the desire to reach the sun and the sen-
sual experience of drinking its light. In the Divan, this transcultural ancient image appears to
illustrate the same intense longing.
271 Avery, CCCLXXX, 4, p. 463.
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on the other hand, stress was placed on the painful experience of being in a
world in which the transcendent truth is absent.
I.3.4 Masīḥā (Christ) and the Sun
To discuss the significance of Masīḥā – Christ – in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, we need to
consider Christ’s significance in the poet’s cultural horizon. Earlier, I mentioned
that Ḥāfiẓ associates Christ with the sun.273 As Wohlleben points out, the poet
sees Christ as ‘besonders reiner Mensch’274 on account of his immaculate concep-
tion with the emanation (fayażān)275 of the Holy Spirit (Rūḥ ul-Qudus), which is
the ‘grace and power’276 of the Holy Ghost that makes Christ Rūḥullāh or the
‘Soul of God’ in Islamic theology.277 In this context, Christ is the second human
being after Adam who was born directly from God’s soul. The Quranic verses rel-
evant to this subject can be found in the Surah al-Nisāʾ (Women).278
It is noteworthy that, in the Qurʾān, the titles Word of God and Soul of God
are reserved only for Christ.279 This exclusive characteristic of Christ in the
Qurʾān reflects itself in the views of Aḥmad ibn Ḥayāt, an Islamic rationalist
theologian of the Muʿtazili school of the ninth century CE, who ‘held that there
are two deities: one, the creator and eternal deity, and the other, the created
one which is Jesus Christ, the son of Mary. He regarded Messiah as the Son of
God. On account of this belief he was considered to have renounced Islam’.280
These extraordinary characteristics of Christ reflect themselves in the convic-
tion that, Jesus ascended to the house of the sun.281
273 See the citation and explanations on p. 30.
274 See footnote to Wohlleben p. 52.
275 See in: Clarke, 123, 9, p. 259. Here, Clarke translates fiyż as ‘bounty’. Ḥāfiẓ sees the power
in Christ in the contribution of emanative grace of the Holy Ghost: Fiyż-i Rūḥ ul-Qudus
276 See G. Payne’s translation in: Arberry, Fifty Poems of Ḥāfiẓ: Text and Translations
Collected and Made, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur J. Arberry, p. 99.
277 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: pp. 326–327.
278 The Glorious Kur’an, trans. Abdallah Yousuf Ali, 3rd. ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1938), 04,
171, p. 233–234.
279 Other prophets have titles in the Qurʾān which depict them in a relation to God and not as
an extension and will of God as soul and word. For instance, Abraham has the title of God’s
friend: Ḫalīl ullāh. And Moses’s title is ‘the one who converses with God’: Kalīm ullāh
280 Mir Valiuddin, ‘Mu’tazilism’, in A history of Muslim philosophy: With short accounts of
other disciplines and the modern renaissance in Muslim lands, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 211.
281 See in Qurʾān (04: 158) ‘Nay, God raised him up | Unto Himself; and God | Is Exalted in
Power, Wise’. The Glorious Kur’an, p. 230.
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In the poet’s view, whenever we think of miracles and the final ascent of
Christ, we must consider that the humanity of Christ is dissolved in the grace of
God. This privileged state is reserved for him and whomever else God may
choose.282 Ḥāfiẓ recognizes the magnificence of those who, like Christ,283 have
dissolved the boundaries of their individuality. He believes that they may expe-
rience a divine existence – but if so, ‘by grace of the Holy Spirit’ rather than by
their own efforts. Yet it is vitally important to note that Ḥāfiẓ does not in any
way personally identify with the Masīḥā; he considers himself a simple human
being.
In two different ġazals in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ treats the difference between
Masīḥā and others regarding their respective desires for transcending to the
sphere of the sun. Since the term that Ḥāfiẓ uses in the following ġazal is diffi-
cult to capture in translation, I make use of German and English translations
alongside the transliteration of the original Persian:
Masīḥā-yi muǧarrad rā barāzad
Ki bā ḫuršīd sāzad ham-visā̱qī284
Mit Sonnen ein Bündnis zu schließen, geziemet
Dem Herrn Jesus nur allein285
The lonely (un-married) Masīḥā, it suiteth
That, fellowship with the sun, he should make286
Muǧarrad is the word that Ḥāfiẓ uses to describe Christ (Masīḥā). This word is
originally Arabic, but it is commonly used in Persian to mean ‘single’ or ‘un-
married.’ It also signifies being lonely, and literally it means ‘naked’ and
‘pure’.287 But in the context of Sufism and especially ḥikmat, the term is best
translated as ‘abstract’ – i.e., being purified in the process of negation of all
that is attributive, corruptible and ʿāriżī or being stripped to the essence (ẕāt).
In Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, a canonical Sufi text written by Huǧvīrī in the tenth century,
we learn two major points: first, the writers of the Sufi tradition use the term
muǧarrad exclusively for Christ; and, second, in this context, muǧarrad does
282 See Ḫānlarī, 136, 7; Avery, CXXXVI, 7; Clarke, 123, 9, p. 259.
283 In the context of the Divan, based on instances in which Christ is mentioned together with
Ḥallāǧ, it is most probable that Ḥāfiẓ means Manṣūr-i Ḥallāǧ, born 857 C. E. in Ṭūr, a village in
Shiraz, and crucified on the charges of blasphemy, heresy, sorcery in Bagdad on March 26, 922.
284 Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 460, 13, p. 323.
285 Hammer-Purgstall, XL, p. 417.
286 Clarke, 534, 13, p. 876 (my emphasis).
287 See Pourjavady’s explanation of the term Taǧrīd in: Aḥmad Ġazzālī, Sawāniḥ, ed.
Nasrollah Pourjavady (Based on Hellmut Ritter’s edition) (Tehran: Entešārāt-e Bonyād-e
Farhang-e Iran, 1359/1981), p. 89.
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not mean unmarried or lonely. Huǧvīrī quotes Ǧunayd, a prominent Sufi of the
ninth century:
Sufism is founded on eight qualities exemplified in eight Apostles: the generosity of
Abraham, who sacrificed his son; the acquiescence of Ismael, who submitted to the com-
mand of God and gave up his dear life; the patience of Job, who patiently endured the
affliction of worms and the jealousy of the Merciful; the symbolism of Zacharias, to whom
God said, ‘Thou shalt not speak unto men for three days save by signs’ (Kor. iii. 36), and
again to the same effect, ‘When he called upon his Lord with a secret invocation’ (Kor.
xix, 2); the strangerhood of John, who was a stranger in his own country and an alien to
his own kin amongst whom he lived; the pilgrimhood of Jesus, who was so detached
therein from worldly things that he kept only a cup and a comb – the cup he threw away
when he saw a man drinking water in the palms of his hands, and the comb likewise when
he saw another man using his fingers288
In the original Persian, Huǧvīrī writes: ‘va ba sīyāḥat ba ʿĪsā ki andar sīyāḥat-i
ḫud čunān muǧarrad būd ki [. . .]’.289 We see clearly that the attribute muǧarrad
is applied to Christ three hundred years before Ḥāfiẓ and refers to his ability to
negatively purify himself – or as Nicholson translated it, to detach himself from
whatever is unnecessary and other than God.
It is evident that these terminological details were not considered in the
above translations of Ḥāfiẓ’s couplet. Therefore, taǧrīd (‘abstraction’) is not rec-
ognized as a term and the translations lack an important semantic aspect. In
light of the terminological context, we may infer that in the Divan the quest for
the fellowship of the sun – the quest to become its housemate or roommate, as
the word ham-vis̱āqī suggests – is only suitable for Christ. Moreover, the pro-
cess of profound abstraction and purification from the material realm is re-
served for those whom God chooses. Purification cannot be achieved through
extreme asceticism or rejection of the mundane and bodily concerns, as early
Sufis such as Huǧvīrī believed.
Now that we have the necessary understanding of the term taǧrīd and its
relation to Christ in the Divan, we may turn to the ġazal from which it was
cited. The poem describes the state of separation: ‘From not seeing the be-
loved, blood became my heart; | Now evil befall the days of separation!’290
Earlier, we saw that this state was compared to a prison cell. Now, in addition
to the state of separation, the text provides us with further contextual
288 Alí B. ‘Uthmàn Al-Jullàbí Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on
Sufism, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson, trans. Reynold A. Nicholson, 2nd ed., E. J. W. Gibb Memorial
(London: Lowe and Brydone, 1959), Chapter III. On Sufism pp. 39–40 (my emphasis).
289 ʿAlī ibn ʿUṯmān Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1336/1957), p. 45.
290 Clarke, 534, 3, p. 875.
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information through which to understand the poem – namely, the poet’s age
and his view of the world: ‘Back to my recollection, youthfulness bring–– |
The sound of the harp and the hand-waving of the Sāḳī.’291 The speaker is old
but not blind to the pleasures of life. He even advises himself to be moderate
in drinking wine: ‘O daughter of the vine! the pleasant bride, thou art; | But,
sometimes, worthy of divorce, thou art.’292 Here again, Ḥāfiẓ expresses the
view that pleasure is possible even in the state of separation from the beloved:
‘O minstrel, sweet singer, sweet speaker! prepare | An ’Irāḳ note in Persian
verse.’293 At this point, we may turn to the next ġazal in the Divan in which
the sun and Christ are present.
In this next ġazal, the poet’s gaze is fixed on the night sky as he intro-
spectively reflects on the different meanings that the sky and the heavenly
bodies have for him. The first couplet describes the state of feeling the prox-
imity of death as the poet looks at the slender crescent of the new moon re-
sembling a sickle’s blade; the shape of this heavenly body reminds the poet
of judgment day (the season of harvest): ‘I saw the green meadow of the
Firmament and the sickle of the new moon. | I remembered my own sowing
and the time of reaping.’294 In this dark night, Ḥāfiẓ sets the stage for the
presence of the sun; he describes his time on earth as the night and his ap-
proaching death as the dawn: ‘I said, “O luck, you were sleep and the sun
has come up.” | It answered, “In spite of all this, do not despair of the foreor-
dained.”’295 The poem’s narrator – one of several voices in the poem – con-
trasts the everlasting life of the heavenly bodies to the short lives of human
beings. After death, he reflects, one has to stand before the judgment of the
absolute. At this point, another voice speaks of an event in the past that may
be the origin of hope. After this voice revives the poet’s hope, the voice men-
tions Christ and the sun as reasons for entertaining such hope.
291 Clarke, 534, 6.
292 Clarke, 534, 12.
293 Clarke, 534, 5. For explanation of the musical term (’Irāḳ note) or ṣaut-i ʿIrāqī see p. 29
above. It should be noted that this ġazal is an instance in the Divan in which Ḥāfiẓ displays his
mastery in emulation of the works of other great poets. He writes in the same rhyme and the
same meter as his predecessor ʿIrāqī did in two ġazals where ʿIrāqī also uses the very words
Masīḥā-yi muǧarrad, and ham-vis̱āqī. It is worth mentioning that ʿIrāqī’s usage of this word is
in the context of Sufi-love. No poet before him used this word as frequently as ʿIrāqī. See the
following two ġazals: Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, ed. Nasrīn
Muḥtašam (Tehran: Zawwār, 1372/1994), pp. 71–72; 146–147.
294 Avery, CCCXCIX, 1, p. 484.
295 Avery, CCCXCIX, 2, p. 484.
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Ānčinān rau šab-i raḥlat ču Masīḥā ba falak
Kaz čirāq-i tu ba ḫuršīd rasad ṣad partau.296
On the night of departure, go to the heavens like Messiah,
So that from your lamp a hundred rays might reach the sun.297
In der Nacht der (großen) Reise mach dich, so rein wie der Messias, auf in den Himmel,
So daß von deinem Licht zur Sonne hundert Strahlen gelangen.298
Although the poet is anxious about losing time, since he hasn’t yet attained de-
tachment in this life, the guiding voice connects Christ’s ascent to the sun to an
event in the past that may be understood as an allusion to God’s breathing life
into Adam (Qurʾān, 15:29). Death is referred to as a state in which the soul
(breath of the divine) goes back to its original state of purity. Therefore, there is
hope that the soul after death will be as pure as Christ’s soul during his life.
Remarkably, the poet is not in a position to educate others; he listens to the
voice along with his readers. In the seventh couplet, this voice goes a step fur-
ther by criticizing the notion that the heavens are more elevated than humans
and that humans should reach for them. This juxtaposition of heaven and
human alludes to the story of original sin in which (according to the Islamic
tradition) Adam and Eve eat the forbidden grain – wheat. Interestingly, the
poet satirizes the event by replacing wheat with barely corn, a much cheaper
grain – and, therefore, one eaten by poor – during the time of the poem’s com-
position: ‘Tell the heavens not to deck themselves out in all this pomp, because
in love | The moon’s harvest would fetch one barely corn, and the cluster of
Pleiades, two.’299 The guiding voice belittles the heavenly bodies in front of hu-
mans. It mentions that humans are not only not repentant of their original sin,
but that they are ready to give up paradise for an even lesser price – it is the
only way for them to become capable of love.
We face the following questions: why is the poet himself still inclined to a
path of purity, despite that the guiding voice tries to open his eyes to another
perspective? Does the voice in fact advise the poet to turn his back to religion
by abandoning the ascending approach that entails ascetic negative methods?
The following couplet of this ġazal belittles the heavenly bodies and suggests:
‘From your mole may the Evil Eye be far, because on the chequer-board of beauty
296 See Ḫānlarī, 399, 3. See also Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 407, 3. In Qazvīnī & Ġanī’s edition the Masīḥ
is described with the adjective muǧarrad.
297 Avery, CCCXCIX, 3, p. 484.
298 Wohlleben, 399, 3, p. 508.
299 Avery, CCCXCIX, 7.
300 Ibid., 6.
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| It has moved a pawn by which the moon and the sun lost the wager.’300 A new
set of metaphors emerge. The sun and the moon that belong to the ascending con-
text are juxtaposed to the mole on the face of the beloved.301 In the discourse of
ascent, we know that the sun stands for the Beauty and Truth and that the moon
represents a lower level of emanation. In this couplet, the mole of the beloved is
compared to the player who starts a game of chess by moving a pawn – the
most insignificant piece on the board. With this move, the beloved beats the
sun and the moon. From the verses we have analyzed thus far, therefore, we
can infer that the mole of the beloved is a modification of the metaphor of the
sun, redefined to reflect a new understanding of the relation between the
transcendent and the world. We are now in a position to answer the first
question above: the poet confronts his own finitude whenever he looks to-
ward the sun, yet he is also aware of other ways of grasping the relation be-
tween the transcendent and the world. The beauty of the ġazal is that the
poet is not depicted as someone who has purified himself in the path of ab-
straction; in other words, the poet is represented neither as a teacher of new
ways nor as an ardent follower of the older method. Rather, the reader relates
to him and experiences the flow of the verses in real time.
The last couplet provides an answer to our second question. The voice of
the guide invites us to be proud of original sin – and thus of our inclination to
beauty and love.302 Does Ḥāfiẓ thereby mean to critique religion in the form of
ḥikmat and Sufism? ‘The fire of hypocritical asceticism will burn up the grain
heap of the Faith; | Throw off the woollen cassock, Háfiz, and go.’303 As we see
in this couplet, the voice warns against a false notion of the method of pursuit
of truth that the narrator appears to endorse. This couplet concludes the ġazal
by characterizing asceticism – and its symbol, the woolen garment (ḫirqa-yi
pašmīna) – as the wrong notion, one that jeopardizes the common understand-
ing of religion (dīn).
300 Ibid., 6.
301 In the last chapter we will turn to the imagery of the face of the Beloved which includes
the mole.
302 Consider that in the Enneads and Islamic Neoplatonic views the inclination of the soul to
the body is considered the reason for the fall; therefore, the ascending path to return includes
abstraction and disregarding the body. See the Ennead IV. 8. 7. Farrukh points out that, ac-
cording to Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā, the entanglement of the soul with the material realm and its neglect
of the heavenly glory was the reason for the fall: Farrukh, ‘Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, p. 297.
303 Avery, CCCXCIX, 8, p. 484.
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Gūšvār-i zar-u laʿl arči girāndārad gūš
Daur-i ḫūbī guẕarān ast naṣyḥat bišinau
The ear may be heavy with earrings of ruby and gold,
But beauty’s season is transient. note the warning.304
Ḥāfiẓ’s self-criticism is articulated by the guiding voice who points out that he
neglects the beauty of this world for the material rewards of extreme negation.
The voice sarcastically refers to the weight of the expensive earrings while the
poet metonymically alludes to becoming hard of hearing (girāndārad gūš) after
being rewarded for submission to suppressive ascetic rulers.305 The contrast be-
tween the desirable rewards and the ability to hear admonition is the key to
appreciating this couplet’s social critique.
Thus, Ḥāfiẓ does not turn his back to the transcendent itself, but rather
criticizes the negative and excluding approach toward it. Furthermore, he sees
a great danger in the pursuit of this path taken to an extreme. Such a pursuit is
only for the few chosen ones, such as Christ. For normal human beings such as
the poet himself, the process of abstraction must be seen in relation to the
breath of God, which separates from the body after death. The fifth couplet con-
veys the reason for Adam and Eve’s proud choice of beauty over abstraction.
This choice is what Ḥāfiẓ sees as the true religion, which negative approaches
can burn and corrupt.
One of the beauties of the Divan that differentiates it from works like
those of Šāh Niʿmatullāh, a Sufi-poet contemporary to Ḥāfiẓ, is that the Divan
contains a critique of social and ethical problems. Such critique often takes
the form of the poet’s self-criticism or criticism directed to him by others. The
reader of the Divan may try to imitate the abstract Christ, turning away from
the pleasures of the beauty of the world. By doing so, the reader sympathizes
with the poet and progresses through the poet’s own stages of self-criticism.
He thereby arrives at a new perspective and sees the possibility of achieving
detachment after death, as the soul returns to its abstract form. In fact, the
Divan does not abandon the possibility of giving up life in favor of experienc-
ing such an abstract state. In the following section, I address this issue in the
Divan.
304 Avery, CCCXCIX, 5, p. 484.
305 Compare to ʿAbd ul-Ḥusaīn Zarrīnkūb, ‘Ešārātī dar ḥāšīe-ye Dīvān-e Ḥāfiẓ’, in Naqš bar
āb (Tehran: Muʿīn, 1368/1989), p. 405.; Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 3: p. 1692.
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I.3.5 Self-Annihilation as the Last Hope for Ascent and Union
According to the Platonic tradition, the path of purification runs against the ul-
timate barrier – the soul is trapped inside the body and is constantly deceived
and misled by it. In the Phaedo, we saw that philosophy was defined as practice
of death and as abstracting the soul from the origin of error. We also pointed
out that Socrates abandoned hope of experiencing the transcendent truth
within the body306; suicide presented itself as a way to achieve the abstraction
that the seeker of knowledge strives for.
Yet the seeker of truth who resorts to suicide alters his ability to perceive
the truth, because he reverses the typical passivity of death. The main argu-
ment of Socrates against suicide stresses this act of will:
I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain
times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why when a man is
better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the kindness of
another.307
Destroying something that belongs to the gods and not the mortals is unlawful,
Socrates thought. Even in this philosophical text, this law remains a mystery;
philosophy can do nothing other than provide an analogy:
I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any
real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner
who has no right to open the door and run away; this is a great mystery, not to be easily
apprehended. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a
chattel [sic] of theirs.
Do you not agree?
Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.
And if one of your chattels [sic], an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of put-
ting itself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that it should
die, would you not be angry with it, and would you not punish it if you could?
Certainly, replied Cebes.308
The same urge tempts the poet in the Divan in many cases – namely, to shorten
the path to transcendent truth through an act of free will. This problem appears
in the Divan in a number of ġazals and takes the form of a dialogue between the
poet and the beloved or simply as the poet’s self-criticism.
306 See Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 417. 66 e.
307 Ibid., pp. 411–412, 62, a (my emphasis).
308 Ibid., p. 412. b & c.
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The seeker of union with the transcendent is ready to sacrifice his life in
order to fully experience its Goodness: ‘By his soul, if my life were at my dis-
posal, | It would be the least of his slave’s offerings.’309 However, what holds
him back is that he (like Socrates) does not consider himself the owner of his
own life.
The other issue concerns the act of free will regarding something that the
poet does not see as his own. Ḥāfiẓ sees the matter in the context of the relation
between an act of free will and elevation to a higher state. In the verses that fol-
low, this problem finds poetic articulation in the image of kissing the beloved:
When my life became the sacrifice for Thy lips I established the fancy
That a drop of its limpid water to the palate of ours falleth.
The fancy! Thy tress spake saying: ‘O Lover! make not (thy) life the means (of desire);
‘For, of this kind, many a pray into the snare of ours falleth.’310
In his fantasy, the poet is about to give up his life to join the beloved in union.
But the beloved, looking at his proud face, responds that his life is not a rare
gift at all – the beloved has countless lives at her disposal. Furthermore, the
poet is wrong to suppose that an offering will suffice to attain union. As I men-
tioned earlier, even in the case of the poet’s highest example, i.e., Christ, the
ascent is not the result of any direct action on the part of the seeker himself.
Offering life to the source of life is futile – not for lack of free will, but rather
because there can never be anything greater than the transcendent. Nothing
can force the transcendent to react in a certain way.311
In the Sufi context, the term for ultimate abstraction and emptiness is
fanāʾ – annihilation. In the twentieth chapter of Šahāb ud-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ
Suhravardī’s (539–632/1145–1234) ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, we find a categorization of
such abstraction in two levels: first, there is the outward abstraction in which
the seeker of the truth experiences unity with ḥaqq taʿālā.312 In other words, the
seeker should be unable to distinguish ḥaqq taʿālā’s will from his own. In
the second stage of abstraction – the inward fanāʾ –, all existence is dissolved
in the One.313 The self-knowledge attained in the first stage allows the will of
309 Avery, CCCCXXXIII, 1, p. 523.
310 Clarke, 217, 5–6, p. 399. See: Avery, CCCCXXXIII, 5–6, p. 523.
311 Consider that in Neoplatonic philosophy the transcendent can logically never be influ-
enced. As we discussed earlier, the reason for the One being named the Necessary Existent by
Ibn Sīnā (a Neoplatonist) was that it cannot be consequent to anything.
312 Abu ̄ Ḥafṣ Suhravardī uses the word Transcendent Truth (Ḥaqq Taʿālā).
313 ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad Suhrawardī, ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, 2 vols. (Cairo: Maktab aṯ-
Ṯaqāfa ad-Dīnīya), p. 171. Compare to: Shaikh Shahab-ud-Din ´Umar B. Muhammad
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the individual to fade into that of the One. Thereby, the seeker of truth’s per-
sonal wish for ascent must also fade into the will of the One.
This theme finds another expression in the Divan in the form of self-
criticism, as Ḥāfiẓ speaks to himself: ‘Life is base coin, Háfiz: | For festive con-
fetti it’s not good.’314
With such knowledge, the seeker of the truth has only one choice – to
wait for the will and mercy of the beloved. Or as Socrates said in the quote
above, to ‘wait for the kindness of another’ to free the seeker from the world
in which absolute knowledge of the truth can never be attained. Ḥāfiẓ illus-
trates the experience of waiting for union and death in the following couplet:
‘This borrowed life the Friend entrusted to Háfiz, | One day I might see His
face, and this life surrender.’315 The surrendering of force, as we demon-
strated, is the result of the self-knowledge that Ḥāfiẓ has regarding the na-
ture of the transcendent truth. In his symbolic metaphorical mode of
articulation, he conveys this aspect of his world-view to his readers.
I.4 Body and Soul in Direct Pursuit of Knowledge of the
Transcendent in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
I.4.1 Direct Negative Pursuit of Transcendent Truth
Before proceeding to the next chapter, I summarize the findings of this study
thus far. I have argued that both texts illustrate a negative method of attaining
knowledge based on exclusion of the corporeal realm. This method accords with
Neoplatonic epistemology and ethics which consider the body a mixture of soul
and matter, each striving in opposite directions. The soul seeks to ascend and
exclude the material realm so that it can reunite with the ultimate truth.
I.4.2 Light Metaphors and the Call for Ascent
In both texts we encounter a plethora of metaphors of heavenly bodies and
light that draw on the Platonic tradition. The relation between these metaphors
and the influence they have on their observers bring to light one way of
Suhrawardy, The ´Awarif-u`l-Ma´arif, trans. H. Wilberforce Clarke (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf, 1979), p. 196.
314 Avery, CLIX, 7, p. 215.
315 Avery, CCCXLIII, 7, p. 422.
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evaluating the relation between body and soul on the path to acquire knowl-
edge. In section I.2 (discussing Faust) and sections I.3.3 and I.3.4 (discussing
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan), I showed that the sight of the sun and the moon gives rise to a
desire for ascent. In the following chapter, I trace how these metaphors evolve
against the background of the body and soul relationship in the two texts.
I.4.3 Suicide as a Failed Method of Ascent
In the scene Nacht of Faust, the heavenly bodies kindle Faust’s desire to ascend
to the truth and address the full moon. They also shape metaphorical expres-
sions of Faust’s wish to fly toward the setting sun and drink from its eternal
light.316 We also observed that each attempt to reach directly for the heavenly
body results in pain and failure; and Faust’s escape into fantasy only results in
further failure.
In Faust, this circular pattern signifies a crisis, which Faust attempts to re-
solve through suicide. His suicide attempt is an expression of his despair at the
possibility of realizing his desire of direct ascent while alive. In other words, his
suicide attempt results in the realization that the individual can never attain to
his goal qua individual; he needs to be annihilated in the extramundane non-
individuated truth.
In the Divan, we find a similar desire for direct ascension to the sun as a
metaphor for the transcendent truth. The negative method of abstraction of the
soul from the body results in similar reoccurring experiences of pain and alien-
ation from the world.317 The limitations of the body make it impossible for the
seeker of knowledge to attain to his desired level of ascent. This problem brings
the question of suicide, once again, to the foreground. Yet Ḥāfiẓ refutes suicide
with arguments resembling those of Socrates in Phaedo.318 Furthermore,
Ḥāfiẓ’s poems show that the absolute abstraction from the body is reserved for
the Masīḥā; although it is conceivable that the Holy Ghost bestow this grace on
others, the abstraction in question cannot be achieved through a negative pro-
cess in life.319
316 For textual articulations of the desire to drink the light of the sun in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ,
see p. 77 above. Regarding this metaphorical expression in Goethe’s Faust, see p. 64 above.
317 See the ġazals cited and analyzed on p 70; 72 above.
318 See §I.3.5 (‘Self-Annihilation as the Last Hope for Ascent and Union’).
319 See §I.3.4 (‘Masīḥā (Christ) and the Sun’).
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I.4.4 A Critical Look into the Method of Seeking Knowledge
Both texts present poetic articulations of a rising consciousness about problems
that arise from methods of radical purification and exclusion. In the scene Nacht,
a conflict is dramatized between (a) a world-view based on the active immanence
of the transcendent in the world; and (b) Faust’s multiple failed attempts at as-
cent for which he holds the body responsible. This conflict shows that Faust’s
actions and views at this stage in the drama are deeply grounded in a radically
transcendent view of the world – a view that keeps him segregated from nature
and isolated from people. By the end of the scene Osterspaziergang, however,
Faust becomes aware of the failure of the method of negative acquisition of
knowledge. In the next chapter, I elaborate on Faust’s process of leaving this
method behind.
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, sensory experiences of natural beauty oppose the
method that seeks to exclude everything other than the One. A voice speaks to
Ḥāfiẓ, warning him about the problems of radical ascetic exclusion.320 Then the
poet himself expresses his critique of this ascetic outlook. He realizes that these
extreme ascetic views have filled his world with pain and prevented him from
appreciating beauty. Ḥāfiẓ seeks the help of the Persians – from whom he
expects sympathy with his human situation – to find an aesthetically pleasing
path through the world.321
In both texts, we find an expression of a need for external assistance:
Faust seeks the help of the souls reigning between heaven and earth, and
Ḥāfiẓ seeks the help of the Persians. In the chapter that follows, I explore in
both texts the process of shifting away from a transcendent world-view. I also
investigate the specific mediations introduced in this process and the state of
the body and soul.
320 See the analysis of the presence of this voice on pp. 81ff above.
321 See p. 77 above. Compare to Clarke, 391, 5, pp. 669–670.
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II Toward Life
II.1 The Process of Turning Toward Life in Faust
In his commentary on Faust, Jochen Schmidt remarks that most scholarly anal-
ysis of the Studierzimmer scenes focuses on the so-called wager scene. Thus,
scholars focus less on the process of transition that opens the world of the
drama to the appearance of the poodle and to the ambiguous character
Mephisto with his multifaceted gestalt.1 In this section, I trace this process of
transition and analyze the turn from the negative Platonic direct approach to
the truth. I also investigate light metaphors in this context. I then focus on the
world that undergoes this change and follow the dramatic process by which
Mephisto’s presence actively contributes to Faust’s turn toward life.
II.1.1 Reevaluations and Modifications
Since his first dialogue in the scene Nacht, Faust’s main endeavor has been
reevaluating attempts at seeking knowledge in various fields – cosmology, epis-
temology and ethics, each inseparable from the others. Although this part of
the drama was present in the earliest stages of its composition, it could not join
the final version of 1808 unless the main character underwent an important
modification. In Faust frühe Fassung, Faust was not depicted as an aged man.
This depiction first appears in Faust die Tragödie erster Teil and intensifies the
significance of Faust’s self-reevaluation and his claims to vast knowledge and
life experience. Now, the main character is an old ‘Doktor’ who spent a lifetime
seeking knowledge and self-knowledge. Yet he questions the fruits of his stud-
ies – maybe there are none, he thinks.2
In this section, I explore two aspects of Faust’s process of reevaluation: (a)
his turn from the direct approach to acquiring knowledge via construction of
the concept of mediation; and (b) possible modifications in his view of the rela-
tion between transcendent truth and the world. In exploring (b) I investigate
the modifications of light and color metaphors relative to their use in the
Platonic tradition – the origin of Faust’s direct and ascending approach, which
we investigated in the previous chapter.
1 Jochen Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen - Werk - Wirkung,
Arbeitsbuc̈her zur Literaturgeschichte (Mun̈chen: Beck, 1999), pp. 118–119.
2 Compare to ibid., p. 154.
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II.1.1.1 Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation
Faust’s reevaluations in the opening of the scene Nacht lead him to a series of
attempts to summon a soul, whose union would bring Faust experiences of as-
cent.3 These attempts are first illustrated in verse 394 and 418. He hopes that
magic – ‘Durch Geistes Kraft und Mund’4 – will help him find a way to realize
his imagined secrets of nature. Throughout this stage, Faust does not look for
guidance or instruction from an intermediary spirit. Rather, Faust aspires to
summon the most elevated spirit, since he considers himself similar to the crea-
tor of the universe – ‘Ebenbild der Gottheit’.5 This phrase references Genesis (1:
26–27), according to which the human being was created after God’s likeness
and is the image of God.6 Faust’s self-image becomes clearer in his constant de-
nial of the Erdgeist’s rejection.7
Yet as he reaches for the macrocosm sign and the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust makes
compromises and adjusts his expectations: ‘Du Geist der Erde bist mir näher’.8
Faust evaluates his experience with the ‘Erdgeist’ only after Wagner brings him
back to his senses; Faust becomes aware that ‘die Erscheinung war so riesen-
groß, | Daß ich mich recht als Zwerg empfinden sollte.’9 Subsequently, Faust
expresses his desire for a mediating guide – ‘Wer lehrt mich? was soll ich mei-
den?’10 – and takes a step toward the formation of the idea of an intermediary
agent that will later appear as Mephisto.11 This emerging knowledge, however,
pales in comparison to the pain of his failure, which forces him to find fault in
his human condition rather than his particular approach. The text warns us
about Faust’s pending impulsive reaction: ‘Soll ich gehorchen jenem Drang?’12
In a self-reflective moment, Faust then describes this reaction as an interruption
3 See p. 52 above.
4 V. 378.
5 See v. 516; 614.
6 As in Luther’s translation: ‘ein Bild, das uns gleich sei’ (Moses, 1: 26). Compare to Arens,
Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 94. Arens holds that the moment that Faust is rejected by
the Geist der Erde is a turning point in Faust’s life – a point of departure from ‘a world to
which he neither can, nor wants to return.’
7 The ‘Erdgeist’ explicitly and repeatedly rejects Faust and reminds him of his limited horizon:
‘Da bin ich! – Welch erbärmlich Grauen | Faßt Übermenschen dich!’ (V. 489–490) See also:
‘Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, | Nicht mir!’ (V. 512–513)
8 V. 461.
9 V. 612–613.
10 V. 630 (my emphasis).
11 This becomes clear when we consider that Mephisto, in his second visit, lets Faust know
that he had been observing Faust as he was about to commit suicide.
12 V. 631.
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of a process: ‘Ach! unsre Taten selbst, so gut als unsre Leiden, | Sie hemmen unsres
Lebens Gang.’13 Once again, Faust perceives his human condition as a limitation.14
Filled with intense contempt for the ‘Sorge’, Faust forgets about mediation
and takes his most extreme step yet toward the realm of ether – one that almost
costs him his life.15 Faust’s suicide attempt is the culmination of a series of ac-
tions that he takes in accordance with his belief that he is ‘the likeness of God’.
This self-conception leads Faust to aim directly for transcendent knowledge.16
Highlighting verses 712 and 713, Van der Laan rightly considers this act of Faust
to be an attempt at apotheosis: ‘Das Geschöpf will also Schöpfer werden.’17
At the end of this scene, however, Faust’s self-deifying act of suicide results in
his being given back to earth – in other words, in the middle.18 Another bold at-
tempt to directly approach the highest spheres brings Faust no further than where
he started – ‘die Erde hat mich wieder’.19 This failed attempt brings Faust closer to
realizing the necessity of abandoning his direct approach. Faust’s new stage of de-
velopment finds its articulation near the end of Osterspaziergang, where Faust
turns from reaching directly to the highest spheres toward an indirect path
through the sphere in the middle; he implores the souls that rule between heaven
and earth to descend and guide him. A further sign of Faust’s change in approach
is that he asks for guidance – and not, as he previously did, for companionship.
The ultimate goal is still flight, but Faust’s wish for direct approach gives way to a
wish for guidance and mediation:
O gibt es Geister in der Luft,
Die zwischen Erd’ und Himmel herrschend weben,
So steiget nieder aus dem goldnen Duft
Und führt mich weg, zu neuem buntem Leben!’20
Faust’s choice of words in describing his mediated ascent signifies a modification
in his expectations. Whereas ‘Feuerwagen’, a metaphor for the sun, was once the
means of Faust’s desired ascent, now he wishes for a ‘Zaubermantel’, which is
13 V. 632–633 (my emphasis).
14 V. 634; 651. See p. 59 above.
15 V. 719.
16 On the early development of the problematization of Neoplatonic transcendence of truth
along with the notion of its immanence in nature see pp. 54–55 above.
17 J. M. van der Laan, ‘Faust und das Böse: Der Sündenfall, der Zauber und der Wille zur
Macht’, Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, 64, no. 3 (2012), pp. 265–266.
18 See p. 63 above.
19 V. 784. Faust’s boldness can be seen in the following verses: ‘Vermesse dich die Pforten
aufzureißen, | Vor denen jeder gern vorüber schleicht.’ V. 710–711.
20 V. 1118–1121 (my emphasis).
92 II Toward Life
described as superior to a ‘Königsmantel’. From the scene Nacht to verses
1120–1221 of the scene Vor dem Tor, Faust’s views evolved to the point where he
clearly recognizes his need for guidance.
II.1.1.2 The Sun, Its Light and the Colors: Modification of a World-View
Through Metaphors
II.1.1.2.1 Color as Stained-Glass Windows (‘Gemalte Scheiben’)
In verse 1121 we find an indication of the developing shift in Faust’s cosmologi-
cal and epistemological views. This shift is reflected by the modification of the
metaphorical representation of color and colorfulness. As I will explain, the ex-
pression ‘das bunte Leben’ in verse 1121 represents this shift.
The word ‘gemalt’ in verse 401 is the first time in the drama that Faust him-
self uses a word associated with color. Faust describes how the light reaches
his world (his study): ‘Wo selbst das liebe Himmelslicht | Trüb’ durch gemalte
Scheiben bricht!’ In his world, colors are the result of light passing through
stained-glass windows. But the colors in questions are gloomy; seeing color as
a degradation of light coheres with the tradition of Platonic and Neoplatonic
views regarding the ‘impurity’ of descent. This Platonic view of color is dis-
cussed in Mendelssohn’s Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, which
Goethe studied together with Plato’s work itself. In the Ephemerides, Goethe
writes the following21:
Die Farben kommen unsern Augen öfters wie unverändert vor, und gleichwohl wechselt
beständig neues Sonnenlicht mit dem vorigen ab. Wenn wir aber die Wahrheit suchen,
so müssen wir die Dinge nach der Wirklichkeit, nicht aber nach dem Sinnenschein
beurtheilen.22
Plato’s dialectical and negative approach dictates that, if one is a true seeker
of knowledge, one must go beyond the realm of ever-changing nature. As
Mendelssohn’s Socrates asserts, colors, like bodies, are mere appearances.
Goethe directly cites a passage from Mendelssohn’s Phädon that defines na-
ture as follows: ‘Zwischen seyn und nicht seyn ist eine entsetzliche Kluft, die
von der almählig wirkenden Natur der Dinge nicht übersprungen werden
kann.’23 This view characterizes the relation between light and color in
Faust’s world.
21 See p. 44 above.
22 Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, p. 64.
23 Der Junge Goethe, p. 438. Also in: Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele’, p. 70.
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Turning our attention now to the scene Vor Spiel auf dem Theater, we see
that the Poet’s metaphorical use of ‘bunt’ – here meaning ‘diverse’, ‘mixed’ and
‘colorful’ – is not different from Mendelssohn’s view. The Poet contrasts ‘jener
bunten Menge’24 to ‘stillen Himmelsenge’25; that which is diverse and mixed is
contrasted to that which is simple and pure. But the Poet refuses to participate
in the kind of work that the Director supports: ‘Ich wünschte sehr der Menge zu
behagen, | Besonders weil sie lebt und leben läßt.’26 Like Mendelssohn’s
Socrates, the Poet is oriented toward that which is lasting and transcends time
and change: ‘Was glänzt ist für den Augenblick geboren; | Das Echte bleibt der
Nachwelt unverloren.’27 The same affinity toward the transcendent that we find
in Faust’s character is also present here, expressed by the Poet as the desire to
create a work that reaches the ‘Nachwelt’ – a timeless masterpiece, in other
words. In the scene Vor dem Tor, we find further stages of the modification of
the metaphors of light and color, an important step in the evolution of Faust’s
views regarding the acquisition of knowledge.
II.1.1.2.2 Colorful Lives and the Sun’s Will to Animate
The metaphorical representation of color in relation to light and the sun under-
goes a significant modification in verse 913, where Faust utters the word ‘Farben’
for the first time. In this verse, colors are portrayed in a positive way – not as
appearances and corruptions of the ‘Himmelslicht’, but rather as something that
is willingly intended by the sun:
Aber die Sonne duldet kein Weißes,
Überall regt sich Bildung und Streben,
Alles will sie mit Farben beleben.28
Faust explains his observation that the sun is the source of life, emanating
‘Bildung’ and ‘Streben’; but then he ironically extends the sun’s influence into
the human realm: ‘Doch an Blumen fehlt’s im Revier, | Sie nimmt geputzte
Menschen dafür.’29 Significantly, the gate to the human realm is the ironic phrase
‘geputzte Menschen’. Faust points out to Wagner (and the reader) that the tran-
scendent sun is linked to the human realm. Yet Faust stipulates a condition for
24 V. 59.
25 V. 63.
26 V. 37–38.
27 V. 73–74.
28 V. 911–913.
29 V. 914–915 (my emphasis).
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Wagner. If Wagner fulfills this condition, he will be able to see what Faust wants
to show him: ‘Kehre dich um von diesen Höhen | Nach der Stadt zurück zu
sehen’.30 This change in approach and perspective makes these speculations pos-
sible. Faust enthusiastically turns his gaze from the heights toward the city
gates. The diversity and colorfulness he sees is contrasted to the darkness of the
gate: ‘Aus dem hohlen finstren Tor | Dringt ein buntes Gewimmel hervor.’31 The
light metaphors then take on even greater significance in the human realm as
resurrected Christ brings the people out of their limiting walls and narrow
worlds – ‘Aus der Kirchen ehrwürdiger Nacht | Sind sie alle an’s Licht gebracht.’32
From his elevated perspective, Faust enjoys and praises this activity, which ema-
nates from the transcendent realm into the human and natural realms. He is fas-
cinated by the immanence of the transcendent, which manifests in the vitality of
the festival: ‘Selbst von des Berges fernen Pfaden | Blinken uns farbige Kleider
an.’33 Faust’s praise of the sun in the Osterspaziergang scene show him to reject a
basic Platonic view; rather than looking toward the sun, Faust looks away from it
and toward its manifestations in the world. ‘Kehre dich um, von diesen Höhen’,
he says to Wagner.
We are now in a position to return to verses 1120 and 1121, where Faust ex-
presses his wish for mediation and guidance from the souls that reign between
heaven and earth.
It is a significant moment in Faust’s intellectual life; his developing concep-
tion of the relation between the transcendent and the world finds its articula-
tion in his appeal to intermediary souls and the path he imagines they would
guide him down. Earlier in verses 704–705, believing himself to be in God’s
likeness, Faust articulates his wish as follows: ‘Auf neuer Bahn den Äther zu
durchdringen, | Zu neuen Sphären reiner Tätigkeit.’ The rhetoric of abstraction
is present in ‘Äther’, the incorporeal matter of the heavenly bodies and the sun.
In verse 1121, on the other hand, a new perspective articulates itself – in
‘neuem buntem Leben’. As I mentioned above, ‘bunt’ refers to the quality of di-
versity and imports a perspective other than that of mere purification and ab-
straction; the abstract perspective of verses 704–705 prefers pure (‘rein’) to
colorful and diverse.
We can clarify the fundamental difference between the two paths in ques-
tion – the paths that Faust envisions, respectively, in verse 1121 and verses
704–705 – by comparing Mendelssohn’s Platonic definition of ‘color’ in Phädon
30 V. 916–917 (my emphasis).
31 V. 918–919 (my emphasis).
32 V. 927–928 (my emphasis).
33 V. 935–936 (my emphasis).
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to Goethe’s definition of ‘color’: ‘Gegenwärtig sagen wir nur so viel voraus, daß
zur Erzeugung der Farbe Licht und Finsternis, Helles und Dunkles, oder, wenn
man sich einer allgemeineren Formel bedienen will, Licht und Nichtlicht gefor-
dert werde.’34
Goethe offers a definition of color as a vast realm of co-presence. He defines
color as the realm in which light and non-light meet. This definition follows an-
other definition of color, which defines it as ‘deeds and sufferings’ of light
(‘Taten und Leiden’).35 Importantly, Goethe does not assign any sort of value,
hierarchical or otherwise, to the components of his definition; therefore, in
Farbenlehre, the issues of purity and impurity are irrelevant.36
If we read Goethe’s definitions of color in Farbenlehre critically through the
hierarchical Platonic perspective of Mendelssohn’s Phädon, the following issues
arise: in Goethe’s first definition, because color belongs to the realm of mixture,
it appears to be lower than that which is simple and unmixed. Goethe’s second
definition, moreover, ignores Platonic principles that mandate ‘general defini-
tions’. Goethe abandons this essentialist approach and turns to the phenomena
themselves in terms of light’s ‘deeds and sufferings’; he explores colors by turn-
ing toward the realm of the changeable rather than the unchanging truth of
Mendelssohn’s Socrates. This change radically diverges from the Platonic view.
In other words, whereas the dialectic negative method moves from color to light,
Goethe’s definitions invite us to explore the space in between.
Earlier, when Faust’s method of acquisition of knowledge was a direct
and negative one, Faust described his path as flying through the ether in a
fire chariot – a metaphor for the sun – toward ‘reiner Tätigkeit’. This path
34 FA, I, 23/1: p. 26.
35 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
36 I do not ignore the emphasis on the quality of ‘Reinheit’ in regards to light in Farbenlehre.
(See: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, pp. 85–93. Specifically, p. 86 contains Schöne’s expla-
nation on the spectrum of meaning of presence of ‘rein’ in this study.) But I draw attention to
the difference between pure in contrast to being composed of parts – that is the form of this
quality in Farbenlehre in Goethe’s crusade against Newton’s view – on the one hand, and pure
in contrast to devaluated and polluted as a result of being in a mediated relation with the
many, on the other hand. It is in the context of the second semantic variant that the Platonic
realms of ‘Schein’ and ‘Wahrheit’ as reflected in Phädon of Mendelssohn receive their signifi-
cance. Regarding Goethe’s view on purity and pure, see also Lohmeyer’s treatment of the se-
mantic specifications of ‘rein’ and ‘Reinheit’ in Goethe’s Faust II: Dorothea Lohmeyer, Faust
und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung Eine Anleitung zum Lesen des Textes (München:
C. H. Beck, 1975), pp. 337–338.
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accords with that of Socrates in Mendelssohn’s Phädon: ‘Wenn wir aber die
Wahrheit suchen, so müssen wir die Dinge nach der Wirklichkeit, nicht aber
nach dem Sinnenschein beurtheilen.’37 As the drama progresses, we notice a
significant shift from the rhetoric of ‘pure’ (‘rein’) to that of ‘colorful’ and
‘diverse’ (‘bunt’) in Faust’s description of his path forward. As I demon-
strated above, this shift marks a fundamental divergence from the Platonic
tradition of negative pursuit of truth through purification; the influence of
this divergence encompasses all realms of knowledge, from cosmogony to
ethics.
Taking a broad view of the scene Vor dem Tor, we see that the wish for a
colorful life is expressed by someone who, just moments earlier, was flying
over the seas, chasing the setting sun and eager to drink its eternal (though not
colorful) light. In other words, a perfect poetic articulation of the Platonic
world-view, including anamnesis and wish for ascent as a way of returning
home,38 results in a fundamentally different cosmological conception of the
world. Furthermore, Faust articulates his non-Platonic (and even anti-Platonic)
view as the prospect for a negative, abstract yearning for separation and purifi-
cation of the elevated soul.39 In Mendelssohn’s Phädon, we are told that a wise
one ‘lernt seine ganze Lebzeit durch sterben. Der Tod setzt er voraus sey eine
Trennung des Leibes und der Seele’.40 How can we account for Faust’s wish for
life after this process of abstraction, if this separation of the inferior soul from
the elevated soul is the practice of death?
At first glance, we might be inclined to think that Faust desires for himself a
philosophical life in the Platonic sense. But on closer inspection, the difference
between ‘rein’ and ‘bunt’ refutes this explanation. The co-presence of these con-
trasting views makes for a tempestuous moment in Faust’s intellectual and ethi-
cal life. Against this backdrop, Faust shifts from a world-view according to which
‘Ein Weiser stirbt gerne’41 and one should be ready to take the risk ‘in’s Nichts
dahin zu fließen’42 to a world-view that justifies his seeking to lead a new color-
ful life. We are thus justified in describing this stage as one in which Faust turns
away from death and toward life.
37 Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, p. 64.
38 See v. 1092–1099. I explained the issue of anamnesis in these verses above p. 65.
39 Compare v. 1110–1117 to v. 1121.
40 Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
41 Ibid.
42 V. 719.
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II.1.2 Painful Walls of Exclusion
In the first chapter, I introduced the circular pattern of Faust’s actions and ex-
plained the flow of scenes as a cycle of pain, escape and fall.43 In the following
we observe a phase of transition in Faust’s life that includes the appearance of
Mephistopheles in the drama. In the scene Nacht, Faust’s feeling of pain moti-
vates him to speak to the moon, and the conversation kindles an escape in spec-
ulative fantasy: ‘Fliehe! Auf! Hinaus in’s weite Land!’44 This escape culminates
in an expression of amazement – ‘Welch Schauspiel!’ –, which is interrupted by
a sigh of pain that springs from disillusionment: ‘aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!’45
In these verses, the movement from one stage to another is quick; the first es-
cape is instantaneously followed by another escape from this newly felt pain, as
Faust summons the ‘Erdgeist’. As the drama unfolds, Faust’s various escapes in
fantasy become lengthier and more painful. This pain causes Faust to reach for
the deadly potion: ‘Ich sehe dich, es wird der Schmerz gelindert’.46 It is neces-
sary for us to explore Faust’s pain, since it drives the circular pattern that moves
Faust through the beginning of the drama, from the scene Nacht to the end of
Vor dem Tor.
The pain in the scene Nacht is expressed immediately before Faust names
the fields of knowledge he has studied. It finds articulation in a sigh – ‘ach!’ –
that indicates Faust’s deep discontent with the knowledge he has accumulated.
The problem appears to be insufficiency of knowledge.47 But what is insuffi-
cient can be improved with time and patience. So if insufficiency of knowledge
were the only problem, then Faust’s lamentations would need to be understood
in relation to a perceived lack of time. In fact, a perceived lack of time is pre-
cisely what Wagner, Faust’s pupil, expresses; but it is not Faust’s main con-
cern. If we can answer how Wagner’s concerns are different from Faust’s, then
we will have a clear understanding of the origin of Faust’s pain.
As Mayer asserts, ‘Wagner identifiziert Gelehrtentum mit Philologie und
Historiographie. Das Wichtigste sind die Quellen, Texte, Pergamente.’48 Since
Wagner is a philologist,49 his own expression of ‘Ach Gott!’ has a temporal color:
43 See pp. 52–53 above.
44 V. 418.
45 V. 454 (my emphasis).
46 V. 696.
47 V. 356–364.
48 Mayer, ‘Der Famulus Wagner und die moderne Wissenschaft’, p. 178.
49 Compare to: FK, p. 222.
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Ach Gott! die Kunst ist lang!
Und kurz ist unser Leben.
Mir wird, bei meinem kritischen Bestreben,
Doch oft um Kopf und Busen bang’.
Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben,
Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!
Und eh’ man nur den halben Weg erreicht,
Muß wohl ein armer Teufel sterben.50
Remarkably, displaying his textual knowledge, Wagner glosses his expression
of emotional pain with a citation from Hippocrates’s Aphorisms I, I.51 The unrest
Wagner feels is not due to a faulty method. On the contrary, Wagner has faith
in his critical endeavor; if life were not so short, he would be able to attain to
the level of knowledge he desires. Given enough time, Wagner would be able to
apply a textual method of investigation to historical sources and follow the
footsteps of his forefathers:
Verzeiht! es ist ein groß Ergetzen
Sich in den Geist der Zeiten zu versetzen,
Zu schauen wie vor uns ein weiser Mann gedacht,
Und wie wir’s dann zuletzt so herrlich weit gebracht.52
It is clear that Wagner sees no problem with this method. Furthermore, unques-
tioningly accepting of past scholarship, Wanger believes in upholding his fore-
fathers’ traditions53:
Tut nicht ein braver Mann genug,
Die Kunst, die man ihm übertrug,
Gewissenhaft und pünktlich auszuüben?
Wenn du, als Jüngling, deinen Vater ehrst,
So wirst du gern von ihm empfangen;
Wenn du, als Mann, die Wissenschaft vermehrst,
So kann dein Sohn zu höh’erm Ziel gelangen.54
Wagner believes in following his sources to the letter – ‘Von Buch zu Buch, von
Blatt zu Blatt!’55 He envisions an experience of ascent in his textual studies that
50 V. 558–565.
51 See in: FK, p. 222.
52 V. 570–573.
53 See above, p. 25, Mayer’s explanation of Wagner’s unquestioning attitude toward historical
sources.
54 V. 1057–1063.
55 V. 1105. Schöne, in his comments on ‘pünktlich’ in this verse, points out the proper mean-
ing in accordance with the historical context as follows: ‘Auf den Punkt genau’: FK, p. 239.
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elevates him ‘zu den Quellen’.56 Moreover, he articulates a vision in which the
heavens open up to those who read old parchments: ‘Und ach! entrollst du gar
ein würdig Pergamen, | So steigt der Ganze Himmel zu dir nieder.’57
As we see, Wagner doesn’t experience pain per se, but rather fears not hav-
ing enough time to reach his desired destination. This destination, however, is
not a transcendent truth, as it is for Faust. Rather, Wagner hopes to leave behind
an intellectual inheritance for his descendants.58 Therefore, Wagner’s primary
concern is his lack of time; his secondary concern, which appears in the Faust II
in which Wagner produces the isolated incorporeal soul Homunculus,59 is his
lack of a son to inherit his legacy. This latter concerns surfaces as Wagner ex-
presses his admiration for Faust and his father, both of whom are venerated by
the people: ‘Welch ein Gefühl mußt du, o großer Mann! | Bei der Verehrung die-
ser Menge haben!’60 But Wagner’s second concern (not having a son) is related
to his first concern (not having enough time); Wagner’s wish for a son expresses
his wish to attain an intellectual form of patriarchal immortality.
In the case of Faust, on the other hand, time is a secondary problem, and
Faust’s concern about time is not the same as Wagner’s – i.e., Faust does not
fear that his acquisition of knowledge will get cut short because of lack of time.
Faust’s concern is not about insufficient time, but rather about wasted time:
What has he gained, Faust asks, from all of his time-consuming efforts?
In the following verses, Faust criticizes institutions of learning and the
practice of acquiring degrees. His polemic starts with a self-critique:
Heiße Magister, heiße Doktor gar,
Und ziehe schon an die zehen Jahr,
Herauf, herab und quer und krumm,
Meine Schüler an der Nase herum61
The critique is not directed at knowledge per se, but rather at the seekers of
knowledge – namely, ‘Doktoren, Magister, Schreiber und Pfaffen’62 – and the
process of transmitting a faulty form of knowledge to students. In verse 364,
Faust expands his self-critique as he describes the small institute (‘wir’) that
centers around him: ‘Und sehe, daß wir nichts wissen können!’63 Notably, the
56 V. 564.
57 V. 1108–1109.
58 V. 572–573; 1063.
59 V. 6882–6884; 8249; 8252.
60 V. 1011–1012.
61 V. 360–363.
62 V. 367.
63 V. 364.
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next verse expresses a feeling of pain that is, for the first time, not expressed as
an interjection. The sigh ‘ach!’64 that once voiced a pain of unclear origin turns
into an eloquent articulation of pain with a clear cause – namely, the aware-
ness that ‘we cannot know anything’: ‘Das will mir schier das Herz verbren-
nen.’65 In a final step, Faust expands his critique even further to cover all his
contemporary polymaths – of whom, he claims, he is the most learned.66 This
claim is consistent with the amount of respect that Faust receives in the
Osterspaziergang scene on Wagner’s account:
Der Vater zeigt dich seinem Knaben,
Ein jeder fragt und drängt und eilt,
Die Fiedel stockt, der Tänzer weilt.
Du gehst, in Reihen stehen sie,
Die Mützen fliegen in die Höh’:
Und wenig fehlt, so beugten sich die Knie,
Als käm’ das Venerabile.67
Wagner’s second-hand description of Faust’s status is reinforced by the first-
hand account of a new student who seeks Faust’s instruction:
Und komme voll Ergebenheit,
Einen Mann zu sprechen und zu kennen,
Den Alle mir mit Ehrfurcht nennen.68
Faust begins his critique of knowledge by criticizing himself, but he then ex-
pands the scope of his critique to the method and institutions of knowledge in
general. Yet Faust’s critique does not imply absolute impossibility of knowl-
edge. The ‘wir’ in verse 364 refers to the practitioners of a faulty method by
means of which true knowledge remains out of reach. Thus, Faust changes his
method and approach: ‘Drum hab’ ich mich der Magie ergeben’.69 He is con-
vinced that the knowledge he gained through study is empty: ‘Daß ich nicht
mehr, mit sauerm Schweiß, | Zu sagen brauche was ich nicht weiß’.70
Unlike Wagner, who fears that lack of time will interrupt his accumulation
of knowledge, Faust is concerned with being trapped in a method of acquisition
of knowledge that is a cause of pain and doomed to fail. Unlike Wagner,
64 V. 354.
65 V. 365 (my emphasis).
66 V. 366.
67 V. 1015–1021.
68 V. 1869–1871.
69 V. 377.
70 V. 380–381.
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therefore, Faust (a) does not have blind faith in the body of knowledge passed
down to him; and (b) is confident that the method of acquisition of knowledge
taught to him is wrong. Whereas Wagner seeks to continue accumulating
knowledge, Faust seeks to interrupt a vicious cycle that he sees as the source of
his pain: ‘O sähst du, voller Mondenschein, | Zum letztenmal auf meine Pein’.71
II.1.2.1 Exclusion and ‘Kerker’
The scene Nacht commences in the subjective realm of self-criticism. The set-
ting takes form as Faust is described as sitting at a desk – ‘An diesem Pult’ –,
where he resolves to end his pain.72 But after his first fantasy ends with disillu-
sionment, his study is described as a ‘Kerker’73; Faust feels trapped. The signifi-
cance of this room is brought to the foreground through the metaphor
‘Mauerloch’,74 which refers to Faust’s study. Goethe gives poetic articulation to
his stage directions – ‘In einem hochgewölbten, engen, gotischen Zimmer’75 –,
and the word ‘Mauerloch’ conveys the confinement that Faust feels within the
walls of his study. The following verses further describe this setting of Faust’s
pain; a series of statements oscillate between objective and subjective perspec-
tives on the room:
Beschränkt von diesem Bücherhauf,
Den Würme nagen, Staub bedeckt,
Den, bis an’s hohe Gewölb’ hinauf,
Ein angeraucht Papier umsteckt;
Mit Gläsern, Büchsen rings umstellt,
Mit Instrumenten vollgepfropft,
Urväter Hausrat drein gestopft –
Das ist deine Welt! das heißt eine Welt!76
The first verse conveys Faust’s feeling of being ‘beschränkt’ (subjective) by
piled-up books (objective). The description conveys the function of this wall-
like part of the inner space of the room. From verse 403, a subjective judgment
is assigned to the rhyming words. In consecutive verses, the components of
the inner space are related to the act of covering (exclusion seen from within)
71 V. 386–387 (my emphasis).
72 V. 387.
73 V. 398.
74 V. 399.
75 Goethe’s stage directions for the opening of the scene Nacht, according to FT. p. 33.
76 V. 402–409 (my emphasis).
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and, more importantly, surrounding (exclusion from outside) – ‘bedeckt’,
‘umsteckt’, ‘rings umstellt’.
The room itself is filled with numerous objects that had once belonged to
Faust’s ancestors; these objects are the elements of Faust’s world, a world of
exclusions. This room, whose high walls confine (‘beschränken’) Faust, is the
setting of Faust’s pain:
Und fragst du noch, warum dein Herz
Sich bang’ in deinem Busen klemmt?
Warum ein unerklärter Schmerz
Dir alle Lebensregung hemmt?77
In this instance of pain, Faust’s description of his room merges with his de-
scription of the faulty method of pursuit of knowledge. The exclusion that
Faust feels in this room is made clearer in verses 414–417. His world is a con-
struct, stuffed with inherited instruments and books representing the form of
knowledge that Faust strongly criticizes. This world excludes the natural
realm, replacing nature with representations of nature – the calcified
‘Tiergeripp’ und Totenbein’ in a suffocating atmosphere of ‘Rauch und Moder’.
The ‘wir’ in ‘wir nichts wissen können’78 and the world around Faust are one
and the same. This form of pursuit of knowledge and the institution built it
around cohere with the term ‘Stubengelehrtheit’; the term reflects the associa-
tion between being knowledgeable and being separated from the natural
world. Adelung defines ‘Der Stubengelehrte’ as follows: ‘ein Gelehrter, welcher
seiner Wissenschaft bloß auf der Stube, d.i. aus Büchern, erlangt und ausübt;
zum Unterschiede von demjenigen, welche sie im Umgang mit der Welt ausbil-
det und anwendet.’79 Faust’s complaints and Adelung’s definition of the term
at hand illuminate the relation between Faust’s study as a ‘Gelehrtenstube’
and his world of ‘Stubengelehrtheit’.
The pain that motivates Faust to reevaluate his world of accumulated
knowledge finds articulation in the following call for ascent and escape: ‘Flieh!
Auf! Hinaus in’s weite Land!’80 In the first chapter of this study, I explored the
series of attempts at ascent that Faust made in response to this call. As we saw,
these attempts were all of an excluding nature; they aimed directly for the tran-
scendent source of the natural world in accordance with the Neoplatonic
77 V. 410–413 (my emphasis).
78 V. 364.
79 Adelung, Versuch eines volständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen
Mundart, vol. 4: p. 842.
80 V. 418.
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negative purifying method. Yet none of these attempts required that Faust actu-
ally leave his ‘prison cell’. Thus, Faust’s direct and abstract approach to the
transcendent truth proves to be another path that the walls of his study insulate
from the realm outside.
Faust’s study and the objects within it play an active role in his suicide at-
tempt. The phial that shines in the moonlight, an object that Faust inherited,
testifies to the presence of his old world in his act of self-deification. Faust’s
declaration that ‘die Erde hat mich wieder’ signifies that the phial (and the
death it promises) has been overcome. After his aborted suicide attempt, Faust
leaves his study for the first time in the drama. Outside, Faust’s views of media-
tion and his new (non-Platonic) perspective on color take form.81
II.1.2.2 The World and the Significance of Honorific Titles
Faust’s first attempt to leave his study and directly experience nature in the scene
Vor dem Tor marks a major change in Faust’s outlook on the world. This change
finds articulation in the following verse: ‘Und führt mich weg, zu neuem buntem
Leben!’82 Faust’s embrace of the outside signifies an enthusiastic turn toward the
human realm. Yet this turn is subjective; distant from the people, Faust fantasizes
about the immanence of the transcendent sun in the human realm.
Ich höre schon des Dorfs Getümmel,
Hier ist des Volkes wahrer Himmel,
Zufrieden jauchzet groß und klein:
Hier bin ich Mensch, hier darf ich’s sein.83
Human beings derive meaning from relationships with other human beings.
The question remains, however, whether Faust really has succeeded in escap-
ing his study. Notably, unlike the scene Nacht, the scene Vor dem Tor does not
begin with Faust’s subjective reconstruction. Goethe’s dramatic arrangement in
this scene enables the reader to compare Faust’s descriptions to the reality in
question itself, presented through the dialogue of ‘das Volk’. Furthermore, as
Schöne clarifies, ‘Die Szenerie geht sehr genau auf Örtlichkeiten in der
Umgebung Frankfurts und auf Jugenderinnerungen Goethes an beliebte
Wanderziele zurück.’84 That this scene refers to a historical location was
81 See the process of the turn that unfolds outside Faust’s room explored in the previous sec-
tion: pp. 91–97.
82 V. 1121
83 V. 937– 940.
84 FK, p. 230.
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obvious to contemporary readers and performers of Goethe’s work; when an ex-
cerpt from Faust was performed on August 27, 1829 in Frankfurt, the scene Vor
dem Tor was enacted in front of the backdrop of a scenic painting of the famil-
iar path of the Osterspaziergang.85
In contrast to Faust’s subjective retelling of the events, the conversations of
the people are far from sublime. Faust is far removed from the people whom he
wants to join, as Wagner’s response to him makes clear:
Mit euch, Herr Doktor, zu spazieren
Ist ehrenvoll und ist Gewinn;
Doch würd’ ich nicht allein mich her verlieren,
Weil ich ein Feind von allem Rohen bin.
Das Fiedeln, Schreien, Kegelschieben,
Ist mir ein gar verhaßter Klang;
Sie toben wie vom bösen Geist getrieben
Und nennen’s Freude, nennen’s Gesang.86
Wagner reluctantly tolerates this vulgarity because it gives him an opportunity
to listen to Faust’s eloquent speech. Yet Wagner leaves no doubt that he dis-
dains folk songs and games. A pupil created by the system of learning that
Faust epitomizes, Wagner’s response reminds Faust of a bitter fact – he is still
the ‘Doktor’.87 In Faust’s eyes, ‘diese Namen wollen nichts heißen, sie sind nur
Namen der wissenschaftlichen Farce, die ihren Ungrund in der Unmöglichkeit
des Wissens hat’.88 The ‘Kerker’ from which Faust tries to escape confines him
even when he is not physically within it. Wagner and Faust are present at the
festival, but they do not partake in it. Wagner reminds Faust of his title
‘Doktor’ – a mark of his distance from ordinary people. Even an old farmer ges-
tures toward this distance as he addresses Faust, thanking him for not shun-
ning the crowd:
Herr Doktor, das ist schön von euch,
Daß ihr uns heute nicht verschmäht,
Und unter dieses Volksgedräng’,
Als ein so Hochgelahrter, geht.89
85 FK, p. 230. Schöne provides us with this information in reference to Marianne v. Willemer’s
letter to Goethe from September 25, 1829.
86 V. 941–948 (my emphasis).
87 V. 385.
88 Peter Brandes, Goethes Faust: Poetik der Gabe und Selbstreflexion der Dichtung (München:
Wilhelm Fink, 2003), p. 82.
89 V. 981–984 (my emphasis).
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The walls of Faust’s study function not only to contain dead representations of na-
ture; they also project a representation of Faust as a ‘Hochgelehrter’. Accepting a
drink from the intimidated old farmer, Faust is reminded of the shortcomings of
the form of knowledge he has inherited from his fathers. He rejects the image of
‘savior’ that the people project on him and finds himself submerged in an endless
sea of error: ‘O glücklich! wer noch hoffen kann | Aus diesem Meer des Irrtums
aufzutauchen.’90
II.1.2.3 ‘Meer des Irrtums’
In the analysis of the scene Nacht above, I pointed out that Faust’s conception
of his world changes. Faust’s cold reevaluation of his world fills him with dis-
content: ‘Das ist deine Welt! das heißt eine Welt!’91 Turning now to Hans
Blumenberg’s views regarding the ‘Horizonterfahrung’, I explore the signifi-
cance of the condition that articulates itself in verse 409. Furthermore,
Blumenberg’s explanation of the ‘Horizonterfahrung’92 will help us understand
the situation of setting out for the unknown and will thus prepare us for
Mephisto’s entrance in the drama.
In Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer, Blumenberg refers to a
note written by Goethe on April 3, 1787 in the Italienische Reise. In this note,
Goethe describes his first experience of being surrounded by an open horizon
on the sea. Goethe stresses the importance of his experience and admits that it
changed his conception of world: ‘Hat man sich nicht ringsum vom Meere um-
geben gesehen, so hat man keinen Begriff von Welt und von seinem Verhältnis
zur Welt.’93 The nullification of one’s conception of one’s world, Blumenberg
explains, leads to a ‘Horizonterfahrung’, in which the boundaries that once de-
fined one’s world vanish or (viewed differently) expand in countless directions,
each pointing toward an unknown destination. Blumenberg describes this con-
dition as ‘phänomenologische Iteration von Horizonten’.94 The link between
‘Horizonterfahrung’ and change in one’s world-conception lies at the core of
Blumenberg’s argument; he includes the term ‘Welterfahrung’ in the subtitle of
his essay.
90 V. 1064–1065.
91 V. 409.
92 Hans Blumenberg, ‘Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer’, in Goethe zum
Beispiel, ed. Hans Blumenberg-Archiv (Frankfurt am Main & Leipzig: Insel, 1999), p. 68.
93 FA I, XV/1: p. 248.
94 Blumenberg, ‘Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer’, p. 68.
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Having clarified how ‘Horizonterfahrung’ affects one’s conception of the world,
Blumenberg contextualizes ‘the world’ in respect to ‘die goethezeitgenössische
Definition der Welt als series rerum’95 – in other words, ‘a more or less fixed quan-
tity of things’.96 This conception of world is strongly present in Faust’s illustration
of his study.97 In the scene Nacht, Faust’s ‘world’ does not have a single mean-
ing for him. Its multiplicity of meanings indicates that Faust is in the process
of ‘Welterfahrung’ – a crisis of definition. For instance, there is fundamental
difference between ‘world’ as it appears in verse 382 (‘Daß ich erkenne was die
Welt | Im Innersten zusammen hält’)98 and ‘world’ as it appears in verse 409
(‘deine Welt’ or ‘eine Welt’). For Wagner, on the other hand, the ‘world’ only
has a single meaning – it is ‘die Welt’ in the humanistic and non-cosmic
sense.99
Blumenberg’s attempt to explain the ‘Horizonterfahrung’ in a world that is
understood as ‘series rerum’ clarifies Faust’s representation of his ‘Gelehrtenstube’
as the world in which he feels pain and the desire for change: ‘diese Dinge,
aus deren Ansammlung die Welt bestehen soll, sind doch in der ›reinen‹
Horizontanschauung verschwunden. Es wäre die äußerste Verarmung des
Weltbestandes, die allererst freilegte, was denn eine Welt sei.’100 After Faust expe-
riences such an expansion, the objects of his old world appear worthless. This ex-
perience informs Faust’s description of his study, whose books and parchments
are glorified by Wagner (‘steigt der ganze Himmel zu dir nieder.’)101 But Wagner’s
path to heaven – ‘Von Buch zu Buch, von Blatt zu Blatt’102 – now seems hopeless
to Faust:
95 Ibid.
96 Nele Bemong, Re-thinking Europe: literature and (trans)national identity (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 2008), pp. 74–75.
97 V. 402–409. See the description of Faust’s world explained in terms of series rerum above
pp. 102f.
98 V. 382–383 (my emphasis).
99 Wagner’s world is not the ‘unendliche Natur’ (v. 455) of Faust. Remarkably, throughout
the drama, Wagner uses the term ‘world’ in an anthropological and specifically humanist
sense [See in: FK, p. 221] to signify a certain group of people ‘Eine Menge Menschen’, ‘Die zu
gleicher Zeit lebenden Menschen’ or ‘Menschen überhaupt, besonders die Menge Menschen
und Dinge um uns her; als ein Collectivum ohne Plural’ as we find in: Adelung, Versuch eines
volständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, 5, pp. 158–161.
This conception of world can be found in verses 531, 586, and 6875.
100 Blumenberg, ‘Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer’, p. 68.
101 V. 1109.
102 V. 1105.
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Wie nur dem Kopf nicht alle Hoffnung schwindet,
Der immerfort an schalem Zeuge klebt,
Mit gier’ger Hand nach Schätzen gräbt,
Und froh ist wenn er Regenwürmer findet!103
Faust’s ‘Horizonterfahrung’ occurs within the context of his pursuit of knowledge;
he questions his old world and his inherited institution of learning. Blumenberg
stresses that ‘[d]ieser Übergang ist nicht selbstverständlich’104; in Faust’s case, the
transition is accompanied by cries of pain. In the context of Blumenberg’s meta-
phor of the sea voyage, Faust’s previous life of scholarly learning and academic
degrees represents destinations that were part of his fathers’ world; Faust was sail-
ing close to the shore. The world outside his study, on the other hand, appears as
an endless cosmos.
In light of Blumenberg’s definition of ‘Horizonterfahrung’ as
‘phänomenologische Iteration von Horizonten’, we should note that Faust’s
experience unfolds slowly from the scene Nacht to the scene Osterspaziergang. The
‘Horizonterfahrung’ is explained in Arbeit am Mythos as a polarity of anticipation
and reaching out: ‘›Horizont‹ ist nicht nur der Inbegriff der Richtungen, aus denen
Unbestimmtes zu gewärtigen ist. Es ist auch der Inbegriff der Richtungen, in
denen Vorgriffe und Ausgriffe auf Möglichkeiten orientiert sind.’105
In Osterspaziergang, Faust experiences the extension of the walls of his
study beyond their physical location and bemoans Wagner’s compliments,
which remind him of his academic identity: ‘Der Menge Beifall tönt mir nun wie
Hohn’.106 Suddenly, Faust sees his condition in a new light that anticipates his
path ahead: ‘O glücklich! wer noch hoffen kann | Aus diesem Meer des Irrtums
aufzutauchen.’107
Faust dismisses his accumulated knowledge as nothing but error; what sur-
rounds him is unknown. The limitless world of the unknown discloses itself to
Faust, who previously viewed his world in terms of ‘knowing’.108 Faust ex-
presses the need that is the source of his pain: ‘Was man nicht weiß das eben
braucht man, | Und was man weiß kann man nicht brauchen.’109 His response
103 V. 602–605.
104 Blumenberg, ‘Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer’, p. 68.
105 ———, Arbeit am Mythos (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), p. 13.
106 V. 1030.
107 V. 1065.
108 Blumenberg describes this state as follows: ‘Im Staunen sollte sich die natürliche
Bestimmung des Menschen zur Kenntnis als Bewußtsein seines Nichtwissens angekündigt
haben.’ In: Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, p. 33.
109 V. 1066–1067.
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to this pain is to escape: ‘Doch laß uns dieser Stunde schönes Gut | Durch sol-
chen Trübsinn nicht verkümmern!’110 Faust refers to his fantasy of flying to-
ward the setting sun as ‘Ein schöner Traum’, and immediately after waking up
from this dream, his pain returns with the expression of ‘Ach!’111 Faust tries one
last time to escape the endless unknown and take refuge in his dream of flying;
as Blumenberg explains, his dream represents an extreme form of escaping the
endless sea of ignorance:
Der Traum ist reine Ohnmacht gegenüber dem Geträumten, völlige Ausschaltung des
Subjekts und seiner Selbstverfügung inmitten seiner Bilder mit der extremen Disposition
zum Angstzustand; doch zugleich ist er die reine Herrschaft der Wünsche, die das
Aufgewecktwerden zum Inbegriff aller Enttäuschungen macht112
After waking up from his daydream, Faust is determined to leave the old world
behind and enter the unknown – ‘Und trüg’ er [der Zaubermantel] mich in
fremde Länder’.113 Remarkably, however, for Wagner, the realm outside the
‘Studierzimmer’ does not stand for the unknown. He dismisses the outside as
the realm that is familiar to him: ‘Berufe nicht die wohlbekannte Schar’.114
Wagner’s reaction to his mentor’s approaching the realm of the unknown dram-
atizes an aspect of the ‘Horizonterfahrung’ that contrasts with Faust’s. In Arbeit
am Mythos, Blumenberg elaborates on the tendency to avoid the unknown be-
hind the horizon, a tendency that is informed by ‘Angst’: ‘Die Angst ist auf den
unbesetzten Horizont der Möglichkeiten dessen, was herankommen mag, bezo-
gen.’115 ‘Durch sie [die Angst] wird der ganze Horizont gleichwertig als Totalität
der Richtungen, aus denen ›es herankommen kann‹.’116 Wagner gestures to-
ward the forbidden unknown realm that Faust approaches – a realm in which
evil and Angst (on Blumenberg’s definition) are ubiquitous:
Berufe nicht die wohlbekannte Schar,
Die strömend sich im Dunstkreis überbreitet,
Dem Menschen tausendfältige Gefahr,
Von allen Enden her, bereitet.
Von Norden dringt der Scharfe Geisterzahn
Auf dich herbei, mit Pfeilgespitzten Zungen;
Von Morgen ziehen, vertrocknend, sie heran,
110 V. 1067–1068.
111 V. 1090.
112 Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, p. 17 (my emphasis).
113 V. 1123
114 V. 1126
115 Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, p. 12.
116 Ibid., p. 10.
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Und nähren sich von deinen Lungen;
Wenn sie der Mittag aus der Wüste schickt,
Die Glut auf Glut um deinen Scheitel häufen,
So bringt der West den Schwarm, der erst erquickt,
Um dich und Feld und Aue zu ersäufen.
Sie hören gern, zum Schaden froh gewandt,
Gehorchen gern, weil sie uns gern betrügen,
Sie stellen wie vom Himmel sich gesandt,
Und lispeln englisch, wenn sie lügen.117
In the verses above, Mephisto is introduced as the ‘Zerstörer’, a quality that re-
appears in his self-representation in Studierzimmer [I]. The unknown realm in
Wagner’s view is an evil that manifests in the darkness from which Wagner
wishes to flee:
Doch gehen wir! Ergraut ist schon die Welt,
Die Luft gekühlt, der Nebel fällt!
Am Abend schätzt man erst das Haus.118
In his comments on this dialogue, Schöne points to Harold Janz’s work Goethe’s
Faust as a Renaissance Man, in which Janz discusses Wagner’s perception of his
world and the frightful darkness beyond its walls. In the view of these two schol-
ars, Goethe wrote Wagner’s monologue with an engraving from Robert Fludd’s
Medicinæ catholicæ in mind. This book describes the state of the human being as
‘aus allen vier Windrichtungen (hier von allen Enden der Welt her: Norden,
Morgen, Mittag und West) Scharen von bösartigen Windgeister auf einen Kranken
abgeschossen werden.’119 In this engraving, the human being is depicted as safe
and healthy within the walls of a cross-shaped fortress. The fortress has no gates,
and at the top of each of the four chambers of the fortress stands one of the four
archangels, Michael, Gabriel, Raphael and Uriel, who are fighting off threats com-
ing from all directions. The only imaginable way to escape from this space is to
ascend toward the sunlike source of light above and to pray.120 The world outside
this sanctuary is a cycle, within which ‘tausendfältige Gefahren’ abound; the
117 V. 1126–1141 (my emphasis).
118 V. 1142–1144.
119 FK, p. 241. See also Harold Jantz, Goethe’s Faust as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and
Prototypes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 63. Jochen Schmidt,
too, mentions the relation between these words of Wagner and Fludd’s work. See: Schmidt,
Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 116.
120 This engraving of Fludd’s work published in 1631 in Frankfurt is explained in further detail
in: Neil Kamil, The Fortress of the Soul: Violence, Metaphysics and Material Life in the Huguenots’
New World (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 445–450.
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sources of the danger lie beyond the dotted circular line that represents the hori-
zon of this world. The only benevolence comes directly from above. Fludd and
Wagner illustrate the Angst toward the approaching threat from beyond the hori-
zon. It’s not surprising that Wagner – ‘ein braver Mann’ is so restless to go home.
As Faust gazes into the darkness, a poodle emerges. Faust sees in the poodle the
possibility of having his wishes fulfilled. Thus, the ‘Studierzimmer’ becomes host
to a living being from the outside – this is the first act of inclusion in the drama.
II.1.3 The Process of Inclusion or ‘Wie kommen wir denn aus dem Haus?’
II.1.3.1 Lege dich zu des Meisters Füßen: Naming the Unnamable
Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’, which had previously only admitted students and
teachers, opens its doors to a new member:
Dem Hunde, wenn er gut gezogen,
Wird selbst ein weiser Mann gewogen.
Ja deine Gunst verdient er ganz und gar,
Er der Studenten trefflicher Scolar.121
Schöne points out that well-trained dogs were popular among students during
Goethe’s time.122 This historical context is important for understanding the ap-
pearance of Mephisto in the drama. The playful quality of the dog surfaces in
Wagner’s description: ‘Es ist ein pudelnärrisch Tier.’123 This quality was toler-
ated only outside these walls and not in a space that belongs to books and
‘Tiergeripp’ und Totenbein.’ Faust orders the restless dog to remain silent – ‘Sei
ruhig Pudel!’124 The poodle appears to be strongly drawn to the room’s thresh-
old: ‘An der Schwelle was schnoberst du hier?’125 Schöne recognizes in this act
the dog’s awareness of the pentacle,126 placed deliberately at the threshold to
prevent the evil spirits lurking outside from entering the house. It is also note-
worthy that the poodle, from the moment it steps inside these walls, becomes a
part of an episode in which the room turns into Mephisto’s dramatic opponent.
The quality of the poodle as a disturbance in the old world (‘Studierstube’)
121 V. 1174–1177.
122 FK, p. 243.
123 V. 1167.
124 V. 1186.
125 V. 1187.
126 FK, p. 245.
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surfaces as Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’ becomes the stage of Faust’s attempts to
translate the Gospel of John.
Faust’s denial of his deep discontent with the world that he inherited from
his fathers is apparent from the way that he describes his room. The room that
he once called a ‘Kerker’ and a ‘verfluchtes, dumpfes Mauerloch’ becomes a
safe fortress. In this safe fortress, ‘des Lebens Quelle’127 has nothing to do with
the sun, and its tangible presence in the natural world.128 Rather, the source of
life is associated with an inner light that burns within. Now, this house is a
place where the inner light is appreciated far more than the natural one. The
scanty light of a lamp burning in darkness suffices, and the sun and the moon
make no appearance. In the following verses, for the first time in the drama,
‘narrowness’ is used without negative connotations (as it is in verses 398–417):
Ach wenn in unsrer engen Zelle
Die Lampe freundlich wieder brennt,
Dann wird’s in unserm Busen helle,
Im Herzen, das sich selber kennt.
Vernunft fängt wieder an zu sprechen,
Und Hoffnung wieder an zu blühn;
Man sehnt sich nach des Lebens Bächen,
Ach! nach des Lebens Quelle hin.129
Adelung and Campe both define ‘die Zelle’ as a small room, especially as dwell-
ing place of a monk or a nun. They point out the inner relation between this
word and the cloister and its ascetic renunciation of the world.130 Near the turn-
ing point in the drama (the wager with Mephisto) the ‘Studierstube’ appears as
a hermitage. In the verses above, Faust describes his room in a way that denies
his earlier views. Jochen Schmidt describes this phase of the drama as follows:
Daß Faust den Pudel mit nach Hause in sein Studierzimmer nimmt, wo er trotz aller in-
zwischen aufgebrochenen Weltsehnsucht noch einmal ins alte Gelehrtenleben
zurückfinden scheint, signalisiert eine Phase des Übergangsgeschehens, in der noch
nichts entschieden ist, aber alles zur Entscheidung drängt.131
127 V. 1201.
128 Compare with v. 913.
129 V. 1194–1201.
130 Adelung, Versuch eines volständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen
Mundart, vol. 5: p. 361. See also Johann Heinrich Campe,Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, ed.
Johann Heinrich Campe, 5 vols. (Braunschweig: Schulbuchhandlung, 1811), p. 837.
131 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 119.
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It is as if the presence of the poodle brings forth an extreme side of the room. In
his comment on Wagner’s words in verses 1126–1141, Schmidt introduces
Wagner’s wish to return home (a wish that Faust, who seeks adventure – ‘sucht
das Abenteuer’132 – doesn’t share). In this scene, however, the house has the
same meaning for Faust and Wagner. The two are closer to each other than at
any other point in the drama. As Faust seeks refuge from his Angst in this for-
tress of health,133 he appreciates the protection of a steady island within the
‘Meer des Irrtums’ – even if that island is narrow.134
‘In der Weltabschirmung des mittelalterlichen Gehäuse leuchtet zuerst die
schöpferische Potenz des Menschen auf; nur durch die Weltaskese entdeckte
sich die Weltmächtigkeit.’135 This account of the gothic house is elucidating in
the context of the two worlds mentioned by Blumenberg. We can differentiate
between, on the one hand, a world whose darkness overwhelms one with the
‘Horizonterfahrung’ – seeing nothing but ‘Meer des Irrtums’ in all directions –
and, on the other hand, a world that offers safety as darkness falls and ‘Mit ah-
nungsvollem heil’gem Grauen’136 awakens the better soul and sedates the
‘wilde Triebe, | Mit jedem ungestümen Tun’.137 This holy dread that momentar-
ily changes the meaning of narrowness in Faust’s eyes is shared by Wagner as
he faces darkness:
Doch gehen wir! Ergraut ist schon die Welt,
Die Luft gekühlt, der Nebel fällt!
Am Abend schätzt man erst das Haus.138
In his translation of the Gospel of John, Faust tries to find solace in the inner
non-aesthetic light. He turns to a light that burns in the scripture and outside
the aesthetic context of Osterspaziergang.139 Faust returns to a form of pursuit
of knowledge that justifies and qualifies him as Wagner’s mentor. The
‘Erkenntnis’ of verse 1196 is one of inner light: ‘Dann wird’s in unserm Busen
helle, | Im Herzen, das sich selber kennt.’ This kind of knowledge is acquired in
exclusion from the natural world and brings about a form of ‘Weltmächtigkeit’
132 Ibid., p. 116.
133 See p. 110 above.
134 V. 1194.
135 Hans Blumenberg, ‘Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit: Im Vorfeld der philosophischen
Begriffsbildung’, in Ästhetische und Metaphorologische Schriften (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 152.
136 V. 1180.
137 V. 1182–1183.
138 V. 1142–1144.
139 ‘Die nirgends würd’ger und schöner brennt, | Als in dem neuen Testament.’ V. 1218–1219.
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that belongs to the world of Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’, as a gothic room, and it is
valid and in force within these walls.
As Faust approaches the act of translation, the stranger in the room dis-
tracts him:
Knurre nicht Pudel! Zu den heiligen Tönen,
Die jetzt meine ganze Seel’ umfassen,
Will der tierische Laut nicht passen.140
The contrast between the spiritual realm and the animal realm (represented in
Schiller’s Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen
mit seiner geistigen)141 is also the contrast between the body and soul; Faust
sees in the poodle the embodiment of the soul that he denigrated in the
Ostersspaziergang scene.
The scene Studierzimmer [I] enters a phase of knowing in terms of naming.
This phase begins with the translation of the Gospel of John, where the unnam-
able logos is translated as ‘Wort’, ‘Sinn’, ‘Kraft’ and finally ‘Tat’. Schöne dis-
cusses the influence of Herder’s commentary (from 1774) on the Gospel of John
and critique of Luther’s translation of logos as ‘Wort’ on this scene.142
Specifically, Herder argues that the original term is unnamable: ‘[das] Alllicht,
unsichtbarer Urglanz in [der] Tiefe seiner Fülle verborgen: kein Gedanke kann
ihn denken: kein Wort ihn nennen’.143 Herder describes the unnamable realm
as divine and notes that it is the nature of the divine to be outside the reach of
human understanding and language: ‘Nicht an Johannes, sondern an Uns
liegts, daß wir ihn nicht verstehen: er gibt Nachricht von der Gottheit Jesu, wie
140 V. 1202–1204.
141 See p. 61 above. It is important to note the similarity in approach to body and soul during the
phase in which Faust turns to an ascending path with direct approach to the sun. In this phase of
returning to the world of his fathers and inner light, Faust denies his previous discontent. In ob-
serving the two phases near one another, we find the ‘Studierzimmer’ capable of housing both
phases, although in the first one the pain prepares Faust for stepping outside and for the wish for
a form of mediation that would take him outside of the walls of his limited world.
142 See FK, p. 246. It is worth mentioning that Herder invites researchers to make enquires
into the context within which logos was articulated in the Gospel of John. As a way to gain
more clarity, he invites researchers to consider exploring the Chaldean and Zoroastrian texts.
In his notes introducing the Zande Avesta, Herder explores the light metaphorical language
that is common between the Zoroastrian text and those of John. See Herder’s further clarifica-
tion of this view in the Introduction of Erläuterungen zum Neuen Testament aus einer
neueröffneten Morgenländischen Quelle in: Johann Gottfried Herder, Aus der Schrifft: ‘Johannes’
1774, ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols., Herders Sämtliche Werke (Berlin 1877–1913:
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1884), vol. 7: pp. 335–354.
143 Ibid., p. 321.
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sie nur Menschliche Seele, Sprache und Zeitlauf faßen konnte.’144 Then, as
Faust finds in ‘Tat’ the origin of that which ‘alles wirkt und schafft’,145 the poo-
dle becomes the center of attention and the process of naming and knowing the
core of the poodle commences.
Schöne’s comments on verse 1232 cast light on the role of Faust’s compan-
ion (‘Geselle’)146 by reminding us that, in the Prolog im Himmel, the Lord gave
this companion (‘Geselle’) to Faust, as a way to keep Faust creative and active:
Des Menschen Tätigkeit kann allzuleicht erschlaffen,
Er liebt sich bald die unbedingte Ruh;
Drum geb’ ich gern ihm den Gesellen zu,
Der reizt und wirkt, und muß, als Teufel, schaffen.147
Faust’s translation of logos as ‘Tat’ reminds the reader of the ‘Wirken’ and
‘Schaffen’ that the Lord associated with Mephisto in the Prolog im Himmel. This
explains why Mephisto (in the form of a poodle) breaks out of his dormant state
as soon as Faust utters the word ‘Tat’. It is remarkable that the poodle changes
form at precisely the moment Faust becomes irritated by it. At first, Faust
names the poodle ‘mein Pudel’.148 Nevertheless, the poodle soon overstays its
welcome – ‘Einer von uns beiden | Muß die Zelle meiden.’149
Faust admitted a stranger inside his house, but the stranger distances itself
more and more from what the walls of the house can confine. Faust’s poodle re-
fuses to be recognized as a dog – ‘Das ist nicht eines Hundes Gestalt’150 – and fear
overcomes Faust: ‘Welch ein Gespenst bracht’ ich ins Haus!’151 Faust seeks to rec-
ognize some familiar characteristic in the stranger; his attempts to do so oscillate
between the realm of evil spirits and exotic animals. In quick succession, the dog
appears to Faust as a ghost (‘Gespenst’); a hippopotamus; a ‘halbe Höllenbrut’152;
144 Ibid., p. 320.
145 V. 1232 (my emphasis).
146 FK, p. 242. See also in: Heinrich Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der
Dichtung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), p. 166.
147 V. 340–344 (my emphasis).
148 V. 1250.
149 V. 1243–1244.
150 V. 1252.
151 V. 1253. Campe and Adelung define ‘Gespenst’ in relation to ‘Schrecken’. They characterize
it as a name given to a figurative manifestation that infuses dread. See in: Campe, Wörterbuch
der Deutschen Sprache, p. 345.; Adelung, Versuch eines volständigen grammatisch-kritischen
Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. 2: p. 626.
152 V. 1257.
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and an ‘Elephant’.153 Unable to challenge Faust verbally, the creature challenges
him by shifting its form.
The dramatic opposition between the stranger and the house is stressed
once again by the spirits: ‘Drinnen Gefangen ist einer!’154 The reader perceives
the room as a prison for the emerging Mephisto; furthermore, the threatening
stranger is associated with useful acts (‘Denn er tat uns allen | Schon viel zu
Gefallen’155). Instead of trying to know the beast through naming it, Faust tries
to know it through identifying its basic element: ‘Erst zu begegnen dem Tiere, |
Brauch’ ich den Spruch der Viere’.156
At this point, Faust’s attitude toward the stranger changes. At first, Faust
tried to silence the poodle, which he considered a representation of the bestial.
But when his attempt to silence the poodle failed, Faust moved to dispose of
it.157 Furthermore, when Faust learns that the stranger is not corporeal, he be-
comes aggressive. To know the stranger is to harm it:
Keines der Viere
Steckt in dem Tiere.
Es liegt ganz ruhig und grins’t mich an;
Ich habʼ ihm noch nicht weh getan.158
Before the ‘Studierzimmer’ fills with the poodle’s presence – ‘Den ganzen Raum
füllt es an, | Es will zum Nebel zerfließen.’159 –, knowing in terms of inflicting
pain evolves into knowing in terms of mastering.160 Mirroring his encounter
with the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust naively claims superiority over the creature he does
not know: ‘Steige nicht zur Decke hinan! | Lege dich zu des Meisters Füßen!’161
II.1.3.2 Inclusion and Paradox
The stranger (the poodle) whom Faust brings into his world shifts its shape
while grinning at Faust’s attempts to exert pressure on him.162 At the moment
153 V. 1311.
154 V. 1259.
155 V. 1269–1270.
156 V. 1271.
157 V. 1241–1246.
158 V. 1292–1295.
159 V. 1312–1313.
160 See above on page 58 Goethe’s strong objection to a view that understands knowing as
torturing and persecution.
161 V. 1314–1315.
162 V. 1294.
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he discloses himself as a travelling student,163 he starts talking in Faust’s lan-
guage: ‘Wozu der Lärm?’164 When Faust threatens to scorch him with the holy
flame, Mephisto responds sarcastically – it would only make him sweat!
Mephisto evolves from Wagner’s ‘der Studenten trefflicher Scolar’ to a person
whom Faust names ‘Ein fahrender Scolast’. Mephisto’s form and ironic tone
prove that he is not dominated by Faust. Mephisto’s manifestation has all the
qualities that the ‘Erdgeist’ did not offer. The ‘Erdgeist’ introduced itself fully,
yet remained beyond apprehension; Mephisto, on the other hand, shows active
inclination toward communication. Mephisto reaches for Faust in a communi-
cative manner and facilitates the process of change.
In the following, I explore how Mephisto opens the closed walls of Faust’s
world in his act of mediation. To understand Mephisto as a mediator, we need
to turn to Faust’s question – ‘Wie nennst du dich?’165 This question launches a
process that Peter André Alt characterizes as Mephisto’s ‘self-definition’166 and
‘Selbstdarstellung’.167
There is a difference between these two terms. A self-definition is an articu-
lation of one’s perception of one’s self: it defines one’s self through one’s per-
spective and does not requires a communicative aspect. ‘Selbstdarstellung’, on
the other hand, is necessarily communicative: it is a self-exposition or self-
presentation meant for someone else. Differentiating between these two terms
helps us elucidate Mephisto’s role as a dramatic element in Faust and examine
Faust’s process of turning toward life.
If we view the episode as one of Mephisto’s self-definition, then we should
expect to find an answer to the question of Mephisto’s essence – or as Peter
Michelsen puts it, Mephistos eigentliches Element.168 This approach considers
Mephisto relative to the duality between good and evil, a duality that also ap-
pears in Dante’s and Milton’s devil. Furthermore, Goethe’s Mephisto is explored
as an instance of the ‘Mephisto figure’ in its historical transformations from
Historia von D. Johann Fausten of 1587 to the story’s dramatic adaptation by
163 ‘Scolast: von Universität zu Universität wandernder Student.’ In: FK, p. 251.
164 V. 1322.
165 V. 1327.
166 Peter-André Alt, ‘Mephisto’s Principles: On the Construction of Evil in Goethe’s Faust I’,
The Modern Language Review, Vol. 106, no. 1 (January 2011), p. 157.
167 ———, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, in Ästhetik des Bösen (München: C. H. Beck,
2010), pp. 113–114. See also ‘Selbstdarstellung’ employed to describe verse 1335 in Schöne’s
comment on this verse in FK, p. 251. We will discuss Schöne’s comment below.
168 Peter Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes Faust’, in Das
Böse: eine historische Phänomenologie des Unerklärlichen, ed. Carsten Clope and Wilehlm
Schmidt-Biggemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993).
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Marlowe and to Goethe’s time.169 In this context, Goethe’s Mephisto represents
evil in the era of the enlightenment170; a Mephisto that defines himself in Faust
will, therefore, observe himself within the historical horizon of the work and
will undergo an enlightened exorcism.171 In this context, the self-definition of
Mephisto is seen as self-definition of the Devil. As Alt puts it, ‘The Devil inter-
prets himself in the vanishing point of the old European tradition, thus becom-
ing recognizable as the product of this cultural tradition.’172
Although the above-mentioned attempts explore the text as a field for
phenomenological and historical investigation of the concept of evil, they still
treat the Faust text and its Mephisto character with an essentialist approach that
focuses on Mephisto’s words, rather than his deeds. Michelsen relativizes his ap-
proach to Mephisto by pointing to Goethe’s dramatic and aesthetic principles.173
Goethe discusses his aesthetic principles in a letter to Schiller from August 3, 1799;
namely, he discusses his view of the impossibility of bringing the absolute good
and evil into an aesthetic context where they are both active.174 Michelson further
supports his argument by referring to the forty-ninth Paralipomenon of Dichtung
und Wahrheit, where Goethe asserts that a relativization of good and evil is the pre-
requisite for aesthetic representation: ‘Konflikt des bösen und guten kann nicht
ästhetisch dargestellt werden: Denn man muß dem Bösen etwas verleihen und
dem Guten etwas nehmen, um sie gegeneinander ins Gleiche zu bringen.’175
‘[W]er bist du denn?’, Faust asks Mephisto.176 Mephisto offers several an-
swers, but the most controversial is the following: ‘Ein Teil von jener Kraft, | Die
stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.’177 Seen through the perspective of
self-definition, this statement corresponds to Leibniz’s theodicy, a part of the cul-
tural context of Goethe’s time. This reading connects this statement to the Lord’s
169 Compare to: Eggensperger, ‘Den Bösen sind sie los. Ub̈erlegungen zu Mephistopheles und
zum Bösen in Goethes Faust,’ pp. 191–197.
170 In the following article, Vaget explores evil in Faust against the horizon of the enlighten-
ment. He provides us with some important historical evidence on the manner of reception of
Mephisto by Goethe’s contemporaries and their reading of Faust in comparison to the image of
the evil in Milton and Dante’s works. Hans Rudolf Vaget, ‘Mäßig boshaft: Fausts Gefährte.
Goethes Mephistopheles im Lichte der Aufklärung’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, no. 118 (2001), p. 235.
171 Alt, ‘Mephisto’s Principles: On the Construction of Evil in Goethe’s Faust I,’ pp. 149–152.
172 Ibid., p. 152 (my emphasis).
173 Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes Faust’, p. 240.
174 See in FA II, 4: pp. 705.
175 FA I, 14: p. 946. Compare to: Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in
Goethes Faust’, p. 240.
176 V. 1335.
177 V. 1336.
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words in verses 342–343. Thus, Alt maintains that Mephisto’s self-definition is a
perfect example of theodicy: ‘He could not come up with an argument more
Leibnizian and more by the book than by suggesting that evil’s right to exist is
derived from the stabilizing function it performs with regard to good.’178
Oskar Seidlin reads these verses as of Mephisto’s self-analysis ‘Wenn diese
mephistophelische Selbstanalyse wirklich eine Antwort geben soll auf Fausts
und unsere Frage, dann muß sie wohl über das “Böse” wie über das “Gute” eine
endgültige Aussage machen.’179 The tendency toward generalizing Mephisto as
the embodiment of evil comes from reading Mephisto’s words as independent
of their communicative and contextual contexts. In his next step, Seidlin seeks
to overcome the paradoxical capacity in Mephisto’s words by pointing out that
‘das Gute’ in verse 1336 is represented within Mephisto’s set of values, in which
he refuses to recognize himself as evil.180 Seidlin explains his decoded recon-
struction of Mephisto’s paradox as follows: ‘Mephisto würde sich Faust voller
Ehrlichkeit als der vorstellen, der er wirklich ist: ein Teil von jener Kraft, die
Zerstörung und Sünde (was ihr das Böse nennt) will und das tote Nichts (das im
teuflischen Sinne Gute) schafft.’181
In his comment on verse 1336, Schöne agrees with Seidlin. However, he
sees the verse as Mephisto’s ‘Selbstdarstellung’ – aimed at Faust – rather than
his self-definition:
Mephisto kleidet seine berühmte Selbstdarstellung in einen höchst mißverständlichen
paradoxen Satz. Um Fausts Argwohn zu beschwichtigen scheint er sich hier zunächst der
Sprachreglung des Prologs (340ff.) anzupassen –als müsse er bei böser Absicht stets doch
das Gute bewirken.182
Schöne refers to biblical instances that condemn the misrepresentations of vice
and darkness as virtue and light; such misrepresentations are themselves char-
acterized as evil deeds.183 When Faust asks for further explanation of the
178 Alt, ‘Mephisto’s Principles: On the Construction of Evil in Goethe’s Faust I,’ p. 154. Alt also
elaborates on the historical background of Leibniz’s theodicy in the following work: ———,
‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, pp. 101–102.
179 Oskar Seidlin, ‘Das Etwas und das Nichts: Versuch zur Neuinterpretation einer Faust-
Stelle’, in Aufsätze zu Goethes ‘Faust I’, ed. Werner Keller (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1974; reprint, The German Review. Vol. XIX, 1944, pp. 170–175), p. 365 (my
emphasis).
180 See v. 1342–1343.
181 Seidlin, ‘Das Etwas und das Nichts: Versuch zur Neuinterpretation einer Faust-Stelle’,
p. 366 (my emphasis).
182 FK, p. 251.
183 Before joining Seidlin’s argument, Schöne first refers to the New Testament: Romans (7: 18)
and the Old Testament: Isaiah (5: 20): FK, p. 251.
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‘Rätzelwort’, Schöne suggests, Mephisto gives an honest answer and reveals his
evil nature. Following Seidlin, Schöne, too, proposes a paradox-free, safe re-
construction of Mephisto’s (allegedly) failed attempt to manipulate Faust.
Other commentators are content to leave the paradox unresolved. In his ar-
ticle written in 1968, Albert Fuchs argues that Mephisto’s explanation of his
puzzle does not end in verse 1344; rather, it continues through verse 1378.184 In
this way, the full extent of the theodicy that is seen in Mephisto’s awareness
and confession – ‘Und freilich ist nicht viel damit getan’185 – can be perceived.
As the scene progresses, Mephisto doesn’t weaken his paradoxical state-
ment. He simply elaborates on his earlier statement – namely, that the intended
evil (‘Das Böse will’) resides in the tendency to negate and destroy the existing
order.186 Regarding deeds (‘das Gute schafft’), Mephisto admits that ‘Geruhig
bleibt am Ende Meer und Land’187 and ‘immer zirkuliert ein neues, frisches Blut.
| So geht es fort, man möchte rasend werden!’188 Mephisto sees no need for fur-
ther argumentation; he wants Faust to know him as a paradoxical being.
Reading this scene as one of Mephisto’s self-definition, Alt writes:
Mephistos Antworten auf Fausts Frage, wer er sei, verraten, daß der Teufel unter
den Bedingungen der Theodizee in verschiedenen Rollen fortexistiert. Er verkörpert
einen Flickenteppich aus Deutungen, die den Interpretationen entsprechen, welche der
Höllenherrscher und sein Gefolge in der abendländischen Kulturgeschichte gefunden haben.189
According to this view, Mephisto’s self-observation encompasses Greek and
Judeo-Christian conceptions of the evil. However, Faust (and not Mephisto) is
the one who connects Mephisto with this religious context. Faust calls
Mephisto ‘Flüchtling der Hölle’190 and ‘Fliegengott’.191 Faust even calls
Mephisto a ‘Lügner’,192 a label that may be influenced by Zoroastrianism. In his
notes on West-östlicher Divan, in the section entitled Aeltere Perser, Goethe dis-
cusses evil in Zoroastrianism:
184 Albert Fuchs, ‘Mephistopheles: Wesen, Charakterzüge, Intelligenz, Seine geheime
Tragödie, Das Problem seiner Rettung’, in Aufsätze zu Goethes ‘Faust I’, ed. Werner Keller
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974; reprint, Goethe-Studien. (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter & Co. 1968): p. 42–52), p. 353.
185 V. 1362.
186 V. 1340–1344.
187 V. 1368.
188 V. 1374–1374 (my emphasis).
189 Alt, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, p. 103 (my emphasis).
190 V. 1299.
191 V. 1334.
192 Ibid.
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Man betrachte ihre Hauptgebote und Verbote: nicht lügen, keine Schulden machen, nicht
undankbar seyn! die Fruchtbarkeit dieser Lehren wird sich jeder Ethiker und Ascete leicht
entwickeln. Denn eigentlich enthält das erste Verbot die beyden andern und alle übrigen,
die doch eigentlich nur Unwahrheit und Untreue entspringen; und daher mag der Teufel
im Orient bloß unter Beziehung des ewigen Lügners angedeutet werden.193
In this scene, Mephisto will not name himself and refuses to let Faust to name
him. Moreover, he insists on being seen as ‘ein Teil des Teils’.194 In this way, he
refuses to have an identity or essence. Furthermore, Mephisto attacks the credi-
bility of what humans call evil and the wholeness of humanity as an essence –
‘Wenn sich der Mensch, die kleine Narrenwelt, | Gewöhnlich für ein Ganzes
hält’.195 Finally, Mephisto convinces Faust to arrive at a non-religious (but
rather mythological and cosmological) understanding of him; Faust refers to
him as ‘Des Chaos wunderlicher Sohn!’196
It is worth noting that, as soon as Faust associates Mephisto with chaos,
Mephisto asks for permission to leave.197 Elaborating on the concept of chaos and
Mephisto’s claim that he is an offspring of the primordial mother-night, Michelsen
points out the significance of Goethe’s study of Karl Philipp Moritz’s Götterlehre
(1791). In his study of this work, Goethe found an explanation of Hesiod’s
Theogony, in which Chaos is introduced as the origin of everything198: ‘Da wo das
Auge der Phantasie nicht weiter trägt, ist Chaos, Nacht und Finsternis; und doch
trug die schöne Einbildungskraft der Griechen auch in diese Nacht einen sanften
Schimmer, der selbst ihre Furchtbarkeit reizend macht.’199
The only attribute that Faust is able to ascribe to Mephisto relates to Chaos.
In other words, Faust fails to define Mephisto’s ‘eigentliches Element’. In
Moritz’s work, we perceive an echo of Mephisto’s identification with part of a
paradoxical state:
Gleich im Anfange dieser Dichtungen[200] vereinigt sich die entgegengesetzten Enden der
Dinge; an das Furchtbarste und Schrecklichste grenzt das Liebenswürdigste. – Das
Gebildete und Schöne entwickelt sich aus dem Unförmlichen und Ungebildeten. – Das
Licht steigt aus der Finsternis empor. – Die Nacht vermählt sich mit dem Erebus, dem
193 FA I, 3/1: p. 150–151 (my emphasis).
194 V. 1349.
195 V. 1347–1348 (my emphasis).
196 V. 1384.
197 V. 1385.
198 Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes Faust’, pp. 234–235.
199 Karl Philipp Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, in Werke, ed.
Horst Günther (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1981), Vol. 2: pp. 616–617.
200 Theogony of Hesiod.
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alten Sitze der Finsternis, und gebiert den Äther und den Tag. Die Nacht ist reich an man-
nigfaltigen Geburten, denn sie hüllt alle die Gestalten in sich ein, welche das Licht des
Tages vor unserem Blick entfaltet.201
Bearing in mind Goethe’s reading of Moritz, we can better understand Faust’s
surrender to the namelessness of Mephisto, after Faust tried to dominate
Mephisto with names such as ‘liar’ and ‘corrupter’. Now Faust associates
Mephisto with Chaos, which represents an auspicious beginning: ‘Was anders
suche zu beginnen | Des Chaos wunderlicher Sohn!’202
Let us return to Mephisto’s paradoxical words. Reading this episode as one
of Mephisto’s self-definition, Alt asserts the following: ‘Goethes Faust wird hier
zum Drama des Teufels, der sich nur charakterisieren kann, indem er sich der
Sprache der Menschen unterwirft.’203 Remarkably, Alt sees in Mephisto’s pre-
sentation of paradox the potential to elude the grasp of a ‘binary logic’; more-
over, Alt introduces the deconstructive capacity of the lack of definitive identity
that is the contribution of paradox.204 In a closer examination of the two ap-
proaches, we notice that Alt sees the same episode from two perspectives – as
‘self-definition’ and as ‘Selbstdarstellung.’ In the first case, Alt explains the epi-
sode as Mephisto’s surrendering to the language of men. Seeing this episode as
Mephisto’s ‘Selbstdarstellung’, on the other hand, Alt describes it as Mephisto’s
acting within language and deconstructing the negative mind and its disposi-
tion to definitively separate good and evil. Mephisto’s paradoxical rhetoric
contributes to the flow of this scene and to the development of Faust, who pre-
viously saw death or an escape into the old world as the only way forward.
Regarding paradox as a mode of thought and speech and its relation to the
reader, Heinrich Plett clarifies:
Das Paradoxon ist ein Denk- und Sprachmodus, der sich in logischen Widersprüchen
manifestiert. Diese Widersprüche sind Scheinwidersprüche; denn sie verhüllen verbor-
gene Wahrheiten. Ihre Enthüllung löst im Rezipienten psychische und kognitive Reaktionen
aus. Auffällig ist das Plötzliche und geradezu Schockartige solcher Erkenntnisvorgänge.205
Paradoxical statements operate on an epistemological level, Plett asserts; they
use language to pave the way for transitions. As a figure of speech, Jane Green
201 Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, pp. 616–617.
202 V. 1383–1384.
203 Alt, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, p. 113. The same subject is treated in the follow-
ing: ———, ‘Mephisto’s Principles: On the Construction of Evil in Goethe’s Faust I,’ p. 159.
204 ———, ‘Mephisto’s Principles: On the Construction of Evil in Goethe’s Faust I,’ p. 157.
205 Heinrich F. Plett, ‘Das Paradoxon als rhetorische Kategorie’, in Das Paradox: Eine
Herausforderung des abendländischen Denkens, ed. Paul Geyer and Roland Hagenbüchle
(Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1992), p. 90 (my emphasis).
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argues, paradox challenges views that dominate discourse: ‘[f]or the purpose of
shaking a rooted prejudice there is nothing like a shattering paradox’.206
Paradox provides the necessary space for the process of inclusion to ex-
pand the old world and break down its walls. In the statement ‘Ein Teil von
jener Kraft, | Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft’,207 we find a
space that includes two mutually exclusive elements – ‘das Böse’ and ‘das
Gute’. The language practices this inclusion on the reader. Therefore, Mephisto
is not disempowered as he steps inside language; rather, he acts upon the situ-
ation with the force of a rhetorical category that language itself offers.
The dramatic setting of the scene Studierzimmer [I] – namely, Faust’s
‘Gelehrtenstube’ – is based upon exclusion. Yet the ‘Drudenfuß’ leaves open a
small space for inclusion. This object reflects the presence of Leibniz’s
necessary evil:
Beschaut es recht! es ist nicht gut gezogen;
Der eine Winkel, der nach außenzu,
Ist, wie du siehst, ein wenig offen.208
Until Mephisto is viewed as a prisoner – ‘mein gefangner wärst denn du?’,209 –
his answers maintain a defensive stance. Even Faust’s inquiry regarding the
possibility of a pact receives a short response.210 Mephisto asks Faust repeat-
edly and politely (‘hoch und höchst’)211 to let him out of the house: ‘Jetzt laß
mich los! ich komme bald zurück; | Dann magst du nach Belieben fragen.’212
Faust, however, declines to do so: ‘Den Teufel halte wer ihn hält! | Er wird ihn
nicht sobald zum zweitenmale fangen.’213
Unfolding against the backdrop of overcoming the ‘Drudenfuß’, the pro-
cess of inclusion compels Faust to reconsider his dominating approach.
Mephisto’s statement ‘Du bist noch nicht der Mann den Teufel fest zu hal-
ten’214 echoes a statement by the ‘Erdgeist’: ‘Du gleichst dem Geist, den du
Begreifst nicht mir.’ Faust clearly associates the two moments – ‘Bin ich denn
206 Jane Green, ‘Figures of Speech: IX. Paradox and Oxymoron’, Notes and Queries, 182,
no. 11 (1942), p. 144.
207 V. 1336.
208 V. 1400–1402.
209 V. 1404.
210 ‘Die Hölle selbst hat ihre Rechte? | Das find’ ich gut, da ließe sich ein Pakt, | Und sicher
wohl, mit euch ihr Herren schließen?’ V. 1413–1415.
211 V. 1387; 1420–1421; 1424–1425. Here: V. 1420.
212 V. 1424–1425.
213 V. 1428–1429.
214 V. 1509.
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abermals betrogen?’ he asks after waking up.215 Mephisto’s remark at the be-
ginning of Studierzimmer [II] – ‘So gefällst du mir’ – reminds us that the con-
dition of dialogue is of seminal importance. As a part of nature, Mephisto is
not excluded from the following rule:
Läßt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.216
II.1.3.3 Differentiating between Mephisto’s Intentions and Deeds
Reading the first encounter between Mephisto and Faust as Mephisto’s
‘Selbstdarstellung’, I argued, accentuates the communicative aspect between
the characters. This reading opens the way to exploring the dramatic relation
between Faust and Mephisto. It interprets Mephisto based on his deeds
(‘Taten’)217 rather than his intentions. However, there are also instances in
the text that are not communicative in terms of the dramatic relation between
the characters within the drama; rather, they communicate with the audi-
ence. When Mephisto directly addresses the audience, our analysis will have
to follow Mephisto in relation to his self-definition or self-observation.
Consequently, this approach requires more speculation, since the impact of
Mephisto’s statements cannot be followed within the dramatic structure of
the text.
II.1.3.3.1 Mephisto’s Evil Intentions and the Presence of Faust’s Old World
Not all of Mephisto’s statements are directed to Faust. In some cases, state-
ments that inform the reader’s judgment of Mephisto’s malevolence are di-
rected to the reader himself and do not influence the flow of the drama.218 The
first instance in which Mephisto voices his malevolence occurs near the end of
the Prolog im Himmel – ‘Staub soll er fressen, und mit Lust’.219 This is a general
statement and cannot be fully understood without reference to Mephisto’s view
215 V. 1526 (my emphasis).
216 V. 673–675.
217 Compare to Goethe’s words quoted on p. 21 above.
218 See: Johannes Anderegg, ‘Wie böse ist der Böse? Zur Gestalt des Mephisto in Goethes
Faust’, Monatsheft, 96, no. 3 (University of Wisconsin Press, Fall, 2004), pp. 343–344.
Anderegg explains this aspect of Mephisto as a ‘commentator’, ‘characterizer’, and ‘evaluator’
(p. 344) who forms the last impression of a scene; Goethe concludes 22 scenes of the drama
with Mephisto’s words and only seven with Faust’s (p. 343).
219 V. 334.
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of humanity. Anglet clarifies Mephisto’s critique of the human condition in the
Prolog im Himmel:
Der Bindung des Menschen an das Göttliche durch die ‘Vernunft’, den ‘Schein des
Himmelslichts’ (V. 284f.), stellt Mephistopheles die sinnliche Natur des Menschen, seine
‘thierische’ Seite, entgegen: die ‘Nase’, die dieser ‘in jeden Quark’ stecke (V. 292)220
In Mephisto’s judgment, the human being’s dependency on senses is incompat-
ible with the glow of heaven’s light. Furthermore, this inconsistency creates
constant misery for the human being: ‘Ein wenig besser würd’ er leben, | Hätt’st
du ihm nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben’,221 Mephisto says. He
adds, ‘Die Menschen dauern mich in ihren Jammertagen, |Ich mag sogar die
armen selbst nicht plagen.’222
Faust’s early views are remarkably similar to Mephisto’s – both describe
two mutually exclusive souls residing in the human being.223 Furthermore,
both Faust and Mephisto consider this mixture to be the source of human mis-
ery. This view is consistent with the Neoplatonic view of secondary evil, dis-
cussed earlier in this study.224 Considering the negative, exclusive tendency
that Mephisto displays in his critique of the creation of human beings, it is not
surprising that Mephisto denigrates light as impure due to its relation to the
corporeal – ‘Von Körpern strömt’s, die Körper macht es schön, | Ein Körper
hemmt’s auf seinem Gange’.225 Thus, Mephisto’s disdain for that which is
mixed and impure shapes his understanding of the flow of light from genera-
tion to reflection and perception.
In verse 1851, after Faust leaves Mephisto to prepare himself ‘zur schönen
Fahrt’,226 Mephisto dresses ‘in Faust’ s langem Kleide’227 and displays his malev-
olence to the reader:
Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft,
Des Menschen allerhöchste Kraft,
Laß nur in Blend- und Zauberwerken
220 Andreas Anglet, Der ‘ewige’ Augenblick: Studien zur Struktur und Funktion eines
Denkbildes bei Goethe, Kölner germanische Studien (Köln; Weimar; Wien: Böhlau, 1991),
p. 178.
221 V. 283–284.
222 V. 297–298.
223 In addition to the verses above, see v. 634; 1090–1091; 1110–1117.
224 See p. 67 above.
225 V. 1355–1356.
226 V. 1850.
227 FT. p. 81.
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Dich von dem Lügengeist bestärken,
So hab’ ich dich schon unbedingt228
The value that Mephisto assigns to reason and knowledge negates what he
deems to be the animal and wild quality of life:
Den schlepp’ ich durch das wilde Leben,
Durch flache Unbedeutenheit,
Er soll mir zappeln, starren, kleben229
This judgment once again underscores that Mephisto shares more with Faust
than just clothing. Here again, Mephisto’s rhetoric in verse 1853 mirrors Faust’s
rhetoric earlier in the drama, as he curses a life that he characterizes as ‘Lock-
und Gaukelwerk’230 and ‘Blend- und Schmeichelkräft[e]’.231 Later in the scene,
Mephisto’s conversation with the new student echoes Faust’s critique of the old
institution of knowledge. Mephisto even voices Goethe’s own opinions in many
cases,232 such as Goethe’s critique of jurisprudence.233
Mephisto’s view of the corporeal world (v. 1363–1366) and his lamentation
before the scene Grablegung reveal an important aspect of Mephisto’s negative
approach and point to a non-intellectual side of his negations. In verses
1363–1366, Mephisto claims to be a corrupting force in the world:
Was sich dem Nichts entgegenstellt,
Das Etwas, diese plumpe Welt,
So viel als ich schon unternommen,
Ich wußte nicht ihr beizukommen234
Mephisto’s evil intention is to corrupt the corruptible. By comparing the logical
justification of negative pursuit of truth to Mephisto’s views, we see Mephisto’s
negation and destruction in a different light.
As the force that corrupts the corruptible, Mephisto is part of the logic of ne-
gation and abstraction. The pleasure that Mephisto takes in corruption shows
that his highest principle is one of absolute emptiness. Throughout the drama,
228 V. 1851–1855.
229 V. 1860–1862.
230 V. 1588.
231 V. 1590.
232 See in: Anderegg, ‘Wie böse ist der Böse? Zur Gestalt des Mephisto in Goethes Faust,’
pp. 344–345. Here, Anderegg explores the role of Mephisto as the ‘Sprachrohr Goethes’ who
voices the author’s critique of the method of acquisition of knowledge.
233 See v. 1972ff and compare to FK, p. 271.
234 V. 1363–1366.
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Mephisto stakes a claim to the truth as he follows Hesiod’s view of the primor-
diality of Chaos. In other words, the process of purification for Mephisto proceeds
with negative purification, until the impure ‘Etwas’ is turned into the purified
‘Nichts’ and returns to its origin in Chaos (rather than Nous). Negation is the
foundation of Mephisto’s personal philosophy and ethics. Echoing his earlier
statement in verses 1860–1867, Mephisto expresses this view after Faust’s death:
Ihn sättigt keine Lust, ihm gnügt kein Glück,
So buhlt er fort nach wechselnden Gestalten;
Den letzten, schlechten, leeren Augenblick
Der Arme wünscht ihn fest zu halten.235
In the following verses, Mephisto seems to lament Faust’s absence:
Vorbei! ein dummes Wort.
Warum Vorbei?
Vorbei und reines Nicht, vollkommnes Einerlei.
Was soll uns denn das ewge Schaffen,
Geschaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen?
Da ists vorbei! Was ist daran zu lesen?
Es ist so gut als wär es nicht gewesen,
Und treibt sich doch im Kreis als wenn es wäre.
Ich liebte mir dafür das Ewig-Leere.236
As Michelsen points out, Mephisto’s use of ‘uns’ signifies that he sympathizes
with Faust:
Ein wenig scheint Mephisto demjenigen nachzutrauern, den ins Verderben hinabzustoßen
doch sein eifrigstes Bemühen war; und für einen Moment nimmt er sogar – indem er sich
der identifizierenden ersten Person Pluralis bedient (‘Was soll uns denn das ew’ge
Schaffen!’) – den Standpunkt des Menschen ein, die all ihr Tun, vom Rückblick des Endes
her, als ganz und gar vergeblich erkennen müssen. ‘Geschaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen’:
das war doch gerade Mephistos Hauptgeschäft, das erreicht zu haben eigentlich seinen
Triumph und nichtWehmut über die Vergänglichkeit der Dinge zur Folge haben müßte!237
The feeling of loss permeates this dialogue and the word ‘dafür’ suggests the log-
ical process and its negative method in the Neoplatonic tradition. Furthermore,
this ‘dafür’ gestures toward a reaction which Mephisto presents as a judgment
that the changeable is unworthy of being the object of desire. In other words,
235 V. 11587–11590 (my emphasis).
236 V. 11595–11603 (my emphasis).
237 Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes Faust’, p. 248 (my
emphasis).
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when Mephisto abandons his pretense of schadenfreude after Faust’s death, it
comes to light that Mephisto’s self-observation is mostly the self-observation of
the very agent of negation that is active in the process of abstraction in the
method of dialectic. As he lowers his defensive mask of schadenfreude, we see
that Mephisto’s tendency to avoid the pain of loss explains his ascetic and negat-
ing words following verse 1860.
Several facts allow us to deduce that there is a relation between the ex-
cluding views of Faust’s old world and the elements we find in the evil inten-
tions of Mephisto: Mephisto wears Faust’s clothes as he reveals his evil
intentions, Mephisto’s evil intentions have the logic of negation of the corpo-
real and the corruptible realm, and the logic above correspond to Faust’s old
world. We can also detect that Mephisto claims a higher intellectual ground
that is rooted in his love for eternal emptiness: ‘Ich liebte mir dafür das Ewig-
Leere.’238 In this verse, Mephisto expresses that he has chosen eternal empti-
ness in order to avoid the pain of loss. The moment he fails to exclude and
negate, the ‘Klugerfahrener’239 must suffer this pain.
The relation between Mephisto’s evil intentions and Faust’s old world be-
comes clearer when we take into account that evil, as Schmidt-Biggeman puts
it, is regarded as such only subsequent to an experience which refuses to be
recognized and categorized as known.240 Bearing in mind that Faust is absent
in all the instances in which Mephisto expresses his evil intentions, we know
that Mephisto is communicating these intentions directly to the reader.
Furthermore, it is important to note that in all the instances above the reader
is in a state of suspense. In the first instance (v. 1851–1867), Faust leaves his
room to prepare for his journey – he has just ruined his old world; and in
the second instance (v. 11595–11603), Faust has just died. In both cases, Faust
steps into the darkness beyond the horizon (as Blumenberg might say).
Therefore, the ominous feeling of the unknown that lies beyond the horizon –
or as Faust puts it, the anxiety that ‘mit ahnungsvollem heilʼgem Grauen | In
uns die bess’re Seele weckt’241 – dominates the scene in the form of Mephisto.
238 V. 11603.
239 V. 11841.
240 See: Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Über die unfaßliche Evidenz des Bösen’, in Das Böse
eine historische Phänomenologie des Unerklärlichen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993),
p. 8. Here, we read: ‘Die Faszination dieses Phänomens muß wohl darin liegen, daß das Böse
das tremendum, das Zitternmachen, an sich behält, das die Augenblickserfahrung der nu-
minosen Evidenz charakterisiert. Und erst der zweite Augenblick macht dann die Beurteilung
dessen, was sich zeigt, als Böse möglich – das Böse wird hinterher-gedacht.’
241 V. 1180–1181.
128 II Toward Life
As Faust prepares to leave his old world of negation, Mephisto articulates
those anxieties. And when Faust dies, the reader once again faces the fear of
the unknown.
This form of communication with the reader is integrated into the drama and
manifests in Mephisto’s becoming the voice of fear of the darkness beyond the ho-
rizon. Thus, we see that Mephisto’s evil intentions have an affinity to Faust’s old
world; Mephisto is the voice of anxiety of the ‘Horizonterfahrung’. Yet this is true
only insofar as we follow his intentions in statements that are not directed toward
Faust and thus do not advance the plot of the drama. As we follow the process of
Faust’s turn toward life, we must focus on Mephisto’s deeds, rather than his
intensions.
II.1.3.4 Mephisto’s Deeds and Faust’s Turn Toward Life
II.1.3.4.1 Toward Life in the Song of the Spirits: Connecting the
Sun with Wine
The song of the spirits casts Faust in ‘ein Meer des Wahns’242 and provides
Mephisto with the opportunity to escape the house. Employing light metaphors,
the song creates a vision for Faust that is relevant to his wishes. It starts bybreak-
ing through the gothic ceiling of Faust’s study – the ‘dunkeln | Wölbungen dro-
ben’243 – and dispelling the dark clouds so that the light of the sun can flow. But
the flow is not one of pure intellect; rather, it is an emanation of beauty as articu-
lated in ‘Himmlischer Söhne | Geistige Schöne’.244 The beauty that the ‘heavenly
sons’ disperse converts metaphors of light into a metaphor of wine; the sun ripens
grapes that are turned into flowing wine.245 In this picture, humans appear as
lovers:
Wo sich für’s Leben,
Tief in Gedanken,
Liebende geben.246
This dream exerts a strong influence on Faust. It ends as the immanent flow of
beauty reaches its peak. Once again, all things flow toward love and life:
242 V. 1511.
243 V. 1447–1448.
244 V. 1457–1458.
245 V. 1471–1480.
246 V. 1467–1469.
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Alle zum Leben,
Alle zur Ferne
Liebender Sterne
Seliger Huld.247
In his notes on West-östlicher Divan, Goethe discusses the affinity between light
metaphors and wine metaphors. In this text, Goethe attempts to understand the
culture of the ancient Persians, for whom both metaphors were important:
‘Alles wozu die Sonne lächelte ward mit höchstem Fleiß betrieben, vor anderm
aber die Weinrebe, das eigentlichste Kind der Sonne, gepflegt.’248 In the song
above, we detect the promises that calm Faust’s restless soul as well as his de-
sire for a turn toward life.
II.1.3.4.2 From Pain and Pleasure to Paradox and Partaking
Mephisto’s entrance into Faust’s room in the scene Studierzimmer [II] marks a
significant change in the relation between the two characters. Unlike their first
encounter, their second encounter does not involve domination. Upon entering
Faust’s room, Mephisto finds Faust willing to partake in his ritual – ‘Du mußt
es dreimal sagen.’249 He explicitly describes to Faust the difference between
this encounter and the first one: ‘So gefällst du mir. | Wir werden, hoff’ ich, uns
vertragen’.250
Mephisto sees himself as a mediator and a guide for Faust. His new appear-
ance is meant to dispel Faust’s gloominess. He encourages Faust to likewise
dress fashionably, promising that Faust will appreciate what life has in store
for him: ‘Damit du, losgebunden, frei, | Erfahrest was das Leben sei.’251 Faust’s
response – ‘In jedem Kleide werd’ ich wohl die Pein | Des engen Erdelebens
fühlen’252 – contains one of the keywords in this study: ‘pain’. Faust explores
this pain further: ‘Ich bin zu alt, um nur zu spielen, | Zu jung, um ohne Wunsch
zu sein.’253 We recognize the inner conflict between, on the one hand, an under-
standing of being old – being experienced enough to regard many endeavors as
childish games – and, on the other hand, a desire for new experience. Faust’s
247 V. 1502–1505.
248 FA I, 3/1: p. 150. For an early instance of a poetic articulation of the relations between the
sun, grapes and wine in Persian poetry, see my translation of a fragment of a poem by
Manūčihrī of Dāmqān (d. 1041 CE) on p. 141 below.
249 V. 1532.
250 V. 1533–1534.
251 V. 1542–1543.
252 V. 1544–1545 (my emphasis).
253 V. 1546–1547.
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state of negation, the result of his age and experience, makes it impossible for
him to see the world with fresh eyes254: this is what gives meaning to the pain-
ful ‘sollen’ that first echoes after ‘Entbehren’ and then comes to the foreground
in ‘Entbehren sollst du! sollst entbehren!’255 Faust acknowledges the existence
of his knowledge that ‘selbst die Ahnung jeder Lust | Mit eigensinnigem Krittel
mindert’.256 There is a gap between the pain that this knowledge foresees and
the possibility of a life of happiness: ‘Und so ist mir das Dasein eine Last, | Der
Tod erwünscht, das Leben mir verhaßt.’257 Mephisto’s job is to help Faust
bridge this gap. In verses 1572–1645, Mephisto proves the sincerity of the claim
he made in the Prolog im Himmel: ‘Da dank’ ich euch; denn mit den Toten |
Hab’ ich mich niemals gern befangen.’258 To turn toward life, Faust must first
address his suicide attempt, which, as I explained in the previous chapter, was
the most intense form of escape in Faust’s cycle of pain. In the next step of my
argument, I focus on how Mephisto contributes toward defeating Faust’s mor-
bid tendencies.
In the scene Studierzimmer [II], Faust appears to oscillate between pleasure
and pain. Faust’s statement in verses 1570–1571 vividly expresses his discontent
with his old world, which brings Faust to attempt suicide. Later, Mephisto
leads Faust to take a deeper look at his wish for death – ‘Und doch ist nie der
254 On the difference between (a) being wise and experienced in the sense of being able to
foresee and expect the outcome of an experience; and (b) being experienced in terms of being
trained in partaking in a process that each time challenges premises and expectations, see:
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophishen Hermeneutik,
5th ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986), pp. 361–362. Here, Gadamer explains that ‘[j]ede
Erfahrung, die diesen Namen verdient, durchkreuzt eine Erwartung.’
255 V. 1549. Arens claims that Faust has felt ‘Entbehren’ (doing without), but never grasped
‘Entsagen’ (renouncing). It appears that Arens takes the scene Nacht as the measure for
Faust’s way of life, whereas in fact it is in the translation scene that Faust’s old world has clear
dominance. In this scene, Faust’s tendency to renunciation is dramatized in his attempts at
silencing the undesirable voices of the poodle. Furthermore, in the evil intentions of Mephisto,
Faust’s anxieties are reflected. They are rooted in a level of ascetic renunciation of the corrupt-
ible and changeable. (See above p. 127) The translation scene reveals Faust’s old world as it
was before the scene Nacht. It is in the process of reevaluation that starts in the scene Nacht
that the ‘Entsagen’ of his old world comes out as a painful ‘Entbehren’. See in: Arens,
Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 170.
256 V. 1558–1561.
257 V. 1570–1571.
258 V. 318–319. See another instance in which Mephisto is concerned about saving Faust’s life
in the following source: Huber, ‘Mephisto is the devil – or is he?’, p. 40. Here, Huber gives a
concrete example of Mephisto’s saving Faust’s life in their confrontation with Valentin.
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Tod ein ganz willkommner Gast.’259 Faust’s response to Mephisto shows the
other side of his pain:
O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze
Die blut’gen Lorbeer’n um die Schläfe windet,
Den er, nach rasch durchras’tem Tanze,
In eines Mädchens Armen findet.
O wär’ ich vor des hohen Geistes Kraft
Entzückt, entseelt dahin gesunken!260
Faust’s experience of pain turns into an exulted wish for death; Mephisto even
provokes him. Again, Mephisto uses sarcasm to move Faust – ‘Und doch hat
jemand’261 – and to remind him that he does not actually want death. In a direct
and rather impulsive reaction to Mephisto’s act,262 Faust suddenly takes a sig-
nificantly radical negating step toward all sources of joy:
So fluch’ ich allem was die Seele
Mit Lock- und Gaukelwerk umspannt,
Und sie in diese Trauerhöhle
Mit Blend- und Schmeichelkräften bannt!263
These curses include the ‘childish’264 religious feelings that once saved Faust
from suicide as well as the speculative faculty (‘die hohe Meinung, | Womit der
Geist sich selbst umfängt’265) and what the senses perceive (‘Verflucht das
Blenden der Erscheinung, | Die sich an unsre Sinne drängt!’266). When attacking
the mundane, Faust revisits his views expressed in verses 634–651, in which he
curses fame, worldly possessions (Mammon),267 and ‘Weib und Kind, als Knecht
259 V. 1572.
260 V. 1573–1578 (my emphasis).This glorified death shows its cosmic proportions when we
compare these verses with the following citation from the essay Die Natur (1783) written by
Christof Tobler, which was published and commented on by Goethe: ‘Ungebeten und unge-
warnt nimmt sie uns in den Kreislauf ihres Tanzes auf und treibt sich mit uns fort, bis wir
ermüdet sind und ihrem Arme entfallen’ in: FA I, 25: p. 11.
261 V. 1579.
262 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 173. Arens too sees the sudden reaction as in
respond to Mephisto’s provocation, whereas, he reads this negation as negation of all human
weaknesses.
263 V. 1587–1590.
264 Compare v. 1585 to v. 781. See p. 64 above.
265 V. 1591–1592.
266 V. 1593–1594.
267 See Adelung, Versuch eines volständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der
Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. 3: p. 334. In the following verses of the New Testament in Luther’s
translation Mammon refers to money as an object of desire: ‘Die Bible oder die gantze Heilige
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und Pflug!’268 At the peak of these radical negations of all mundane and exulted
objects of desire, Faust proceeds to his last negations. As Schöne clarifies, these
are curses directed at the ‘fundamentalen christlichen Tugenden’.269 The spirits
then affirm that Faust has taken a serious step toward tearing down the walls of
his old world:
Du hast sie zerstört,
Die schöne Welt,
Mit mächtiger Faust;
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!270
The unique character of this negation (compared to Faust’s negation after the
bitter experience with the ‘Erdgeist’) is that it negates both spiritual and sen-
sual sources of satisfaction. The experience of the fall of all forms of known val-
ues is a prelude to the formation of a new conception of the world:
Wir tragen
Die Trümmern in’s Nichts hinüber,
Und klagen
Über die verlorne Schöne.
Mächtiger
Der Erdensöhne,
Prächtiger
Baue sie wieder271
Mephisto encourages Faust to focus on future happiness, rather than his cur-
rent pain. He characterizes Faust’s radical negation, which informs those
curses, as Faust’s ‘playing around with his grief’ (pain).272 Mephisto must help
Faust to overcome two obstacles: a painful, negative and excluding knowledge;
and a form of self-glorification that is rooted in the ascending aspect of the neg-
ative approach to knowledge.273 These two obstacles contribute to Faust’s isola-
tion. In order to bring Faust out of his solitude, therefore, Mephisto must defeat
them. Mephisto interprets the words of the Spirits as a call for Faust to break
out of his isolation: ‘In die Welt weit, | Aus der Einsamkeit’.274
Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments / nach der Übers. Martin Luthers. Neu durchges. nach
dem Dt. Evang. Kirchenausschuss genehm. Text.’Matthaeus, 6: 24; Lukas 16: 9; 11; 13.
268 V. 1598.
269 FK, p. 257.
270 V. 1608–1611.
271 V. 1613–1620.
272 V. 1635. Compare to: Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 177.
273 See v. 1573 and compare to v. 702–719 and p. 92 above.
274 V. 1631–1632.
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Mephisto approaches Faust gradually.275 He offers to change Faust’s ap-
pearance, but without compromising Faust’s individuality.276 The pact is intro-
duced to Faust as a promise that would end Faust’s entrapment in cycles of
pain; nonetheless, Mephisto does not kindle high expectations:
Ich bin keiner von den Großen;
Doch willst du, mit mir vereint,
Deine Schritte durch’s Leben nehmen,
So will ich mich gern bequemen
Dein zu sein, auf der Stelle.277
Mephisto’s goal in proposing the pact is to force Faust to acknowledge that he
does not seek death.
It is noteworthy that Faust associates the earth with joys (‘Aus dieser Erde
quillen meine Freuden’) and the sun with his pains (‘Und diese Sonne scheinet
meinen Leiden’).278 This reminds us of the scene Nacht, where the moon was
depicted as shining upon Faust’s sufferings. Faust immediately asks Mephisto
to help him transcend and exclude both joy and pain: ‘Kann ich mich erst von
ihnen scheiden’.279
Mephisto does not assist Faust in this act of radical exclusion of pain and joy.
Rather, he continues provoking Faust to remain between both emotions. In verse
1635 Mephisto stresses grief; and in verse 1673 he stresses joy: ‘Verbinde dich; du
sollst, in diesen Tagen, | Mit Freuden meine Künste sehn’. If the pact was what
Mephisto desired, then he already had secured Faust’s interest (see v. 1649 and,
in the scene Studierzimmer [I], v. 1413–1415). Yet Mephisto’s choice of words show
that he is instigating a change in Faust. Mephisto emphasizes joy so that Faust
once again may proudly speak of his ascetic negative knowledge.280 Mephisto ar-
gues that knowledge of the corruptibility of these natural sources of joy should
not make Faust ignore their quality of facilitating life.281 Again, Mephisto men-
tions the joy that springs from a fleeting moment of rest; he stresses ‘Ruhe’282
275 Through the perspective of intentions, one can follow the realization of v. 314: ‘Ihn meine
Straße sacht zu führen!’
276 See V. 1639–1640.
277 V. 1641–1645.
278 V. 1663–1664.
279 V. 1665.
280 V. 1675–1685.
281 ‘Mit solchen Schätzen kann ich dienen.’ V. 1689.
282 V. 1691.
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after Faust speaks of ‘Streben’.283 In this setting, Faust forms a wager that is based
on eternal discontent.
The reoccurrence of pain and grief is more important to the context of this
study than the ritual that integrates the wager into the traditional pact.284 The first
influences of the paradox that Mephisto brings to the drama find articulation
when Faust looks into the depths of sensuality for the shining light of passion.285
In contrast to his transcendent wish for the timeless, represented by his wish to
drink from the eternal light of the sun in the scene Osterspaziergang, Faust seeks
something radically different from what his old world understood as knowledge.
The oxymora of ‘Schmerz und Genuß, | Gelingen und Verdruß’286 form a space
where Faust can finally arrive at a point foreseen by the Lord in the Prolog: ‘Nur
rastlos betätigt sich der Mann.’287 Yet this newly discovered, paradoxical approach
has a point. The dominance of grief resonates in the following verse: ‘In deinen
Rang gehör’ ich nur.’288
Responding to the hidden grief in the structure of Faust’s paradoxical unity
of ‘Schmerz’ and ‘Genuß’, Mephisto says, ‘Bekomm euch wohl was euch er-
getzt.’289 He instigates in Faust a deeper investigation into the causes of his isola-
tion – namely, pain and self-glorification. Emphasizing his pain,290 Faust admits
that he sees the way ahead as a heroic act of self-deification that shall end in his
annihilation:
Du hörst ja, von Freud’ ist nicht die Rede.
Dem Taumel weih’ ich mich, dem schmerzlichsten Genuß,
Verliebtem Haß, erquickendem Verdruß.
Mein Busen, der vom Wissensdrang geheilt ist,
Soll keinen Schmerzen künftig sich verschließen,
Und was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist,
283 V. 1676.
284 The verses following 1741 are where Faust has the space to sign the covenant. They bring
the scene in connection to the failure to summon the ‘Erdgeist’. This consists of the broken
relation to Nature (v. 1747) as well as the self-criticism that ‘ich habe mich zu hoch gebläht’ (v.
1744). In this self-criticism, the inner relation between pain and self-glorification can be seen
clearly.
285 V. 1750.
286 V. 1756–1757.
287 V. 1759.
288 V. 1745.
289 V. 1763.
290 Arens explains Faust’s reaction as follows: ‘F. weist den Gedanken zurück, es gehe ihm
um Freude, und betont vielmehr das Element des Schmerzes in seinen zukünftigen
Erfahrungen.’ In: Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 190.
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Will ich in meinem innern Selbst genießen,
Mit meinem Geist das Höchst’ und Tiefste greifen,
IhrWohl undWeh auf meinen Busen häufen,
Und so mein eigen Selbst zu ihrem Selbst erweitern,
Und, wie sie selbst, am End’ auch ich zerscheitern.291
The last verse cited above, as Arens points out, is still a ‘pseudoheroische Geste’.292
In its titanic claim to god-likeness and glorification of pain,293 it is far from being
able to activate the inclusive potentials of the oxymora. Muschg is right to call
these words spoken by Faust the ‘Oxymora der Selbstquälerei’.294 Mephisto’s re-
sponse shows that he is trying to help Faust overcome this obstacle. He rephrases
Faust’s titanic ‘was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist’ as ‘Und euch taugt einzig
Tag und Nacht.’295 Mephisto keeps the state of oxymora, but he refutes the element
of self-deification that seeks glorification in pain. Faust pays attention to these
words of Mephisto. His response shows that Mephisto’s attempts to address the
excluding hindrance of self-glorification were successful: ‘Was bin ich denn, wenn
es nicht möglich ist | Der Menschheit Krone zu erringen’.296 Furthermore, Mephisto
insists on making his point through verses 1776–1809: ‘Du bist am Ende – was du
bist’297 and ‘Du bleibst doch immer was du bist’298 Mephisto says. He makes it
clear that he wants to be heard and that he wants to exert an influence. Reflecting
Mephisto’s influence, Faust once again sees himself submerged in the sea of igno-
rance: ‘Ich fühl’s, vergebens hab’ ich alle Schätze | Des Menschengeistʼs auf mich
herbeigerafft’.299 Once again, the richness of the old world is dwarfed by the limit-
less horizon. Mephisto’s analogy leaves no place for glory:
Ich sag’ es dir: ein Kerl, der spekuliert,
Ist wie ein Tier, auf dürrer Heide
Von einem bösen Geist im Kreis herum geführt,
Und rings umher liegt schöne grüne Weide.300
291 V. 1765–1775 (my emphasis).
292 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 191.
293 Compare to FK, p. 264.
294 Adolf Muschg, Der Schein trügt nicht: über Goethe (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2004), p. 87.
295 V. 1783.
296 V. 1803–1804.
297 V. 1806.
298 V. 1809.
299 V. 1810–1811.
300 V. 1830–1833.
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Again, Mephisto stresses joy while Faust stresses pain. Mephisto examines
Faust again in the following verses: ‘Wir müssen das gescheiter machen, | Eh’
uns des Lebens Freude flieht’301; and ‘Doch alles, was ich frisch genieße, | Ist
das drum weniger mein?’302 Faust’s response this time shows no resistance to-
ward joy. He simply asks: ‘Wie fangen wir das an?’303
Thanks to Mephisto’s persistent mediation, the oxymora of pain and pleasure
reach the polar balance that can connect Faust to life. In inclusion of the excluded
corruptible and natural, Faust takes his first steps toward a colorful new life.
Once again, the house is at the center of Mephisto’s attention:
Wir gehen eben fort.
Was ist das für ein Marterort?
Was heißt das für ein Leben führen,
Sich und die Jungens ennuyieren?304
Mephisto sees the first step as fleeing this house of torture. He also points out
how this house stifles the freshness of youth. Through the eyes of the newly
arrived student, we review Faust’s critique of his old world and its exclusion of
nature:
Aufrichtig, möchte schon wieder fort:
In diesen Mauern, diesen Hallen,
Will es mir keineswegs gefallen.
Es ist ein gar beschränkter Raum,
Man sieht nichts Grünes, keinen Baum,
Und in den Sälen, auf den Bänken,
Vergeht mir Hören, Seh’n und Denken.305
A new character appears within these walls as Faust prepares to leave them. Like
the process of settling into the house, the process of breaking out of it is also grad-
ual, Mephisto claims.306 The new student asks to be admitted: ‘Doch sagt mir nur,
wie kann ich hingelangen?’307 Faust, on the other hand, poses a different question:
‘Wohin soll es nun gehn?’308
301 V. 1818–1819.
302 V. 1822–1823.
303 V. 1834.
304 V. 1834–1837.
305 V. 1881–1887 (my emphasis).
306 V. 1888–1893. It is remarkable how similar this student is to Faust; both are about to
leave their respective familiar worlds.
307 V. 1895.
308 V. 2051.
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At this moment, Faust notices his long beard and worries that he lacks
the qualities necessary to partake in life. Faust’s words remind the reader of
Mephisto’s fashion advice: ‘und rate nun dir, kurz und gut, | Dergleichen gleich-
falls anzulegen’.309 Now Mephisto addresses Faust as ‘Mein guter Freund’310 in-
stead of as ‘Mein guter Herr’.311
The significance of the house is stressed one last time before Faust and
Mephisto depart. ‘Wie kommen wir denn aus dem Haus?’312 Faust asks Mephisto.
In his comments, Arens notices the extraordinary quality of this question:
‘Wunderlich naive Frage, als hätte er schon vergessen, daß sein Reisegefährte
nicht ein normaler Diener, sondern ein Teufel ist.’313 Considering the long battle
that Mephisto waged with these walls, we can appreciate Goethe’s
defamiliarization of the moment of departure from a place previously character-
ized as ‘Kerker’, ‘verfluchtes dumpfes Mauerloch’ and ‘Marterort’. This naïve
question reflects the strength of the walls of the house and the anxiety Faust
feels in the face of a ‘Horizonterfahrung’. Within these walls, a world was put
together and the natural world was excluded. It is hard to imagine that Faust
could leave this world of walls simply by walking out the door.
II.2 The Turn Toward Life in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
In the previous chapter, I explored ġazals in the Divan that point to the poet’s vast
knowledge of Sufi teachings, which prescribe a negative, ascending and direct ap-
proach to the truth. This is the main characteristic of an approach within Sufism
known as ‘taṣavvuf-i zuhdī’314 – ascetic Sufism. It emphasizes abstinence and the
process of abstraction in a strict ascetic ascending manner. This approach to
knowledge of the truth was a seminal part of the intellectual and literary tradition
that a poet of Ḥāfiẓ’s rank was expected to master. Poetic articulations that have
an affinity to this method are integrated into the Divan. This affinity inspired the
poet to write two ġazals (334 and 478) with one central theme uniting all the
309 V. 1540–1541.
310 V. 2061.
311 V. 1816.
312 V. 2063.
313 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 211.
314 For a summary of views of philosophers and Sufis on abstraction from the worldly and
corporeal, see the entry on zuhd (asceticism) and zuhhād (ascetics) in the following: Sayyid
Ǧaʿfar Saǧǧādī, Farhang-e maʿāref-e eslāmī, 4 vols. (Tehran: Šerkat-e Moʾallefān va
Motarǧemān-e Iran, 1362/1983).
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couplets of these ġazals.315 The ġazals 334 and 478 promulgate the ascent to the
transcendent truth and the separation of the bodily realm from the spiritual realm.
Yet the presence of an excluding, negative approach to the bodily realm is not re-
stricted to these two poems. In other verses, the poet alludes to, criticizes or dis-
cusses this method of approach to knowledge of truth.
To explain Ḥāfiẓ’s specific manner of critique of ascetic exclusion of the
bodily in pursuit of truth, I first explore the articulations of an inclination to-
ward the natural realm. To understand Ḥāfiẓ’s critiques in their historical con-
text, we need a clear view of the form of representation of nature in the Persian
literary tradition. As his many allusions in the Divan prove, Ḥāfiẓ studied and
committed to memory a vast body of Persian literature, ranging from the ninth
century to works of his own contemporaries.
II.2.1 Nature in Persian Poetry of the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries
As we know it today, classical Persian poetry developed in dialogue with
Arabic poetry and rhetoric around the ninth century CE.316 In works of one of
the earliest Persian poets, Rūdakī (c. 880–941) – ‘generally regarded as the fa-
ther of Persian poetry’,317 according to Edward Browne – nature represents na-
ture itself and evokes the experience of nature in the reader.318 This does not
mean that the poet avoids anthropomorphic analogies; though nature in its ob-
jective sense is the center of the poet’s attention, anthropomorphism intensifies
the poet’s empathy in the experience of the natural. For instance, in a qaṣīda in
celebration of the arrival of spring (a frequent theme in the poetry of Rūdakī
and other poets of the ninth to eleventh centuries), Rūdakī constantly invites
his readers to observe natural phenomena and he employs analogies through
315 In §I.3.1 (‘Escaping the Cage of the Body’), I elaborated on these two poems as two ġazals
that strictly describe the Sufi ascetic tendency to ascend in the process of separation of the
soul from its inclinations to the corporeal. In the above-mentioned section, I provided trans-
lations of these two ġazals – i.e. the ġazals 334 and 478.
316 On the influence of Arabic poetry in the development of Persian prosody see the following
source: B. Utas, ‘Prosody: Meter and Rhyme’, in A History of Persian Literature, ed. J. T. P. De
Bruijn (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 98–99; pp. 121–122. See also: E. G. Browne,
A Literary History of Persia, IV vols. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1951), vol. 1: p. 340.
317 ———, A Literary History of Persia, p. 368.
318 It must be noted that evoking joy and happiness and illustrating festivities was expected
of high-ranking court poets, such as Rūdakī, Farruḫī (d. 1038), ʿUnṣurī (d. 1040), and
Manūčihrī (d. 1041).
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which he brings the natural realm in connection with the human realm. The
following five couplets from this qaṣīda illustrate this technique:
Look at that cloud, how it cries like a grieving man,
Thunder moans like a lover with a broken heart.
Now and then the sun peeks from behind the clouds
Like a prisoner hiding from the guard.
The world, which had been in pain for some time,
Has found a cure in this Jasmine-scented wind.
A shower of musk streams down in waves,
On leaves, a cover of shiny new silk.
Snow covered crevices now bear roses.
Streams that have been dry now swell with water.319
After Rūdakī, Manūčihrī of Dāmġān made important advances in the poetic repre-
sentation of nature. In his introduction to Manūčihrī’s Divan, Dabīrsīyāqī explains
that Manūčihrī has a unique mastery of the poetic representation of nature; he
even suggests that students of Persian poetry and language turn to Manūčihrī’s
poems to develop their knowledge of different names of various flowers, birds and
other natural phenomena.320 Discussing one of Manūčihrī’s famous qaṣāʾid that
was inspired by spring, Zipoli draws our attention to extraordinary and innovative
imagery in which dark spring clouds ‘rain down’ on a meadow covered with tulips,
which are compared to the breast of a maid from Ḥabaša (Ethiopia) nursing an
infant321; a further analogy likens the bent growth of a Narcissus to the curved stat-
ure of a lovesick person.322 In another one of his qaṣāʾid, Manūčihrī describes the
flourishing influence of the sun on grapes. He insists on specifying the exact num-
ber of days, spanning from early spring to the end of summer, during which the
ripe grapes are plucked (in Transoxiana) and made into wine. Furthermore, the
poet uses the image of the grape to compare the natural realm with the religious
and customary rituals of intimacy between lovers:
319 Translated by Tabatabai in: Sassan Tabatabai, Father of Persian Verse: Rudaki and his
Poetry, ed. A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, Iranian Studies (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), p. 100.
For the complete and original Persian verses see: Dīvān-e Rūdakī-ye Samarqandī, ed. Saʿīd
Nafīsī (Tehran: Negāh, 1373/1997), pp. 68–69.
320 Manūčihrī Dāmġānī, Dīvān-e Manūčihrī-ye Dāmġānī, ed. Muḥammad Dabīrsīyāqī (Tehran:
Zawwār, 1356/1977), p. 29. See also Kadkanī’s mention of significance of rendering nature in
Manūčihrī’s poetry in: Muḥammadriḍā Šafīʿī Kadkanī, Ṣuvar-e ḫīyāl dar šeʿr-e Fārsī, 4th ed.
(Tehran: Āgāh, 1370/1991), p. 325.
321 R. Zipoli, ‘Poetic Imagery’, in A History of Persian Literature, ed. J. T. P. De Bruijn (London
& New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 173.
322 Dīvān-e Manūčihrī-ye Dāmġānī, p. 34.
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To the farmer, the grape once said:
From afar, the sun me pregnant made.
More or less than a hundred and seventy-three days
I spent in the luminous sun’s bed.
Between us, no covenant, no ceremony was held
Neither a rite of matrimony nor were we wed.
I was never hidden and before me
My late mothers were not covered or shelled.323
II.2.2 The Space of Exclusion in Saʿdī and Ḥāfiẓ
The ascetic Sufi method of exclusion influenced the poetic depiction of nature and
its beauty. Compared to the works of Rūdakī and Manūčihrī, the works of Sanāʾī
display an early stage of this influence. The following is an example from his
ġazals:
[1] When I behold her image, all
My life becomes a festival;
[2] My dwelling through her beauty rare
Converteth to a garden fair.
[3] Musk-laden though the breeze be borne
And rich brocades the earth adorn,
[4] Though blossoms on the leafy trees
Shine starry as the Pleiades;
[5] Though mid the hills the tulip shy
Gleams like the houri’s sable eye:
[6] These lesser glories all depart
When love’s own empire rules the heart.
[7] To yearn, to win: love’s little pain
Is worth a harvest’s load of grain;
[8] And union’s fortune cannot blind
The heart that hath in absence pined.
[9] No more the crow’s discordant cry
Disturbs the garden’s harmony;
[10] On every twig the philomel
Chants anthems to the happy dell.
[11] The raven’s croak doth fade and fail;
Mid roses nests the nightingale,
[12] Trilling for joy that for this while
We bask at last in Fortune’s smile.324
323 Ibid., p. 39 (my translation).
324 Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, trans. A. J. Arberry (London: Luzac & Co.,
1948), p. 5 (my emphasis). See the Persian ġazal in: Sanāʾī, Dīvīn, pp. 805–806.
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As a Sufi-poet, Sanāʾī begins his ġazal with a description of a source of joy that
is beyond the sensible realm; his beloved is the divine Beloved. His object of
pursuit replaces the natural beauty. This is evident from the fact that the
Beloved’s beauty is regarded as the poet’s garden. In the third, fourth and fifth
couplets, he introduces the beauty of nature, and finally in the sixth couplet he
transcends mundane beauty as the empire of love rules over his heart. Through
his repeated qualifications (‘though’), Sanāʾī conveys that natural beauty is in-
sufficient. The last four couplets, then, introduce the evil component of the nat-
ural world – a component that justifies the negation of nature despite its
sensible beauty. This evil element is represented by the raven. In other words,
the natural world is a mixture of the nightingale and the raven. In the ascent
and negation of the natural realm, sublime beauty can be enjoyed.
A clear view of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic treatment of nature, Giovanni D’Erme correctly
argues, requires considering the treatment of nature in Saʿdī’s (d. 1292 CE)
ġazals.325 The undisputed master of ġazal before Ḥāfiẓ, Saʿdī was a learned poet
with profound knowledge of Sufism, theology and jurisprudence. Saʿdī’s ġazals
mark an important development in the poetic representation of nature and are in-
dispensable to understanding the literary tradition in which Ḥāfiẓ perfected his
poetic skills and formed his intellectual views.
The following ġazal by Saʿdī evokes the image of spring, but also draws the
reader’s attention to a ‘true delight’ that lies beyond nature:
Roses are blossoming
And joyous birds do sing
In such a season gay,
A desert-faring day.
Autumn the scatterer
Setteth the leaves astir;
The painter morning air
Decketh the garden fair.
Yet no desire have I
In grassy meads to lie:
Where’er thou art in sight,
There dwelleth true delight.326
325 Giovanni D’Erme, ‘Taǧrobehā-ye donīavī-ye Ḥāfiẓ’, in Soḫan-e ahl-e del: Maǧmūʿe-ye
maqālāt (Tehran: UNESCO-Iran, 1371/1992), p. 408.
326 Translated by A. J. Arberry in: A. J. Arberry, ed. Persian Poems: An Anthology of Verse
Translations, Everyman’s Library (London & New York: J. M. Dent & Sons; E. P. Dutton, 1954),
p. 54 (my emphasis). For the Persian ġazal see: Muṣliḥ ibn ʿAbdullāh-i Shīrāzī Saʿdī, Kollīyāt-e
Sʿadī, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Forūġī (Tehran: Eqbāl, 1340/1961), p. 42. Ġazal 44. Couplets 1–3.
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D’Erme writes that ‘his [Saʿdī’s] visible world is of a complete negative kind and
appears as a minimal token of the truthfulness of the transcendent world.’327 In
this section, I narrow the scope of the comparison between Saʿdī’s and Ḥāfiẓ’s
poetry to their respective poetic descriptions of spring.
In the following ġazal, Saʿdī makes it known that the poem was written in
spring, a time of year during which everyone flocks to gardens around the city
of Shiraz. Yet Saʿdī is not overwhelmed by this natural phenomenon. He begins
his poem with a description of a deep desire for union with a beloved; this de-
sire consumes every moment of the poet’s life:
1. While you are heedless of the state of your desirers [friends], O beloved one,
Not a moment’s rest could possibly find us as occupied with you as we are
2. If you saw the beauty of your face in a mirror
You would have known what came upon the impatient one (the lover)
3. It is springtime, but let us (you and me together)
Leave to others the meadows and gardens
4. Instead of the tall cypress standing by the river
Why don’t you look upon beloved’s figure tall as a cypress as it is?
5. A figure in description of its fine composition,
The eloquent tongue falls short and remains speechless.328
In the verses above, we recognize the process in which the beauty of the be-
loved and natural beauty are separated from each other. The beauty that moves
Saʿdī is of an extramundane kind; in the third and the fourth couplets, the poet
explicitly advises the reader to leave behind the beauty of spring (represented
by the natural cypress) and instead explore the sublime, ineffable beauty of his
beloved, whose perfection transcends the beauty of tall cypresses.
Saʿdī begins his poem without making any mention of spring. This differen-
tiates his work from the works of poets of the tenth and the eleventh centuries,
such as Rūdakī, who would frequently announce the arrival of spring in the
poem’s first couplet.329 In the case of Saʿdī’s poem, we find a world and a safe
space that contains the ideal beauties; remarkably, however, this world is
327 D’Erme, ‘Taǧrobehā-ye donīavī-ye Ḥāfiẓ’, p. 409.
328 Saʿdī, Kollīyāt-e Sʿadī, p. 5. Ġazal 4. My translation of the couplets 1–5. Here, I must admit
that the poetic beauty of Saʿdī’s work is not rendered in my translations. These verses are trans-
lated solely to convey the intellectual content of the ġazal and to clarify the literary and intellec-
tual context within which Ḥāfiẓ wrote his works.
329 As an example of announcing the arrival of spring in the first verse, we can turn to the poem
that I quoted earlier: ‘A Lush spring has arrived, colorful and effervescent, | With thousands of de-
lights and decorations.’ As translated by Tabatabai in the following source: Tabatabai, Father of
Persian Verse: Rudaki and his Poetry, p. 100.
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articulated only in negation of the meadows and gardens – it does not have a
‘positive presence’, as the poet tells us in the second verse of the third couplet
and the first verse of the fourth couplet. Another remarkable feature of this
poem is that the poet uses simile to trace the negative process of ascending
from the natural to the ideal. In the fourth and fifth couplets, the cypress tree is
present on two level – natural and metaphorical. The simile gives the natural
phenomenon a last chance to be compared before it is left behind in the process
of abstraction that brings the reader to the ideal, transcendent beauty.
In the following verses of Saʿdī, we find a further articulation of the natural
and the ideal worlds:
1. Facing our beloved, carefree of orchards we are.
Whether it is spring, arriving, or the cold autumn’s breeze, blowing, carefree we are.
2. If we attain the cypress-statured [beloved] that we desire,
Then let there never more be a cypress in the world, carefree we are.
3. If others go to meadows to find joy,
With you, O solace of souls, in our solitude carefree we are.330
In the second couplet of this ġazal, a process of ascent abstracts the ideal form of
the quality of tallness from the natural phenomenon that is the cypress tree.
Having attained this intellectual vision, the poet claims to be carefree from the
natural revolution of seasons. The intelligible content is not regarded as imma-
nent and active in the natural phenomena; therefore, experiencing it is not of
any value. After one has arrived at its intelligible content in the process of nega-
tion, the natural realm must be left behind. In the third couplet, the world that is
founded on negation is given the name solitude (‘ḫalvat’). This name describes
the space that facilitates intellectual independence and ascent from the corrupt-
ible natural world. Implicitly, the poet reminds the reader that the cypress tree is
corruptible and that the joys of meadow are fleeting. Witnessing the beauty of
spring and its corruptibility, the wise poet abandons it to find its ideal everlasting
form. He collects these ideal forms in his solitude, which provides safety and
freedom from mundane concerns. At the end of each couplet, the poet boasts
about being carefree, thereby expressing his negated care for the cypress trees,
which perish and cause the poet grief. In contrast to the realm of ever-changing
nature, solitude offers elevation from and sublimation of the mundane.
In the first verse of the second couplet, ‘cypress-statured’ now appears as a
metaphor replacing the natural and the ideal. The natural disappears in the meta-
phor to mark the arrival at the transcendent and extramundane that is the space of
exclusion in solitude. Since intelligible content has no active immanence in the
330 Saʿdī, Kollīyāt-e Sʿadī, p. 413. Ġazal 433 (my translation).
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natural realm, we cannot expect to trace a corresponding relation between the
human faculty of appreciation of intelligible content (sublime beauty) and nature
itself. Stress is placed on the space of solitude formed in negation of the corrupt-
ible. In another poem, Saʿdī further describes this space of solitude (ḫalvat) as well
as the method of finding it:
1. We shut the door to our solitude [ḫalvat] before the masses;
We turned back from all and with you we sat.
2. We detached ourselves from everything that was not an attachment to the Friend;
We broke whatever promises that were not made to the Friend.331
In this solitude that excludes corruptible nature, Saʿdī celebrates his freedom
from the mundane spring and its flowers. He claims to perceive (in the vision of
his intellect) the sublime and the ideal form of fleeting natural beauty. This be-
comes clear in the following couplet: ‘If spring came no more, and if tulips and
roses ceased to grow, | Let it be! You unveil yourself, my rose, my tulip O! you
spring of mine.’332
The term ḫalvat (‘solitude’), belongs to a long tradition of ascetic Sufi
teachings and their poetic articulations in the works of the Sufi-poets. This term
also appears in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. In the first couplet of the following ġazal of Ḥāfiẓ
we read:
Ḫalvat guzīda rā ba tamāšā či ḥāǧat ast?
Čun kū-yi dūst hast ba ṣaḥrā či ḥāǧat ast?
Wer die Abgeschiedenheit gewählt hat, wie sollte der noch eines Umblicks (in der Welt)
bedürfen?
Wenn die Gasse des Freundes da ist, welcher Bedarf bestünde dann noch nach dem Gang
ins Freie?333
Who chose to dwell
In cloister cell,
To go abroad
What need?
Who chanced to gain
The Darling’s lane,
Of desert road
What need?334
331 Ibid., p. 414. Ġazal 434 (my translation).
332 Ibid., p. 450. Ġazal 472, 4 (my translation).
333 Wohlleben, 34, 1, p. 91.
334 Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, pp. 110–112. Here p. 110 (my emphasis).
See also: Clarke, 51, 1, p. 129.
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This couplet confirms that Ḥāfiẓ generally agreed with Sufi negative views re-
garding the independence of the one who has found the way into solitude and
escaped natural beauty and its sensible appreciation. The rhetorical question
denotes this point of agreement, since it appeals to commonsense discourse
and denies a need for proof. The following couplet, in which solitude ‘expands
itself’ into the house, shows another instance of this rhetoric:
What need of cypress and pine has my garden? [|] Less than whom is my home-grown
boxtree?335
Wieso braucht mein Garten eine Zypresse und eine Pinie?
Mein im Hause aufgezogener Buchsbaum – wem kommt der nicht gleich?336
Through this rhetorical question, Ḥāfiẓ gives articulation to the poetic tradition
of his time that denied the significance of sensory appreciation of the natural
realm; the first verse of the couplet explicitly conveys the pointlessness of sen-
sory vision, after the negative ascending process has led the seeker to ḫalvat
(‘cloister cell’, as Arberry translates it). Unlike Saʿdī, who follows Sanāʾī in con-
stantly providing a poetic experience of the dialectic process of abstraction,
Ḥāfiẓ does not invite or teach, but rather illustrates the space of solitude from
within. The second verse of the couplet marks a shift in tone; the poet ironically
suggests that his home-grown box-tree will not come up short in the face of any
cypress or pine tree.
One of the clearest examples of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic illustration of the world in-
side the space that is built around abstraction and exclusion of the natural ele-
ments is the following ġazal. I quote couplets 4–6 and 9:
[4] In my abode I have a cypress in whose stature’s shade
I enjoy freedom from the cypress of any garden and the box-tree of any meadow.
[5] Although I might have a hundred armies of beauties laying
Ambushes for my heart, Praise and Thanks to God, I have an army-routing idol!
[6] It is fitting that through his ruby signet ring I boast myself a Solomon:
Where the Great Name is, what have I to fear from Ahriman?
[. . .]
[9] When I am proudly strutting in the rose bed of his acceptance,
Praise be to God,
I have no partiality for tulips and wild roses, nor the petals of the narcissus.337
335 Avery, XL, 1, p. 72 (my emphasis).
336 Wohlleben, 40, 1, p. 97 (my emphasis).
337 Avery, CCCXXII, p. 399.
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In the above verses, once again, solitude is represented as a house. The resident
of this house is kept safe from whatever the outside world has to offer. Ḥāfiẓ’s
moderate style avoids Saʿdī’s bold claims – namely, that nature is irrelevant, as
long as he is in his safe space of abstraction. Ḥāfiẓ only makes the humble
claim that he has no desire for flowers of the natural world – a claim that other
verses of the poem weaken. Nevertheless, as the sixth couplet shows, Ḥāfiẓ
compares himself to King Solomon, who possessed a ring that dispelled all evil
and granted him safety. Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ identifies the unsafe and excluded
realm with that of Ahriman, the supreme malevolent spirit in Zoroastrianism.
Although he can do without natural beauty, Ḥāfiẓ conveys that he is moved by
the force that tradition ascribes to the realm of Ahriman; ‘a hundred armies of
beauties’, Ḥāfiẓ writes, attack his senses.
This approach to the natural world coheres with the direct approach that
we examined in the previous chapter – namely, an approach of negation of
whatever is changeable and of mixed. As Saʿdī explains in the verses above, the
doors of solitude are closed to all that is recognized as the other. This negative
space is filled with the unchangeable and everlasting forms that, in the sublu-
nary realm, are present only in mixture with the corruptible substances. The
house of solitude analogy is indebted to Sufism as well as the Neoplatonic doc-
trine of a process of ascent through negation.338 The greatest achievement of
this world of exclusion is its constant differentiation: differentiation between
the mundane and the extramundane as well as between the corruptible and ev-
erlasting. This differentiation allows for exclusion and abstraction.
The examples discussed in this section portray the natural realm as worthy
of negation and exclusion. The inevitability of autumn and winter causes
spring to lose its appeal, and the garden reveals its impurity because of the
presence of the raven. In a remarkable ġazal in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ denies that
being fleeting and mixed provides an argument for negative ascent:
O Hafiz, über den Herbstwind auf der Wiese dieser Welt gräme dich nicht.
Denke bitte vernünftig: Die Rose ohne Dorn, wo wäre die?339
Ḥāfiz̤! grieve not of the (cruel) autumn wind (which bloweth) in the sward of the world:
Exercise reasonable thought. The rose (time) without the thorn (the autumn wind) is
where?340
338 Compare to: Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Genres of Religious Literature’, in A History of Persian
Literature, ed. J. T. P. De Bruijn (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 293.
339 Wohlleben, 27, 8, p. 84.
340 Clarke, 62, 10, p. 154.
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In these verses, the autumn wind is accepted as part of the totality of the world,
despite that it is the evil corrupter of sensible beauty. The poet appeals to a
form of reason, but refuses to negate nature on account of its corruptibility. In
order to understand how the poet attains to this inclusive form of reason,
which praises the beauty of fleeting objects despite the pain they cause, we
need to trace his critique of the Sufi argument for exclusion of the corruptible.
In the following sub-section, I explore elements of negation and exclusion de-
veloped in the Sufi tradition and I introduce the terms of exclusion that formed
a space in which abstraction was practiced.
II.2.3 Elements of Exclusion in the Sufi Tradition
As I explained earlier, the Sufis adopted, in a modified form, the Platonic and
Neoplatonic notion of a process of ascent in pursuit of knowledge. In the develop-
ment of Sufism, the theoretical and metaphysical aspects of this ascent gained im-
portance. This is evident from philosophical and metaphysical treatises written by
Sufis and Sufi-philosophers in Persian. One of the first of these treaties was Aḥmad
Ġazzālī’s (d. 1126) treatise on love, titled Sawāniḥ ul-ʿuššāq (‘Inspirations’341 or
‘Meditations’).342 In the course of their development, Sufi issues and terms became
integrated into the intellectual and metaphysical sphere of Islamic culture (and,
specifically for the purposes of this study, Persianate culture). Even non-Sufi phi-
losophers and theologians partook in dialogue with Sufis and produced treatises
on Sufi matters. Naṣīr ud-Dīn Ṭūsī’s Uwsāf ul-ašrāf of the thirteenth century is an
example of a philosopher’s work on Sufism.343
Sufi texts were most frequently written in verse. Even in the case of meta-
physical texts such as the Sawāniḥ of Aḥmad Ġazzālī and Faḫr ud-Dīn-i ʿIrāqī’s
Lamaʿāt (The Flashes) the prose is interspersed with verse. Gulšan-i rāz (The
Rose Garden of Secrets) is a didactic work in verse that explains basic Sufi phi-
losophy and imagery. Written by Sufi-philosopher Šayḫ Maḥmūd-i Šabistarī, it
was the first such didactic work of its kind. Between the twelfth and fourteenth
341 Aḥmad Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, trans. Nasrollah
Pourjavady (London: KPI, 1986), pp. 1–2.
342 Pourjavady, ‘Genres of Religious Literature’, pp. 298–299. See the author’s elaboration on
the theoretical and metaphysical significance of this work, which historically stands between
Ibn Sīnā’s Treatise on Love and Suhravardī’s Mun̄is ul-ʿuššāq (The Intimate Companion of
Lovers) and shows a major development and modification of the Platonic view of love.
343 Pourjavady points out that non-Sufi thinkers addressed Sufi issues as far back as the elev-
enth century. See: ibid., p. 283.
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centuries, Sufi-poets reinterpreted the metaphors and imagery of the non-Sufi
poetic tradition that was already fully developed in the tenth century. Sufi-
poets played the most significant role in the further development of the literary
tradition that Ḥāfiẓ inherited.344
In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ employs metaphors for the quest for knowledge and the
relation between body and soul that evoke Sufi poetry. Furthermore, consider-
ing Ḥāfiẓ’s knowledge of the evolution of poetic metaphors from Rūdakī to
Saʿdī, we can read the Divan as a literary dialogue with poetic metaphors and
Sufi terms.
To introduce these terms, I turn to the first Persian Sufi manual345 – Kašf ul-
maḥǧūb, written by Huǧvīrī in the eleventh century. I also refer to Suhravardī’s
ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, a source introduced earlier in the first chapter. The established
world-views offered here provide us background on the culturally dominant dis-
courses and terms of Sufism in Ḥāfiẓ’s time.
II.2.3.1 Purification (ṭahārat) and Repentance (tauba)
In the Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, one of the first terms concerning the ascending process is
ṭahārat – ‘purification’. In Islamic orthodoxy, this term pertains to a ritual prac-
ticed before each prayer. Huǧvīrī goes beyond the orthodox views of this term
and gives it a deeper meaning in the context of Sufism. The process of developing
Sufi ethics out of morality and religious practices can be witnessed in Sufi termi-
nology that contributes to attainment of a negative and abstract knowledge of
the truth or gnosis. Here is Nicholson’s translation:
After faith, the first thing incumbent on everyone is purification (ṭahárat) and the perfor-
mance of prayer, i.e. to cleanse the body from filth and pollution, and to wash the three mem-
bers, and to wipe the head with water as the law prescribes, or to use sand in the absence of
water or in severe illness. Purification is of two kinds: outward and inward. Thus prayer re-
quires purification of the body, and gnosis [maʿrifat] requires purification of the heart.346
344 In Bāde-ye ʿešq (The Wine of Love), Pourjavady asserts that the origin of poetic elements
of analogy referring to wine, love and listening to music that Sufis used is to be found in the
works of non-Sufi and secular poets and in between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries they
gradually developed their Sufi symbolism from secular metaphors like those of early poets of
the tenth and eleventh centuries: Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Bāde-ye ʿešq (2): Peydāyeš-e maʿnā-
ye maǧāzī-ye bāde dar šeʿr-e Fārsī’, Našr-e Dāneš, no. 67 (1370/1991), p. 6.
345 Composed after Mustamlī of Buḫārā’s (d. 1042 CE) translation and commentary on
Taʿarruf, written in Arabic by sheikh Kalābādy (d. 995). Compare to ———, ‘Genres of Religious
Literature’, p. 277.
346 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 291 (my
emphasis).
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Regarding inward purification, the author prescribes the following: ‘The method
of spiritual purification is to reflect and meditate on the evil of this world and to
perceive that it is false and fleeting, and to make the heart empty of it.’347 Hence,
the inward purification is an intellectual negative process of emptying the heart
(where the faculty of knowledge resides) from the corruptible, and therefore evil,
natural world. After integrating purification (ṭahārat) into Sufism by introducing
two hierarchic stages, Huǧvīrī introduces another term that is also of a negative
nature concerning the process of acquisition of knowledge.
The term repentance (tauba) originally belongs to the religious non-Sufi
context. In almost all lexicons, it is defined as ‘returning-to-God’; in other
words, the term is introduced as a solely religious term. Huǧvīrī, however, pro-
vides his readers with an etymological account: ‘[e]tymologically tawbat means
“return”,348 and tawbat really involves the turning back from what God has for-
bidden through fear of what He has commanded.’349 Unlike previously, where
Huǧvīrī introduced ‘purification’ from an orthodox religious viewpoint, in the case
of ‘repentance’, the author provides an etymological account of the term and then
connects it to ‘returning from the forbidden’ and being guided by the commands
of God (amr).350 In three levels, Huǧvīrī introduces his ascending, negative Sufi
process of returning: ‘Repentance is of three kinds: (I) From what is wrong to what
is right, (2) from what is right to what is more right, (3) from selfhood to God.’351
The first belongs to the ‘ordinary men’; the second to ‘the elect’ (the seekers of the
Sufi knowledge); and the third to those in pursuit of ‘Divine love (maḥabbat).’
At its highest level, this process of return arrives at the negation of the self.
According to Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, the negative pursuit of ‘Divine love’ entails not only
repenting of ‘the imperfection of a station below the station to which they [the
seekers of Divine love] have attained, but also of being conscious of any “station”
or “state” whatsoever.’352
It is worth providing a brief explanation regarding the usage of love as it ap-
pears in ‘Divine love’ in Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, since love is a component of Neoplatonic
and Sufi views and is one of the most frequently used words in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
Nicholson uses the word ‘love’ to translate ḥubb, a word that appears in Qurʾān.
(See v. 54 of the Surah Māʿida – it is one of the most frequently cited verses from
347 Ibid., p. 292 (my emphasis).
348 After providing his etymological suggestion, Huǧvīrī constantly uses ‘returning’ in place
of ‘repentance’ in his section on tauba.
349 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 294.
350 Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, p. 379.
351 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 297.
352 Ibid.
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the Qurʾān in Persian Sufi literature.) The term ḥubb corresponds to Huǧvīrī’s
views, which emphasize ascetic purification and remain as close as possible to the
teachings of šarīʿa. Yet the term meaning ‘love’ that is most frequently used in
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan is ʿišq.
From the tenth century onwards, the term ʿišq appears in philosophical,
and Sufi texts. The term ʿišq appears in philosophical works such as Ibn Sīnā’s
Treatise on Love, Suhravardī’s Fi ḥaqīqat al-ʿišq or Munis ul-ʿuššāq, and in the
works of the Sufi thinkers such as Aḥmad Ġazzālī’s Sawāniḥ ul-ʿuššāq, and ʿAyn
ul-Quḍḍāt of Hamadan’s Tamhīdāt and the body of the Sufi literature that fol-
lows this line. Sufi thinkers cited a fragment of the above-mentioned verse that
concerns the term ḥubb. But they then shifted from ḥubb to ʿišq as their ontolog-
ical speculations regarding love developed. In Murūǧ aḏ-ḏahab (Meadows of
Gold), al-Masʿūdī’s uses the word ʿišq (and not ḥubb) to recount the intellectual
exchange in Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḫālid al-Barmakī’s house on the subject of love.353
Accordingly, he names this section of his book ‘Aqwāl fī al-ʿišq’354 – Utterances
on Love. There is no doubt, therefore, that the term ʿišq was common in intellec-
tual circles a century before Kašf ul-maḥǧūb; Nevertheless, Huǧvīrī opts to use
ḥubb in his work in order to mark his affinity with the earlier school of ḥubb in
Sufism.355
Let us now return to the Sufi terms concerning abstraction and purification.
Similar to the terms ‘purification’ and ‘repentance’, the process of negative return
to the pure oneness in Sufism departs from an orthodox view that can be pursued
within an ordinary social way of life. Yet Huǧvīrī insists that the basic require-
ments of religious law must be upheld as an elementary component. Those who
wish to appreciate the knowledge of the truth must ascend until they arrive at
the highest level of abstraction and are devoid of themselves and unified with
the One. Huǧvīrī places distance between social life and natural beauty, on the
one hand, and the ascending negative pursuit of union with the One, on the
other hand. The isolation that awaits the followers of this path is evident from
the author’s accounts of cases of severe obsession with outward purification:
Kašf ul-maḥǧūb contains multiple accounts of pioneers of early Sufism who per-
formed sixty purifications before each prayer. For instance, Ibrāhīm Ḫawwāṣ
(d. 904 CE and a contemporary of al-Ǧunayd)356 washed his whole body sixty
353 al-Masʿūdī,Murūǧ aḏ-ḏahab wa maʿādin al-ǧawāhir, vol. 4: p. 236.
354 See more on this subject on p. 34f above.
355 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 310.
356 A. J. Arberry, Muslim Saints and Mystics: Episodes from the Tadhkirat al-Auliyā’
(‘Memorial of the Saints’) by Farid al-Din Attar, trans. A. J. Arberry, Persian Heritage (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 272.
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times in one day and ‘died in the water.’357 Huǧvīrī emphasizes true knowledge
in contrast to superficial obsession with outward cleansing of the body; nonethe-
less, his glorification of these masters of asceticism outweighs his emphasis on
knowledge. For instance, Huǧvīrī describes the Sufi Abū ʿAlī Rūdbārī spending
all day – from dawn to sunset – in the sea to cure himself from obsession over
cleansing. Finally, the sea itself answers his cry: ‘I cried out: “O God, restore me
to health!” A voice answered from the sea: “Health consists in knowledge.”’358
Even in the ordinary act of joining the community in a mosque for prayer, the
great Šiblī has to face the following dialogue:
One day Shiblí purified himself. When he came to the door of the mosque a voice whis-
pered in his heart: ‘Art thou so pure that thou enterest My house with this boldness?’ He
returned back, but the vice asked: ‘Dost thou turn back from My door? Whither wilt thou
go?’ He uttered a loud cry. The voice said: ‘Dost thou revile me?’ He stood silent. The
voice said: ‘Dost thou pretend to endure My affliction?’ Shiblí exclaimed: ‘O God, I im-
plore Thee to help me against Thyself.’359
These isolating acts of ascetic self-purification placed early Sufis at a distance
from fellow Muslims. These cases may have been extreme, but they were held up
as models for younger, aspiring Sufis. In the following section, I trace the con-
crete elements of abstraction and negation of the mundane in Sufism.
II.2.3.2 The Sufi Frock (ḫirqa, muraqqaʿ, dalq)
In the twelfth section of his ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, Abu ̄ Ḥafṣ Suhravardī addresses
the Sufi frock; he discusses the way in which a neophyte would receive his gar-
ment from his mentor in a ritual of initiation. Emphasizing the role of the men-
tor (pīr),360 Suhravardī asserts that the Sufi garment was a sign of the pupil’s
bond with his mentor and dedication to his mentor’s teachings: ‘Das Tragen
des Flickenrockes ist also ein Zeichen der Machtübertragung (tafwyḍ) und der
Selbstauslieferung (taslym).’361 Suhravardī elaborates on the relation between
the Sufi garment and the mentor. According to Suhravardī, the mentor personi-
fies the mediator in the process of ascent to the transcendent truth. The mentor
357 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 293.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid., p. 294.
360 The term pīr (Mentor) together with the originally Arabic term šayḫ can be found in
Persian sources including Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
361 Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad Suhrawardī, Die Gaben der Erkenntnisse (ʿAwārif al-ma
ʿārif), trans. Richard Gramlich (Wiesbaden: Steiner, Franz, 1978), p. 100.
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is expected to supervise the pupil each step of the way. In other words, the Sufi
garment is a sign of belonging to an institution of learning.
In contrast to Suhravardī’s symbolic explanation of the Sufi frock, earlier
works of Sufism explain the frock in a more objective way. In works of the tenth
and the eleventh centuries explaining customs of Sufi dress, the issue of the
mentor is of secondary importance compared to objective remarks concerning
wearing a specific outfit.
In his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ (The Book of the Gleam on Sufism), Sarrāǧ (d. 988) ex-
pounds on the meaning of the word ‘Sufi’. In the context of these explanations,
he gives his view on the meaning and significance of the Sufi garment. He asks:
why is it generally the case that experts receive their titles from their respective
fields – e.g., lawyers receive their title from their expertise in the field of law –
while Sufis do not? Sarrāǧ explains that non-Sufi experts are only experts in one
field, whereas Sufis draw on many sources and are experts in many areas; there-
fore, Sarrāǧ notes: ‘[ich habe] sie nach der äußeren Kleidung benannt. Denn
Wolle (ṣūf) zu tragen ist die Gepflogenheit der Propheten und das Emblem der
Freunde und Getreuen Gottes.’362
It is remarkable that Sarrāǧ and Huǧvīrī used the same word to demon-
strate the significance of the Sufi dress. Gramlich (translating Kitāb al-Lumaʿ)
renders this word as ‘emblem’ and Nicholson (translating Kašf ul-maḥǧūb) ren-
ders it as ‘badge’: ‘[k]now that the wearing of a muraqqaʿa (patched frock) is
the badge of aspirants to Ṣúfism.’363 The word in question is šiʿār – it articulates
the significance of the Sufi garment. This word bears the meaning of ‘mark’,
‘sign’, ‘totem’, ‘emblem’ and ‘badge’, and it is homonymous to another word
that means clothes, thereby acquiring that association for itself.364 The two
teachers of Sufism mentioned above assert that this dress is a sign of submis-
sion to an elite group who are on the Sufi path and dedicated to purification by
way of abstraction (taǧrīd).365
An anecdote recounted in the Kašf ul-maḥǧūb illustrates the relation be-
tween wearing this woolen garment and detachment from ordinary social life.
According to the story, the Imam Abū Ḥanīfa wore the woolen garment ‘and
was on the point of retiring from the world’ until a dream changed his life: ‘he
362 Abū Naṣr Sarrāǧ, Schlaglichter Über das Sufitum: Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāǧs Kitāb al-lumaʿ,
trans. Richard Gramlich (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), p. 59 (my emphasis). Note that, here,
ṣūf means ‘wool’ and ‘Sufi’ stands for one who wears wool garments.
363 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 45.
364 The homonym word šiʿār means a piece of cloth or underclothing in a general sense.
365 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 45. See also on
the relation between taǧrīd and abstraction on pp. 79f above.
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saw in a dream the Apostle, who said: “It behoves thee to live amidst the peo-
ple, because thou art the means whereby my Sunna will be revived.”’366 After
this dream, the Imam abandoned the woolen garment along with the path it
represents – a path that would have detached him from ordinary Muslims.
(Nonetheless, the Imam distanced himself from the mundane insofar as doing
so was not detrimental to his connection to society.367)
As we have seen, early texts introduce the Sufi woolen dress as the mark of
sainthood – it is the garment of prophets and the elite. This dress is an emblem
that both clothes the wayfarer and labels him throughout his life.368 Huǧvīrī’s an-
ecdote also shows the difference between the Islamic orthodoxy, strongly tied to
the community, and the Sufi’s path of abstraction in pursuit of knowledge.
In order to analyze the ġazals in this section, we need to introduce three
words that refer to the Sufi garment: ḫirqa, muraqqaʿ, and dalq.369 Each of these
three words conveys an aspect of the design of the garment. In Gramlich’s trans-
lation of ʿAwārif al-maʿārif (‘Flickenrock’) and Nicholson’s translation of Kašf ul-
maḥǧūb (‘patched frock’), we saw that the Sufi dress is mostly made of patch-
work cloth. This characteristic is conveyed in all three of the above terms.
Of the three words above referring to the Sufi garment, the word ḫirqa appears
most frequently in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.370 Modern Persian also commonly uses this
word to refer to the Sufi garment. In its literal sense, ḫirqa means ‘tattered’ and
‘torn’; it thus conveys that the Sufi dress is a tattered patched frock.371 The other
word for the woolen Sufi frock is muraqqaʿ (‘patchwork frock’), which signifies the
pieces of torn fabric from which the Sufi outfit is sewn together. Other forms of
this word such as muraqqaʿa and (even more so) ruqʿa literally mean a piece of
something or a patch with which one mends one’s torn clothes372: unlike ordinary
members of society, the Sufis go to great lengths to avoid obtaining anything new.
The Sufis’ choice of clothing shows that their way of life is detached from customs
366 Ibid., p. 46.
367 Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, p. 50. Huǧvīrī claims that he found this account in Tārīḫ ul-ma
šāyiḫ of Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī at-Tirmiẕī.
368 In Sufi literature, one of the most frequently used expressions for the death of a Sufi mas-
ter is ḫirqa tuhī kardan or ‘evacuating (abandoning) the woolen garment.’ (See this figure of
speech’s entry in Dehḫodā’s Loġatnāme)
369 For a complete list and lexicographical information on other variations used in Ḥāfiẓ’s
Divan to denote the Sufi garment see the following: Aḥmad ʿAlī Raǧāʾī Buḫārāʾī, Farhang-e
ašʿār-e Ḥāfiẓ, 2nd ed. (Tehran: ʿElmī, 1364/1986), pp. 199–235.
370 According to Ṣeddīqīyān, this word is used 57 times in the Divan. Dalq is used 19 times and
muraqqaʿ 3 times: Ṣeddīqīyān and Mīrʿābedīnī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ, p. 406; 530; 1068.
371 Raǧāʾī Buḫārāʾī, Farhang-e ašʿār-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 199–200.
372 Muʿīn, Farhang-e Muʿīn, pp. 4036–4037; p. 1667.
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of the masses. Huǧvīrī describes a Sufi who belonged to the Malāmatīya sect of
Sufism and exemplified the extreme ascetic detachment from the natural that his
muraqqaʿa represents:
He neither ate nor wore anything in which human beings had a hand. His food consisted
of things thrown away by men, such as putrid vegetables, sour gourds, rotten carrots,
and the like. His clothes where made of rags which he had picked up from the road and
washed: of these he had made a muraqqaʿa.373
The second most frequently used word for the Sufi garment in the Divan is dalq.
In his lexicographic work, Buḫārāʾy asserts that the etymology of this word is
uncertain, yet he likewise explains the word in relation to the garment’s design
as a patchwork dress. Buḫārāʾy points out that a dalq can be made of a combi-
nation of pieces of leather, fur and textiles, sometimes in various colors. Other
lexicons provide no further information.374
In this section, we saw that a ḫirqa surrounds the body of the Sufi seeker of
the truth and marks his commitment to a mentor. The last Sufi term that is relevant
to this study and is present in the Divan is the term for ‘convent’ or ‘cloister’.
II.2.3.3 The Convent (ḫānaqāh and ribāṭ)
Ḥāfiẓ uses several terms to refer to the dwelling place in which Sufis spent their
lives in meditation, purification and prayer. Among those terms are ḫānaqāh,
ṣaumaʿa, dayr and ribāṭ. The place of meditation and worship of Bāyazīd of
Basṭām (a prominent Persian Sufi of the ninth century) was called a ṣaumaʿa.
This is the most frequently used term in the Divan to refer to the Sufi dwelling
place.375 Compared to the three other terms above, ṣaumaʿa denotes a smaller
dwelling place. It translates literally as ‘hermitage’ – a place ‘where a Sufi lived
in seclusion, separate from other people.’376
373 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 50. Malāmatīya be-
long to a movement in Sufism whose followers hide their prayers and good deeds as well as their
knowledge to keep their deeds pure of hypocrisy – i.e., they act piously for God alone and not to
earn respect from others. Further in this study, I point out the differences between the followers of
this view and Ḥāfiẓ’s views in the Divan against hypocrisy. A comprehensive review of the differ-
ences between Malāmatī views and those of Ḥāfiẓ’s is beyond the space of this study, but scholars
have already explored this subject in various works. See for instance: Mortażavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ:
Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, pp. 131–148. Also: Voǧdānī Farīde, ‘Naqdī bar entesāb-e Ḥāfiẓ be
ṭarīqe-ye Malāmatī’, Zabān va adabīyāt-e Fārsī, no. 64 (Spring 1388/2009).
374 Raǧāʾī Buḫārāʾī, Farhang-e ašʿār-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 231–232.
375 Ṣeddīqīyān and Mīrʿābedīnī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 778–779.
376 Gerhard Böwering and Matthew Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, in Encycopædia Iranica, ed.
Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Encycopædia Iranica Foundation, 2011), p. 459.
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The word ḫānaqāh is the Arabicized form of the Persian word ḫānagāh. It is
composed of ḫān and gāh377: ḫāna (from which ḫān derives) means ‘house’ or
‘place of residence’ and gāh is a locative suffix.378 Due to the function of these fa-
cilities – i.e., they provide shelter and food for travelling Sufis –, some scholars
have argued that the word ḫān, meaning ‘inn’, is the etymological origin of the
Persian term; however, as Böwering and ʿAdli assert, the origin for the term is the
Persian noun ḫāna (‘house’).379
After ṣaumaʿa, ḫānaqāh is the most frequently used term in the Divan for the
Sufi convent.380 Yet this term is not reserved for Sufi convents in particular, and
neither was it the first term to signify the Sufi convent. The earliest known men-
tion of this term was in the tenth century. During this time, the term was used for
the dwelling place of Manicheans in Samarqand, as evidence from the anony-
mously authored Ḥudūd al-ʿālam (372 H/982–983 CE) suggests. In this book, the
word appears in its Persian (rather than Arabicized) form – ‘ḫānagāh’.381 In the
ninth century, moreover, ḫānaqāh was not only used to refer to the Manicheans’
place of residence. Throughout Khorasan and Transoxiana during this time,
many ḫānaqāhs existed in which the followers of Abū ʿAbdullāh Muḥammad
b. Karrām (d. 869 CE) devoted themselves to extreme ascetic practices.382
In his work on the life of Abū Saʿyd Abū ‘l-Ḫayr (d. 1049 CE), Meier points
out that in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, as Sufism was just beginning
to develop, even scholars of Islamic orthodoxy, who were strongly against
Sufis, named their places of teaching ḫānaqāh.383From the eleventh century on-
ward, the madrasa flourished in the Islamic world. The madrasa was dedicated
to scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and orthodoxy (faqīh/imam) and provided
facilities for education and housing.384 As the madrasa and ḫānaqāh became
institutionalized, a traveling faqīh or Imam would seek accommodations in a
377 Muḥammadriḍa ʿAdlī, ‘Ḫānaqāh’, in Dāyerat al-maʿāref-e bozorg-e eslāmī (Tehran: Markaz-
e Dāyerat al-Maʿāref-e Bozorg-e Eslāmī, 1367/1988), p. 718.
378 Ibid.
379 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, p. 457. See also: ʿAdlī, ‘Ḫānaqāh’, p. 718.
380 Ṣeddīqīyān and Mīrʿābedīnī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 394–395.
381 Ḥudūd al-ʿālam min al-mašriqī ilā ‘l-maġrib, ed. Manūčehr Sotūde (Tehran: Danešgāh-e
Tehran, 1340/1962), pp. 107–108.
382 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, p. 460.
383 Fritz Meier, Abū Saʿīd Abū l-Ḫayr (357–440/967–1049) Wirklichkeit und Legende, Troisième
Série (Leiden & Tehran 1976), pp. 311– 312. See also: Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Ḵānaqāh’,
p. 460. See also: ʿAdlī, ‘Ḫānaqāh’.
384 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, p. 461.
156 II Toward Life
madrasa whereas a Sufi šayḫ would prefer a ḫānaqāh.385 Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn, the
hagiographic work of Aflākī written in the first half of the fourteenth century,
provides an anecdote that illustrates an Imam’s reluctance to reside in a
ḫānaqāh. According to the story, Bahāʾ Walad (d. 628 H/1231 CE), the father of
Rūmī, arrived in Baghdad, where he was received with due revere by Abū Ḥafṣ
Suhravardī. Invited to reside in Suhravardī’s ḫānaqāh, Bahāʾ Walad refused; he
declared that a madrasa is more befitting for an Imam.386
As I mentioned, the earliest textual evidence of the word ḫānaqāh is from
the tenth century. The word ribāṭ, however, was used as early as the seventh
century to mean ‘fortified army camps at the coastline and frontiers of the na-
scent Arab empire of Islam.’387 The early use of the word ribāṭ can be under-
stood in the context of early Islamic conquests; at this point, the term had no
connection to mysticism or Sufism.
In addition to war that aimed to expand the Muslim empire (ǧihād), as
Meier explains, another duty was required of Muslims – namely, residing in for-
tresses along territorial borders that separated cities from active theaters of
war. The duties at these posts were those of ‘waiting and watching in military
readiness, murābaṭa or ribāṭ “being on guard duty or guarding the frontier”.’388
According to Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ribāṭ became an important Sufi
concept because of the Sufis’ mystical interpretation of the word ǧihād. Sufism
interprets ǧihād (‘struggle on the path of God’)389 on two levels: the outward
act of war is seen as the ‘lesser ǧehād’ and the struggle for self-discipline and
abstinence as the ‘greater ǧehād’.390 We can see how a state of constant vigi-
lance – a requirement for soldiers stationed in border posts – was metaphori-
cally interpreted as a spiritual act of self-control and self-purification. The
convent built in the eighth century in ʿAbbādān – founded by ʿAbd ul-Wāḥid
385 In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ there is an instance in which the terms madrasa and ḫānaqāh are
juxtaposed: 417, 9. Wohlleben translates the verse as follows: ‘Erzählungen von Schule [ma-
drasa] und Kloster [ḫānaqāh] laß nicht verlauten, denn wieder fiel in den Sinn des Hafiz die
Lust aufs Weinhaus [maīḫāna].’ Wohlleben, 417, 9, p. 528. Avery translates this verse as fol-
lows: ‘Recite no dicta of College [madrasa] and the Dervish Hospice [ḫānaqāh], because |
Háfiz’s head has once more become filled with lust for wine.’ Avery CCCCXVII, 9, p. 503.
386 Šams ud-Dīn Aḥmad Aflākī, Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn, ed. Taḥsīn Yāzīǧī, 2 vols. (Tehran: Donyā-
ye Ketāb, 1362/1983), pp. 17–18.
387 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, p. 457.
388 Fritz Meier, ‘Almoravids and Marabouts’, in Essays on Islamic Piety and Mysticism.
Translated by John O’Kane (Leiden . Boston . Köln: Brill, 1999), p. 336 (my emphasis).
389 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Ḵānaqāh’, p. 457.
390 Ibid., p. 458.
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b. Zayd, a follower of Ḥāsan al-Baṣrī –,391 marks the first time that the term
ribāṭ was used to refer to such a facility.
In a Sufi ḫānaqāh or ribāṭ, a community of Sufis would live under the guid-
ance of a Sufi mentor – šayḫ. The ten rules of convent life composed by Abū
Saʿīd Abū ‘l-Ḫayr (d. 440 H/1049 CE) was one of the first such sets of regula-
tions.392 Suhravardī’s ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, written in the thirteenth century, is a
remarkable example of a book ‘which served as the basic Sufi manual for Sufi
life in ribāṭs for many generations.’393
In ʿAwārif al-maʿārif, Suhravardī introduces his conception of ‘convent’ in
association with the early notion of ribāṭ:
Ribāṭ bedeutet eigentlich den Ort, wo (an der Grenze eines Landes) die (kampfbereiten)
Pferde festgebunden werden (yurbaṭu). Danach sagt man für jede Frontlinie, deren
Besatzung die Bewohner des Hinterlandes verteidigt, ribāṭ. Der im ribāṭ postierte Kämpfer
verteidigt also die, die sich weiter hinten aufhalten. Und durch den im Gehorsam gegen
Gott im ribāṭ (=Konvent) Stationierten, und durch sein Gebet, wird das Unheil von Land
und Leuten ferngehalten.394
Suhravardī then describes how Sufism appropriated the military term:
Der Konvent dient dem Heiligen Krieg gegen die Seele, und wer sich im Konvent aufhält,
ist ein an der Front Stehender, der den Heiligen Krieg gegen seine Seele führt. Gott
Sprach: Und führt den Heiligen Krieg um Gottes willen, wie es sich gehört, [Koran 22, 78]
nämlich der Große Heilige Krieg, entsprechend dem, was in der Überlieferung erzählt
wird, daß nämlich der Gesandte Gottes bei seiner Rückkehr von einem seiner Kriegszüge
gesagt habe: ‘Wir sind vom Kleinen Heiligen Krieg zum Großen Heiligen Krieg
zurückgekehrt.’395
This passage illustrates the Sufi interpretation of the concepts of early Islam
and the era of Muslim conquests. The constant vigilance in anticipation of an
approaching army is metaphorically repurposed as the constant control and pu-
rification of the lower soul (nafs) that Gramlich translates as ‘Seele’. In this con-
text, Suhravardī propounds his rules of life in a convent:
Folgendes sind die Pflichten der Konventbewohner: Mit dem Verkehr mit den Menschen
Schluß machen und mit dem Verkehr mit Gott beginnen; dem Erwerb entsagen und sich
damit zufrieden geben, daß der Verursacher der Ursachen die Sorge für den Unterhalt
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid., p. 460.
393 Ibid., p. 461.
394 Suhrawardī, Die Gaben der Erkenntnisse (ʿAwārif al-maʿārif), p. 107.
395 Ibid., p. 108.
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übernimmt; sich von gesellschaftlichem Umgang fernhalten; vermeiden, daß man
Forderungen gegen sie geltend machen kann.396
Suhravardī accentuates the spiritual state of being in constant vigilance by casting
light on the connection between the life in a convent and fortresses that guarded
Islamic territory. Suhravardī viewed the act of purification as bringing health and
safety to all the Muslim community. By purifying themselves from the desires of
the lower soul, therefore, the Sufis bring security to themselves and the masses.
The pupils are required to severe all attachments to the mundane world. In this
negative process of exclusion, they seek knowledge of and union with the cause
of all causes – God.
In this section, I introduced several elements and terms of negative and ex-
cluding nature in the Sufi world, which are relevant to this study and appear in
the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. In the next section, I discuss the experience of spring in a
world in which natural beauty was considered devoid of the transcendent. As we
have seen, Saʿdī and Ḥāfiẓ illustrate how the wise person seeks a life of seclusion
(ḫalvat) to free himself from corruptible nature. Within this negative world-view,
natural phenomena appear in their literary works either as objects of negation or
as metaphors for an ideal and absolute truth.397
II.2.4 Spring as a Call for Reevaluation of Exclusion
Now that we have a clear view of the cultural background regarding the Sufi
negative approach to the natural world, we can explore how spring influences
Ḥāfiẓ’s critique of the negative approach of Sufism.
The following ġazal describes the first days of spring. Following the tradi-
tion of tenth and eleventh century poets such as Rūdakī, Ḥāfiẓ celebrates the
new year (the first day of spring, according to the Persian calendar) by writing
panegyric poems to be recited during the festivities:
1 Vom Gau des Freundes kommt der Hauch des Neujahrs-Windes–
falls du diesen Wind um Hilfe bittest, entzündest du deine Herzens-Fackel (an ihm).
2 Wenn du, wie die Rose, über Goldstaub verfügst, um Gottes willen, gib ihn für ein lus-
tiges Leben aus;
dem Korah bescherte seine Leidenschaft, Gold zu häufen, nur Irrtümer.
3 Verschleierte Worte sage ich dir: wie die Rose, so tritt aus (deiner) Knospe hervor,
(schließlich) währt die Herrschaft des Neujahrs-Fürsten nicht länger als fünf Tage.
396 Ibid., p. 109.
397 On solitude and space of exclusion in the Divan see pp. 142–147 above.
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4 Einen Wein habe ich, rein wie die Seele; doch der Sufi kritisiert ihn (sofort);
o Gott, kein Mann von Verstand sollte ein so unglückliches Schicksal haben.398
Ḥāfiẓ begins the poem by focusing on flowers and the stages they go through
during spring. He invites the reader to receive illumination from spring’s breeze
and let its reviving force touch his soul. In the second couplet, the flowers
teach us to be generous for the sake of a joyous life.399 The poet alludes to the
story of Korah (Qārūn) in the Qurʾān (28: 76–77), who is the epitome of greed in
contrast to the natural generosity of the flowers.
The third couplet displays an element common to Ḥāfiẓ’s poems about
spring – namely, the poet persistently reminds his reader that spring is fleeting.
Yet this fact does not bring gloominess to Ḥāfiẓ. Rather, the desire to seize the
passing opportunity energizes him. Ḥāfiẓ invites his reader to imagine a rose
bud, as closed and isolated as a hermit in a hermitage. Ḥāfiẓ advises his reader
to leave his closed rooms (‘bud’) and to be like the flower that (now) is fully
opened and ready to spread its pollen.
In the fourth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ addresses the conflict between enjoying wine
and the views of Sufism (as well as orthodox Islam). Wine had been an integral
part of the spring celebration (as well as its poetic illustration) since the tenth
century. Even though he has a wine as pure as the soul itself,400 Ḥāfiẓ com-
plains, the Sufi still finds faults with it. Ḥāfiẓ articulates his critique in a witty
and sarcastic manner; he does not directly doubt the Sufi’s sanity, but rather
assumes that an unfortunate stroke of fate must have clouded the reasonable
man’s judgment.401 This is a vivid example of Ḥāfiẓ’s sarcasm, reserved for his
critique of zealot Sufis, hypocritical judges, faqīhs and muftīs.402
In another couplet in this ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ expands his criticism from Sufism in
particular to the whole structure of acquisition of knowledge during his time, in-
cluding philosophy and kalām (theology). He writes: ‘Excluded from the means
of joy, in wonder of knowledge, one cannot be; | Sāḵī! come; to the fool arriveth,
the largest victual-portion.’403
Despite the warnings that he attributes to a certain form of knowledge that
prohibits wine and forbids celebration of spring, Ḥāfiẓ calls for his wine-bringer.
398 Wohlleben, 445, 1–4, p. 560. Compare to Clarke, 531, pp. 869–870; Avery, CCCCXLV, 1–4,
p. 536.
399 Including the Vizier Ǧalāl ud-Dīn Tūrānšāh, whose name is mentioned in the thirteenth
couplet of this qaṣīda and who had a good relationship with the poet.
400 Here, the poet has in mind the simple nature of the soul in metaphysical, Platonic terms.
401 Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 1844–1845.
402 Mortażavī,Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, p. 7.
403 Clarke, 531, 8, p. 870. Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 454, 11.
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Once again employing irony, he casts his lot with the foolish and ignorant to
show that he prefers to be associated with them – not with those opposed to joy.
And once again, Ḥāfiẓ challenges those pursuing the excluding path by question-
ing their reason and sanity. There are two points worth mentioning in the poem
above. First, the poet is aware of the shortness of life and the fleeting character of
spring and natural beauty. Second, Ḥāfiẓ clearly considers the ascetic Sufi philos-
ophy as inconsistent with reason. He expresses this in his sarcastic reference to
the Sufi as a ‘reasonable’ person whose bad judgment must be due to bad luck.
Nonetheless, some of Ḥāfiẓ’s ġazals (analyzed above in comparison to Saʿdī) show
an affinity to the negative Sufi views that prescribe a life of contemplation in
ḫalvat (solitude).404 In light of this fact, it is not surprising that we find poetic ex-
pressions of an inner struggle with the dominantly excluding Sufi views. In the
following section, I explore this inner struggle, which arises from the contrast be-
tween natural beauty (perceivable by the bodily senses) and an understanding of
truth as attainable solely through negation and purification.
II.2.4.1 ‘The Repentance-Shattering Spring’
Referring to Huǧvīrī’s work, I showed that repentance in Sufism transcends its
basic religious aspect and becomes an ascending act of purification. As Huǧvīrī
explains, this purification is ascending, since the Sufi must repent of the infe-
rior state in order to arrive at a higher state; to achieve the highest state, more-
over, the Sufi must repent of all states.405 Against this background, we turn to a
number of ġazals that display the poet’s inner struggle with two conflicting de-
sires – i.e., the desire for the beauty of nature and the desire to attain an ele-
vated truth by way of a negation of the mundane. The following ġazal is a clear
instance of this inner struggle:
[1] Ba ʿazm-i tauba saḥar guftam istiḫāra kunam
Bahār-i tauba-šikan mīrasad čičāra kunam
[2] Suḫan durust bigūyam namītavānam dīd
Ki maī ḫurand rafīqān u man niẓāra kunam
[3] Ba daur-i lāla dimāq-i marā ʿalāǧ kunīd
Gar az myān-i bazm-i ṭarab kināra kunam
[1] Intent on repenting at dawn I said, ‘I’ll take an omen for luck.’
Repentance-shattering Spring’s on the way. How can I manage?
[2] I must say frankly, I cannot see
Comrades drinking wine with me looking on.
404 On ḫalvat and the house as the place of negation and exclusion of the natural and cor-
ruptible, see pp. 145f above.
405 See p. 150 above.
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[3] In tulip-time, physick me
If I step aside from the midst of the banquet of merriment.406
This ġazal has a strong ironic tone. Ḫorramšāhī rightly remarks that repentance,
being a mandatory component of the šarīʿa, is not an object of counsel or consid-
erations. Yet the call to celebrate the beauty of spring has made it into an object
of speculation and interpretation.407 In this second instance of irony, the poet
accentuates his own honesty; he is unable to merely observe others enjoying this
beautiful season. Yet the irony turns to sarcasm as Ḥāfiẓ castigates those who
demand repentance in spring. Ḥāfiẓ provides us with another instance of sarcas-
tic refutation of the Sufi notion of constant repentance. In the third couplet, just
as in the fourth couplet of the previously cited ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ ironically questions
the Sufi’s sanity; if he were likewise to forgo the festivities of spring, he would
want to be cured of his faulty intellect.
Repentance and spring appear to be mutually exclusive in the poet’s view.
Repentance seeks to purify and negate in order to arrive at a simple state, while
spring – with all its vigor – is a manifestation of multiplicity and diversity. In
Ḥāfiẓ’s view, one cannot turn one’s back to the beauty of spring and strive for
negation and isolation (ḫalvat) – at least not if one is of sound mind. To convey
this conflict between spring and repentance, Ḥāfiẓ employs a rather unfamiliar
compound adjective in his description of spring: ‘repentance-shattering’ or
(tauba-šikan). In Persian, the compound verb tauba šikastan – to break one’s
repentance, as in breaking a promise (ʿahd šikastan) – was commonly used dur-
ing Ḥāfiẓ’s time and is also common today. The compound adjective ‘repen-
tance-shattering’ in reference to spring has only one precedent in Persian
literature; about five hundred years before Ḥāfiẓ, Rūdakī used this compound
adjective in a single couplet of a longer poem:408
Āmad īn nau bahār-i tauba-šikan
Parnīyān gašt bāġ u barzan u kūy409
Along came this repentance-shattering new spring
The gardens, streets and alleys turned to silk410
In the Persian literary tradition before the emergence of the Indian School in six-
teenth century, we scarcely encounter new inventions and obscure word-plays
406 Avery, CCCXLII, 1–3, p. 421 (my emphasis).
407 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 2: p. 986.
408 See: ibid., vol. 2: pp. 987–988.
409 Dīvān-e Rūdakī-ye Samarqandī, p. 152.
410 My translation of the above couplet
162 II Toward Life
such as ‘repentance-shattering’. Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic choice, therefore, would have cer-
tainly attracted his reader’s attention.
In the first couplet of ġazal 388,411 Ḥāfiẓ uses this adjective again to describe
spring: ‘Joy-exciting and repentance-shattering became the spring and rose: | With
the joy of the face of the rose, grief’s root from the heart up-pluck.’412 In this verse,
we notice an alteration that opens the way toward a clearer understanding of this
quality of spring. As Clarke’s faithful translation reflects, the spring becomes ‘re-
pentance-shattering’ to the poet while he experiences it. Spring attains this quality
by moving the poet aesthetically; in other words, it becomes repentance-shattering
when perceived by the senses and then judged by reason.
II.2.5 Diving into the Sea of the Wine House
The inconsistency between the negative process of ascent and the joy of spring
festivities goes beyond irony and reaches a new level in the following ġazal, in
which aesthetic appreciation of beauty appears in the context of the critique of
the negative act of repentance:
[1] I am not the reprobrate [rind] to abandon the darling and the cup!
The moral police’s chief knows that I rarely act like this.
[2] I, who time and time again have censured repenters,
Would be mad were I to repent of the wine of the time of roses.413
1 Ich bin nicht der Freigeist [rind414], der den Schönen und den Pokal im Stich läßt;
der Polizeimeister weiß, daß ich derlei kaum vollbringe.
2 Ich, der ich oftmals die Bußetuenden verlästert habe,
würde ja verrückt sein, wenn ich dem Wein abschwörte zur Rosenzeit!415
Ḥāfiẓ ironically appeals to the chief of the morality police of Shiraz as his wit-
ness that he never abandoned wine; we are led to assume that Ḥāfiẓ had been
411 In Qazvīnī & Ġanī’s edition, and absent from Ḫānlarī’s first vol., in the vol. 2: 32, p. 1020.
412 Clarke, 448, p. 750 (my emphasis).
413 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 1–2, p. 417 (my emphasis).
414 In the two translations above, we find two attempts to translate the word rind in the
Divan. It must be mentioned that, in case of rind (like other antinomian terms in the Divan),
the poet employs a pejorative attribute (denoting a charlatan, a criminal or a drunkard) as a
laudatory attribute. In the entire Divan, rind has a laudatory connotation in contrast to its pejo-
rative literal meaning outside the Divan. Through the juxtaposition of these two attempts in
the two above translations, we can attain an understanding of this aspect of the term rind in
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
415 Wohlleben, 338, 1–2, p. 440 (my emphasis).
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repeatedly arrested, though without feeling any regret. In a later verse of this
ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ argues all parts of nature are affected by a universal inebriating
force; yet only Ḥāfiẓ is labeled as a libertine: ‘The tulip a taker-up of the cup,
the narcissus drunk, but for me, debauchery’s repute; | I have plenty to answer
to: Whom, O Lord, shall I make the judge?’416 Using anthropomorphism, Ḥāfiẓ
integrates himself into nature and complains about being surrounded by unrea-
sonable judges who are alien to nature. The poet points out that the same force
that affects nature brings him aesthetic pleasure. He articulates this point by
comparing the tulip to a cup and the narcissus flower to an inebriated eye, as
if the tulip were the cupbearer and the narcissus the drunkard in the natural
realm.
In the following couplet of this ġazal, the critique of a negative ascending
approach reaches a new level:
Garči gard-ālūd-i faqr-am šarmbād az himmat-am
Gar ba āb-i čišma-yi ḫuršīd dāman tar kunam
I am a poor and dust-stained beggar, yet let there be shame at my ardour
If I wet my garment with water from the spring of the Sun King!417
Although poor compared to the transcendent sun, Ḥāfiẓ would be ashamed to
allow the skirt of his garment to be tainted with the light of the sun. To under-
stand this couplet, we need to clarify two points. First, a wet or soiled garment
is a conventional figure of speech in Persian and is attributed to someone
whose honor and purity has been besmirched. It has a strong pejorative tone,
for men and women alike. Ḥāfiẓ’s compound verb dāman tar kardan (‘to wet
one’s garment’) refers to this figure of speech.
The second point pertains to the Persian word that Avery translates as ‘ar-
dour’ – himmat. In his commentary, Ḫorramšāhī explains that the term himmat
denotes an inner aspiration or an intention focused in a specific direction. In a
Sufi context, himmat is a spiritual endeavor in which the Sufi constantly rules
over the body and submits to the hardships of self-purification and ascent.418
In this context, himmat represents the intention that guides the Sufi in pursuit
of his goal. As a combination of self-disciplined intention rooted in knowledge
and constant zealous aspiration, himmat is considered indispensable to the
416 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 4, p. 417.
417 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 6, p. 417. The word ‘King’ is an addition of Avery’s and does not exist
in the Divan. Compare to Wohlleben’s translation of this couplet: ‘Obgleich meine Armut
staubbesudelt ist, müßte ich mich doch der Absicht schämen, | mit dem Naß der Sonnenquelle
meinen Saum zu netzen.’ Wohlleben, 338, 6, p. 440.
418 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: pp. 324–326.
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Sufi – like wings for those on the path of ascension.419 In the couplet above,
Ḥāfiẓ poetically modifies the negative and ascending connotations of himmat.
The metaphor of ‘the fountain of the sun’ (čišma-yi ḫuršīd) is mentioned
three times in the Divan. But its other two occurrences are fundamentally differ-
ent from the one quoted above:
Ba havādārī-yi ū ẕarra ṣifat raqṣkunān
Tā lab-i čišma-yi ḫuršīd-i diraḫšān biravam420
(That) like a mote, in love for Him,
To the lip of the fountain of the resplendent sun, I will go.421
Ẕarra rā tā nabuvad himmat-i ʿālī Ḥāfiẓ
Ṭālib-i čišma-yi ḫuršīd-i diraḫšān našavad422
Ḥāfiz̤! So long as lofty resolution is not the atom’s
Seeker of the fountain of the gleaming sun, it becometh not.423
In the first chapter of this study, I analyzed the seventh couplet of the ġazal
351.424 This couplet explicitly illustrates an individual of a lower level – namely,
the mote – aspiring toward the sun. In the eighth couplet of the ġazal 220, him-
mat denotes an intention of an elevated (ʿālī) quality – himmat-i ʿālī, translated
as ‘lofty resolution’ by Clarke and as ‘das hohe Streben’ by Wohlleben.425 This
lofty resolution is essential to the desire for ascent to the fountain of the sun. In
both cases, the mote reaches for union with that which is most elevated.
In the ġazal 338, Ḥāfiẓ refutes repentance, celebrates the cosmic rejuvena-
tion in spring and beholds the whole nature as a feast of wine and beauty. In
the same ġazal, we find an alteration in the representation of the zealous inten-
tion for ascending to the sun. Whereas the mote (ẕarra) in the two couplets
above is determined to reach the fountain of the sun, in the sixth couplet of the
ġazal 338, Ḥāfiẓ – stained with dust (poverty) – introduces another direction for
his aspiration (himmat). He is aware of his deprivation in comparison to the
perfection of the sun. In Plato’s Symposium, Plotinus’s Enneads V. 1. 6 and Ibn
Sīnā’s Treatise on Love,426 this awareness accounts for the zeal that informs the
419 Mahīn Panāhī, ‘Hemmat: Borāq-e haft vādī-ye solūk’, Faṣlnāme-ye Pažūhešhā-ye Adabī,
no. 3 (1383/2004), pp. 8; p. 10–11.
420 Ḫānlarī, 351, 7.
421 Clarke, 391, p. 670 (my emphasis).
422 Ḫānlarī, 220, 8.
423 Clarke, 193, 10, p. 365 (my emphasis).
424 See in this study §I.3.3 (‘The Mote and the Sun’) and above p. 77.
425 Wohlleben, 220, 8, p. 304.
426 See Emil L. Fackenheim, ‘A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina’, Mediaeval Studies, 7, no. 1
(1945), pp. 212–214; p. 225.
II.2 The Turn Toward Life in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ 165
love for the higher level. Yet another awareness is also at work here – one that
defines a direct approach to the sun as besmirching human dignity.
Admittedly, the poet does not claim to have a spotless reputation; on the con-
trary, his garment is dust-stained. Nonetheless, he sees more honor in pre-
serving his deprivation and poverty than in reaching for the golden sun. To
the beggar of the poem, the sun appears to be a king with limitless wealth in
the sky and who is unconcerned with the poet’s humanity and place on earth.
Torn between natural beauty and the cultural and intellectual values of his
world, the poet is engaged in an intellectual struggle.
Against the backdrop of this struggle, Ḥāfiẓmakes a heroic resolution: ‘Love is
a pearl-grain and I am the diver, and the sea is the tavern. | I have plunged in
there. Let us see how I bob up.’427 At this stage, ascent to the sun and the exclusion
of the natural world seems to Ḥāfiẓ to contradict reason and truthfulness.428
Therefore, the restless poet introduces a new direction for his zealous pursuit of
knowledge and self-knowledge: descending into the sea, rather than ascending to-
ward the sun. Though Ḥāfiẓ characterizes his celebration of natural beauty as dan-
gerous and heroic, it is supported by his sense and wisdom. As a diver (lover) he is
only aware of two things: (a) that the object of his desire lies deep beneath the
surface; and (b) that, having plunged into the sea, there is no guarantee that he
will surface. On a metaphorical level, this poem illustrates a fundamental change
in the direction of the seeker of knowledge (who is now also the lover): ascent to-
ward the sun becomes descent into the sea of the wine-house. To grasp the signifi-
cance of the metaphor of the sea, we need to examine the use of this word in the
Divan.
In the Divan, the sea-voyage metaphor is associated with perilous quests.
In his commentary on Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, Ḫānlarī argues that ġazal 147 illustrates
the poet’s direct experience of the sea. Ḫānlarī points to a number of ġazals in
the Divan suggesting that Ḥāfiẓ’s correspondence with the Indian ruler Ġīyāṯ
ud-Dīn Muḥammad Šāh (r. ca. 1325–1351 CE) resulted in his receiving an invi-
tation to the ruler’s court. (Ġīyāṯ ud-Dīn Muḥammad Šāh was known to be a
generous patron of literature and the arts.) Ḥāfiẓ had to travel to India by sea.
But shortly after boarding the ship, he witnessed a horrible tempest, which
caused him to abandon the prospect of riches and return to Shiraz.429 According
to Ḫānlarī, the following couplets represent the fierce and petrifying aspect of
the sea. Here is Gertrude Bell’s poetic and clear translation:
427 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 5, p. 417.
428 See the second couplet of this gȧzal and above p. 162.
429 Ḥāfiẓ, Dīvān-e Ḥāfiẓ ġazalīyāt, qaṣāʾed, mas̱navīyāt, qaṭaʿāt va robāʿīyāt, vol. 2: pp. 1193–1195.
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Full easy seemed the sorrow of the sea
Lightened by hope of gain—hope flew too fast!
A hundred pearls were poor indemnity,
Not worth the blast.
The Sultan’s crown, with priceless jewels set,
Encircles fear of death and constant dread;
It is a head-dress much desired—and yet
Art sure ’tis worth the danger to the head?430
In these couplets, a non-aesthetic pursuit is the object of desire. Therefore, un-
like in the couplet that illustrates Ḥāfiẓ’s descending quest for love, the sea in
the couplet above is not described as the sea of the wine-house. The poet sees
no reason to risk his life solely for the sake of gold, where heroism (Ḥāfiẓ sug-
gests) doesn’t apply; even hundreds of pearls are worthless in comparison to
his priceless life. As a locus of immense horror, the sea is frequently present in
the Divan; yet the object of desire determines whether an endeavor is heroic or
idiotic. The following verses convey the significance of the sea in relation to the
object of one’s quest:
When I was becoming a lover, I said, ‘I have borne off the sought-for pearl’.
I did not know what blood-tossing waves this ocean has.431
The waves run high, night is clouded with fears,
And eddying whirlpools clash and roar;
How shall my drowning voice strike their ears
Whose light-freighted vessels have reached the shore?432
In these verses, the poet employs a heroic tone in his illustration of the horrors
of the sea. In the first of these two couplets, just as in the fifth couplet of ġazal
338 that we cited earlier in Avery’s translation, Ḥāfiẓ uses a heroic rhetoric to
illustrate a diver looking for the one pearl of love – rather than someone on a
ship looking to get rich.
II.2.6 Anxiety in the Field of Critique of the Old World
As we have seen, the bright scene of ascending to the sun is replaced by the
image of plunging into a dark and bottomless sea. Abandoning his world-view
based on exclusion, the poet turned toward the pursuit of beauty and its
430 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 21, P. 103. See also: Ḫānlarī, 147, 5 and 4;
Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 151, 5 and 4.
431 Avery, CXVI, 3, p. 161.
432 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 1, p. 63. See also: Ḫānlarī, 1, 5.
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appreciation in love – a frightful step into the realm of darkness. Notably, the
intellectual tradition handed down to Ḥāfiẓ considered the descending path to
have a corrupting influence on the once elevated soul. Moving toward the natural
world contradicts Sufi and Neoplatonic teachings. In case of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā,
the process of emanation from the material world takes a course that is no longer
approved by the Intellect. The Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā held that the Individual Souls are
banished into the world to ‘atone’ for neglecting the glory of the World-Soul.433
In their modified versions of Neoplatonic cosmogony, the story of the fall in the
Qurʾān and previous Abrahamic Holy Books, the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā condemned this
change in direction.434 Furthermore, the Sufi method of acquisition of self-
knowledge was founded on exclusion, as Sufi elements such as purification
(ṭahārat), repentance (tauba), the Sufi garment (ḫirqa) and the convent
(ḫānaqāh) show. So, it is no surprise that this excluded territory causes anxiety.
In the following ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ illustrates a perilous realm:
[1] If sword blades swish in the moon-faced’s street,
Our neck is ready. It is God’s decree.
[2] I too am informed of the requirements of piety,
But for luck gone astray, what is the remedy?
[3] Me a debauchee, and a lover, and then repentance?
God forbid! God forbid!
[4] We are not much given to recognizing Shaikh and Preacher.
Either give a bowl of wine or cut the cackle.435
The context of the verses sheds light on the reason the narrator anticipates
danger. These verses are explicitly critical toward Sufi views of purity and
piety; they rebel against the Sufi convent (ḫānaqāh), represented here by the
šayḫ (the Sufi mentor) as well as preachers from the madrasa.
Ḥāfiẓ imagines himself stepping inside a realm that accords with his turn
toward aesthetic beauty. But being in this state evokes extreme feelings of
anxiety and dread. Despite these threats, Ḥāfiẓ does not retreat; he finds him-
self in accord with a greater divine truth than that of the Sufis and preachers –
his God is capable of understanding the poet’s human nature. In the second
433 Farrukh, ‘Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, p. 297.
434 Ibid., pp. 297–298. See also Nāṣir Ḫusrau Qubādīyānī’s explanation of negative philo-
sophical ascent. This philosopher of the eleventh century held that the soul, due to over en-
gagement with the material realm (hyle), had drifted further and further away from Intellect.
Only through philosophy, he claimed, can one elevate the soul to its original purity and ab-
straction: Nāṣir Ḫusrau Qubādīyānī, Zād ul-musāfir (Tehran: Markaz-e Pažūhešī-ye Mīrās̱-e
Maktūb, 1384/2005), pp. 190–191.
435 Avery, CCCCX, 1–4, p. 495.
168 II Toward Life
couplet, he displays his familiarity with the dictates of piety, yet he claims
that they are against his nature; he finds the act of negation of natural beauty
to be the very pollution from which he should purify himself. In the third cou-
plet, which I translate literally, Ḥāfiẓ introduces this ironic form of
repentance:
Man rind u ʿāšiq dar mausim-i gul
Āngāh tauba astaġfurallāh
I, the libertine, the lover, and in the season of roses,
And then atonement! Of this (idea) I repent.436
In another ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ uses the same meter as above to develop the notion of
repentance of negation: ‘We have repented of the ascetic’s profession, | And
may there be God’s forgiveness for the carrying-on of the devotee.’437 In this
same ġazal, he sarcastically attacks – with even more vehemence – the insti-
tution of Sufism as represented by Sufi mentors (pīr) and their asceticism.
‘Thanks to the ignorant mentors [pīrs] and deluded šayḫs | Now I am a legend
in libertinism’.438 Since the poet denies the possibility of (ignorant) Sufi
šayḫs’ attaining truth, he decides to go in the very direction against which
they warn. The following couplet provides a similar justification for Ḥāfiẓ’s
turn from an abstract method: ‘In confusion I raised my head to the door of
the tavern: | In the chantry there was no Elder [mentor] knowing you.’439 In
these couplets, Ḥāfiẓ’s primary accusation against Sufism and its mentors ap-
pears to be that they are ignorant. The poet seeks a convincing explanation
for the cosmic natural influence of beauty and the realm of the body on the
intellectual and spiritual realm; he does not find an answer among Sufi men-
tors. In Ḥāfiẓ’s view, the ascetic not only deceives himself by claiming to be
unmoved by the natural beauty; he also tries to deceive the universe. In the
following ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ compares the heavens to a master trickster who knows
all the false tricks, and therefore cannot be duped by the Sufi.440 Here are the
first two couplets of this ġazal in Wohlleben’s and Bicknell’s translation:
436 My translation of the couplet in Ḫānlarī, 410, 3.
437 Avery, CCCCIX, 4, p. 494.
438 Ḫānlarī, 409, 3 (my translation).
439 Avery, CCXIV, 4, p. 278.
440 In the following poem, Ḥāfiẓ uses a figure of speech that refers to a trick performed for
entertainment in which the trickster hides some eggs in his cap to surprise the audience by
revealing them as a trick. If someone found him out, he or she would break the eggs and that
would bring the trickster humiliation. See: Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: p. 544.
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1 Der Sufi legte seine Schlinge aus und öffnete seinen Zauberkasten,
er legte es darauf an, (sogar) den Himmel – der selber ein Scharlatan ist – zu umgarnen.
2 Das Spiel des Schicksals zerbricht ihm sein Ein unterm Hut,
weil er die Darbietung seines Hokuspokus einem Kenner zumutete.441
[1] The Ṣúfí has spread out his net, and lifted is his box’s lid:
He builds his structure of deceit, to cope with juggling Heaven unbid.
[2] The sport of the revolving Sky breaks in his cap an egg in two,
For daring to play jugglers’ tricks on one who all their secrets knew.442
Beginning in the eleventh century, the expansion and institutionalization of
Sufism led to decline of sincerity and growth of hypocrisy.443 The following
couplet throws into stark relief the corruption and emptiness of the institution
of cloisters (ḫānaqāh) in Ḥāfiẓ’s time: ‘In this season no wise bird flies to the
door of the conventicle, | Because a snare is laid in the congregation of every
sermon.’444 As we see in the two couplets above, the gatherings and teachings
of Sufism are described as traps.
The institutionalization of Sufi convents paralleled the institutionalization
of teaching colleges of Islamic jurisprudence (madrasa)445; both accelerated
from the eleventh century to the time of Ḥāfiẓ. The patronage of rulers freed the
Sufis from monetary and other mundane concerns. Many madrasas and
ḫānaqāhs were funded by charitable acts (waqf) by high-ranking individuals
such as ‘sultans and viziers’.446 But this funding scheme contributed to the cor-
ruption of Sufis and their dependence on the authorities. Furthermore, piety
and asceticism practiced for the sake of money and comfort alienated the insti-
tution of Sufism from the pursuit of truth and self-knowledge and turned it into
a source of political power and financial gain.447 This historical context pro-
vides the background for another aspect of Ḥāfiẓ’s critique of Sufism and the
institutions of madrasa and ḫānaqāh. The following is an example of Ḥāfiẓ’s
sarcastic attacks against this corrupt institution:
441 Wohlleben, 129, p. 201 (my emphasis).
442 Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman
Bicknell (Tehran: Imperial Organization for Social Services, 1976; reprint, London 1875), LXXII,
p. 111 (my emphasis).
443 See in the following the trace of decline in Sufism: Mortażavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ:
Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, pp. 20–44. For an account of early critiques of falsehood and hy-
pocrisy in the tenth century, see pp. 21–26, and regarding the fourteenth century contempo-
rary to Ḥāfiẓ, see pp. 42–44.
444 Avery, CCCCLVII, 4, p. 552 (my emphasis).
445 Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kā̱naqāh’, p. 458.
446 Ibid., p. 461.
447 Compare to: Mortażavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, p. 26. Also see:
Raǧāʾī Buḫārāʾī, Farhang-e ašʿār-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 168–170.
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See the town Súfí. Since he consumes the dubious morsel,
May his crupper be extended, the well-foddered beast!448
Sieh den Sufi der Stadt, wie er verdächtige Brocken verschlingt;
möge er ganz zum Tier werden, dieser strotzende Kerl!449
This couplet displays the full force of Ḥāfiẓ’s sarcastic attack against the Sufis
of his time. He not only refutes their views; he also denies the sincerity of their
quest for knowledge and even questions their humanity.
Ḥāfiẓ’s attacks are not limited to the convent and its mentors; they also tar-
get the corruption of the madrasa as well as of faqīhs and muftīs. In the follow-
ing couplet, Ḥāfiẓ sarcastically demonstrates a case of in vino veritas: ‘The
School’s jurisprudent was drunk last night and issued a decree, | That, “Wine is
unlawful, but better than the revenue from endowments”!’450 Mortażavī con-
tributes to our knowledge of the Divan by pointing out that Ḥāfiẓ’s attack
against the corruption of the institutions of Sufism (ḫānaqāh) and Islamic juris-
prudence (madrasa) differs from Sufi literature’s rhetoric of blame (malāmat);
Ḥāfiẓ’s criticism is not confined to mere (self)-criticism of hypocrisy, but rather
in using irony and sarcasm Ḥāfiẓ goes beyond the ways of Malāmatīya and ex-
poses the corruption in the two above-mentioned institutions, and their depen-
dency on questionable financial means.451 The Divan in many cases contains an
ironic and sarcastic refutation of the Sufi negative and excluding elements. The
distance between Ḥāfiẓ’s (negative) and Suhravardī’s (positive) representations
of the elements of Sufism show that, for Ḥāfiẓ, an essential element, which had
once given meaning to people’s lives, had disappeared: ‘This patched gown
that I own is better in pawn for drink, | And this idiotic book of texts, better
drowned in good wine.’452 In the remainder of this ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ explores the ex-
perience of such a failure of values and teachings. These verses reference a reli-
gious requirement in Islam – a dress or prayer-mat stained with wine must be
purified with water or else the owner’s prayers will be ineffective. In the verse
above, Ḥāfiẓ pawns his imaginary Sufi garment for a cup of wine and provoca-
tively suggests dumping his books of nonsense in wine. Let us not forget the
significance of the Sufi garment; as we saw earlier, the Sufi garment symbolizes
the path of purification. Yet Ḥāfiẓ would prefer to trade it for wine. Though he
is knowledgeable about Sufi philosophy, clearly, Ḥāfiẓ rejects their negative as-
cetic methods.
448 Avery, CCXC, 8, p. 361.
449 Wohlleben, 290, 8, p. 380.
450 Avery, XLV, 4, p. 78.
451 Mortażavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, pp. 133–134.
452 Avery, CCCCLVII, 1, p. 551.
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II.2.6.1 Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Dilemma of Purification and
Pollution
The following ġazal in the Divan displays a remarkable instance of the state of
anxiety. The poet paints a scene in which he converses with himself. He is torn
between the path of purification and the pursuit of beauty and love.
[1] Still drowsy with sleep I went last night to the tavern door;
The gown has been soiled, the prayer-rug stained with wine.
[2] The magian child of the vintner came chiding.
He said, ‘Wake up you drowsing wanderer.
[3] Wash and launder yourself clean. Then boldly stride into the inn [ḫarābāt],
When this temple [dayr-i ḫarāb] will not be polluted by you.
[4] How long, desiring the lips of sweet lads, will you
Stain the jewel of the spirit with liquid ruby?
[5] Pass in chastity the stages of old age and do not
Make the robe of honour of the elderly tainted like the gaudy robe of youth.
[6] Those who know the path of love have in this deep sea
Drowned and yet not been sullied with water:
[7] Be clean and pure and come out of the pit of nature,
Because no cleanliness does dust-infected water give.’
[8] I said, ‘O soul and O world, the rose’s record book is not blackened
If in the height of spring it has got stained with pure wine.’
[9] He replied, ‘Do not, Háfiz, foist riddles and conceit on your friends.’
Ah the pity of this charm, besmeared by all sorts of blame!453
The poet illustrates himself in a situation that is diametrically opposed to the
path of purity. He does this by including in the ġazal the rhyming word ālūda
(‘defiled’ or ‘polluted’). The poem illustrates the narrator’s perplexity from its
first couplet. Notably, this ġazal has a straight narrative line; it concentrates on a
single theme. (In most manuscripts, the order of the couplets – or at least the
first three – remains the same.454) The poem is set in front of the door of the wine
house on a dark night. Ḥāfiẓ once again depicts himself wearing a soiled Sufi
garment455; furthermore, he carries a prayer-rug stained with wine. By the stand-
ards of Persian classical poetry, the poetic illustration of this prayer-rug would
have been considered taboo.456 Several poems of Sanāʾī and ʿAṭṭār mention
prayer-rugs being cast aside or sent to the wine house as acts of concealing pray-
ers in pursuit of purification and self-negation. Yet, as far as this writer can tell,
the image of pouring wine on the prayer-rug appears only one time in classical
453 Avery, CCCCXIV, p. 500.
454 Ḫānlarī, vol. 1: p. 845.
455 See p. 164 above.
456 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: p. 95.
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Persian literature – in a quatrain written by Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī of the thirteenth
century.457 It must be noted that the prayer-rug was considered the purest space
upon which the believers would direct their words to God.
From the second couplet onward, the young vintner castigates Ḥāfiẓ for
having abandoned the path of purification and having fallen into nature’s pit.
Yet in the third couplet, the poet paints an ironic image – why should he re-
ceive lessons in abstinence and piety on the door steps of a wine-house? The
name even alludes to the Persian word ḫarābāt, which literally denotes a build-
ing for gambling and prostitution.458 Ḫarābāt (translated above as ‘inn’ in the
third couplet) literally means ‘ruins’. In the Divan, the word appears in forms
such as ‘ḫarābāt-i muġān’, ‘ḫarābābād’459 and (in the case of this couplet) ‘dayr-i
ḫarāb’ – literally, ‘the ruined cloister’, but translated above as ‘temple’. Here is
Clarke’s translation of this couplet: ‘“Washing and washing, do; then, to the tav-
ern, proudly move; | “So that, by thee, this ruined cloister become not stained.’460
The irony is palpable: standing before the pleasure house, the young vintner
chides Ḥāfiẓ for being sleepy and soaked in wine! He demands ablution lest this
house become tainted. Stressing purification, ablution and seeking ascent from
nature’s pit, the vintner mixes shaming and blaming. The resemblance between
this dialogue and that which Huǧvīrī narrates between Šiblī and God suggests that
Ḥāfiẓ hears the voice of abstraction in front of the wine house – a voice that he
vehemently criticized.461 This voice tries to remind Ḥāfiẓ of the necessity of the
purification as well as the exclusion of the natural realm.
The image of the sea of love that we discussed earlier reappears in the sixth
couplet. Through the perspective of abstraction and purification, it is recon-
structed as the sea of God.462 In this vision, the seeker goes through the sea
without being tainted or getting wet; he is able to do so on account of the purity
of his soul. The grotesque, ascetic vintner chides Ḥāfiẓ for having turned to-
ward life and tainted his abstract soul. It is important to note that Avery’s
‘jewel of the spirit’ in the fourth couplet translate the original Persian ǧauhar-i
rūḥ – a philosophical term meaning ‘the essence of the soul’. Thus, as a simple
entity in the Platonic context, the essence of the soul is described as in danger
457 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 354.
458 On the literal and figurative meaning of ḫarābāt, see: Raǧāʾī Buḫārāʾī, Farhang-e ašʿār-e
Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 179–183. Specifically see Buḫārāʾy’s citation from Šarḥ-i taʿarruf, vol. 1: p. 181.
459 See ‘ḫarābāt-i muġān’ in 327, 349 and for ‘ḫarābābād’ the ġazals 36, 97, and ‘dayr-i
ḫarābābād’ in 310 in: Ḫānlarī.
460 Clarke, 485, 3, p. 801.
461 See p. 152 above.
462 See p. 72 above.
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of losing its unmixed nature. (Once again, this tradition equates being mixed
with being degraded and defiled.) This explanation shows that Ḥāfiẓ comes
under criticism (in this ironic setting) for debasing his elevated simple soul in
the corruptible realm. His path is characterized as evil because it drifts away
from the light of the truth and toward the ephemeral beauty of the world.
Remarkably, Ḥāfiẓ’s only counterargument to the vintner is to remind him
of spring; Ḥāfiẓ identifies himself with the red roses in spring – both are shaped
by the natural forces of spring. Yet this answer does not convince the vintner.
Despite the vintner’s efforts, Ḥāfiẓ remains unshaken; he continues to identify
himself with nature as influenced by spring. In other words, spring itself be-
comes an argument in this poem. At the end of the ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ ironically notes
that the only flaw in the lovely, young vintner is his disposition to negate natu-
ral beauty.
II.2.7 Mediation and Going Beyond Exclusion
In the first chapter, I showed that Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic formulation of the direct and
excluding method of ascending to an extramundane truth corresponds to
Platonic views and has a strong affinity with the Sufi path of exclusion and pu-
rification. Yet I did not discuss the presence of a mediating figure, which is an
essential part of the philosophical and Sufi traditions in the Islamic world.463
One characteristic of Islamic Neoplatonists is that they offer a modification of
the Soul of the World as a mediating agent, who imparts forms to the universe
and guides the seekers of the truth toward union. In Ibn Sīnā’s treatise Ḥayy
ibn Yaqẓān, the Active Intelligence assumes an anthropomorphic appear-
ance464; similarly, in Šahāb ud-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhravardī’s ʿAql-i surḫ, it appears
as a wise old man ‘bright like the sun’.465
Ibn Sīnā describes an encounter he had with a personification of Active
Intelligence (a sage) as Ibn Sīnā and his companions visited a garden near the city.
This sage appears to him as ‘beautiful’ – ‘his person shone with a divine glory.
Certainly he had tasted of years; long duration had passed over him. Yet there was
463 On the relevance of the intermediary agents in the works of Ibn Sīnā and Suhravardī to
the question of Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor see also: Ḥusaīnʿalī Mallāḥ, ‘Pīr-e golrang kīst?’, in Ḥāfiẓšenāsī
(Tehran: Pāžang, 1367/1988); Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Pīr-e Golrang’, Našr-e Dāneš, no. 4
(Winter 1378/1999).
464 See the English translation of this work in: Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary
Recital, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 137–150.
465 Morewedge, ‘The Neoplatonic Structure of Some Islamic Mystical Doctrines’, pp. 68–70.
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seen in him only the freshness proper to young men’.466 In his encounter with the
sage, Ibn Sīnā feels the intellectual love that each member of the lower level has
for the level above. He recounts: ‘I felt a desire to converse with him. From my
inmost depths arose a need to become intimate with him and to have familiar ac-
cess to him.’467 The sage defines human bodily aspects as companions of humans;
thus, we may infer that Ibn Sīnā had been alone and that the companions he men-
tions in the opening of his account were his bodily senses, anger (violence) and
his bodily needs: ‘These companions who are about thee and never leave thee are
evil companions. It is to be feared that they will seduce thee and that thou wilt
remain captive in their bonds, unless the divine safekeeping reach thee and pre-
serve thee from their malice.’468
Like Plato’s Socrates in Phaedo, Ibn Sīnā’s sage informs him that humans
cannot separate themselves from the erroneous knowledge of their senses and
bodily desires; yet the sage encourages Ibn Sīnā to train his senses and gain
mastery over them. As for traveling across the cosmos with the sage, the sage
tells Ibn Sīnā and all humankind the following: ‘the road is closed to you all,
unless thy fortunate destiny should aid thee, for thy part, to separate from
these companions. But now the hour for that separation is not yet come: there
is a time set for it, which thou canst not anticipate.’469
In Šahāb ud-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhravardī’s treatise ʿAql-i surḫ (The Red Intellect),470
Suhravardī similarly describes an encounter with the intermediary agent. The
setting of this encounter, however, is beyond the realm of senses and occurs in a
state of ascent. Suhravardī metaphorically refers to his divine soul as a bird. As a
human being answering the questions of his pupils, Suhravardī remembers the
time when he was a bird trapped in the sublunary realm. The bird’s (i.e., his) vi-
sion was impaired and tied with ‘four different bounds’471 – the four elements472 –
‘with ten wardens’ watching over his divine soul. Suhravardī then differentiates
between these ten wardens as follows:
466 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, p. 137.
467 Ibid.
468 Ibid., p. 138.
469 Ibid., p. 141.
470 Šahāb ud-Din Yaḥyā Suhravardī, Maǧmūʿe-ye moṣannefāt-e Šayḫ-i Išrāq, ed. Seyyed
Hossein Nasr and Henry Corbin, 4 vols. (Tehran: Pažūhešgāh-e ʿOlūm-e Ensānī va Moṭāleʿāt-e
Farhangī, 1380/2001), pp. 226–239.
471 Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardi, The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi,
trans. W. M. Thackston (London: The Octagon Press, 1982), p. 35.
472 Taqī Pūrnāmdār, Ramz va dāstānhā-ye ramzī dar adab-e Fārsī: Taḥlīlī az dāstānhā-ye
ʿerfānī-falsafī-ye Ibn Sīnā va Suhravardī (Tehran: ʿElmī va Farhangī, 1364/1985), p. 316.
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Five of them faced me with their backs toward outside, while the other five stood facing
the outside with their backs to me. The five who faced me kept me in the world of perplex-
ity so that I forgot my nest, my realm and everything I had known. I thought I had always
been the way I was then.473
The five senses are allegorically rendered here as the ten wardens. In contrast
to Ibn Sīnā, Suhravardī does not view the stage of finding the intermediary
agent as one of companionship of the five senses; after a while, Suhravardī (in
a process of abstraction) flees from his wardens and, with his shackles (the four
elements), he finds his way into the wilderness, where he meets the intermedi-
ary agent. Throughout this treatise this intermediary agent is constantly called
the pīr474 – ‘the elder’ or ‘the master’.
As we saw earlier, the Sufi mentor (pīr) has the important role of guiding the
wayfarer and presiding over the ḫānaqāh (convent).475 Abū Ḥafṣ Suhravardī’s ex-
planation of the Sufi pīrs resembles Yaḥyā Suhravardī’s (the Sufi-philosopher’s)
intermediary agent, who approaches the seeker of knowledge and guides him
through each step. Yet according to Abū Ḥafṣ Suhravardī, the mediating fig-
ure of the Sufi mainly refers to a personal mentor, rather than a non-personal,
intellectual and spiritual agent. As Abū Ḥafṣ Suhravardī explains in ʿAwārif
al-maʿārif, Sufism, from its earliest masters onwards, considered a pīr to
be indispensable. Emphasizing the importance of having a pīr, Abū Ḥafṣ
Suhravardī refers to Bāyazīd of Basṭām of the ninth century: ‘Von Abū Yazīd
(al-Basṭāmī) wird berichtet, er habe gesagt: “Wer keinen Meister hat, dessen
Autorität ist der Satan.”’476
II.2.7.1 The Mediating Agent Pīr-i Muġān
As I mentioned earlier, there is no evidence in the Divan to support the conclu-
sion that Ḥāfiẓ belonged to a Sufi order. Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ’s sarcastic polemic
against šayḫs and pīrs does not stop at non-personal attacks on ignorance,
greed, and hypocrisy477; rather, as Muʿīn points out and Ḫorramšāhī and
Heravī corroborate,478 Ḥāfiẓ attacked a prominent, contemporary Sufi master,
Šāh Niʿmatullāh-i Walī-yi Kirmānī. Šāh Niʿmatullāh wrote in a ġazal: ‘With a
473 Suhrawardi, The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi, p. 35.
474 Suhravardī,Maǧmūʿe-ye moṣannefāt-e Šayḫ-i Išrāq, p. 228.
475 See pp. 152f above.
476 Suhrawardī, Die Gaben der Erkenntnisse (ʿAwārif al-maʿārif), p. 101.
477 See p. 169 above.
478 Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan, pp. 191–194.; Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: pp. 715–722.;
Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 2: pp. 823–829.
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glance of ours, we turn the dust to gold.’479 In the final couplet of this ġazal,
Šāh Niʿmatullāh invites the seekers of truth to become his disciples so that he
can lead them toward God. The following is Ḥāfiẓ’s ironic response:
[1] Those eyes that with their alchemy
Convert base dust to gold,
Will they of their great courtesy
One moment us behold?
[2] ’Twere best from doctors fraudulent
To keep my pain concealed;
By that unseen medicament
I may at last be healed.480
Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ expands his poetic polemics and addresses famous early
Sufi masters. For instance, Ḥāfiẓ even attacks Bāyazīd Basṭāmī:
[1] Get up so that we might take the Súfí gown to the tavern:
Take ecstatic outpouring and ejaculations of the possessed to the market of superstitions.
[2] Let us, by way of a novelty brought from a distant voyage,
Take to the wild wandering calendars the Bastámí cloak and rapturous exclamations.481
Despite Ḥāfiẓ’s attacks against Sufi masters, there are still instances in the
Divan in which the poet conveys his interest in finding an intermediary agent.
Yet nowhere in the Divan does Ḥāfiẓ express an interest for a person as a guide.
The guide he desires is what he describes as dalīl-i rāh – ‘guide of the path’482
or ‘Wegführer’,483 as Clarke and Wohlleben, respectively, translate the term.
Ḫorramšāhī claims that there was a phase in the poet’s intellectual develop-
ment, after his refutation of the Sufi pīrs, during which he recognized the need
for an intermediary agent; eventually, he invented a mythological one.484
Considering that devotion to a personal Sufi master was very common among
poets of the time, Ḥāfiẓ’s invention of a literary character that guides him intel-
lectually and spiritually resembles the intellectual practice that goes back to
Ibn Sīnā and Yaḥyā Suhravardī.485
479 Šāh Niʿmatullāh-i Walī-yi Kirmānī, Dīvān (Tehran: ʿElmī, 1341/1962), pp. 387–388. My
translation of the first verse of the first couplet
480 Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 164. See Ḫānlarī, 191.
481 Avery, CCCLXVI, 1–2, p. 448.
482 Clarke, 428, 5, p. 716.
483 Wohlleben, 356, 5, p. 460.
484 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: p. 96.
485 See: Pourjavady, ‘Pīr-e Golrang,’ p. 49.
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Yet Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor is not a super-natural sublime entity like the sages of Ibn
Sīnā and Yaḥyā Suhravardī. The pīr that Ḥāfiẓ invents, as numerous cases in the
Divan illustrate, is a fictional character named Pīr-i Muġān – Master of the Magi.
The words Magi (muġān) and Magus (muġ) appear forty times in the Divan.486 This
term appeared in Persian poetry from as early as the time of Sanāʾī (in the eleventh
century), yet Ḥāfiẓ was the only poet who portrays the character as the sole medi-
ating figure.487 The difference between Ḥāfiẓ’s use of Pīr-i Muġān and that of other
poets like Sanāʾī lies in the fact that these other poets do not criticize great Sufi
masters, whom they revere as saints. Sanāʾī uses Pīr-i Muġān to show he is a
Malāmatī and that he desires to conceal his piety; accordingly, he praises Bāyazīd
of Basṭām. Furthermore, unlike Ḥāfiẓ, Sanāʾī writes numerous didactic poems in-
viting his disciples to join the path of Sufism. The name of Ḥāfiẓ’s fictional charac-
ter alludes to Zoroastrianism;488 the word muġ, in the pre-Islamic Iran, denoted a
high-ranking Zoroastrian priest.489 Nonetheless, as Ġanī, Ḫorramšāhī,490 and
Muʿīn assert,491 in post-Islamic Iran, this term must be understood in relation to
the prohibition of consumption and production of wine; after this prohibition,
Muslims would commonly turn to Christians or Zoroastrians in order to enjoy
wine. In his book on the influence of Zoroastrianism (Mazdayasnā) on Persian lit-
erature, Muʿīn demonstrates that, for scholars and historians of the Islamic world,
wine was commonly accepted as a component of Zoroastrian religion; further-
more, leading a joyous life and drinking were considered to be in service to the
religion.492 This background allows us to understand an aspect of Ḥāfiẓ’s inven-
tion of his mentor. In relation to his ironic crusade against Sufi zealots and their
ascetic praise of purity, Ḥāfiẓ turns to the Pir-i Muġān instead of to the mentors of
the Sufi path (pīrān-i ṭarīqat).493 The following couplet illustrates how the poet in-
troduces his intermediary character in contrast to the šayḫs of convents:
486 Ṣeddīqīyān and Mīrʿābedīnī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 1087–1088.
487 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: p. 97.
488 Ibid., p. 99. Regarding the non-personal characteristic of Pīr-i Muġān, see also the follow-
ing: Mortażavī,Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar ḥāfiẓšenāsī, p. 284.
489 Muʿīn, Farhang-e Muʿīn, vol. 1: p. 886.
490 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: pp. 97–98.
491 Muʿīn, Farhang-e Muʿīn, vol. 1: p. 886.
492 ———, Mazdayasnā va taʾs̱īr-e ān dar adabīyāt-e pārsī (Tehran: University of Tehran
Press, 1326/1947), p. 275.
493 Ehsan Yarshater, ‘Hafez: An Over View’, in Encyclopædia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater
(New York: Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation, 2003), p. 463.
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Murīd-i Pīr-i Muġān-am zi-man maranǧ aī šayḫ
Čirā ki vaʿda tu kardy yu ū biǧā-āvard
I am the disciple of the Magian Guide. Do not, O Shaikh, rail at me.
Why? Because you gave a promise, but he fulfilled it!494
As we saw above, Pīr-i Muġān fulfilled the promise once made by the Sufi
šayḫs – namely, to provide guidance in pursuit of self-knowledge. Several cou-
plets of the Divan illustrate the poet’s devotion to his intellectual invention. In
the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ reaffirms his commitment to Pīr-i Muġān, in whom
he sees a path to a joyous life:
Az āstān-i Pīr-i Muġān sar čirā kašam
Daulat dar ān sarā u gušāyiš dar ān dar ast
Why should I shun the Magian Elder’s threshold?
Good fortune is in this mansion, and opening in this door.495
In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ asserts that his bond with this intellectual guid-
ing agent is eternal:
Tā zi maīḫāna u maī nām u nišān ḫvāhad būd
Sar-i mā ḫāk-i rah-i Pīr-i Muġān ḫvāhad būd
So long as of the wine-shop and wine there will be the name and the sign,
Our head will be the dust of the Magian Elder’s path.496
These couplets praise Pīr-i Muġān as a literary personification of the possibility
of moving beyond the failed teachings of Sufis. In the following couplets, the
poet attempts to move beyond praise and provide the reader with details about
Pīr-i Muġān’s contribution as a mediator:
Zānrūz bar dilam dar-i maʿnī gušūda šud
Kaz sākinān-i dargah-i Pīr-i Muġān šudam
The door of True Meaning was opened to my heart from that day
That I became one of the dwellers in the Court of the Magian Guide.497
In the following couplet, moreover, we read that Pīr-i Muġān liberated the poet
from ignorance. In this couplet, Ḥāfiẓ juxtaposes the slavery of ignorance to a
kind of knowledge that truly frees the knower. This act of liberation, described
as ʿayn-i ʿināyat, is one of the contributions of this pīr:
494 Avery, CXLI, 8, p. 192.
495 Avery, XL, 3, p. 72.
496 Avery, CCI, 1, p. 263.
497 Avery, CCCXIV, 7, p. 391.
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Banda-yi Pīr-i Muġān-am ki zi ǧahl-am birahānd
Pīr-i mā harča kunad ʿayn-i ʿināyat bāšad
I am the servant of Pīr-i Muġān, who freed me from ignorance
Whatever our mentor does is the essence of grace.498
The phrase ʿayn-i ʿināyat can be translated literally as ‘the essence of grace’,
‘the spring of favor’ or ‘the image of care’. This term makes another appearance
later in the same ġazal from which the couplet above originates: ‘The ascetic –
self regard and prayer, and I – drunkenness and supplication: | Well now,
which of the two would you be disposed to favour?’499 In this translation by
Avery, ʿināyat conveys intentionality. As Ḫorramšāhī explains in his commen-
tary on the Divan, the term ʿināyat, in philosophical and theological contexts,
pertains to a divine perspective.500 This perspective lies beyond human.501 In a
different context, Ḥāfiẓ uses this term in his polemic against the Sufi master
Šāh Niʿmatullāh, whom we mentioned earlier:
Ču ḥusn-i ʿāqibat na ba rindī-yu zāhidīst
Ān bih ki kār-i ḫvīš ba ʿināyat rahā-kunand
Since the success of the issue lies not with debauchery or abstinence,
It were better that they left their affair to Providence.502
In the couplet above, this term is used to show that neither the pious person
nor the libertine can be judged by conventional morality. By attributing
ʿināyat to his fictive mentor, Ḥāfiẓ points out that his emancipation from igno-
rance is not a reward for ascetic piety, but rather a reward for realizing the
existence of a perspective that goes beyond the simple laws of religion. This
perspective is a divine one. Pīr-i Muġān maintains that what is perceived as
good can in fact be evil, and vice versa; judgment belongs to a perspective
that lies beyond these human notions. Ḥāfiẓ deploys this teaching of Pīr-i
Muġān against the self-aggrandizing Sufi (Šāh Niʿmatullāh). He reminds the
Sufi that neither of these two qualities – i.e., debauchery and abstinence –
grant higher or lower moral ground. The act of judgment belongs to a divine
perspective beyond good and evil, and it obeys a logic that is incomprehensi-
ble to the human’s binary mind.
498 My translation according to the Divan edited by Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 158, 6.
499 Avery, CLIV, 6, p. 209.
500 Saǧǧādī, Farhang-e maʿāref-e eslāmī, pp. 377–379.
501 Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 1: pp. 716–717.
502 Avery, CXCI, 4, p. 251.
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II.2.7.2 Ḥāfiẓ’s Mentor and Inclusion in Paradox
In Čārdah revāyat, Ḫorramšāhī dedicates an article to explaining the third couplet
of ġazal 101.503 The couplet in question has been the object of various controversial
interpretations; Sūdī recounts consulting with experts about this couplet during
his many journeys and pilgrimages.504 The couplet itself is not complicated with
respect to its vocabulary or structure, but its paradoxical irony challenges the
reader. Here are three different translations:
Said our Pīr: ‘On the creator’s pen, passed no error:’
On his (the Pīr’s) pure sight, error covering, afrin[505] be!506
Der Alte sprach: des Künstlers Schrift
Ist ganz von allen Fehlern frey.
Sein Blick voll Nachsicht soll dafür
Von mir gepriesen seyn.507
Unser Alter sagte: Ein Fehler ist in das Schreibrohr der Schöpfung nicht eingeflossen.
Lob und Preis sei Seinem klaren Blick, welcher Fehler zudeckt.508
The couplet operates on two levels: the level of action (the demiurgic level) and
the level of a perspective through which discernible flaws are not recognized as
such. The irony of the second verse spares the reader a mystical statement in-
different to the fact that evil exists.509 The controversy surrounding this verse
stems from this humanist ironic perspective.510
According to Sūdī, the main controversy of the couplet concerns how to
interpret the existence of evil in a world that is held to originate from a princi-
ple of absolute Good. Sūdī recounts the views of several experts, whom he
personally requested to interpret the couplet. Among these experts were
Mullā Aḥmad Qazvīnī from Šām (modern day Syria); Mullā Muṣliḥ ud-Dīn Lārī
(from modern day Iran), who was both a clergyman and a poet; and Šayḫ
Ḥusaīn-i Ḫvārazmī, who resided in Āmid (modern day Diyarbakir) and who
503 Transcription of the Persian couplet is the following: Pīr-i mā guft ḫaṭā bar qalam-i ṣunʿ
naraft | Āfarīn bar naẓar-i pāk-i ḫatāpūš-aš bād
504 See: Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Ho̮rramsā̌hī, Čārdah revāyat: Maǧmu ̄ʿ e-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye šeʿr va
šaḫṣīyat-e Hạ̄fiẓ (Tehran: Ketāb-e Parvāz, 1988), p. 45.
505 Praise
506 Clarke, 237, 4, p. 428
507 Hammer-Purgstall, vol. 1: CXXIII, pp. 388–389.
508 Wohlleben, 101, 3, p. 171.
509 Compare to Ḫorramsā̌hī, Čārdah revāyat: Maǧmu ̄ʿ e-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye šeʿr va
šaḫṣīyat-e Hạ̄fiẓ, p. 39.
510 Compare to Zarrīnkūb’s treatment of this subject in relation to this couplet in the follow-
ing: Zarrīnkūb, Az kūče–ye rendān, pp. 140–143.
II.2 The Turn Toward Life in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ 181
was also a clergyman and a poet. All three agreed that this couplet alludes to
a Quranic story in which Moses find a mentor (whose identity the Qurʾān does
not reveal) with divine wisdom.511 When Moses asks permission to be the
mentor’s follower,512 the mentor reluctantly grants it, but on one condition –
Moses must not ask the mentor to explain why he acts as he does. Moses
enthusiastically accepts the offer, but he fails to uphold his part of the bar-
gain. On three consecutive occasions, Moses loses his patience and asks the
mentor to explain his actions: an act of vandalism, an act of homicide and re-
building an old city wall without expecting compensation. (The first two of
these actions appear to be evil.) The mentor finally parts ways with Moses,
but not before offering a partial explanation: his apparently evil actions in
fact benefited other people.
Another story to which Ḥāfiẓ may have alluded in the couplet above, Sūdī
suggests, is the story of Šayḫ-i Ṣanʿān. A great Sufi master, Šayḫ-i Ṣanʿān aban-
dons his religion after falling in love with a Christian girl. He follows his belo-
ved’s customs, drinks wine and burns the Qurʾān. His own former disciples
accuse him of having succumbed to evil temptation; yet, in fact, his apparently
evil action brought about his enlightenment.513
Sūdī’s enquiries show how the poem kindles among scholars a strong curi-
osity regarding this enigmatic mentor, who speaks about the world and evil in
a paradoxical, ironic tone.
Since Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor is non-personal and formed from various intellectual
sources known to the poet, we may further explore the mentor’s views regard-
ing the problem of evil in light of the views of Ḥāfiẓ’s contemporaries. In his
article on this couplet, Ḫorramšāhī directs his reader’s attention to ʿAḍud ud-
Dīn Īǧī’s views on evil, expressed in his book Mawāqif (Stations). A contempo-
rary of Ḥāfiẓ, Īǧī was a highly respected scholar and judge. The poet respected
him as an expert and teacher.514
511 The Qurʾān (18: 65–82)
512 Muḥamad B. Sūdī, Tarǧome-ye šarḥ-e Sūdī, trans. Maʿṣūma Sattārzāde, 4 vols. (Tehran:
Dehḫodā, 1358/1979), pp. 680–681.
513 Šayḫ-i Ṣanʿān, a character between reality and legend, is explicitly praised by Ḥāfiẓ. The
poet’s admiration for Šayḫ-i Ṣanʿān is second only to his reverence for al-Ḥallāǧ. See: Qazvīnī
& Gȧni,̄ 77, 6. & 10; Wohlleben 79, 7. p. 142 & 10, p. 60; Clarke, 69, 7, p. 169. & 10, pp. 46–49.
See the story of Šayḫ-i Ṣanʿān (alternatively written as ‘Sam’an’) in the following: Farid ud-Din
Attar, The Conference of the Birds, trans. Afkham Darbandi; Dick Davis (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 57–75.
514 Ho̮rramsā̌hī, Čārdah revāyat: Maǧmu ̄ʿ e-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye šeʿr va šaḫṣīyat-e Hạ̄fiẓ,
p. 37 & 39. See also Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan, pp. 181–182.
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In the Divan, there is a qaṭʿa in which Ḥāfiẓ eulogizes five great men in the
time of Šāh Šayḫ Abū Isḥāq (ruled ca. 1342–53)515; in this qaṭʿa, he praises Īǧī
as the ‘king of knowledge’ and refers to Īǧī’s masterwork, Mawāqif.516 Despite
the fact that Īǧī played an important role in the court as a judge, advisor and am-
bassador,517 however, Ḥāfiẓ does not praise Īǧī as a judge or a politician; rather,
Ḥāfiẓ praises him for his intellectual achievements. Another important aspect of
this poem is that it reflects Ḥāfiẓ’s genuine faith in greatness of these men; Ḥāfiẓ
did not expect any reward for his expressions of praise, since, by the time all five
of these men had died, Shiraz was ruled by the enemies of the Īynǧū dynasty. Here
are several couplets of this poem:
1. In the time of the rule of Shāh Shaikh Abū Isḥāḳ
By five wonderful persons, prosperous was the country of Fārs.
[. . .]
5. The next the king of learning,518 ʿAẓd, who in composition
In the name of the King (Shāh Abū Isḥāḳ), laid the foundation of the work of ‘Stations.’
[. . .]
[7] Equal to themselves, they left none; and departed (in death);
May God, great and glorious, cause all to be forgiven!519
In Mawāqif, Īǧī discusses metaphysical views regarding the existence of evil.
Beings are either pure good, absolutely devoid of evil, like the intellects and the
spheres;520 or the good outweighs the evil in them as in our world, namely, the sublunary
realm. Here, although, for example, diseases are many, health still outnumbers them,
and if there are sufferings, there is still more rest and joy. In the philosophers’ view,
beings are of one of these two categories. Yet absolute evil, and evil which outweighs or
is equal to good, does not exist. If anyone were to ask why this world is not purged of
evil, the answer would be that absolute abstraction in this world is impossible, for that
[the outcome of this abstraction] would belong to the first category, whereas the realm of
many goods which necessarily contain a little evil [the second category or the natural
world] is our concern here, and a proposition that considers dispensing with the neces-
sary [lāzim] part of something is an absurd one. And the good entered the divine
515 Qaṭʿa (or qiṭʿa) is a form of poetry in which the second verse of each couplet rhymes.
516 Ho̮rramšāhī, Čārdah revāyat: Maǧmu ̄ʿ e-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye šeʿr va šaḫṣīyat-e Hạ̄fiẓ,
p. 39.
517 Limbert, ‘Inju Dynasty’ In Encyclopædia Iranica, Yarshater, XIII, p. 144.
518 Ḥāfiẓ’s phrasing here is šahanšah-i dāniš, which can be literally translated as ‘king of the
kings of knowledge’.
519 Clarke, 579, p. 936.
520 Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā explain the stages of emanation in modification of Plotinus’s emana-
tion as the different stages of Intellect; Active Intelligence (Soul of the World); and the sublu-
nary realm (nature).
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determination by prior intentionality, and it is original and essential to it, whereas evil
comes about by necessity [bi ḍ-ḍarūra], and contingently [bi t-tabʿ]. And it would be far
from wisdom if the rain, the delicacy of which no one can deny and upon which the life
of this world depends, were to be dispensed with just to eliminate a possibility that it
might ruin a few houses or possibly do a few travelers harm.521
Īǧī argues that evil is a necessary part of the existence of this world (in con-
trast to the intelligible realm). He explicitly refutes the view, which appears in
various religions, that evil is a self-contained entity. Most importantly, Īǧī dif-
ferentiates between the intention of the demiurgic act and the contingent
presence of imperfection that makes the sublunary realm possible.
Ḥāfiẓ’s pīr teaches that there are evils and imperfections in the sublunary
world, but that the good far outweighs the evil. To appreciate the natural
world, one needs to go beyond the limited binary perspective of good and evil
and accept that evil makes the sublunary world possible and beautiful. Ḥāfiẓ’s
experience of spring testifies to this beauty. If we agree with Ḥāfiẓ, then we
must accept evil as part of the pursuit of beauty and truth in the natural realm.
This teaching of the Pīr-i Muġān is no longer based on an outlook of exclu-
sion. Rather, it turns toward life in the world and it recognizes an aesthetic and
cosmogenic necessity in what appears as evil; exploring the world aesthetically
or as seeker of knowledge means exploring it as a whole. Thus, Pīr-i Muġān im-
presses upon Ḥāfiẓ, the necessity of going beyond the dualities of evil and
good; pure and defiled; and corruptible and everlasting.
The following couplet, quoted in three English translations, illustrates the
necessity of inclusion in the view of Pīr-i Muġān:
Ba maī saǧǧāda rangīn kun garat Pīr-i Muġān gūyad
Ki sālik bīḫabar nabvad zi rāh-u-rasm-i manzilhā
Stain the prayer-mat with wine, if the Magian Elder tells you:
The traveler won’t be ignorant of the road and of how to behave at the halts.522
Stain with the tinge of wine thy prayer-mat, if thus the aged Magian bid,
For from the traveller of the Pathway no stage nor usage can be hid.523
Hear the Tavern-keeper who counsels you:
521 My translation of Ḫorramšāhī’s Persian translation in: Ho̮rramšāhī, Čārdah revāyat:
Maǧmūʿe-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye šeʿr va šaḫṣīyat-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 39–40. For the sake of comparison
with the original work, I provide the necessary original Arabic terms italicized in brackets:
ʿAḍud ud-Dīn Īǧī, al-Mawāqif, 8 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿa as-Saʿāda, 1907), vol. 8: pp. 179–180.
522 Avery, I, 3, p. 18 (my emphasis).
523 Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman
Bicknell, I, 3, p. 4 (my emphasis).
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‘With wine, with red wine your prayer carpet dye!’
There was never a traveller like him but knew
The ways of the road and the hostelry.524
In this couplet, the mentor encourages Ḥāfiẓ to stain (or dye) the very locus of
purity – the prayer carpet. Yet this is no act of rebellion; it is a necessary step
on the way to becoming involved in the realm of nature and appreciating natu-
ral beauty. In the couplet that follows, Pīr-i Muġān is again introduced as the
teacher of inclusion:
Guftam šarāb u ḫirqa na āyīn-i maẕhab ast
Guft īn ʿamal ba maẕhab-i Pīr-i Muġān kunand
Ich sprach: Wein und Kutte, das paßt nicht zur selben Ordensregel.
Er sprach: Dies ist Praxis im Orden des Alten Magiers.525
I said: ‘Wine and the patched gown are not religiously ordained.’
He answered: ‘These comprise the rite performed in the Magian Elder’s sect.’526
This couplet comes from a ġazal that poetically narrates the dialogue between
Ḥāfiẓ and his beloved; Ḥāfiẓ asks questions, and the beloved answers. As the
beloved brings up the topic of wine, Ḥāfiẓ is prompted to recall the exclusive
elements of purification and the Sufi frock. The beloved reminds Ḥāfiẓ that, ac-
cording to Pīr-i Muġān, wine and the Sufi frock are two fundamental parts of
existence; they cannot be excluded from each other, even though they are dia-
metrically opposed.
The poet recognizes the gravity of stepping outside the space of exclusion
and abstraction. In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ uses an ironic tone to show
how turning toward the excluded realm ruins the world built around exclusion:
Na ba haft-āb ki rangaš ba ṣad ātaš naravad
Anči bā ḫirqa-yi zāhid maī-i angūrī kard
Weder in sieben (rituellen) Waschungen noch hundert Bränden weicht der Farbfleck,
den auf der Kutte des Frömmlings der Traubensaft hinterläßt.527
Not with the prescribed seven dippings nor in a hundred fires will the stain go
That the wine of the grapevine has dropped on the ascetic’s gown.528
Not by water in seven cleansings
Nor by a hundred fires’ blazing
Its trace shall be gone
524 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 1, p. 63 (my emphasis).
525 Wohlleben, 193, 6, p. 275.
526 Avery, CXCIII, 6, p. 253.
527 Wohlleben, 135, 6, p. 208.
528 Avery, CXXXV, 6, p. 184.
II.2 The Turn Toward Life in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ 185
What to the ascetic’s frock
The grape’s wine
Has done.529
Turning toward the inclusion that unfolds in the paradoxical space of co-
presence of conventionally and logically mutually exclusives, another world is
revealed to the poet. Following the teachings of his fictional mentor, Ḥāfiẓ
views the evil of the world as a condition of its beauty:
Qand-i āmīḫta ba gul na ʿalāǧ-i dil-i māst
Būsaʾī čand barāmīz̄ ba dusňāmī ̄ čand
Kandis mit Rosenwasser vermischt, das ist keine Medizin für mein Herz,
ein paar Küsse mische auf mit ein paar Gemeinheiten.530
Candy mixed with the rose (rose-conserve), is not the remedy for our sick heart:
Some kisses mix with some abuse.531
Davām-i ʿaīš u tanaʿum na šīva-yi ʿisq̌ ast
Agar muʿāšir-i māʾī binus̄ ̌ nīs-̌i ġamī ̄
Dauerndes Vergnügen und Ergötzen ist nicht die Art der Liebe.
Wenn du Unsresgleichen bist, schlucke den Stachel des Grams!532
The rites of love are not uninterrupted pleasure nor sybaritic living.
If you are our companion, imbibe the poison of grief.533
In his pursuit of beauty and love, the poet finds more truth in tenderness and
bitterness than in a pure and flawless constant adoration. In the first of the two
couplets above, Ḥāfiẓ reveals to his beloved the secret that he learned from his
intellectual pīr – namely, in the natural realm, evil is a condition of beauty. For
Ḥāfiẓ, love stands in relation to two contradictory pairs – affection and dis-
tance; and pain and pleasure. In Ḥāfiẓ’s view, the space of paradox is the space
in which one can pursue truth and beauty.
Az ḫalāfāmad-i ʿādat biṭalab kām ki man
Kasb-i ǧamʿīyat az ān zulf-i parīšān kardam
By strange ways only can thy wish be blest:
529 My translation of the verse: Ḫānlarī, 135, 6. In my translation the gravity of Ḥāfiẓ’s choice
of word ‘ānči [. . .] maī-i angūrī kard’ is conveyed. Here, the simple harmless but excluded wine
has done something to the gown, which is a life-changing event. The stain here stands for the
permanent mark of stepping outside the safe space of exclusion.
530 Wohlleben, 177, 4, p. 256.
531 Clarke, 141, 4, p. 286.
532 Wohlleben, 462, 7, p. 579.
533 Avery, CCCCLXII, 7, p. 558.
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That lock so restless set my heart at rest.534
From the contradictory to the customary
seek your desire, for I
Found composedness in those scattered locks of hair.535
In this couplet, the poet articulates his theory of the fundamental role of paradox
in attaining his object of aspiration. The phrase that Bicknell translates as
‘strange ways’ is ‘ḫalāfāmad-i ʿādat’ – literally, it means ‘contradictory to the cus-
tomary’. In the first verse, Ḥāfiẓ states that a paradox has revealed to him the
fulfillment of his wishes; in the second verse, he uses the metaphor of multiplic-
ity – namely, the locks of hair that brought him to unity –, which alludes to the
metaphor of the mole of the beloved.536 In the third chapter, I return to the para-
dox of unrest and composedness of the beloved’s hair and I elaborate on the alle-
gorical meaning of this paradox in Ḥāfiẓ’s world-view.
Pīr-i Muġān inspires Ḥāfiẓ to go beyond the negative and excluding meth-
ods of ascetic Sufism and opens space of inclusion in paradox.
Zi kunǧ-i ṣaumaʿa Ḥāfiẓ maǧūy gauhar-i ʿišq
Qadam burūn nih agar maīl-i ǧust-u-ǧū dārī
Do not, Háfiz, search in the recesses of the hermit cell for the jewel of love.
If you want to make the quest, step outside.537
Vom Winkel im Kloster aus, o Hafiz, suche nicht nach dem Juwel der Liebe,
tritt dort heraus, wenn du wirklich nach ihm forschen willst.538
This rejection of the exclusive elements of Sufism – ḫalvat (solitude), ḫānaqāh
(convents) and ḫirqa (the Sufi frock) – marks a turn toward the natural realm,
both aesthetically and intellectually.
II.3 Toward Life in Goethe’s Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan
Thus far, we have seen that the direct approach toward a transcendent truth
is reevaluated in Goethe’s Faust and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. In both cases, the critique
of the method of attainment of knowledge in abstraction of the bodily and
natural realms has brought about a turn toward life. I now review the
534 Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman
Bicknell, CLVI, 8, p. 216.
535 Ḫānlarī, 312, 3 (my translation).
536 Compare to: Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 2: pp. 932–933.; Sūdī, Tarǧome-ye šarḥ-e Sūdī,
vol. 3: p. 1818.
537 Avery, CCCCXXXVII, 9, p. 527.
538 Wohlleben, 437, 9, p. 551.
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similarities and differences between these two texts in light of their historical
and cultural differences.
II.3.1 Space of Exclusion
The negative method of attaining knowledge in both texts forms a world of
exclusion in which nothing of the natural sphere is admitted. In Faust’s case,
this world is the legacy of his fathers, and in the case of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, it is the
historically dominant method of attaining truth. In both cases, this world pro-
vides a safe place in which the bodily and natural realms are excluded, and
the seeker of such negative knowledge is able to pursue his negative ascend-
ing process of self-development.
As I showed in sections II.1.2 and II.1.2.1, this space in Faust corresponds to
Faust’s study.539 In this space, Faust repeatedly denigrates his body and wishes
to transcend its limits, until, finally, he decides to take a poison inherited from
his father. As I explored in detail in section II.1.2.1, the study is explicitly illus-
trated as a place that prevents the natural life force from reaching Faust.
Consequently, Faust desires to leave his old world of exclusion and return to
nature and life.540
To explore the presence of a space defined in accordance with the exclu-
sion of the natural realm in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, I demonstrated the difference
between, on the one hand, the tenth and eleventh-century poetic representa-
tions of natural phenomena in early Persian poetry and,541 on the other
hand, the representation of nature in works of Saʿdī of the thirteenth century
and in several ġazals by Ḥāfiẓ, in which traces of Sufi exclusive views are
present.
The space introduced as ḫalvat (solitude) by Saʿdī and Ḥāfiẓ is a space in
which the seeker of truth aspires for freedom from changeable natural phenom-
ena in order to arrive at the unchangeable ideal of truth. Thus, those who reside
in this house of exclusion are kept safe from the confusions of the natural
realm. In section II.2.2,542 I explored the details of this space and pointed out
that, in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, this space is referred to as his house.543
539 See p. 103 above.
540 See p. 112; 116 above.
541 See pp. 139–141 above.
542 See pp. 142–147 above.
543 See pp. 147f above.
188 II Toward Life
II.3.2 Elements of Exclusion
In section II.1.2, I discussed Faust’s inheritance from his forefathers, which
forms a space of exclusion. I demonstrated that Faust’s institution of knowl-
edge separates him from the natural world.544 The walls of exclusion follow
Faust outside the study. In society, he is revered as ‘Herr Doktor’ and thus re-
mains distant in his subjective world.545
Furthermore, I explained the negative elements in the Sufi tradition that
excluded Sufi followers from ordinary life and the natural world. The ḫānaqāh
and ḫirqa represent the objective aspect of these Sufi excluding views; purifica-
tion and repentance represent the subjective aspect. In the Divan, elements of
purification in the Sufi tradition are constantly present, since Sufism was the
dominant discourse during Ḥāfiẓ’s time. I explored Ḥāfiẓ’s poetical critique of
these elements, in which Ḥāfiẓ exposes their contradictions with his experience
of the natural world.
II.3.3 Influence of Spring in the Turn Toward Life
In both texts, the arrival of spring casts doubt on the method of exclusion of
the natural realm. Both Ḥāfiẓ and Goethe illustrate spring as a landscape in
which an immanent cosmic force invigorates nature after winter. More impor-
tantly, the seeker of knowledge sees that the same cosmic force extends its in-
fluence into the human realm.
In the Osterspaziergang scene, I discussed two instances of change in Faust’s
intellectual development: his assessment of the relation between the light and
color546; and his new conception of mediation.547
As I explained in section II.2.4, the narrator of Divan finds himself aesthetically
impressed by the same force that revives nature in spring. Like Faust, Ḥāfiẓ of the
Divan sees the feasts and celebrations that bring joy to people’s lives as an exten-
sion of the force that animates the natural and heavenly realms.548 Thus, Ḥāfiẓ
criticizes the teachings of extreme ascetic Sufis as hypocritical and ignorant. In the
544 See p. 103 above.
545 See §II.1.2.2 (‘The World and the Significance of Honorific Titles’).
546 See §II.1.1.2 (‘The Sun, Its Light and the Colors: Modification of a World-View Through
Metaphors’).
547 §II.1.1.1 (‘Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation’) demonstrates this
line of Faust’s intellectual development.
548 See p. 164 above.
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poet’s view, spring and abstraction are mutually exclusive, since abstraction pre-
scribes exclusion of the natural realm whereas spring provides evidence of the im-
manence of the heavenly source of life.
Whereas Faust clearly expresses a wish to lead a new ‘colorful life’ (v. 1121),
a clear instance of an early step towards the modification of light metaphors
cannot be found in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. A reason for this is the Divan’s different
genre. Whereas in drama and narrative literary works, we can identify turning
points of a given plot or sub-plot, in a lyrical work – even one with Ḥāfiẓ’s sty-
listic form that suggests narrative characteristics –, detecting and highlighting
such nuanced modifications is nearly impossible. We simply don’t have enough
information to date the composition of each poem – not to mention, the poet
constantly reedited his works.
II.3.4 Anxiety and Leaving the Old World Behind
The two texts illustrate the experience of finding that one’s old world has lost
its value. In the scene Nacht, Faust finds nothing worthy in his study. He finally
sees himself drowned in the sea of error. In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ poetically articu-
lates the experience of facing the ruins of one’s old world; he recounts wishing
to drown all his books of nonsense in wine and pawn his imaginary Sufi-frock
for a glass of wine.
I showed that Ḥāfiẓ explicitly abandons a desire for union with the sun. As
an instance of this change in direction, we saw that the poet describes himself
as a diver submerged into a bottomless and shoreless sea in pursuit of the pearl
that represents his love.549
In both cases, the act of abandoning the space of exclusion is intertwined with
the experience of anxiety. Referring to Blumenberg’s view of ‘Horizonterfahrung’, I
showed that each of Faust’s steps into the excluded realm is seen as a step inside
the realm of darkness and the unknown. Moreover, the mediating figure Mephisto,
who approaches from behind the walls of Faust’s study, receives his evil traits
from that excluded space; Mephisto is the guide Faust desired, who will lead him
beyond the limits of his world. The feeling of anxiety in Faust first appears in
Wagner’s warnings, as Faust stares heroically into the darkness just before the
poodle emerges.550 In the scene Studierzimmer [I], Mephisto reveals himself while
Faust describes his study as a hermitage. I delineated the relation between the
549 See §II.2.5 (‘Diving into the Sea of the Wine House’).
550 See pp. 109ff above.
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values of Faust’s old world and Mephisto’s evil intentions.551 Furthermore, I ex-
plained the exclusive, ascetic characteristic of Mephisto’s personal philosophy.
Through Wagner, Faust and Mephisto, the dramatic work conveys the experience
of stepping inside the unknown.
In the Divan, in addition to Ḥāfiẓ’s constant usage of sarcasm to attack ex-
treme ascetic Sufism, we also find poetic depictions of anxiety and settings
filled with threats. We explained this state of anxiety with reference to a ġazal
that illustrates the poet stepping inside a space where swords are raining down
from the sky. Yet the poet is determined not to turn back to the safety of his
solitude or the teachings of zealot ascetics; these no longer represent a safe
place where truth can be attained, but they rather appear as an institution that
perpetuates ignorance and self-deception. By resisting the false promise of
safety (now seen as a trap), the poet shows heroism. This heroism, however,
does not stop him expressing his doubts and anxieties.552 Outside the walls of
the excluding world (ḫalvat), Ḥāfiẓ faces an inner conflict, since his turn toward
life is seen by the followers of purification as besmirching his pure and elevated
soul.553
II.3.5 Mediation and Inclusion in Paradox
Mephisto’s mediation is dramatized in stages: first, he frees himself from his
imprisonment in Faust’s study; then, he succeeds in convincing Faust to leave
his house. Mephisto resists Faust’s attempts to dominate him. He presents him-
self in a paradoxical manner that nullifies the binary categories of good and
evil, which are the basis of Faust’s method of exclusion. In Studierzimmer [II],
Mephisto (again) employs paradox to help Faust overcome two obstacles. He
helps Faust move beyond the duality of pain and pleasure to arrive at a para-
doxical co-presence of these two categories; and he also persistently challenges
Faust’s self-deification.554
In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ follows the tradition of philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā
and Suhravardī by introducing a non-personal mediatory figure. However, un-
like the mentor of these philosophers, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor is not an extramundane
modification of the Soul of the World or Active Intelligence. Rather, Ḥāfiẓ
551 See §II.1.3.3.1 (‘Mephisto’s Evil Intentions and the Presence of Faust’s Old World’).
552 See §II.2.5 (‘Diving into the Sea of the Wine House’) and §II.2.6 (‘Anxiety in the Field of
Critique of the Old World’).
553 See §II.2.6.1 (‘Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Dilemma of Purification and Pollution’).
554 V. 1784. See §II.1.3.4.2 (‘From Pain and Pleasure to Paradox and Partaking’).
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creates a fictional character who serves as his guide and reflects his own views
as well as those of Sufis and theologians. The mentor’s name, Pīr-i Muġān,
highlights his difference from the personal mentors of the institution of
Sufism. This mentor represents the culmination of the poet’s critique of the
Sufi abstract and negative method of attainment of knowledge. As I demon-
strated in section II.2.7.2, the mentor helps Ḥāfiẓ find a way out of the isolation
of his solitude (ḫalvat). Pīr-i Muġān makes use of the potentials of paradox to
uproot the dualistic basis of the negative views. By integrating the notion of
ʿināyat into his teachings, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor nullifies the binary system of evalua-
tion by which the follower of purification negates evil in order to attain to the
good.555 Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor teaches him that the evil that is a neces-
sary element of the sublunary realm does not outweigh the good.556 Therefore,
Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor teaches that one should partake in the natural realm by follow-
ing the principle of inclusion in paradox.557 Ḥāfiẓ is guided by his mentor to
overcome his anxiety and step out of his house of exclusion into the realm of
nature and life.
Unlike in Faust, in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, the ‘protagonist’ (Ḥāfiẓ) does not
come into conflict with his mediating agent. As a lyrical and non-dramatic
work of poetry, the Divan reserves its sarcastic attacks for zealot ascetics who
fail to appreciate the beauty of the natural world.
In Faust, the conflict between Faust and Mephisto dramatizes the process
of mediation. The challenge between the poodle and Faust’s room reveals the
similarity between this room and a hermitage. Thus, an aspect of Faust comes
to light that had been hidden behind his rebellious attacks on the world he in-
herited from his fathers. This sophisticated manner of illustration of the process
of inclusion in paradox is possible through the genre of dramatic literature.
555 See p. 180 above.
556 See pp. 183ff above.
557 See §II.2.7.2 (‘Ḥāfiẓ’s Mentor and Inclusion in Paradox’).
192 II Toward Life
III Colorful Reflections
In this chapter, I explore in both texts the consequences of the turn toward life
that we investigated in the previous chapter. As I demonstrated, in both texts,
the turn was taken from a direct, ascending approach to the truth, which ex-
cluded its seekers from life; its pursuit was defined as separating the higher
soul that desires ascent from the lower part that is concerned with the needs of
the body. In this subchapter, I analyze Goethe’s Faust, and in the following one
I turn to the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
III.1 The World of Reflections in Goethe’s Faust
III.1.1 The Activity of the Faculty of Appreciation of Beauty
Auerbachs Keller in Leipzig is the first scene in the drama after Faust leaves his
old world. Considering the terms of Faust’s contract with Mephisto and the
words of the Lord in Prolog im Himmel (v. 342), we know that the way ahead of
him cannot be that of rest. Mephisto must offer Faust a quest in which he
would be willing to partake. In an early draft of the drama (Faust frühe
Fassung), Mephisto takes Faust to Auerbachs Keller to find out whether he has
any interest in the company of rude drinking companions.1 In other words, the
visit to Auerbachs Keller was an experiment designed to help Mephisto plan
Faust’s next quest. In line with Faust’s youthful character in the early draft,
Faust is the acting magician who performs the wine trick as an engaged partici-
pant of the scene. In the final version of the drama, however, Faust is depicted
as an older man.
In fact, the difference between the ‘early’ Faust character and the ‘late’
Faust character is even more pronounced. In the final version of the drama,
Faust is conspicuously passive and disinterested. The reader is led to believe
that Mephisto performs these tricks for the audience to lighten the mood after
the previous two intense scenes; or perhaps the scene functions to give the
reader an image of the society that will (later) judge Gretchen and her choices.
Mephisto (in the final version) explains his reason for bringing Faust to
Auerbachs Keller: ‘Damit du siehst wie leicht sich’s leben läßt.’2 Yet the process
of inclusion and partaking in life (a process that was kindled in the scene
1 FT, p. 486. V. 54–55.
2 V. 2160.
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Studierzimmer [II]) cannot start in Auerbachs Keller. After greeting the guests,3
Faust’s only words are to articulate his wish for leaving: ‘Ich hätte Lust nun ab-
zufahren.’4 Schmidt points out that, in Auerbachs Keller, sensuality is present,
but not in its sexual aspect. In Schmidt’s view, the sensuality of Auerbachs
Keller does not go beyond an animal desire for eating and drinking.5 Yet the
verses that follow verse 2101 bring sexuality into the scene.6 According to
Schmidt sexuality is first introduced into the drama in the scene Hexenküche.
Yet, on closer investigation, we see that it is not sexuality that is absent in the
scene Auerbachs Keller, but rather beauty and love. Auerbachs Keller offers
nothing worthwhile for Faust.7 This proves that a life of revelry is not what
Faust missed when he uttered ‘Fehlt mir die leichte Lebensart.’8 The Auerbachs
Keller is not even repellent or ugly enough to become an experience for him. As
such, Auerbachs Keller fails to elicit even a single word of evaluation from
Faust.9
In contrast to Faust’s apathy in Auerbachs Keller, Hexenküche begins with a
clear judgment: ‘Mir widersteht das tolle Zauberwesen’.10 Faust rejects this space
immediately. In Faust’s rejection of the Hexenküche, Melzer highlights the signifi-
cance of the word ‘toll’.11 In comparison to the previous stages of his short journey
with Mephisto, the setting of Hexenküche defies Faust’s attempts at rationalization.
The song of the spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I] (as we saw in the previous
chapter) was built around motifs and metaphors that belonged to Faust’s specula-
tive and theoretical world; and Auerbachs Keller was described twice by Mephisto
3 V. 2183.
4 V. 2296. Compare to Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk
Wirkung, p. 144.
5 Ibid., pp. 144–145.
6 Arens points to the sexual association of these verses in his comments on Faust I by casting
light on the similarity between the pithy mention of ‘Riegel auf’ (v. 2105) and ‘Riegel zu!’
(v. 2107) in Auerbachs Keller with Gretchen’s statement that, if it wasn’t for her mother’s being
a light sleeper, she would have gladly left the door unbolted for Faust: ‘Ich ließ dir gern heut
Nacht den Riegel offen’ (v. 3506) See: Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 215.
7 Compare to Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung,
p. 144.
8 V. 2056.
9 Rickert rightly emphasizes that ‘Faust muß wirklich interessiert, ernsthaft beteiligt werden.’
The Hexenküche is another chance for Mephisto to win Faust’s interest and participation in the
world – and thereby win the wager. Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der
Dichtung, p. 211.
10 V. 2337.
11 Friso Melzer, Goethes ‘Faust’: Eine evangelische Auslegung (Berlin: Furche, 1932), p. 111.
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as debased and bestial.12 The space of Hexenküche is a place where Faust expects
to be healed – ‘Versprichst du mir, ich soll genesen,’13 Faust says. The extent and
the quality of this healing can be reconstructed in reference to two passages in the
work: (a) verses 410–413 in the scene Nacht, and (b) verses 2055–2060 at the end
of the second Studierzimmer scene.
The healing in question is a rejuvenation by thirty years.14 In this healing
process, we should consider the intellectual problems that stem from Faust’s
long years of residing in his world of exclusion (v. 410–413) and his lack of con-
fidence due to his old-fashioned looks.15 ‘Sobald du dir vertraust, sobald weißt
du zu leben’,16 Mephisto tells Faust. As Dane asserts, Faust’s healing depends
on his overcoming his lack of confidence – and this is exactly what the potion
achieves.17 I concentrate on the aspect of the process of healing that is relevant
to Faust’s intellectual problems and unfolds before he takes the potion.
The readers witness the gravity of the irrationality that unfolds in Hexenküche
only after Faust tacitly accepts to tolerate the conditions of the place (‘so muß
denn doch die Hexe dran’)18 following his refusal to limit himself to the require-
ments of Mephisto’s suggested ‘natürlich Mittel’.19 With their seemingly nonsensi-
cal rhyming words, the animals in Hexenküche play an important role in the
formation of the atmosphere of this mysterious space.20 It is important to note that
12 See the following verses for Mephisto’s two attempts at characterization of Auerbachs
Keller: v. 2159–2167 and v. 2297–2298.
13 V. 2338 (my emphasis).
14 V. 2342.
15 ‘Doch da er Kenntnis g’nug erworben, | Ist er der Welt fast abgestorben. [. . .] Sein Äußeres
nicht von rechter Art, | Zu lang der Rock, zu kraus der Bart’ in Mask processions of 1818
v. 608–609; 612–613 in: FA I, 6: p. 849. Compare to Schöne’s comment in: FK, p. 274. In
Witkowski’s biographic work on Goethe, we find the young Goethe’s experience of being
dressed in an out of fashion manner as a newcomer and his attempts at adapting himself to
life in Leipzig, the city where Auerbachs Keller is located. See: Georg Witkowski, Das Leben
Goethes (Berlin: Knaur, 1932), p. 43.
16 V. 2062.
17 Gesa Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig
Jahren’ (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1994), p. 107.
18 V. 2365.
19 V. 2348. See Dane’s clarification of the background of Mephisto’s suggestion in Dane, ‘Die
heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 104–106.
Referring to Christoph Hufeland’s Makrobiotik oder die Kunst, das menschliche Leben zu
verlängern (written in 1798), Dane highlights the practical aspect of Mephisto’s suggestion to
Faust, who must have suffered from ‘traurigen Folgen des sitzenden Lebens’ and ‘körperliche
Schwächen und seelische Krankheiten’.
20 V. 2394ff.
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Hexenküche appears nonsensical to Faust, since Faust has just abandoned his safe
world. On closer inspection, however, we recognize that the apes allegorically
refer to the contemporary realities of the poet’s time, including the life of mindless
gamblers21; the ever-changing and brutal world of politics22; and even the decline
of literary taste among writers and readers.23 Faust experiences his first step to-
ward life as a step inside the ‘Hexenküche des Lebens’,24 which challenges his ca-
pability to tolerate the nonsensical and distasteful; he finds the animals ‘so
abgeschmackt als ich nur jemand sah!’25 Only after Faust’s eyes were exposed to
the ugly and his cognition to the nonsensical do his eyes – in a ‘Zauberspiegel’26 –
bring Faust another experience, which he articulates as follows: ‘Was seh’ ich?
Welch ein himmlisch Bild’.27
Accentuating Mephisto’s responsibility for the quality and influence of the
image that emerges in the mirror, some commentators do not recognize the
epistemological aspect of the events in question. Referring to Faust’s reaction
to the image in the mirror, Rickert notes ‘[z]u bemerken ist dabei vor allem, daß
Fausts Leidenschaft in voller Stärke erregt ist, bevor er den Zaubertrank erhal-
ten hat.’28 This textual fact brings us closer to accepting the independency
of Faust’s intellectual faculty from Mephisto’s direct influence, yet it is not
compelling enough for Rickert, who interprets the image in the mirror as ‘von
Mephistopheles zu dem Zweck hervorgebracht worden ist, Faust in geschlecht-
liche Leidenschaft zu verstricken.’29 Though he agrees with Rickert on stressing
the first point,30 Schöne remains undecided regarding the nature of the
mirror; he suggests that the mirror can be interpreted either as an instrument of
21 V. 2400–2401.
22 See the following verses: ‘Das ist die Welt; | Sie steigt und fällt’ V. 2402–2403. Compare to
FK, p. 285. ‘O sei doch so gut, | Mit Schweiß und mit Blut | Die Krone zu leimen!’ V. 2450–2452.
See Schöne’s interpretation of this verse in relation to the events of the French Revolution that
caused the crown to break, thus requiring reparation with sweat and blood: FK, p. 286.
23 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, pp. 151–152.
24 Referring to the subjective totality of all the burdensome and overwhelming life experien-
ces of the poet, Georg Simmel uses this expression in the following article: Georg Simmel,
‘Bemerkungen über Goethe’, Der Morgen. Wochenschrift für deutsche Kultur, begründet und
hrsg. von Werner Sombart zusammen mit Richard Strauss, Georg Brandes und Richard Muther
unter Mitwirkung von Hugo von Hofmannstahl, no. 13 (1907), p. 395.
25 V. 2387.
26 V. 2430.
27 V. 2429.
28 Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 214.
29 Ibid., p. 216–217.
30 ‘Ehe noch der obszöne Hexentrank ihm eingeflößt wird, spricht Faust doch (2431ff.) zur
Liebe, sieht und begreift er die Schönheit als den Inbegriff von allen Himmeln.’ FK, p. 283.
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Mephisto’s or as a medium ‘welches freisetzt und zur Erscheinung bringt, was
dem Bezauberten selber eingebildet ist.’31 Acknowledging Faust’s active influ-
ence in the events in front of the magic mirror, Schmidt emphasizes Faust’s sub-
limating words as responsible for bringing the ambivalence between ‘einerseits
die triebhafte Sinnlichkeit, andererseits eine edlere Liebe’32 into the otherwise
primarily sensual space of Hexenküche.33
Melzer’s analysis of the dramatic role of the magic mirror invites the reader
to consider two levels, inner and outer, that are in play in Hexenküche: ‘Der
Zauberspiegel ist in diesem Zusammenhang wohl nur so zu verstehen: Goethe
will nicht, daß Faust durch das Hexenstück ganz von außen verwandelt wird. So
läßt er ihn diesem Zauber innerlich entgegen kommen.’34
Trunz evaluates the level and the quality of Faust’s involvement in this
scene as follows: ‘Faust ist äußerlich, nicht innerlich passiv.’35 In other words,
Trunz emphasizes the epistemological aspect of the scene. Trunz’s interpreta-
tion of the mirror and its effect is consistent with his view of the inner activity
of Faust in front of the mirror: ‘Da der Zauberspiegel nur als Gegenstand zu der
Hexenwelt gehört, nicht in dem, was er zeigt, kann sich hier im Kontrast zu der
mephistophelisch-hexischen Sphäre das Faustische-Veredelnde auswirken.’36
Furthermore, in Trunz’s view, each scene that follows Hexenküche con-
stantly ‘erhält auch von Faust seine Prägung infolge seiner Innerlichkeit.’37 In
light of its epistemological significance, I interpreted Faust’s experience in front
of the mirror as a necessary step toward life. But first we must note that the
Hexenküche, dramatologically speaking, is the place where Faust becomes aware
of the activity of his faculty of appreciation of beauty; he becomes receptive to
what the world has to offer him.38 We can then approach this process as a part of
an epistemological structure.
Faust’s experience in front of the mirror is articulated through terms and meta-
phors that are familiar to the reader. The clearest of these metaphors is Faust’s
wish to acquire wings to fly after his object of pursuit. Of course, we have seen this
metaphor before. In the section ‘Flying toward the Setting Sun,’ I analyzed the first
31 FK, p. 283.
32 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 158.
33 See ibid., p. 154.
34 Melzer, Goethes ‘Faust’: Eine evangelische Auslegung, p. 114 (my emphasis).
35 Goethe, Faust: der Tragod̈ie erster und zweiter Teil: Urfaust, p. 549 (my emphasis).
36 Ibid., p. 550.
37 Ibid., p. 549 (my emphasis).
38 Friedrich Bruns, ‘Die Mütter in Goethes Faust: Versuch einer Deutung’, Monatshefte, 43,
no. 8 ( University of Wisconsin Press, 1951), p. 384.
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instance in which Faust yearns for wings. In that section, I mentioned the close
correspondence between the logic of Faust’s justification of his wish for ascent and
the doctrine of anamnesis expounded in Phaedrus.39 I also discussed the epistemo-
logical significance of anamnesis for the body and soul relation. In short, as Allen
argues, ‘the doctrine of Anamnesis is an answer to epistemological problems en-
tailed by the separation of Forms from the particulars in Platonic thought.’40 But
now that Faust has taken up the path toward life, his wish for wings has a different
epistemological significance.
In front of the mirror, after beholding a heavenly image in the form of
human beauty,41 Faust addresses love as a goddess and asks her for wings:
‘O Liebe, leihe mir den schnellsten deiner Flügel, | Und führe mich in ihr
Gefild!’42 Just as in Osterspaziergang, Faust is engaged in a cognitive act that
motivates him to move toward the object of his desire. But whereas in
Osterspaziergang Faust was surrounded by the natural ‘beauty of earth’,43 in
Hexenküche Faust’s surroundings are irrational and ugly; they do not corre-
spond to the conditions that could activate the Platonic ‘recollection of those
things which our soul once saw when it travelled in company with a god and
treated with contempt the things we now say are, and when it rose up into
what really is.’44 The cognitive process in which Faust recognizes what he sees
in the mirror as desirable and worthy of pursuit (flying after) is not a Platonic
recollection. The beautiful image in the mirror contrasts to the hideousness of
Faust’s surroundings: ‘Mitten in diesem Wust von Raserei erhebt sich das
Gegen-spiel’, as Schöne says.45 Against the background of these surroundings,
the reclined female beauty in the mirror appears to Faust as the epitome of the
heavens.
In Goethes Farbentheologie, Schöne traces Goethe’s intellectual develop-
ment from his acquaintance with Susanne Katharina von Klettenberg to his
study of Gottfried Arnold’s Unpartheyiche Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie and
39 See pp. 64f above. Compare to Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe, p. 67. 249 d 5ff.
40 R. E. Allen, ‘Anamnesis in Plato’s Meno and Phaedo’, The Review of Metaphysics, 13, no. 1
(Sep. 1959), p. 172 (my emphasis).
41 See the following verses: ‘Welch ein himmlisch Bild’ v. 2429. ‘Das schönste Bild von einem
Weibe’ v. 2436.
42 V. 2431–2432.
43 ‘Phaedrus’, in The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analysis and
Introductions. Translated by B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprint, Reprinted lithographi-
cally at the University Press, Oxford from corrected sheets of the fourth edition 1964, 1968),
p. 156. 249 d.
44 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe, p. 67. 249 b 5ff.
45 FK, p. 283 (my emphasis).
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other sources pertaining to ancient Indo-Iranian and Alexandrian thought.46
Throughout his work, Schöne singles out elements of Goethe’s ‘vorkritische
Erkenntnistheorie’.47 Referring to Goethe’s letter to Zelter from December 31,
1829, Schöne clarifies that, in Farbenlehre, we should look for the poet’s convic-
tions rather than empirically proven principals. Goethe writes: ‘Ich aber muß
bei meiner Überzeugung bleiben, weil ich die Folgen die mir daraus geworden
nicht entbehren kann.’48 Farbenlehre is one of the sources in which we can
trace the poet’s epistemological views. Though the epistemological content of
Farbenlehre is not the result of scientific investigation, as Schöne shows, it is
informative regarding the intellectual world of the poet, and thus it sheds light
on epistemological questions in Faust. I therefore turn to Goethe’s Farbenlehre
to explain the emergence of beauty and the sublime on the magic mirror.
In his Farbenlehre, Goethe classifies colors in three categories: physiologi-
cal, physical and chemical.49 In the first section of the Farbenlehre, Goethe
places the physiological colors ‘[billig obenan], weil sie dem Subjekt, weil sie
dem Auge, teils völlig, teils größtens zugehören’.50 In contrast to chemical col-
ors, which belong to the objects – ‘[wir können] uns nun objektiv als den
Gegenständen angehörig denken’51 –, the physiological colors, Goethe explains,
are subjective and belong to the eye. The physiological colors are subjective be-
cause they are produced through the eye’s action and reaction: the eye gener-
ates the polar opposite of whatever stimuli it is exposed to. Exposed to a certain
degree of lightness, the eye generates a corresponding degree of shade; and ex-
posed to a particular color, the eye produces its complement.52 The circle of col-
ors and shades is closed in and by the eye: ‘[d]as Auge verlangt dabei ganz
eigentlich Totalität und schließt in sich selbst den Farbenkreis ab.’53 Chol Han’s
explanation of this function of the eye, a fundamental part of Farbenlehre,54
brings to light its epistemological significance: ‘Die Fähigkeit des Auges, in
sich selbst das Ganze zu bilden, ist mit der Immanenzstruktur der Natur zu
begründen. Das Auge kann das Ganze produzieren, weil das Ganze dem Auge
46 Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, pp. 11–23; 53; 68–75; 102.
47 Ibid., p. 109.
48 Ibid., p. 118. Here, cited from: FA II, 38: p. 216 (my emphasis).
49 For a concise yet precise introduction see: ibid., p. 24.
50 FA I, 23/1: p. 31.
51 FA I, 23/1: p. 1046 (my emphasis). Compare to: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, p. 24.
52 Compare to: Chol Han, Ästhetik der Oberfläche, Epistemata: Würzburger Wissenschaftliche
Schriften (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007), p. 76. See also: FA I, 23/1: p. 39. § 33.
53 FA I, 23/1: p. 50.
54 See FA I, 23/1: p. 31; 1044. Compare to: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, p. 103.
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immanent ist’.55 Both Schöne and Han refer to the following poem by Goethe,56
written on September 1, 1805, in order to shed light on the immanence of his
epistemology57:
Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt’ nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt’ uns Göttliches entzücken?58
Referring to the third and fourth verses, Han elaborates: ‘[d]ie göttliche
Identität ist “in uns” eingeschlossen. Diese Immanenz der Identität ist hier her-
vorzuheben, weil sie Kommunikation zwischen dem Menschen und der Natur
ermöglicht.’59 In this context, we must consider Goethe’s view that ‘[d]as Auge
hat sein Dasein dem Licht zu danken.’60 According to this epistemological
view, an active cognitive faculty resides in us which is the direct and immanent
presence of the divine: ‘im Auge wohne ein ruhendes Licht, das bei der mind-
esten Veranlassung von innen oder von außen erregt werde.’61 Unlike Platonic
anamnesis, this form of immanence of the divine does not initiate a process of
ascent, but rather acts upon the reception of the stimuli.
The principally immanent epistemological view developed in Farbenlehre
sheds light on the events before the mirror in the Hexenküche scene. In the
scene Osterspaziergang, the faculty of remembering the distance from the tran-
scendent was described as ‘jedem eingeboren’62 and this ‘remembering’ in-
spired Faust’s wish to grow wings.63 In Hexenküche, on the other hand, Faust’s
inner activity, as Trunz names it64 – or, in terms of Farbenehre, the immanent
light in Faust’s eye – responds to the outer stimuli by bringing forth the oppo-
site in the magic mirror to create the whole. This inner activity is not capable of
creating the whole in the sense of anamnesis – i.e., remembering the absolute
knowledge that was available to it prior to a supposed descent of the intellec-
tual soul. Rather, Faust’s inner activity in Hexenküche follows another theory of
55 Han, Ästhetik der Oberfläche, p. 77.
56 Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, pp. 94–105 specifically in pages 101–102.
57 See p. 46 above.
58 FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
59 Han, Ästhetik der Oberfläche, p. 51 (my emphasis).
60 FA I, 23/1: p. 24 (my emphasis).
61 FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
62 V. 1092–1093.
63 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 418. 67 d.
64 Goethe, Faust: der Tragod̈ie erster und zweiter Teil: Urfaust, p. 549.
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knowledge – one that is based on immanence. In the following passage, Goethe
discusses this view in the context of the eye:
Es ist die ewige Formel des Lebens, die sich auch hier äußert. Wie dem Auge das Dunkle
geboten wird, so fordert es das Helle; es fordert Dunkel, wenn man ihm Hell entgegen-
bringt und zeigt eben dadurch seine Lebendigkeit, sein Recht das Objekt zu fassen, indem
es etwas, das dem Objekt entgegengesetzt ist, aus sich selbst hervorbringt.65
Faust’s inner faculty, in Hexenküche, brings forth the polar opposite of the partic-
ular it confronts. The result is an image that creates a whole in coexistence with
all contributing parts: a constellation comprised of Faust, Mephisto, the apes,
the space of the Hexenküche and the mirror. In this setting, Faust beholds a heav-
enly-earthly image, whose beauty kindles his desire to approach it. Faust’s ques-
tion signals his newfound interest in life and earth: ‘So etwas findet sich auf
Erden?’66 Yet the image does not initiate an ascending process. Instead of flying
toward the beauty, Mephisto offers to bring the beauty to Faust’s home:
Ich weiß dir so ein Schätzchen auszuspüren,
Und selig wer das gute Schicksal hat,
Als Bräutigam sie heim zu führen!67
In the context of Faust’s experience in front of the mirror, Hexenküche is a space
reserved for inner, cognitive activity – ‘Für diesmal sieh dich immer satt’.68 In
this space, the inclusion of all the contributing parts creates a totality. The events
of the scene then unfold in two stages: first, Faust’s desire is activated (the
above-mentioned cognitive process); second, a wish for possessing the desired
one is uttered by Mephisto.
Hexenküche is one of two moments in Faust in which the dramatic seed of a
quest for beauty and love is sown. The second moment spans the scenes
Finstere Galerie and Rittersaal in Faust II. On the similarity between the scenes
Hexenküche and Rittersaal, Rickert remarks:
Kurz, wie einst das Bild der Hexenküche, das eine nackte, sinnlich wirkende Schöne dar-
stellte, die eine Vorbereitung auf Fausts Leidenschaft zu Gretchen war, so ist jetzt das
Bild der Helena eine Vorbereitung auf das Leben im Verein mit der klassischen Schönheit
der wirklichen Helena des dritten Aktes.69
65 FA I, 23/1: p. 41 (my emphasis).
66 V. 2440.
67 V. 2445–2447.
68 V. 2444.
69 Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 324.
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Rickert singles out preparation for the quest to find beauty as the common char-
acteristic of the scenes Hexenküche and Rittersaal. Bruns, reads the scenes
Finstere Galerie and Rittersaal in the context of generating a desire for beauty
and preparing Faust for his quest to find it.70
On two occasions, the reader is led to consider the above-mentioned similarity
between the two moments. In the scene Finstere Galerie, when Mephisto explains
the conditions of the realm of the Mothers to Faust, Faust responds as follows:
‘Hier wittert’s nach der Hexenküche’.71 Then in the scene Rittersaal, Faust places
the phantom of Helena above the image he saw in the magic mirror.72 This com-
parison is articulated in the text as follows:
Die Wohlgestalt die mich voreinst entzückte,
In Zauberspiegelung beglückte,
War nur ein Schaumbild solcher Schöne!73
Faust’s journey to the realm of the Mothers in the scene Finstere Galerie and his
production of Helena’s phantom in the scene Rittersaal mirror the two stages
that are present (though less explicitly) in the scene Hexenküche – namely,
first, being exposed to the specific form of stimuli that hitherto had been ex-
cluded from one’s world; and, second, the cognitive faculty’s production of the
polar opposite of the stimuli.
I turn to the first stage that unfolds in Finstere Galerie and I further explore
Mephisto’s reluctant (v. 6212) exposition of the realm of the Mothers, as well as
Faust’s responses.74
Um sie kein Ort noch weniger eine Zeit,
[. . .]
Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene,
70 Bruns, ‘Die Mütter in Goethes Faust: Versuch einer Deutung,’ p. 384.
71 V. 6229.
72 See Kurt May, Faust II. Teil: In der Sprachform gedeutet, ed. Walter Höllerer and Kurt May,
Literatur als Kunst (München: Carl Hanser, 1962), p. 88; Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramati-
sche Einheit der Dichtung, p. 323.
73 V. 6495–6497.
74 Though I cast light on one aspect of the abode of the Mothers, a thorough clarification of
this mysterious part of the drama remains out of the scope of this study. Eckermann’s report of
his conversation with Goethe (who read this scene to Eckermann on January 10, 1830) shows
that Goethe did not feel any need for further definitions: he provides no information about the
scene, other than mentioning to Eckermann that, according to Plutarch, the ancient Greeks
regarded Mothers as deities. Since this vague attempt failed to help Eckermann, Goethe offered
him the manuscript: ‘Ich gebe Ihnen das Manuskript mit nach Hause, studieren Sie alles wohl
und sehen Sie zu wie Sie zurecht kommen.’ FA II, 12: p. 374. See also FK, pp. 466–467.
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Nicht zu Betretende; ein Weg ans Unerbetene
Nicht zu Erbittende. Bist du bereit? –
Nicht Schlösser sind, nicht Riegel wegzuschieben,
Von Einsamkeiten wirst umhergetrieben.
Hast du Begriff von Öd’ und Einsamkeit?
[. . .]
Nichts wirst du sehn in ewig leerer Ferne,
Den Schritt nicht hören den du tust,
Nichts Festes finden wo du ruhst.75
It is evident that this space can be described only by naming the attributes it
lacks. Rickert is right to point out that the most important and all-encompassing
negative description is already present in the first of the verses above – time and
space are absent from the realm of the Mothers.76 In this scene, Faust is exposed
to absolute privation and emptiness. This experience expands Faust’s intellectual
horizon. Imagining this space strikes him like a blow and provokes a shudder.77
In response to Mephisto’s provocative question (‘[b]ist du bereit?’),78 Faust shows
his grasp of the logic of oxymora that has been at work since his acquaintance
with Mephisto:
Du sendest mich ins Leere,
Damit ich dort so Kunst als Kraft vermehre.79
[. . .] wir wollen es ergründen,
In Deinem Nichts hoff ich das All zu finden.80
Though Mephisto encourages his mentee (‘Ich rühme dich eh du dich von mir
trennst, | Und sehe wohl daß du den Teufel kennst’).81 Mephisto’s words dis-
close Faust’s apprehension toward the unknown: ‘Bist du beschränkt daß
neues Wort dich stört? | Willst du nur hören was du schon gehört?’82
The abode of the Mothers represents absolute emptiness and privation. Yet
it is not entirely empty: it contains images of all creatures (v. 6289) as well as a
mysterious tripod that can summon ‘Held und Heldin aus der Nacht.’83 The pur-
pose of Faust’s journey is to retrieve the tripod that he will later use in the
75 V. 6214, 6222–6227, 6246–6248.
76 Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 314.
77 See v. 6265 and 6216.
78 V. 6224.
79 V. 6251–6252.
80 V. 6255–6256.
81 V. 6257–6258.
82 V. 6267–6268.
83 V. 6298 (my emphasis).
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Rittersaal scene. On the theatrical level, the tripod justifies the presence of the
apparatus necessary for the ‘Laterna Magica’.84
The images that populate the realm of the Mothers – namely, images of all
existing creatures – invite an interpretation of the scene as a dramatization of a
Platonic realm of forms.85 Witkowski’s interpretation of Faust’s journey to the
Mothers is an example of a Platonic reading of the scene.86 Yet Bruns rejects this
interpretation. He denies that the nebulous and shadow-like phantoms in the
realm of Mothers are Platonic forms and rejects reading them as ‘Urtypen’ refer-
ring to Goethe’s intellectual exchange with Schiller; in Glückliches Ereignis,87
Goethe asserts that both ‘Ideen’ and ‘Urphänomen’ are visible and objective.88
Bruns was one of the earliest scholars to interpret the realm of the Mothers as
the realm of the past.89 Gaier denies that Platonic forms are relevant to the realm
of the Mothers; he describes it as a ‘Bild- und Gestalten-Archiv’.90 Schneider con-
curs: ‘[es handelt sich] doch bei Fausts magischem Tun um die Rezeption von
bereits in den Archiven des kulturellen Gedächtnisses vorhandenen Bildern.’91 This
interpretation is a reduction of the realm of the Mothers as seen in retrospec-
tion.92 The important point is that the realm of the Mothers, as the archive of
cultural memory, cannot be described as ‘ungekannt | Euch Sterblichen, von
uns [the immortals] nicht gern genannt.’93 This verse also poses a significant
84 Schöne explains Goethe’s acquaintance with the ‘Laterna Magica’ as a part of ‘Magia natu-
ralis’ (FK, p. 483.) and asserts ‘“Phantasmagorie” war der den Zeitgenossen völlig geläufige
Fachterminus für solche Geisterbeschwörungen.’ FK, p. 484. Another reason for the existence
of the shining tripod, as Gaier explains, concerns lighting Faust’s unconscious body in the
darkness after the explosion. Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, vol. 2: p. 645.
85 For a brief background on the Platonic interpretation of the realm of the Mothers see:
Steffen Schneider, ‘Die Immanenz des Schönen und der Versuch ihrer Überwindung: Helena’,
in Archivpoetik: Die Funktion des Wissens in Goethes ‘Faust II’ (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer,
2005), footnote 10, p. 194.
86 J. W. Goethe, Goethes Faust: edited by Georg Witkowski, 7th ed., 2 vols. (Leipzig: Hesse &
Becker, 1924), vol. 2: pp. 294; 297.
87 FA I, 24: p. 437.
88 Bruns, ‘Die Mütter in Goethes Faust: Versuch einer Deutung,’ p. 370.
89 Bruns introduces Obenauer (Karl Justus Obenauer, Der faustische Mensch: vierzehn
Betrachtungen zum zweiten Teil von Goethes Faust (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1922), p. 51.) and
Rickert (Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 314.) as the first to
mention the realm of the Mothers in association with past. Bruns, ‘Die Mütter in Goethes
Faust: Versuch einer Deutung,’ pp. 371; 376.
90 Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, vol. 2: p. 657.
91 Schneider, ‘Die Immanenz des Schönen und der Versuch ihrer Überwindung: Helena’,
p. 195 (my emphasis).
92 V. 6277.
93 V. 6218–6219.
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challenge to the Platonic reading of the realm of the Mothers. According to
Phaedrus, the realm of forms is not unknown to humans – all human souls have
been there. The process of anamnesis allows us to remember our origins and re-
turn to them. Moreover, the realm of forms is not a place that the immortals
would mention with reluctance.
In verse 6298 (referred to above), Faust should summon the heroes and her-
oines from the night. In the following verse, the glowing tripod marks the deep-
est point of this radical descent, implying that darkness rules over the realm of
the Mothers:
Ein glühnder Dreifuß tut dir endlich kund
Du seist im tiefsten, allertiefsten Grund.
Bei seinem Schein wirst du die Mütter sehn94
In the scene Studierzimmer [I], Mephisto names the beginning of all beings as
‘Mutter Nacht’. Earlier in this study,95 I explained this phrase in reference to Karl
Phillip Moritz’s Götterlehre. Remarkably, Moritz’s illustration in Die Nacht und
Fatum, das über Götter und Menschen herrscht characterizes the night as both
fate and the primordial mother of creation: ‘Aus ihrem Schoße wird des Tages
Glanz geboren, worin alle Bildungen sich entfalten’.96 According to Moritz, this
night intimidates gods and mortals alike: ‘Es gibt also etwas, wovor die Götter
selber Scheu tragen. Es ist das nämliche geheimnis-volle Dunkel, worin sich noch
etwas über Götter und Menschen Obwaltendes verhüllt, das die Begriffe der
Sterblichen übersteigt.’97
In the beginning of Finstere Galerie, Mephisto makes it clear that Helena
and Paris are in Orcus and therefore out of his reach. In Moritz’s work, death
and dreams are described as the sons of the mother night98; and the three
goddesses Parcae (Parzen) are described as the night’s daughters, who control
fate of all the humans by bringing about death and life.99 They are the
94 V. 6283–6285.
95 See p. 121 above.
96 Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, vol. 2: p. 633. Compare to
v. 6430–6435.
97 Ibid., p. 633 (my emphasis). Compare to v. 6212–6215.
98 The importance of dream in this second pursuit of beauty can be sensed from the uncon-
scious Faust’s dream in Laboratorium (v. 6933); Helena’s words describing her union with
Achilles (v. 8880); and Faust’s words describing his union with Helena ‘Es ist ein Traum,
verschwunden Tag und Ort.’ (v. 9414)
99 Compare to: Eine Tragödie von Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: mit Einleitung und erklärenden
Anmerkungen von G. von Loeper, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Gustav Hempel, 1879), p. XXIX. Here, Loeper
directly mentions ‘Parzen’ without any reference to Moritz’s work.
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‘unerbittlichen Parzen’.100 Moritz provides a replica of ancient representations
of the three goddesses, illustrating them sitting, standing and walking. Two of
them hold spindles (in which they spin and measure the threads of life and
fate)101 and the third holds a dagger – an instrument of death.102 The follow-
ing verses remind us of this depiction:
Die einen sitzen, andre stehn und gehn,
Wie’s eben kommt. Gestaltung, Umgestaltung,
Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung103
Thus, the realm of the Mothers is defined as the realm that has been radically
excluded from the worlds of humans and immortals. It is the place of begin-
nings, a realm of radical absence of any quality.104
After being exposed to this absolute privation, Faust produces and projects
the image of the heroine and the hero before the courtiers and the Emperor. The
tripod and the stage act like the magic mirror; from a timeless and formless
realm, the historical characters appear. As the agent, Faust plays a heroic role.
The projection he generates impresses everyone – most of all Faust himself. The
remainder of the scene Rittersaal also shows similarity to Faust’s experience in
front of the magic mirror. Here, too, the delightful image resulted from an expe-
rience of horror: ‘Mein Schreckensgang bringt seligsten Gewinn’.105 And the
image of beauty once again brings ‘Erkenntnis’. Independently of Mephisto,106
Faust expresses the need to possess the object that he recognizes as beautiful:
‘Wer sie erkannt der darf sie nicht entbehren.’107 In his journey with Mephisto, a
new form of cognition becomes active in Faust; he recognizes the image in
Rittersaal in reference to the image he saw previously in Hexenküche, and he de-
tects the continuity of an entity (beauty) in both images above. Overwhelmed by
the image in Rittersaal, Faust describes it as an instance of perception of the
constant flow of beauty from its spring: ‘Zeigt sich tief im Sinn | Der Schönheit
100 Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, p. 633. Compare to v. 6224.
101 In ibid., p. 638. We read: ‘hält die hohe Göttin spielend den Faden in der Hand, an wel-
chem sie die Umwälzungen der Dinge und die stolzesten, Entwürfe der Könige lenkt.’
102 Ibid., pp. 637–638.
103 V. 6286–6288.
104 We should highlight here the difference between privation and active resistance against
qualities. There is no textual support for the latter, but the text (e.g., ‘regsam ohne leben’) im-
plies that this dark and empty place is filled with possibilities.
105 V. 6489 (my emphasis).
106 As I showed above, Mephisto kindled Faust’s desire to possess the object in the magic
mirror.
107 V. 6559 (my emphasis).
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Quelle reichlichstens ergossen?’108 Apart from articulating Faust’s ecstasy, the
superlative modifier invites comparison with Faust’s experience in front of the
magic mirror. The object of pursuit, beauty, is no longer a transcendent object,
but rather an immanent entity that is instantiated in the multiplicity of its im-
ages. Unlike Platonic anamnesis, which requires an ascending process, in the
Rittersaal scene, what once was described by Faust as the ‘Inbegriff von allen
Himmeln’109 is now reevaluated as the ‘Schaumbild’110 of the ‘Inbegriff der
Leidenschaft’.111 This ironic textual suggestion points to the immanence of the
object of pursuit in the world and its relative accessibility for the senses and cog-
nition through its images.112
III.1.2 Within Life as the Space of Inclusion
As I proceed to explore the modifications of the relation between the body and
soul in this comparative study, I do not treat the tragedy of Gretchen. I firmly
assert that a treatment of these scenes would be incomplete without paying due
attention to Gretchen’s experience and perspective in its specific context. In
other words, in this study, Gretchen is not treated as the protagonist of the
‘Gretchen’s tragedy’, but rather as an element in the dramatization of Faust’s
pursuit of beauty subsequent to a turn toward life.
III.1.2.1 Faust’s Encounter with Gretchen
The inclusion of the sublime and the sensual aspects of love is constantly pres-
ent in the scenes that dramatize Faust’s and Gretchen’s love. In this regard,
Schmidt writes the following:
Faust ist beides: Verführer und Liebender, der Sexualität verfallen und doch immer
wieder zur Sublimation fähig. Allerdings wird der Gretchen-Handlung nicht gerecht,
wer, statt diese Ambivalenz ernst zu nehmen, überall nur glaubt herauslesen zu
können, wie Faust zwar in der mephistophelischen Sphäre des bloßen Sinnengenusses
108 V. 6487–6488.
109 V. 2439.
110 V. 6497.
111 V. 6499.
112 Compare to: Mohammad Nadeem Niazi, ‘Faust’s Violence against the Mothers’, The
German Quarterly, Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1999), p. 228.
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sich bewege, aber diese dann wie eine bloße Anfechtung überwinde, um sich zur
höheren Sphäre der Liebe zu erheben.113
When Faust first sees Gretchen, just like when he saw the image of the reclined
woman in the mirror, mention of the heavenly realm elevates her beauty. Faust
articulates his aesthetic experience through an oath: ‘Beim Himmel, dieses Kind
ist schön! | So etwas hab’ ich nie gesehn.’114 Faust’s justification of his judgment
about Gretchen’s beauty shows his appreciation for an inclusion that brings
forth Gretchen’s whole character. Two qualities in particular impress Faust:
she is ‘so sitt- und tugendreich, | Und etwas schnippisch doch zugleich.’115
These two qualities attract Faust irresistibly to Gretchen.116 Faust then describes
Gretchen’s face: ‘Der Lippe Rot, der Wange Licht’.117 Yet as Mephisto enters the
scene,118 the emerging equilibrium between the sublime and the sensual takes a
sharp turn toward the desire to possess the object of beauty: ‘Hör, du mußt mir
die Dirne schaffen!’119 As Schmidt correctly recognizes, Mephisto represents an
aspect of Faust’s own character: ‘Wie kaum sonst im Drama wird damit deutlich,
daß Mephisto eine Valenz Fausts selbst ist. Sein “Auftreten” ist hier nichts an-
deres als das Hervortreten des anderen Teils in Fausts ambivalentem Wesen.’120
The aesthetic judgment that develops here diverges from the ‘two souls princi-
ple’ and the excluding approach that ruled over the previous scenes of Faust,
which gave priority to the sublime and the transcendent realms. From the first
moment of Faust’s encounter with Gretchen, Faust unites the qualities of sub-
lime and sensual to experience an ‘übersinnlich-sinnliche’ love.121
III.1.2.2 The Sun in Gretchen’s Room
Thus far, we have examined a number of light metaphors in Faust: in the open-
ing monologue of the scene Nacht; in Faust’s two speeches in the scene Vor
dem Tor; and in the song of the spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I]. In each
case, I pointed out how the light metaphors (integrated into their respective po-
etic contexts) stand for larger conceptual issues: Faust’s evaluation of body and
113 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 158.
114 V. 2609 (my emphasis).
115 V. 2611–2612.
116 Remarkably, Gretchen, too, expresses her inclination toward the stranger in two qualities
that exist together: ‘wacker’ and ‘keck’. V. 2680; 2683.
117 V. 2913.
118 FT, p. 112.
119 V. 2619.
120 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 159.
121 Compare to Mephisto’s words in v. 3534: ‘Du übersinnlicher, sinnlicher Freier’.
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soul, and the transcendence or immanence of the principle which light represents.
The scene Abend presents another important instance of the light metaphor. Upon
stepping inside Gretchen’s room – ‘nach einigem Stillschweigen’122 –, Faust asks
Mephisto to leave him alone. In Mephisto’s absence, Faust welcomes the ‘sweet
light of the dusk’123 in his beloved’s room.
The relation between light and the space it illuminates in the scene Abend
is of great importance to this study. In the scene Nacht, light was adored in it-
self and in its purity – ‘das liebe Himmelslicht’124 in Faust’s ‘Kerker’. But in the
scene Abend, light receives its significance through its relevance to the room
that it illuminates. The room is revered as a ‘Heiligtum’125; the text employs reli-
gious language in its description of the place, and not the light that fills it.126
Gaier points out that ‘Margaretes reinliches Zimmer ist als “Kerker” eine Replik
auf Fausts “Kerker” (V. 398)’.127 Furthermore, he notes that the experiences of
macrocosm sign and ‘Erdgeist’ in Faust’s old room were ‘getrennte, unverein-
bare Visionen’.128 They were experienced in the room from which nature was
expelled and where the furnishings were alien to Faust. In Gretchen’s room,129
on the other hand, nature nurtures and flows: ‘Entwirkte sich das
Götterbild!’130 The light of Gretchen’s room, which reveals the natural realm to
be divine nature, brings Faust as close as he has yet come to appreciating the
instruction of the ‘Erdgeist’: ‘wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.’131 Therefore,
unlike the ‘Kerker’ of the scene Nacht, this ‘Kerker’ is a place of bliss and a
shrine (‘Heiligtum’). Goethe closely associated ‘Kerker’ and the body; in two
consecutive poems of West-östlicher Divan, he used ‘Kerker’ as a metaphor for
the body.132 In the modification of the ‘Kerker’ metaphor as the place of ap-
pearance of God’s image, we see the elevation of the particular and the natu-
ral realm. Yet the longer Faust stays in Gretchen’s room, the stronger his
tendency grows to distance himself from the desire for pursuit of beauty and
122 The stage directions according to FT, p. 115.
123 J. W. Goethe, Goethe’s Faust, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Anchor Books, 1961),
p. 263.
124 V. 400.
125 V. 2688.
126 FK, p. 292. Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, vol. 2: p. 343.
127 Ibid., p. 344.
128 Ibid., p. 344.
129 Ibid., pp. 344–345.
130 V. 2716.
131 V. 509.
132 See the following two poems in: FA I, 3/1: p. 106; 410. Also, see Hendrik Birus’s attempt to
explain these poems in: FA I, 3/2: pp. 1320–1322.
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its possession – the same desire that brought him to Gretchen’s room. Faust
renounces the desire133: ‘Und du! Was hat dich hergeführt?’134 When
Mephisto returns, he provokes Faust by reminding him of his life as ‘Herr
Doktor’:
Ich kratz’ den Kopf, reib’ an den Händen –
[. . .]–
Um euch das süße junge Kind
Nach Herzens Wunsch und Will’ zu wenden;
Und ihr seht drein,
Als solltet ihr in den Hörsaal hinein,
Als stünden grau leibhaftig vor euch da
Physik und Metaphysika!135
Despite these moments, Faust’s movement is directed toward love and the de-
sire for beauty. On this path, Faust frequently approaches a fragile point of
equilibrium between the heavenly and worldly realms. In this context, we can
appreciate Mephisto’s remarks that are directed to the spectators (despite the
lack of an explicit stage direction ‘ad Spectatores’)136 after Faust exits in the
scene Spaziergang:
So ein verliebter Tor verpufft
Euch Sonne, Mond und alle Sterne
Zum Zeitvertreib dem Liebchen in die Luft.137
Mephisto, a cold observer of human behavior, finds it ridiculous that a lover
would place the beloved above the celestial sources of light and life. Even
Hatem does not place his beloved above the sun in West-östlicher Divan; rather,
the beloved appears as elevated to him as the light. The following few verses
from Nachklang in Suleika Nameh highlight the importance of these words of
Mephisto:
Laß mich nicht so der Nacht dem Schmerze,
Du allerliebstes, du mein Mondgesicht!
O du mein Phosphor, meine Kerze,
Du meine Sonne, du mein Licht.138
133 Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, vol. 2: p. 345.
134 V. 2717.
135 V. 2744; 2746–2751.
136 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 277.
137 V. 2862–2864.
138 FA I, 3/1: p. 95.
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III.1.3 The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion
In the second Strasse scene, the attempt at forming articulations of the views
and specifications of the new chapter of Faust’s life commences. The scene be-
gins with Faust’s focus on action (‘Will’s bald gehn?’),139 but Mephisto shifts
the focus to an articulation of Faust’s new world and world-view. The world-
view that starts articulating itself here is developed piece by piece in the scenes
Strasse [II], Garten, Wald und Höhle, and Marthens Garten. I analyze these
scenes while referring to a selection of Goethe’s poems, which the Hamburger
Ausgabe titles Die weltanschaulichen Gedichte140 and the Frankfurter Ausgabe
titles Gott und Welt.141 Furthermore, a poem from the West-östlicher Divan
will help us elucidate Faust’s articulations of his new world-view, which, as I
will demonstrate, reconceives the body and soul relation and abandons the
Platonic excluding process of attaining knowledge. Importantly, in this study,
I avoid passing moral judgment on Faust’s behavior. I focus exclusively on ex-
ploring the modifications of Faust’s view of body and soul and comparing
them to Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
III.1.3.1 From Naming to Wandering with the Senses
The scene Strasse [II] opens with Mephisto’s question – ‘Find’ ich euch in
Feuer?’142 Forced to answer this question, Faust must articulate his thoughts. If
we follow Schmidt in reading Mephisto as one of two opposing poles in Faust’s
own ambivalent personality, then Mephisto’s question appears to challenge the
sublime aspect that Faust ascribes to his feelings. Yet Faust refuses to admit
that he is just seducing a girl; he insists that his love is genuine (‘Und zwar von
Herzen.’)143 Mephisto tries to identify love with eternal faithfulness. Will Faust
remain eternally faithful to Gretchen? Mephisto wonders.144 Faust responds as
follows:
139 V. 3025.
140 HA I: pp. 357–370.
141 FA I, 2: 489–512. On the reason behind the choice of this title see Karl Eibl (the editor’s)
remarks on p. 1072.
142 V. 3026.
143 V. 3054. As Arens explains, for Faust, being from the heart is the greatest sign of genuine-
ness. Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 286. In addition to this scene, we can find con-
firmation of this view in Faust II in verse 9378.
144 It is worth noticing that Gretchen never asks Faust about faithfulness. She only asks him
(indirectly) about whether he loves her.
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Wenn ich empfinde,
Für das Gefühl, für das Gewühl
Nach Namen suche, keinen finde,
Dann durch die Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife,
Nach allen höchsten Worten greife,
Und diese Glut, von der ich brenne,
Unendlich, ewig, ewig nenne,
Ist das ein teuflisch Lügenspiel?145
In these verses, Faust’s new world-view begins to come into focus. Faust is
aware of being moved by something, but he doesn’t know what that ‘some-
thing’ is. He only feels (‘das Gefühl’) an urgent need to act and explore a chaos
that surrounds him (‘das Gewühl’). Just as Faust tried to name Mephisto and
thereby expose his ‘eigentliches Element’, Faust now tries to name his feelings.
Again, for Faust, naming a thing is equivalent to knowing its essence. But
Faust’s attempts to name the fire that burns in him only bring failure. Having
failed to name this feeling, Faust explores the world with his senses. Trying to
grasp the source of this movement, Faust reaches after ‘allen höchsten Worten’.
Faust’s words here appear to be an early variation of a constantly present
theme in Goethe’s view regarding the exploration of infinite nature. Goethe
writes later in Zur Morphologie: ‘Willst Du ins Unendliche schreiten, | Geh nur
im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.’146 In the end, Faust is only able to say that
this flame (‘diese Glut’) extends itself through all his pursuits. The common de-
nominator here is the energy that moves Faust. At the end of these verses, this
fire is recognized to be eternal (‘ewig’) and infinite (‘unendlich’). It is worth not-
ing that, in the scene Grablegung, Mephisto himself experiences the effect of
beauty in love. He likewise appeals to the metaphor of fire: ‘Ist dies das
Liebeselement? | Der ganze Körper steht in Feuer’.147 For further clarification,
however, we need to explore further instances in which Faust’s articulations in
his new world develop.
III.1.3.2 Abandoning the Self
Near the end of the scene Garten, Gretchen turns to a form of oracle to deter-
mine whether Faust loves her. Faust professes his love in the third person – ‘Er
liebt dich!’148 He tries to lead Gretchen through the same process that he went
through in the above-mentioned scene. The feeling of being moved by love
145 V. 3060–3065.
146 FA I, 24: p. 441. See also p. 1070.
147 V. 11784–11785.
148 V. 3185.
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remains inexpressible for Faust. ‘Verstehst du, was das heißt?’,149 he asks
Gretchen, who remains overwhelmed and speechless. Again, they are unable to
name what moves them. Faust invites Gretchen to follow his lead: ‘durch die
Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife[n]’.150 As we read in the following passage, the
cognitive faculty perceives the unnamable through senses in moments and
instances:
Laß diesen Blick,
Laß diesen Händedruck dir sagen,
Was unaussprechlich ist151
Importantly, in verses 3191–3192, Faust expands this form of cognition through
the senses of the body. By surrendering to the unnamable feeling, Faust says, one
can experience an eternal delight: ‘Sich hinzugeben ganz und eine Wonne | Zu
fühlen, die ewig sein muß!’152 It should be noted that, unlike in the previous
scene, Faust does not reach out for the most exalted of words in his turn to the
senses and the body.153 The touch of two hands clasping and the look between the
lovers are perceived in themselves and are appreciated as the effect of that which
cannot be named. This perception, however, only leads to eternal bliss if the self
is surrendered. In Eins und Alles, written on October 6, 1821,154 Goethe gives poetic
articulation to his view of bliss as a consequence of surrendering the self:
Im Grenzenlosen sich zu finden
Wird gern der Einzelne verschwinden,
Da löst sich aller Überdruß;
Statt heißem Wünschen, wildem Wollen,
Statt läßt’gem Fordern, strengem Sollen,
Sich aufzugeben ist Genuß.155
These verses show that Goethe’s views are consistent with Faust’s remarks to
Gretchen. Underscoring the significance of these verses, Karl Eibl describes the
Eins und Alles as a poem that gives voice to ‘die Parole des ›spinozistischen‹
Pantheismus’.156 The necessity of surrendering the individuated self is also
149 V. 3186.
150 V. 3062.
151 V. 3188–3189.
152 V. 3191–3192.
153 V. 3063.
154 FA I, 2: p. 1084.
155 FA I, 2: p. 494. Eins und Alles v. 1–6.
156 FA I, 2: p. 1084. The issue of the position of Ethics in respect to the individuated self has
been a part of the discourse around Spinoza’s Ethics. Other than mention of this issue in the
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characterized as a prerequisite for a pantheistic perspective by Hegel in his
Vorlesungen über Ästhetik. In the literary works of ‘den mohammedanischen
Persern’,157 Hegel finds a perfect example of the poetic articulation of pantheis-
tic joy. For our purposes, it is important to note that Hegel refers to the realm of
multiplicity (‘allem’) as the image where the presence of the eternal and the di-
vine can be felt and known:
Indem sich nämlich der Dichter das Göttliche in allem zu erblicken sehnt und es wirklich
erblickt, gibt er nun auch sein eigenes Selbst dagegen auf, faßt aber ebensosehr die
Immanenz des Göttlichen in seinem so erweiterten und befreiten Inneren auf, und da-
durch erwächst ihm jene heitere Innigkeit, jenes freie Glück, jene schwelgerische
Seligkeit, welche dem Orientalen eigen ist, der sich bei der Lossagung von der eigenen
Partikularität durchweg in das Ewige und Absolute versenkt und in allem das Bild und die
Gegenwart des Göttlichen erkennt und empfindet.158
III.1.3.3 Oneness with the Brothers in Nature
In Wald und Höhle, Faust reflects upon his new ‘Lebenslauf’.159 As Schmidt
rightly points out, the scene gives Faust space for reflection through a momen-
tary suspension of action: ‘[d]ie Szene Wald und Höhle bildet eine geistige Mitte
jenseits der Handlung’.160 The scene commences with a soliloquy that takes the
form of a thanks-giving prayer.161 It is addressed to the exalted spirit that previ-
ously revealed itself to Faust in fire. Almost all commentators on Faust agree
that it was the ‘Erdgeist’ who (according to the stage directions) appeared in a
red flame and spoke to Faust.162 In this study, I am not interested in naming the
exalted spirit; rather, I follow Faust’s understanding of this spirit, which is re-
flected in the acts that Faust attributes to it.
Each gift for which Faust expresses his gratitude adds further detail to the
image of his new life. Faust claims that the exalted spirit gave him everything
he asked for.163 Faust’s expression of satisfaction and gratitude, Trunz notes,
above-mentioned poem, it is present in Goethe’s essay written in honor of Shakespeare’s day:
FA I, 18: p. 11.
157 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Werke: Vorlesungen über
die Ästhetik I, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1970), vol. 13: p. 475.
158 Ibid., p. 474 (my emphasis).
159 V. 2072.
160 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 160.
161 FK, p. 314.
162 Rickert dedicates a considerable amount of attention to refuting this view: Rickert,
Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, pp. 239–252.
163 ‘Erhabner Geist, du gabst mir, gabst mir Alles, | Warum ich bat.’ V. 3217–3218.
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indicates that Faust has forgotten about his former object of pursuit – knowledge
of what holds the world together ‘im Innersten’.164 Notably, beginning with the
scene Hexenküche, the pursuit of love increasingly proves to be a modification of
the earlier ascending negative pursuit of knowledge. If we do not recognize the
transition between these two stages and the modification of the earlier path, then
Trunz’s question would be justified: ‘er scheint innerlich gewandelt; ist es der
Einfluß des Erlebten?’165 In his article on Wald und Höhle, Hans Jaeger elucidates
the inner relation between love and knowledge in Goethe’s ‘pantheistic’ world-
view; however, he only applies Goethe’s theoretical views to Wald und Höhle and
Marthens Garten: ‘In both scenes love is the soil in which Faust’s pantheism is
rooted.’166 Thus, the question posed by Trunz remains unanswered.167 Schmidt is
in accord with other commentators in accentuating that the role of love in this
scene can hardly be regarded as the result of the previous scenes: ‘Aus dem
bisherigen Verlauf der Gretchenhandlung haben sich diese Dimensionen des
Liebeserlebnisses noch keineswegs erschließen lassen.’168 In this study, I ex-
plained the process of modification of Faust’s pursuit of knowledge as the inner
activity of Faust in appreciation of beauty that is dramatized in the scene
Hexenküche. A further instance of Faust’s new world-view, I argued, is present in
Faust’s modification of the relation between the sun and the place it illuminates
in Gretchen’s room. It is also present in Faust’s recognition of Nature as the
mother who actively nourishes Gretchen and forms her as an image of the divine.
These scenes express the process of moving from an understanding of the world
based on transcendence and exclusion to one based on immanence. The views
expressed in the Wald und Höhlemonologue find early articulations in the scenes
Strass [II] and Garten (as Faust speaks to Gretchen). I further highlight this at-
tempt at an articulation of Faust’s views that can be traced from the previous
scenes. In each step, I single out the elements that are added to the previous step.
The exalted spirit is credited with bestowing upon Faust the capability to
feel and enjoy. In the scene Strasse [II], Faust expressed his awareness of a fire
that provokes in him a constant and overwhelming feeling. In that scene, the
164 HA 3: p. 558.
165 HA 3: p. 557.
166 Hans Jaeger, ‘The Wald und Höhle Monologue in Faust’, Monatshefte, 41, no. 8 (Dec., 1949),
p. 402.
167 Jaeger draws our attention to Goethe’s letter to Fritz Jacobi from May 10, 1812, in which
Goethe asserts that passion and love are parts of the process of attaining knowledge: ‘Man
lernt nichts kennen als was man liebt, und je tiefer und vollständiger die Kenntnis werden
soll, desto stärker, kräftiger und lebendiger muß Liebe, ja Leidenschaft sein.’ ibid., p. 403.
168 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 164.
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element of ‘Genuß’ was absent, but the struggle to name the feeling was pres-
ent. The feeling persisted, motivating Faust to explore the world with his
senses. In the scene Garten, Faust accepts that the feeling cannot be named – it
is ‘unaussprechlich’.169 Instead of seeking to name the feeling, Faust explores
its particular manifestations in the natural realm – in the sense of touch and
in the non-verbal human emotions that a gaze can communicate. Thus, Faust
moves one step further as he recognizes that surrendering the self is a prerequi-
site for feeling the joy that he conceives as eternal. In Wald und Höhle, feeling
is followed by rejoicing as Faust surrenders his self.170 Faust’s surrender of the
self can be seen in the fact that, in Wald und Höhle, Faust counts all of his
achievements as gifts of the exalted spirit. Faust abandons naming, a relic of his
negative excluding approach. Instead, he allows himself to be included and
moved; through the senses, he perceives the influence of the fire that integrates
him into a world beyond his cold entrapment in his self. It is of great import to
note that the spirit in question rejects a cold approach. Schöne contrasts this sur-
render of the self to Faust’s early titanic tendency. Without tracing this surrender
of the self back to Faust’s words to Gretchen in Garten, Schöne leaves the relation
of this development to Faust and Gretchen’s love as an open question:
Tatsächlich spricht hier ja nicht mehr der titanisch Vermessene, der sich mit der Gewalt
der Magie den Zugang in eine unendliche Natur zu erzwingen suchte, sondern ein kontem-
plativ an die herrliche Natur Hingegebener. Fausts Dankgebet (du gabst mir – Vergönnest
mir – lehrst mich – führst mich– zeigst mich mir selbst) zeigt den ganz in die umgreifende
Natur Einbezogenen mit sich selbst befriedet. Eine von der hier gar nicht genannten
Margarete ermöglichte, durch die verwandelnde Liebe ausgelöste Wandlung Fausts?171
In this soliloquy, pleasure includes both a cognitive and an intellectual compo-
nent. The spirit, according to Faust, grants him the capability to gaze into its
‘tiefe Brust’172 – not as an invader or a conqueror,173 but rather as a friend (‘Wie
in den Busen eines Freund’s zu schauen.’)174 Importantly, the ‘Kraft, sie zu
fühlen, zu genießen’,175 was a gift of the very spirit that gives individuation and
motion to ‘die Reihe der Lebendigen’.176 In the absence of a titanic apotheosis,
169 V. 3189.
170 V. 3221.
171 FK, p. 314.
172 V. 3223.
173 Compare to v. 673–675.
174 V. 3224.
175 V. 3221.
176 V. 3225.
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Faust attains knowledge through the awareness that he is a facet of the multi-
plicity moved by a single force: the apotheosis of titanic nature (‘Ich
Ebenbild der Gottheit’)177 becomes a human with glorious nature as his
‘Königreich’.178
This change, as I will explain, cannot be understood unless we turn to a
reinterpretation of the significance of the presence of the image of God in hu-
mans as a faculty of perception of unity. In Goethe’s letter to Auguste zu
Stolberg from January 1775,179 the activity of this faculty remains limited to
human love, explained as the image of the Infinite recognizing Its likeness to
others. The letter’s clear allusion to Goethe’s Prometheus ode clarifies the rela-
tion between this humanist scope and the titanic apotheosis:
wenn das Bild des Unendlichen in uns wühlt. Und was ist das als Liebe! – Musste er
Menschen machen nach seinem Bilde, ein Geschlecht das ihm ähnlich sey, was müssen
wir fühlen wenn wir Brüder finden, unser Gleichniss, uns selbst verdoppelt.180
In Wald und Höhle, this active identity (‘das Bild des Unendlichen in uns’) ex-
pands its field of activity beyond the human realm181; Faust recognizes all natu-
ral phenomena, and not just other humans, as his brethren. The extent of the
human being’s integration into nature in the Wald und Höhle soliloquy goes be-
yond Goethe’s remarks in his letter from 1775. Schöne points out that the Wald
und Höhle soliloquy coheres with the results of Goethe’s osteological discovery
in 1784, which proved that humans and other animals belong to the same fam-
ily. Yet that discovery does not cover the universal spectrum of beings and phe-
nomena that are recognized as Faust’s brothers182:
Du führst die Reihe der Lebendigen
Vor mir vorbei, und lehrst mich meine Brüder
Im stillen Busch, in Luft und Wasser kennen.183
177 V. 614.
178 V. 3220.
179 Jaeger draws our attention to the first line of the letter in order to explain the interconnec-
tedness of love and pantheistic feeling for Goethe. Jaeger, ‘The Wald und Höhle Monologue in
Faust,’ p. 400. And Schöne turns to this letter’s first sentences in order to explain the problem
of the inexpressibility of love in the scene Strasse (FK, p. 305).
180 FA II, 1: p. 427.
181 We should note the phrase ‘wenn wir Brüder finden’ implies that we are exploring. Yet in
this letter, the field of exploration is limited to the anthropological realm – in other words,
there is no attempt made to expand this field.
182 FK, p. 315. See also FA I, 24: p. 23.
183 V. 3225–3227.
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The same force that brings forth all beings as members of a family is what al-
lows humans to recognize their own brethren. In relation to this act of knowing
the multiplicity in unity, ‘die herrliche Natur’184 becomes Faust’s kingdom.
At this stage, Faust recognizes the pleasing as well as the awesome aspects
of the natural world as his brothers. Furthermore, he admits the imperfection of
his human self: ‘O daß dem Menschen nichts Vollkomm’nes wird, | Empfind’
ich nun.’185 Mephisto is a necessary part of Faust – as well as of human destiny
more generally. He is the polar opposite of ‘die Wonne’186 that is felt (according
to the scene Garten) only in total surrender of the self and that brings the sub-
ject close to the divine – ‘Die mich den Göttern nah’ und näher bringt’.187
Mephisto’s cold, separating and individuating influence on Faust fuel’s the fire
that motivates Faust to pursue beauty in images. Mephisto and the feeling of
bliss both are gifts of the spirit and belong to Faust’s faculty of recognizing his
brethren in nature:
Er facht in meiner Brust ein wildes Feuer
Nach jenem schönen Bild geschäftig an.
So tauml’ ich von Begierde zu Genuß,
Und im Genuß verschmachtʼ ich nach Begierde.188
Mephisto annihilates Faust’s bliss,189 causing him to cycle between rejoicing to
craving, as verses 3249–3250 convey. Mephisto spurs Faust on to action, crash-
ing down on Faust’s contemplative ‘Wandel in der Öde’190 and ruining the feel-
ing of cosmic unity that Faust felt in surrendering his self191:
Alle sechs Tagewerk’ im Busen fühlen,
In stolzer Kraft ich weiß nicht was genießen,
Bald liebewonniglich in alles überfließen,
Verschwunden ganz der Erdensohn,
Und dann die hohe Intuition –
Mit einer Gebärde
Ich darf nicht sagen wie – zu schließen.192
184 V. 3220.
185 V. 3240–3241.
186 V. 3241.
187 V. 3242.
188 V. 3247–3250 (my emphasis).
189 V. 3244–3246.
190 V. 3279.
191 See: FK, p. 318.
192 V. 3287–3292.
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III.1.3.4 Knowing the ‘Allumfasser’
In the scene Marthens Garten, Gretchen asks Faust about his views on religion.
Concerning Christianity, Faust declines to give a direct answer. Yet when asked
about God, Faust enthusiastically answers.193 Faust’s God is a principally
immanent one: ‘der Allumfasser’ and ‘der Allerhalter’ that is by definition all-
inclusive. These two terms highlight the relation between that which encom-
passes and that which is encompassed. As the all-inclusive being, it cannot be
named: ‘Wer darf ihn nennen?’194 In the first stage of this relatively short
speech, Faust includes Gretchen, himself and finally the All-encompassing
Itself into the One:
Der Allumfasser,
Der Allerhalter,
Faßt und erhält er nicht
Dich, mich, sich selbst?195
Goethe’s poem Prooemion, written in March of 1816,196 poetically explores the
problem of naming the indefinite divine: ‘In Jenes Namen, der, so oft genannt, |
Dem Wesen nach bleibt immer unbekannt’.197 Here, too, knowing the Indefinite
and Infinite proceeds in stages: announcing the impossibility of naming; turn-
ing to the senses and phenomena; and asserting the immanence of the divine
and its accessibility to the senses, albeit as images. The following verses testi-
fies to this process:
So weit das Ohr, so weit das Auge reicht
Du findest nur Bekanntes das Ihm gleicht,
Und deines Geistes höchster Feuerflug
Hat schon am Gleichnis, hat am Bild genug198
In addition to the similarity between referring to the phenomena as ‘Bekanntes’
and referring to them as Faust’s brethren in Wald und Höhle, Goethe’s argu-
ment in Prooemion in favor of trusting the senses exhibits similarities to Wald
und Höhle.199 By way of sensory perception, the self knows that it is included
193 V. 3425.
194 V. 3432.
195 V. 3438–3441.
196 FA I, 2: p. 1075.
197 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 5–6.
198 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 7–10.
199 See specifically v. 3225ff.
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in the force that moves the senses: ‘Es zieht dich an, es reißt dich heiter
fort’.200 At the same time, it is clear that the same force that moves the senses
also unravels the manifold phenomena before them: ‘Und wo du wandelst
schmückt sich Weg und Ort’.201 This view is further expounded in the follow-
ing verses:
Was wär’ ein Gott, der nur von außen stieße,
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen ließe!
Ihm ziemt’s, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
So daß was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
Nie Seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermißt.202
Faust’s answer to Gretchen shows another important aspect of his view of the
world in which the immanent divine is active always and everywhere:
Wölbt sich der Himmel nicht dadroben?
Liegt die Erde nicht hierunten fest?
Und steigen freundlich blickend
Ewige Sterne nicht herauf?203
In these verses, natural phenomena are depicted as instantiations of the acts
of the ‘Allumfasser’. These acts give the phenomena their qualities: the
heaven arches, the earth remains steady and the heavenly bodies cast friendly
glances. The phenomena are illustrated as extensions of the ‘Allumfasser’,
but each as a separate aspect and an instance of the ‘Allumfasser’. In this
manner, Faust explores that which is beyond naming – ‘[d]em Wesen nach
bleibt immer unbekannt’.
In West-östlicher Divan and the last poem of Suleika Nameh (Book of
Suleika) we find another poetic treatment of the subject of the naming that we
find above in Faust.204
In the following verses, naming is not an attempt at grasping a thing’s es-
sence, but is rather a kind of exploration and identification of attributes of
Suleika’s Allah with the senses in nature. The poem begins by bringing together
love, knowledge and recognition:
200 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 11.
201 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 12.
202 FA I, 2: pp. 489–490 V. 15–20.
203 V. 3442–3445.
204 FA I, 3/2: p. 1305.
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In tausend Formen magst du dich verstecken,
Doch, Allerliebste, gleich erkenn’ ich dich,
Du magst mit Zauberschleyern dich bedecken,
Allgegenwärtige, gleich erkenn’ ich dich.205
Immediately, the poet shows us how vast the immanence of his
‘Allgegenwärtige’ is. The straight and beautiful growth of a cypress exhibits the
attribute of ‘Allschöngewachsene’: ‘An der Cypresse reinstem, jungen Streben, |
Allschöngewachsne, gleich erkenn’ ich dich’.206 The formation and transforma-
tion of clouds displays the ‘Allmannigfaltige’.207 Throughout this natural explora-
tion, the poet introduces active and passive qualities such as ‘Allbuntbesternte’
and ‘Allumklammernde’. Next, he includes emotions as well: ‘Allerheiternde’
and ‘Allherzerweiternde’.208
After exploring the qualities of natural phenomena and recognizing them
as a form of inclusion in All, Faust, like Suleika, turns to human emotions. Just
as the earth is steady as an active instance of the All, the ‘Allerliebste’ in the
look between Gretchen and Faust permeates them from head to heart.209 These
are eternal acts of the Infinite, immanent in the world: ‘Und webt in ewigem
Geheimnis | Unsichtbar sichtbar neben dir’.210
The verses from Suleika Nameh mentioned above bear a striking similarity
to the following verses from Faust:
Dann durch die Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife,
Nach allen höchsten Worten greife,
Und diese Glut, von der ich brenne,
Unendlich, ewig, ewig nenne211
These verses of Faust cannot be understood completely if read independently
from Faust’s invocation of the exalted spirit – ‘Gabst mir die herrliche Natur
zum Königreich, | Kraft sie zu fühlen, zu Genießen’212 – and his gratitude to-
ward the exalted spirit for supplying the senses with objects of perception and
cognition:
205 FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 1–4.
206 FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 5.
207 FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 12.
208 FA I, 3/1: p. 102. V. 18; 20.
209 V. 3446–3448.
210 V. 3449–3450.
211 V. 3062–3065.
212 V. 3220–3221.
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Du führst die Reihe der Lebendigen
Vor mir vorbei, und lehrst mich meine Brüder
Im stillen Busch, in Luft und Wasser zu kennen.213
In West-östlicher Divan, the attribute ‘Allerliebste’ in the second verse becomes
‘Allbelehrende’ in verse twenty-two, where the All is portrayed as the source of
knowledge. Finally, all the names and attributes of the divine are recognized as
different aspects of the beloved, which is disclosed in the natural realm.
Was ich mit äußerm Sinn, mit innerm kenne,
Du Allbelehrende, kenn’ ich durch dich.
Und wenn ich Allahs Namenhundert nenne,
Mit jedem klingt ein Name nach für dich.214
In this poem of Suleika Nameh, we find a lyrical articulation of the active, all-
encompassing immanence of the divine in love – the dramatic subject of Faust,
from Hexenküche onward.
Faust returns to Gretchen’s question: ‘Glaubst du an Gott?’215 He mentions
that attempts at grasping and feeling the Infinite are relative to the subject who
perceives and names:
Erfüll’ davon dein Herz, so groß es ist,
Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist,
Nenn’ es dann wie du willst,
Nenn’s Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!216
In Studie Nach Spinoza, written between 1784 and 1785,217 Goethe discusses the
impossibility of contemplating the Infinite without limiting It in accordance with
our intellect: ‘Wir können nur Dinge denken die entweder beschränkt sind oder
die sich unsre Seele beschränkt.’218 Yet there is a problem: ‘Sie [die Menschen]
werden dasjenige was sie am bequemsten denken worin sie einen Genuß finden
können für das Gewisseste und Sicherste halten’.219 This attained satisfaction is
held up as ‘das letzte Ziel’.220 Goethe does not criticize faith per se, but rather
refuses to follow those who claim ‘daß sie im Wahren eine Sicherheit gefunden
213 V. 3225–3227.
214 FA I, 3/1: p. 102. V. 21–24.
215 V. 3425.
216 V. 3451–3453.
217 Compare to FA I, 25: pp. 863–866.
218 FA I, 25: p. 14.
219 FA I, 25: p. 16 (my emphasis).
220 FA I, 25: p. 16.
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welche über allen Beweis und Verstand erhaben sei.’221 Faust shares his author’s
indefatigable yearning for knowledge. At the end of his speech in the scene
Marthens Garten, having acknowledged the relative nature of seeking to know
the infinite all-including One, Faust does not refute orthodox religion – he never
intended to: ‘Will niemand sein Gefühl und seine Kirche rauben.’222 Rather,
Faust asks for tolerance of his unorthodox speculative view of immanence:
Es sagen’s aller Orten
Alle Herzen unter dem himmlischen Tage,
Jedes in seiner Sprache;
Warum nicht ich in der meinen?223
The scenes we analyzed above give space to Faust’s contemplation. After the
scene Marthens Garten, however, the drama is mostly dedicated to Gretchen’s
struggle with her social and historical challenges as well as Faust’s duel with
Valentin and its consequences. (After killing Valentin in self-defense, Faust
flees from the town.) The consecutive scenes Am Brunnen, Zwinger, Nacht and
Dom illustrate the historical and social realities of Faust’s and Gretchen’s un-
conventional relationship. Moreover, as Schöne demonstrates in his work
Götterzeichen, Liebeszauber, Satanskult,224 the scene Walpurgisnacht mirrors
the social conditions that determine the tragic fate of Gretchen and bring Faust
to the place in which we find him next – Anmutige Gegend.
III.1.4 Faust’s Rebirth in Anmutige Gegend
The scene Anmutige Gegend bridges the gap that Goethe identifies ‘zwischen
dem bekannten jammervollen Abschluß des ersten Theils und dem Eintritt
einer griechischen Heldenfrau’.225 Referring to this function of the scene, Schöne
characterizes it as an interlude (‘Zwischenspiel’).226 The scene creates a space of
symbolic temporality and locality, a dramatic device that Goethe employs again
221 Ibid.
222 V. 3420.
223 V. 3462–3465.
224 Schöne demonstrates that Walpurgisnacht dramatizes Gretchen’s tragic end as a victim of
a witch-hunt (even though she herself is not present in the scene): See in Albrecht Schöne,
Götterzeichen, Liebeszauber, Satanskult: neue Einblick in alte Goethetexte (München: Beck,
1982), pp. 179–189.
225 FT, p. 637. Compare to FK, p. 396. Also compare to Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-
Dichtungen, pp. 525–526. Gaier asserts that this scene functions as the prologue to Faust II.
226 FK, p. 396.
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in Faust II in Klassische Walpurgisnacht, where the ‘Halbwirklichkeiten’227 of
Faust’s union with Helena is made possible. Later in this section, I cast light on
other specifications of the space of Anmutige Gegend. The scene consists of two
smaller sections: first, the events of the night and the song of the Ariel and the
choir; and second, the breaking of dawn and Faust’s soliloquy.
The first verse of Faust II starkly contrasts to the opening of the scene
Nacht in Faust I. Unlike the first verse of the scene Nacht, where the eliminated
subject ‘Ich’ in ‘Habe nun . . . ’ announces the commencement of a subject-
centered drama, Faust II begins with a conditional sentence (‘Wenn der Blüten
Frühlings-Regen’)228 that situates Faust within an idyllic natural scene229; then
Faust is included in ‘Allen Erdgebornen’.230 In order to attain a deeper under-
standing of the space in which Faust’s articulations in the second part of
Anmutige Gegend is made possible, I further compare the first part of Anmutige
Gegend to the scene Nacht.
In Anmutige Gegend, Goethe presents Faust in a vulnerable state. Ariel and
the choir of elves – and not Faust himself – describe what Faust undergoes. This
third person perspective opens a window to Faust’s state of mind. In contrast to
Anmutige Gegend, the scene Nacht is mediated through Faust’s own subjective
self-descriptions, thus leaving the reader always a step behind Faust.
The objective quality of Anmutige Gegend is further apparent from the
scene’s setting, which contrasts to the setting of Nacht. The scene Nacht took
place in a study (a historical setting) and a world of ‘unerklärter Schmerz’,
which hindered the flow of the life force that could have revived Faust.231 In
Anmutige Gegend, on the other hand, the natural surroundings are conducive
to healing and nourishment. Yet, as Michelsen observes, nature in this setting
has an intensified quality: ‘So bietet sich die Eingangsszene dar als ein sinn-
lich-sittliches Experiment der Natur, als objektiver Versuch, bei dem die
Anordnung der Versuchsbedingungen in idealer Reinheit erfolgt.’232 The pure
and uninterrupted flow of immanence of the natural forces in this scene
227 See Goethe’s early planning for Faust II from 1816 in paralipomenon 92 of Dichtung und
Wahrheit in: FA I, 14: p. 983.
228 V. 4613 (my emphasis).
229 See Schöne’s comment in FK, pp. 387–388.
230 V. 4616.
231 See v. 410–417.
232 Peter Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, in Im Banne Fausts (Würzburg: Königshausen
& Neumann, 2000), p. 98.
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contrasts starkly to Faust’s Mauerloch.233 The contrast is so extreme that it sug-
gests what it tries to avoid – it again resembles a laboratory for experience of
immanence of the natural forces! Therefore, Michelson reminds the reader that
the spatial and temporal setting of the scene Anmutige Gegend is to be under-
stood allegorically. In Anmutige Gegend, we find the objective realization of
Faust’s ideal Nature.234
There is another aspect of the first part of the Anmutige Gegend that is of
great importance to this study. In the first chapter, I compared the words of the
Wise One in the scene Nacht to Goethe’s quatrain first written in Lauchstädt in
1805 that reflected Goethe’s productive reception of the Ennead I. 6. 9. In
Goethe’s quatrain, I argued, purification as a hard and long process of abstrac-
tion is absent, while in the words of the Wise One there is an element of nega-
tive process and ascent.235 The Wise One refers to the act of purification by
inviting the seeker to bathe. ‘Dann badet ihn’,236 Ariel says, recalling the two
mentions of bathing in the scene Nacht.237 In the scene Nacht, the act of bath-
ing was an act of purification and a step on an ascending path. In Anmutige
Gegend, the act of bathing has a different significance: Faust is not bathing in
the ‘Morgenrot’, but is rather being bathed; he is a passive subject, not an
actor. Michelson is right to stress the importance of Faust’s passivity:
Man muß sich diese Grundkonstellation vor Augen halten. Es ist von allerhöchster
Bedeutung, daß am Anfang des Faust II nicht das Handeln des Menschen steht, sondern
das Geschehen der Natur. Damit ist unmißverständlich der Rahmen gesteckt, dem der
Mensch eingebunden ist: der Macht der Natur bleibt er unterworfen.238
Faust does not reach or strive for nature as he did in the Nacht scene: ‘Wo fass’
ich dich, unendliche Natur? | Euch Brüste, wo? [. . .]’.239 Rather, nature embra-
ces him. In Anmutige Gegend, like in Goethe’s quatrain of 1805, there is no
place for active purification. Ariel and the elves appear to be in control of
233 See Lohmeyer’s explanation of rein in the context of Arkadien as the state of uninterrupted
and uncompromised immanence and realization of the divine in nature. Michelsen explains
the purity of Anmutige Gegend in reference to this view of Lohmeyer: Lohmeyer, Faust und die
Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung Eine Anleitung zum Lesen des Textes, pp. 337–338.
234 Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 98.
235 See pp. 55f above.
236 V. 4629.
237 The first instance reads ‘In deinem Tau gesund mich baden!’ (V. 397) The second instance,
in the words of the Wise One, reads: ‘Auf, bade, Schüler, unverdrossen’. (V. 445)
238 Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 98.
239 V. 455–456.
III.1 The World of Reflections in Goethe’s Faust 225
Faust’s body: ‘Erst senkt sein Haupt aufs kühle Polster nieder’.240 Then, Faust
is bathed in Lethe’s dew:
Besänftiget des Herzens grimmen Strauß,
Entfernt des Vorwurfs glühend bittre Pfeile,
Sein Innres reinigt von verlebtem Graus.241
At the peak of this regeneration, the holy light is restored to Faust: ‘Vollbringt
der Elfen schönste Pflicht | Gebt ihn zurück dem heiligen Licht.’242 It is es-
sential to note that something is given back to Faust that he already had; in
the Prolog im Himmel, Mephisto tells us that the glow of heaven’s light has
been given to humans. (Mephisto wishes that the Lord had denied them this
light.)
Drawing our attention to the note on Lethe in Hederich’s mythological
lexicon,243 Goethe’s reference book,244 Michelsen remarks that the act of na-
ture in Anmutige Gegend may go beyond healing and signify a rebirth.245 As
Schöne correctly notes, the dew from the river Lethe makes this ‘Bad der
Wiedergeburt’246 possible. In the third and fourth verses of the quatrain from
1805, this divine light is articulated as the presence of God’s own force in hu-
mans, which enables them to recognize the divine in the world and rejoice in
it. This faculty is not attained through an ascending negative effort, but it is
rather active in the appreciation of immanence.
240 V. 4628.
241 V. 4623–4625.
242 V. 4632–4633.
243 Michelsen and Schöne provide information regarding Goethe’s letter to Zelter
from February 15, 1830. In this letter, a context different from that of Faust, Goethe advises his
friend to actively use the human faculty of forgetting: ‘Man bedenke daß mit jedem Atemzug
ein ätherischer Lethestrom unser ganzes Wesen durchdringt, so daß wir uns der Freuden
nur mäßig, der Leiden kaum erinnern. Diese hohe Gottesgabe habe ich von jeher zu schätzen,
zu nützen und zu steigern gewußt.’ FA II, 11: p. 228. For Michelson’s mention see: Michelsen,
‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 105. See also FK, p. 401.
244 Goethes Faust: zweiter Band Kommentar und Erläuterungen, ed. Georg Witkowski, 7th ed.,
2 vols. (Leipzig: Hesse & Becker, 1924), p. 286.
245 Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 107. Hederich explains Lethe as ‘einer von
höllischen Flüssen, welcher insonderheit die Kraft hatte, daß, wenn der Verstorbenen Seelen
daraus tranken, sie sowohl des Elendes vergaßen, welches sie auf der Welt ausgestanden, als
auch der Herrlichkeiten, die sie in den elysischen Feldern genossen, um solcher Gestalt mit desto
weniger Unzufriedenheit in die ihnen von neuem bestimmten Körper zu Fahren.’ In: Benjamin
Hederich, Gründliches mythologisches Lexikon, ed. Johann Joachim Schwaben (Leipzig 1770),
p. 1458 (my emphasis).
246 FK, pp. 405–406. Here p. 406.
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The song of Ariel further highlights Faust’s passivity. Ariel explicitly states
that the merciful act of the elves is not due to any merit on Faust’s part – it is
certainly not a reward for Faust’s ascending purification. It is not even due to
Faust’s being virtuous. Rather, it is the eternal role of the elves to help the per-
son in pain – the virtuous and wicked alike:
Kleiner Elfen Geistergröße
Eilet wo sie helfen kann,
Ob er heilig? ob er böse?
Jammert sie der Unglücksmann.247
III.1.5 Turning from the Sun to Its Colorful Reflections
Upon awakening, Faust opens his eyes to a space shaped for the reader through
the songs of Ariel and the elves. This space is unique in the drama not only be-
cause it is the realization of the ideal of Nature. Faust’s soliloquy in the scene
Anmutige Gegend has three distinguishing features that highlight its seriousness.
The first feature is that, unlike Faust’s soliloquy in front of the macrocosm
sign – ‘Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!’248 –, Faust’s soliloquy
in Anmutige Gegend does not arrive at a painful disillusionment followed by
lamentation. Nor does it culminate in an act of taking distance consequent to
disappointment, as does Faust’s monologue at the end of Osterspaziergang,
in which Faust expresses a wish to fly after the setting sun: ‘Ein schöner
Traum’.249 Another distinguishing feature that is of great importance pertains
to the fact that, unlike all of Faust’s other monologues and soliloquies, which
are interrupted, variously, by Mephisto, Wagner and Gretchen, no one inter-
rupts Faust in this case. Interruption by these companions, Parker notes, ‘pulls
Faust’s subjective lyricism back down into a dramatic relation.’250 In absence of
interruption, the scene suspends the dramatization of the chain of intersubjec-
tive and communicative actions, and moves toward a dramatization of stages
that lead to the articulation of verse 4727. A further distinguishing feature is
that Mephisto is not present in the scene. Without Mephisto, Faust’s remarks
are free of moral judgments. This secluded space intensifies the seriousness of
247 V. 4617–4620
248 V. 454.
249 V. 1089.
250 Fred Parker, ‘Between Satan and Mephistopheles: Byron and the Devil’, The Cambridge
Quarterly, 35, no. 1 (2006), p. 5.
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the soliloquy. Bearing in mind these qualities of the setting, we now turn to
the second part of Anmutige Gegend.
With the heavenly light restored to him, Faust utters his first word – ‘life’.
Life’s pulse beats in him afresh. This awakening is in harmony with nature.
Faust is integrated into nature and moved to greet the day that is about to
dawn: ‘Ätherische Dämmerung milde zu begrüßen’.251 Faust’s integration into
nature is reflected in his description of the earth beneath his feet: ‘Du Erde
warst auch diese Nacht beständig | Und atmest neu erquickt zu meinen
Füßen’.252 At this early point of Faust’s soliloquy, having just mentioned the
part of his body closest to earth, Faust points out that the earth inspires in him
the desire and energy to strive toward the highest being: ‘Du regst und rührst
ein kräftiges Beschließen, | Zum höchsten Dasein immerfort zu streben.’253
This conception of earth is different from Faust’s conception of earth in the
scene Nacht, in which Faust understood the earth as the theater of Sorge. Based
upon the changeable and confusing character of the bodily realm,254 the earth
is seen as the source of Sorge, disguised in the mundane realm ‘als Haus und
Hof, als Weib und Kind’.255 Faust considered the source of life to be transcen-
dent: ‘Die uns das Leben gaben, herrliche Gefühle, | Erstarren in dem irdischen
Gewühle.’256 Furthermore, in the scene Osterspaziergang, I showed that the
earthly and bodily part of Faust’s soul had the characteristic of clinging to the
earth, while the heavenly part desired ascent and separation.257 Faust’s ab-
stracting epistemological and ethical approach developed from this assessment
of the mundane and bodily realms. In Anmutige Gegend, however, nature re-
turns to Faust the heavenly light, and the earth inspires his movement toward
the highest being. In this ideal space, an epistemological shift finds articula-
tion. The shift from an excluding ascending method of attaining knowledge to
one that includes all the senses and the natural realm is a pleasing aesthetic
experience. In his essay Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen
Seele, Herder, whose works had a direct influence upon Goethe,258 outlines
such an epistemological and ethical turn:
251 V. 4680.
252 V. 4681–4682.
253 V. 4684–4685.
254 See p. 64 above.
255 V. 648.
256 V. 638–639.
257 See p. 66 above.
258 One way in which Herder clearly influenced Goethe is that he encouraged Goethe to read
Spinoza’s Ethics, in which Goethe found speculative epistemological views close to his own:
Albert Jungmann, Goethes Naturphilosophie zwischen Spinoza und Nietzsche: Studien zur
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Erkennen und Empfinden scheinen für uns vermischte, zusammengesetzte Wesen in der
Entfernung zweierlei; forschen wir aber näher, so läßt sich in unserm Zustande die Natur
des einen ohne die Natur des andern nicht völlig begreifen. Sie müssen also vieles gemein
haben oder am Ende gar einerlei sein.259
In Herder’s characterization of humans as mixed beings and his effort to clarify
the inner unity of the two faculties at hand, we find a theoretical attempt to
address the problem of two souls that Faust recognized in himself – a recogni-
tion that brought Faust the familiar sensation of pain, as I explained in first
and second chapters of this study. There is a striking similarity between
Herder’s unifying explanation and Faust’s experiences after waking up.
Disagreeing with Plato’s Socrates in Phaedo, Herder asserts that knowledge
cannot be attained in separation of the body from the soul:
[D]as Erkennen der Seele kann als ein deutliches Resultat all ihrer Empfindungszustände
betrachtet werden; die Empfindung also kann nichts anders sein als gleichsam der
Körper, das Phänomenon des Erkennens, die anschaubare Formel, worin die Seele den
Gedanken siehet.260
In Herder’s organic epistemology, each sense (‘Sinn’) is ‘ein Organ, der Seele
Empfindung und unter der Hülle derselben Erkenntnis zu geben.’261 The rela-
tion between sensation and cognition, therefore, is that of multiplicity and
unity, since the goal of this organic activity is recognition of the oneness that is
of divine character: ‘Sie [die Seele] soll unter allen Gestalten nichts als
Wahrheit und Güte ernten, die eins sind. Sie übt sich immer im Erkennen,
indem sie empfindet.’262 Herder’s view of emanation resembles Plato’s views,
but with a twist – for Herder, emanation of the divine is radically immanent in
the cosmos. The core of the process of knowing, according to Herder, is the
practice of recognizing the Good and the Truth in the cosmos. The sensation
nourishes the growth of the intellectual faculty: ‘Jede Empfindung endlich lie-
fert die Kenntnis auf die fruchtbarste und leichteste Weise: das ist das
Kriterium der Empfindung. Viel ist in ihr zusammengehüllt, das auf einmal in
die Seele kommt, dadurch sie zur Entwicklung gelockt wird.’263
Entwicklung von Goethes Naturphilosophie bis zur Aufnahme von Kants ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1989), p. 102. See also FA I, 25: pp. 863–865.
259 Johann Gottfried Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele
[1774]’, in Sturm und Drang: Weltanschauliche und ästhetische Schriften, ed. Peter Müller
(Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1978), p. 399.
260 Ibid., p. 402.
261 Ibid., p. 403.
262 Ibid., p. 406.
263 Ibid., pp. 406–407.
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In Herder’s view, pleasure and cognitive activity of the soul are so interwo-
ven that the soul’s cognitive activity may elude our attention, leading us to be-
lieve that the soul is engaged with nothing but pleasure: ‘Sie [die Seele]
unterhält sich selbst so unmühsam, als ob sie ganz von der Empfindung unter-
halten würde und nicht wirkte, sondern genösse.’264
Herder does not deny that the process of knowing is susceptible to error
and confusion. After all, the multiplicity brought to the cognitive faculty is ex-
traordinarily complex. Yet when error occurs, Herder argues, the senses are not
to blame. Rather, he holds that the evil comes about through the weakness of
the cognitive faculty265:
[D]ie dunkelste und überwältigendste [Empfindung] ist nur in einem langsamen Gange
und größerm Kampfe der Weg zur hellen und um so reichern, richtigern Erkenntnis. Die
menschliche Seele und das Universum für sie ist voll Anlagen zur Weisheit, Güte und
Tugend in jeder Leidenschaft, in jeder Erscheinung.266
Hence, Herder’s ethics does not concentrate on transcending the multiplicity,
but rather on guiding the cognitive faculty to recognize the inclusion of the
multiplicity into unity as reflections of the Good and the Truth in multiple man-
ifestations: ‘Darauf beruht nun auch die ganze Sittenlehre. Die Seele nämlich
zu leiten, daß sie sich nicht täusche, daß sie in jedem Spiegel des Guten und
Wahren auch nichts als diese reine Substanz erblicke’.267
Direct experience of nature provides the soul with the pleasing nourish-
ment that is intertwined with recognizing the immanent divine. Herder specifi-
cally singles out spring as the source of this nourishment:
Ein Blick in die Natur des Frühlings z.E., welche reiche Ernte für die Seele! Duft, Lied,
schöne Farbe, Wohlgestalt – alles fließt zusammen und füllet die Empfindung – ein ange-
nehmes Chaos von Schöpfersideen voll Weisheit und Güte, das auch das Bild Gottes die
Schöpferin in uns, so viel und weit sie kann, nachempfindet und sich, soviel sie kann, zu
einer Welt voll Wohlordnung für sich bildet.268
The passage above shows the deep similarity between Goethe’s and Herder’s
epistemological views. As I mentioned earlier, the image of the divine that is
rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition and Plotinus’s philosophy is modified as an
immanent identity active in the human recognition of the immanence in the
264 Ibid., p. 407.
265 Ibid., p. 408.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid., pp. 408–409.
268 Ibid., p. 406.
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world.269 Herder formulates this idea in its clearest form as follows: ‘Wäre dies
Erkennen nicht der tiefste Grund der Seele, so wäre ihr ja alles gleichviel: so
wäre sie für jede äußere Empfindung taub.’270 This is the core of the view that
is articulated on numerous occasions in Goethe’s poetry: in his quatrain on the
sun-likeness of the eye; in Prooemion; in Wald und Höhle in Faust; and in the
poem in West-östlicher Divan from the Book of Suleika.
Now we can return to Anmutige Gegend. How does the earth (nature) moti-
vate Faust to strive constantly toward the highest being?271 Verses 4686 to 4694
contain the poetic articulation of Faust’s sensory exploration of his natural sur-
roundings (‘die Welt’ in verse 4686). Yet it is important to note that Faust ex-
plores what has been disclosed by the light of the dawn (‘In Dämmerschein
liegt schon die Welt erschlossen’)272 – namely, the inner space of the valley that
is full of fog (‘Tal aus, Tal ein ist Nebelstreif ergossen’).273 Immediately after de-
scribing the valley and the streams of mist (‘Doch senkt sich Himmelsklarheit in
die Tiefen’),274 Faust confirms the crucial role of light – it makes the depth of
the valley perceivable to him. What is explored at this stage is not the one
source of light itself, but rather the multiplicity that the light makes perceivable
by Faust’s senses. In the polyphonic voices of the valley (‘Der Wald ertönt von
tausendstimmigem Leben’275) and the manifold scents and colors of flowers and
leaves,276 Faust’s awareness of the multiplicity comes to life.
The text provides an answer to the question I posed above: these manifold
extensions in life pleasantly activate Faust’s senses (‘Ein Paradies wird um
mich her die Runde’)277 and motivate him to strive for the highest being –
‘Hinaufgeschaut!’278 The word ‘life’ and the quality of being invigorated appear
frequently, in various forms, within the first fifteen verses of the soliloquy:
‘Leben’ (twice), ‘frisch’ (twice), ‘lebendig’, and ‘erquickt’ (twice). In sequences
of pleasing observations of the multiplicity, Faust is led upward from the depth
of the valley to the summits of mountains (‘Der Berge Gipfelriesen’).279 At this
point in the soliloquy, Faust directs his attention to the light and the stages in
269 Enneads V. 1. 10–12. See also: Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, vol. 1: pp. 261–264.
270 Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774]’, p. 413.
271 V. 4685.
272 V. 4686.
273 V. 4688.
274 V. 4689 (my emphasis).
275 V. 4687 (my emphasis).
276 V. 4690–4694.
277 V. 4694.
278 V. 4695.
279 V. 4695.
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which it reaches the world: ‘Und stufenweis herab ist es gelungen’.280 As
the day breaks,281 Faust – ‘vom Augenschmerz durchdrungen’282 – interrupts
his upward movement. In the allegory of the cave, Plato describes the ascend-
ing movement of a prisoner from the depth of the cave toward the sight of the
sun. Though the sun hurts the eyes, Plato insists that the seeker of knowledge
should endure the pain until the eyes grow accustomed to the sun’s light.
Having seen the sun, the former prisoner would pity those who have not yet
broken out of the cave to reside in the realm of truth.283 In Herder’s words, as
Faust explores the depth of the valley, he observes that ‘unten am Berge sind
vielgestaltige Nebel’ and recognizes that ‘oben am Gipfel scheint’s helle’.284 Yet
as the ‘Flammen-Übermaß’285 threatens to destroy his senses, Faust integrates
himself into humanity through his use of the pronoun ‘wir’: ‘Des Lebens Fackel
wollten wir entzünden’.286 Abandoning the ascending process, Faust turns his
gaze back to the earth: ‘So daß wir wieder nach der Erde blicken, | Zu bergen
uns in jugendlichstem Schleier.’287
The choice to turn away from the sun and face the earth has other articula-
tions in Goethe’s poetic works. In the dramatic fragment Pandora, Prometheus
explains the relation between people and the light of the sun as follows: ‘Daß
nicht vor Helios Pfeil erblinde mein Geschlecht, | Bestimmt Erleuchtetes zu
sehen, nicht das Licht!’288 A similar motif is present in the poem Vermächtnis
alt persischen Glaubens in Parsi Nameh (Book of the Persians) of the West-
östlicher Divan. In this poem, Goethe interprets the Zoroastrian adoration of fire
as adoration of the sun on the earth.289 He illustrates the desire for knowledge
(erkennen) of the divine source of life. But the ascending process is interrupted,
and the knower turns back to the earth to explore the natural realm:
Wenn die Sonne sich auf Morgenflügeln
Darnawends unzähligen Gipfelhügeln
Bogenhaft hervorhob. Wer enthielte
280 V. 4701.
281 V. 4702.
282 V. 4703.
283 See: Plato, ‘Republic’, pp. 376–378. Book VII, 515–516 c.
284 Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774]’, p. 422.
285 V. 4708.
286 V. 4709 (my emphasis). See: Staiger, Goethe, p 278. Compare to: Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf
und Erwachen’, pp. 119–120.
287 V. 4713–4714.
288 FA I, 6: p. 693. V. 956–957.
289 See Goethe’s notes on the Divan in: Besserem Verständnis FA I, 3/1: p. 149 lines 9–16.
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Sich des Blicks dahin? Ich fühlte, fühlte
Tausendmal in so viel Lebenstagen
Mich mit ihr, der kommenden, getragen.
Gott auf seinem Throne zu erkennen,
Ihn den Herrn des Lebensquells zu nennen,
Jenes hohen Anblicks werth zu handeln
Und in seinem Lichte fortzuwandeln.
Aber stieg der Feuerkreis vollendet,
Stand ich als in Finsterniß geblendet,
Schlug den Busen, die erfrischten Glieder
Warf ich, Stirn voran, zur Erde nieder.
Und nun sey ein heiliges Vermächtniß
Brüderlichem Wollen und Gedächtniß:
Schwerer Dienste tägliche Bewahrung,
Sonst bedarf es keiner Offenbarung.290
With the sun behind him, Faust gazes upon the countless droplets of the wa-
terfall with growing joy (‘mit wachsendem Entzücken’).291 For a passing
moment, he sees the droplets illuminated and individuated by the light of
the sun. Faust describes the rainbow that he sees by way of the oxymoron
‘Wechsel–Dauer’.
Goethe refuted the theory of refraction. In Goethe’s view, each droplet con-
tains an image of the sun and takes on a particular color.292 Recall Goethe’s
formula from the Farbenlehre: ‘[d]ie Farben sind Taten des Lichtes’.293 The in-
dividuation of each droplet with a color as an image of the sun is the deed
of the light. Goethe brings together his cosmological and natural views to mod-
ify the concept of the presence of an image of God in humans: the droplets re-
ceive their individuality and life (their color) from the divine source that is
present in the sun.294 This view evolves from the titanism in the so-called
Erdgeist scene to Wald und Höhle, in which the presence of the All allows hu-
mans to recognize their natural brethren. In Anmutige Gegend, in the soliloquy
that starts and ends with life, this view appears again in the oxymoron
‘Wechsel-Dauer’:
290 FA I, 3/1: pp. 122–123.
291 V. 4717.
292 Michelsen proves this in reference to Goethe’s letter to Boisserée from January 11, 1832 as
well as from multiple passages in Farbenlehre (see for instance FA I, 23/1: pp. 700–702; 1038):
Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 97.
293 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
294 As I mentioned earlier, we also find this view expounded in Plotinus’s Enneads V. 1.
10–12 as the undescended presence of the One in the individual soul.
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Allein wie herrlich diesem Sturm entsprießend
Wölbt sich des bunten Bogens Wechsel-Dauer
Bald rein gezeichnet, bald in Luft zerfließend,
Umher verbreitend duftig kühle Schauer.
Der Spiegelt ab das menschliche Bestreben.
Ihm sinne nach und du begreifst genauer:
Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben.295
Herder also uses metaphors of the sun and the rainbow to explain perceptual
knowledge. Despite constantly mentioning that sensation and cognition are
identical, however, Herder does not follow Faust in limiting his field of explora-
tion to reflections. Faust’s knowledge and exploration of colorful reflections is
grounded in his awareness that they are acts of light and the images of the di-
vine. Herder specifically mentions that knowing is enjoying each ray of light
and feeling is enjoying the colors of the rainbow:
Erkennen ist Glanz der Sonne genießen, die sich in jedem Strahle abspiegelt: Empfindung
ist ein Farbenspiel des Regenbogens, schön, wahr, aber nur als Abglanz der Sonne. Gehet
diese klar auf am Firmament, so verschwindet der Regenbogen mit all seinen Farben.296
But Herder’s assertion that the senses do not deceive us goes beyond the view
that required the separation of the soul from the realm of confusion and decep-
tion. Thus, Herder can define the exploration of the natural realm as a nourish-
ing process intertwined with the attainment of knowledge:
Kein Sinn, als Sinn kann sie [die Seele] trügen: alle Vorstellungen, selbst die dunkelsten,
sind prägnant von Wahrheit im Schoße der Empfindung: Irrtum ist nichts als eine
Vermischung und Zusammenwerfung zu vieler Teile, deren Grund wir noch nicht sehen,
also nichts als ein Übel unterwegens [sic] auf dem Gange zur Wahrheit.297
In the turn from the absolute source of the life toward life itself in Anmutige
Gegend, we find a clear articulation of Goethe’s view on the impossibility of di-
rect and unmediated knowledge of the truth, which he expressed in Versuch
einer Witterungslehre (1825):
Das Wahre mit dem Göttlichen identisch, läßt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen,
wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten
295 V. 4721–4727.
296 Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774]’, p. 411.
297 Ibid., p. 406.
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Erscheinungen; wir werden es gewahr als unbegreifliches Leben und können dem
Wunsch nicht entsagen, es dennoch zu begreifen.298
The following aphorism sheds light on this view: ‘Wie das Unbedingte sich
selbst bedingen, | Und so das Bedingte zu seines Gleichen machen kann.’299
The Indefinite (or Faust’s ‘Allumfasser’) steps into the realm of appearance by
limiting itself in the act of assuming determinate individuations; each such fi-
nite limitation contains an image of the Infinite. The two passages above shed
light on the modification of the titanic God-likeness, which becomes a likeness
of the Indeterminate in each act of revealing Itself in the multiplicity of unique
instances, similes and reflections.
Exploring the world via the faculty that is the living presence of ‘Gottes eigne
Kraft’300 in us is, therefore, the attempt to know the acts of the Indeterminate –
or in terms of the Farbenlehre, ‘Taten des Lichtes’.301 Knowing is not the painful
practice of death as a means to arrive at the transcendent, but rather the joyful
recognition of the acts of the Indeterminate in Its living finite reflections. In this
spirit, Suleika moves through a thousand veils of the One saying: ‘Du magst mit
Zauberschleyern dich bedecken, | Allgegenwärtige, gleich erkenn’ ich dich.’302
Suleika recognizes the act of the One (Du) that veils itself as the manifold
‘Allgegenwärtige’. Again, in the same spirit, Faust takes shelter in the sphere of
youthful veils from the destructive influence of the direct pursuit of the unveiled
truth – ‘Zu bergen uns in jugendlichstem Schleier.’303
At this point, it is worth examining whether Faust’s soliloquy in Anmutige
Gegend contains any feature of his immanent world-view not already articu-
lated in the context of Faust’s pursuit of Gretchen’s love. In the scenes
Anmutige Gegend, Strasse (v. 3062) and Wald und Höhle (v. 3225–3227) we find
the poetic articulation of Goethe’s famous proposition – ‘Willst du ins
Unendliche schreiten, | Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.’304 Moreover,
as I discussed in detail, the relation between enjoying the unity in all and being
freed from an isolated perspective found its articulation in Faust’s remarks to
Gretchen (v. 3191), as well as in Wald und Höhle and Marthens Garten. The ex-
perience of unity through abandoning one’s self can be found in Faust’s passiv-
ity in his sleep as well as in his use of the pronoun ‘wir’ to refer to himself as
298 FA I, 25: p. 274.
299 FA I, 13: p. 60.
300 FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
301 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
302 FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 1–4.
303 V. 4714.
304 FA I, 24: p. 441. See also Ibid., p. 1070.
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integrated into humankind. A variation of the oxymoron of ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ is
also present in Marthens Garten: ‘Und webt in ewigem Geheimnis | Unsichtbar
sichtbar neben dir’.305
On closer investigation, it becomes clear that the views expressed in
Anmutige Gegend cohere with those which Faust formed during his life-changing
experience with Gretchen. But there is a difference: in this ideal space, absent
reference to other stages of the drama, Faust’s soliloquy assumes the traits of a
lyrical poem.
The soliloquy appears self-sufficient to the reader. It invites interpretation
in reference to Goethe’s world-views regarding the aesthetic exploration of the
realm of multiplicity as the path to acquiring knowledge.
III.1.6 Exploring the Reflections in Faust’s Path to Helena
Anmutige Gegend exhibits the same understanding of unity in multiplicity that
we find in Faust’s love for Gretchen. In Faust’s relation with Gretchen, the sub-
lime aspect of their natural love was constantly challenged by Mephisto, open-
ing the way for the moral judgment of the events in question. After Gretchen’s
tragic fate, Faust’s aesthetic quest for love does not end; however, he redis-
covers and follows the quest of love only in the images that his own magical
power erects before him. Significantly, this quest is limited to outside the his-
torical context of Faust and Gretchen’s relationship and of Faust I.
As Helena’s phantom emerges through the veil of Faust’s own magical re-
presentation on stage, Faust is overcome by a desire for her beauty. Thus,
Faust’s second experience of sublime, bodily and natural love commences. In
the scene Rittersaal, the medium of art opens the possibility for sublime and
natural love to be represented and appreciated without the threat of moral refu-
tation, even though some of the spectators deem the spectacle inappropriate.306
Mephisto does not understand how it is possible that Faust is falling in love in
his own work – ‘Machst du’s doch selbst das Fratzengeisterspiel!’307 This lack
of understanding shows us that it is not ancient Greece to which Mephisto is a
stranger; rather, he fails to grasp the possibility of seeing the sublime in an
305 V. 3449–3450.
306 See verses 6466, 6470 and 6513. The complaints follow Goethe’s plans of 1826; as Paris
appears, the men find fault in his behavior. Some of the women do the same as Helena be-
comes visible before them. See FT, p. 631, H P123B, Reinschrift von der Hand Johns mit
eigenhändigen Korrekturen.
307 V. 6546.
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image and a reflection: ‘Hübsch ist sie wohl, doch sagt sie mir nicht zu.’308
Faust has a strong reaction to Helena’s appearance: ‘Verschwinde mir des
Lebens Atemkraft, | Wenn ich mich je von Dir zurückgewöhne!’309 Faust ex-
presses his need to seek Helena by rejecting a life without her. The pursuit of
love is also intertwined with the pursuit of knowledge; just before reaching for
Helena and falling unconscious, Faust declares, ‘Wer sie erkannt der darf sie
nicht entbehren.’310
In Laboratorium, attesting to the truthfulness of Faust’s claim, Homunkulus
says: ‘Erwacht uns dieser, gibt es neue Not, | Er bleibt gleich auf der Stelle tot.’311
Homunkulus has access to Faust’s dream and he gives voice to the urgency of
Faust’s need to leave the gothic room (his old world) and find Helena.
Homunkulus’s creation highlights an irony of this scene. Homunkulus is
the new born spiritual bodiless being and the highest fruit of Faust’s old
world. Thus, Homunkulus embodies the isolation of that world, as he himself
acknowledges:
Das ist die Eigenschaft der Dinge:
Natürlichem genügt das Weltall kaum,
Was künstlich ist, verlangt geschloßnen Raum.312
Homunkulus is the fulfillment of Wagner’s wish to purge reproduction of sen-
suality and corporeality. Wagner wants the brilliant human mind to procreate
intellectually: ‘Und so ein Hirn, das trefflich denken soll, | Wird künftig auch
ein Denker machen.’313 Wagner sees nothing sublime in natural love, and he
succeeds in separating the body from the soul in its most radical form.
Ironically, within these walls, the paralyzed Faust dreams of an event that con-
tributed to the conception of his beloved Helena. In this house of exclusion,
Faust dreams of an instance of inclusion of the divine in the human sphere. In
Götterlehre, preparing to discuss the myth of Leda, Karl Philipp Moritz describes
Jupiter’s inclination toward the mortals as an act of descending and extending
the divine into the mortal world:
308 V. 6480.
309 V. 6493–6494.
310 V. 6559 (my emphasis).
311 V. 6930–6931.
312 V. 6882–6884.
313 V. 6869–6870.
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Mit seiner Macht und Hoheit vereint sich die ganze Fülle der Jugendkraft, welche durch
nichts gehemmt ist. Der Himmel faßt die Fülle seines Wesens nicht. – Um seine
Götterkraft in manchem Heldenstamme auf Erden fortzupflanzen, richtete er auf die
Töchter der Sterblichen seine Blicke314
Faust’s dream is an instance of the fertility of the mediated presence of the divine
in an image. This image accords with the view that Goethe expresses at the be-
ginning of Versuch einer Witterungslehre and in the soliloquy of Anmutige
Gegend: Since once Juno’s jealousy of Semele taught Jupiter not to reveal himself
to the mortals as he is, he disguised himself – ‘hüllte der Allesdurchwebende in
täuschende Gestalten seine Gottheit ein.’315 Furthermore, Moritz’s illustration of
this scene conveys the sublime and natural beauty of Leda that is irresistible
even for Jupiter. Her beauty drags Jupiter down to earth from his throne: ‘Die
Schönheit der Leda zog den Jupiter von seinem Sitz herab; er senkte sich an den
Ufern des Eurotas in der Gestalt eines Schwans zu ihr hernieder’.316
Correggio’s painting ‘Leda and the Swan’317 helps the reader visualize
Faust’s dream and grasp the sharp contrast between the local setting of the
scene and the dream itself. Homunkulus highlights this contrast (while allud-
ing to Faust’s prediction in verses 6493–6494); he warns that Faust will die if
he wakes up in this room:
Waldquellen, Schwäne, nackte Schönen,
Das war sein ahnungsvoller Traum;
Wie wollt’ er sich hierher gewöhnen!
Ich, der bequemste, duld’ es kaum.318
Reading between the lines, we find the dramatization of a dire need to leave –
a need for emigration (or in Arabic ‘Hegire’ the title of the opening poem of
West-östlicher Divan) from the setting of Gretchen’s catastrophic end to a set-
ting in which the exploration of the sublime and natural beauty in love does
not subject the lovers to torture and death.319 The need for a ‘Hegire’ is present
throughout Faust II. In the ideal refuge of Anmutige Gegend, Faust is revived
through the dew of the river Lethe. We see the reflection of Goethe’s wish for
rejuvenation in ‘Chisers Quelle’ in the poem Hegire of Moganni Nameh:
314 Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, p. 656 (my emphasis).
315 Ibid., p. 656.
316 Ibid., p. 754 (my emphasis).
317 FK. p. 514.
318 V. 6932–6935.
319 FT, Trüber Tag Feld, l. 1–4. also l. 26–27.
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Flüchte du, im reinen Osten
Patriarchenluft zu kosten,
Unter Lieben, Trinken, Singen,
Soll dich Chisers Quell verjüngen.320
The remedy of the Anmutige Gegend, however, cannot keep Faust on his feet and
conscious for more than an act. The Greek and Oriental (Persian and Arabic) ele-
ments of the mask processions in Weitläufiger Saal show the need for an ex-
panded world, and in the second and third act, Faust leaves the historic context
of Faust I in pursuit of beauty and love.321 As far as Faust’s pursuit of love in
Faust II is concerned, the text leaves no doubt that Faust embarks on a mytho-
logical journey. Homunkulus expresses this clearly:
[. . .] setz’ ihn nieder
Deinen Ritter, und sogleich
Kehret ihm das Leben wieder,
Denn er sucht’s im Fabelreich.322
The quest of love in Faust II closely relates to Faust’s realization of the signifi-
cance of reflections. Upon regaining consciousness in Pharsalische Felder,
Faust redirects his attention from the unmediated presence of his object of pur-
suit (‘Wo ist sie? –Frage jetzt nicht weiter nach’)323 to a multiplicity that stands
in relation to her:
Wär’s nicht die Scholle die sie trug,
Die Welle nicht die ihr entgegen schlug:
So ist’s die Luft die ihre Sprache sprach.324
The relation between the multiplicity and the beloved can be compared to the
relation between the ‘Allumfasser’ and the all. Whereas the ‘Allumfasser’ be-
came manifest as the qualities of the multiplicity, here the multiplicity re-
ceives its significance through its relation to the beautiful beloved. In this
sense, the beloved has a divine quality. As we might expect, the path to her is
320 FA I, 3/1: p. 12 (my emphasis). For explanation of the spring of eternal life and Ḫiżr
(Chiser) see: FA I, 3/2: p. 886.
321 In Goethe und 1001 Nacht, Mommsen proves the influence of Goethe’s study of 1001 Nights
on the dramatic construction of Faust II, specifically from the act one to the end of the Helena-
act. She singles out the motifs that Faust II shares with 1001 Nights and stories from the 1001
Nights that are productively assimilated into Goethe’s work. Katharina Mommsen, Goethe und
1001 Nacht (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960), pp. 185–290.
322 V. 7052–7055.
323 V. 7070.
324 V. 7071–7073.
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neither direct nor of an excluding nature; rather, it entails inclusion and ex-
ploration of the most peculiar of individuals. As Faust says, ‘Und find’ ich
hier das Seltsamste beisammen, | Durchforsch’ ich ernst dies Labyrinth der
Flammen.’325 In its next step, this exploration arrives at a poetic image that is
significant to the mediated appreciation of the object of desire in its reflec-
tions. Following the sound of the nymphs, Faust is attracted to the aesthetic nat-
ural beauty; yet he lets himself be touched and pleasingly educated by them:
‘Ich wache ja! O laßt sie walten | Die unvergleichlichen Gestalten’.326 Faust’s new
understanding of ‘Abglanz’ is so central to his approach in this act that he
praises the reflection of the beautiful and healthy ‘Frauenglieder’ in the water for
doubling the intensity of the pleasure they bestow upon the eye:
Gesunde junge Frauenglieder,
Vom feuchten Spiegel doppelt wieder
Ergötztem Auge zugebracht!327
Faust’s awareness of the (not yet visible) beauty of Helena does not bring him
to negate the beauty of her companions; rather he praises their beauty, recog-
nizing their form as ‘unvergleichlich’. Faust is simply aware of a beauty even
more dazzling. He will not stop until he finds it, although he does enjoy the
(lesser) beauty of the nymphs:
Begnügen sollt’ ich mich an diesen,
Mein Auge sollte hier genießen,
Doch immer weiter strebt mein Sinn.328
Importantly, the beautiful images of healthy bodies that reflect in the water do
not pose an obstacle for Faust, since they do not stop or delay his pursuit of
Helena. While Faust conducts this pleasing experiment, Chiron arrives and be-
comes the first one in the strange land to guide Faust toward Manto.
In each step of Faust’s mediated path toward Helena, the mediating figures
confirm the value of Faust’s quest. In response to Faust’s bidding (‘Nun sprich
auch von der schönsten Frau’),329 Chiron attributes the quality of ‘Anmut’ to
Helena, while showing disinterest in addressing her human beauty. Chiron as-
signs a higher value to ‘Anmut’ (relative to beauty) as the source of Helena’s
325 V. 7078–7079.
326 V. 7271 (my emphasis).
327 V. 7283–7285.
328 V. 7289–7291.
329 V. 7398.
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being – ‘ein Wesen [. . .] | Das froh und lebenslustig quillt.’330 This is not the
first time that the word ‘Anmut’ appears in Faust II: we saw it in the paratextual
level in the title Anmutige Gegend as well as in the stage directions just before
the opening verse describing the impression made by the movement of the spi-
rits. In other words, before ‘Anmut’ is ever attributed to a person, the reader
has already witnessed the dramatization of the concept’s influence on Faust as
a moving quality in nature.
The linear steps through which Goethe introduces ‘Anmut’ (‘grace’, ‘charm’
or ‘pleasantness’ in English) into the drama are significant in light of the con-
cept’s historical development in the eighteenth century in the field of aes-
thetics, particularly with regard to the reception of ancient Greek art.331 In his
work of 1759, Winckelmann asserts that the quality of grace or pleasantness is
reserved for humans: ‘Die Grazie in Werken der Kunst geht nur die menschliche
Figur an’.332 This quality, which appears in the movements of human figures,
pleases the beholder: ‘Aller Menschen Thun und Handeln wird durch dieselbe
angenehm’.333 For Winckelmann, ‘Anmut’ is the ‘reasonably pleasant’334 beauty
and, at the same time, ‘das sinnlichste’335 in a work of art. In Schiller’s Über
Anmut und Würde of 1793, ‘Anmut’ remains strictly reserved for humans.
‘Anmut,’ Schiller ascertains, is an expression of the subject’s moral emotion.336
Further, he holds that ‘Anmut’ is a movement that affects the beholder; he de-
scribes it as ‘bewegliche Schönheit’.337 The mover is the human soul moved by
330 V. 7401–7402 (my emphasis).
331 Compare to: Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von
funfzig Jahren’, pp. 154–161. Here, Dane explores the significance of this term in Goethe’s work
Der Mann von funfzig Jahren and provides a brief account of the historical development of this
term as well as the controversies around its application to non-anthropological realm. She dis-
cusses the views of Winkelmann, Schiller, Goethe, and Kleist.
332 Johann Joachim Winckelmann, ‘Von der Grazie in Werken der Kunst’, in Kleine Schriften
Vorreden Entwürfe, ed. Walther Rehm (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2011), p. 158. For more on
Winkelman’s view of ‘Grazie’ see: Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in
Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 155–156.
333 Winckelmann, ‘Von der Grazie in Werken der Kunst’, l. 11–12, p. 157 (my emphasis).
334 Compare to ibid., p. 157.
335 Ibid., l. 3, p. 158.
336 Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig
Jahren’, pp. 157–158. See also Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 100–101. Here,
Michelsen, within the limitations of the scene Anmutige Gegend, mentions the difference in
opinion between Schiller and Goethe on nature as relevant in the context of ‘Anmut’.
337 Friedrich Schiller, Theoretische Schriften, ed. Rolf-Peter Janz, Hans Richard Brittnacher,
Gerd Kleiner, and Fabian Störmer, 12 vols., Friedrich Schillers Werke und Briefe (Frankfurt am
Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1992), p. 331.
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the moral emotion, and the beholder is impressed by this charming and sub-
lime event: ‘Wo also Anmut stattfindet, da ist die Seele das bewegende Prinzip,
und in ihr ist der Grund von der Schönheit der Bewegung enthalten.’338
Goethe, however, sees the quality of Anmut as applicable to nature and
art – not only to humans.339 Goethe’s all-encompassing view of nature, accord-
ing to which nature revitalizes human perception and intellect, differs from
Schiller’s narrow definition of nature that excludes nature from pleasantness. In
Glückliches Ereignis in Zur Morphologie, Goethe criticizes Schiller (and thereby
Kant) for having a view of the subject that does not grasp it as an extension of
nature.340 Goethe then reminds the reader about the all-encompassing Mother
Nature, who lives in the perceivable realm as well as in the subject. This view is
consistent with Goethe’s quatrain on the sun-likeness of the eye and with the
views that are articulated in Faust during Faust’s relationship with Gretchen
and in the scene Anmutige Gegend:
Die Kantische Philosophie, welche das Subjekt so hoch erhebt, indem sie es einzuengen
scheint, hatte er [Schiller] mit Freuden in sich aufgenommen, sie entwickelte das
Außerordentliche was die Natur in sein Wesen gelegt, und er, im höchsten Gefühl der
Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung, war undankbar gegen die große Mutter, die ihn gewiß
nicht stiefmütterlich behandelte. Anstatt sie selbstständig, lebendig, vom Tiefsten bis
zum Höchsten gesetzlich hervorbringend zu betrachten, nahm er sie von der Seite einiger
empirischen menschlichen Natürlichkeiten.341
In Faust, Goethe attributes ‘Anmut’ first to nature and then to Helena. The in-
fluence of nature on Faust is described clearly in the scenes Abend and Wald
und Höhle. This influence remains constantly present throughout Faust’s aes-
thetic quest for beauty. An important aspect of pleasantness (‘Anmut’), Chiron
says, is that it becomes manifest in a pleasant (‘anmutig’) phenomenon; it ex-
tends its influence into the beholder as ‘unwiderstehlich’. Beauty, on the other
hand, resides in ‘die Schöne’ as a self-sufficient and self-referential quality:
338 Ibid., p. 334.
339 Goethe Wörterbuch, ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR; Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Göttingen und der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften (Stuttgart,
Berlin, Köln, Mainz: W. Kohlhammer, 1978), vol. 1: p. 620.
340 See also Dane’s explanation of Goethe’s critique of Schiller in his Zur Morphologie, in
which Goethe points out Schiller’s anthropomorphization of nature and disregard for its all-
encompassing quality in: Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der
Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 158–159.
341 FA I, 24: pp. 435–436.
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Die Schöne bleibt sich selber selig;
Die Anmut macht unwiderstehlich,
Wie Helena, da ich sie trug.342
Chiron mentions the aspect of grace that extends itself to others and that makes
the pleasant so irresistible that the beholder turns into a lover and a seeker. In
mythological works contemporary to Goethe, such as Hederich’s and Moritz’s,343
this differentiation is traceable in the differentiation between Venus’s girdle and
Venus herself. Schiller refers to Venus’s girdle as an allegorical explanation of
the difference between beauty and attractiveness: ‘Die griechische Fabel legt der
Göttin der Schönheit einen Gürtel bei, der die Kraft besitzt, dem, der ihn trägt,
Anmut zu verleihen, und Liebe zu erwerben.’344 In Goethe’s view, ‘Anmut’
reaches a universal level when it encompasses nature and includes humans. In
Anmutige Gegend, ‘Anmut’ appeared as the active influence of nature that re-
vived and embraced Faust’s human endeavor. In the case of Helena, ‘Anmut’ ap-
pears as Helena’s attractiveness that drives Faust toward her.
In the ideal context of Klassische Walpurgisnacht, Faust’s pursuit of love
faces no criticism; before Faust descends into Hades as the second Orpheus,
Manto, whose vision reaches beyond the limits of time,345 praises Faust’s char-
acter and embraces his impossible quest: she loves those who desire the
impossible.346
III.1.7 Lynceus between the Sun and Helena
In the ideal setting of Faust’s second quest for love, Goethe’s productive concept of
world literature shows its most vivid colors. Horst Rüdiger’s article, Weltliteratur in
Goethes Helena, introduces six forms of world literary production: the Greek trag-
edy, the German Minnesang, the Persian ġazal, the European Pastoral, the Italian-
German Opera, and modern English literature.347 In this sub-section, I concentrate
342 V. 7403–7405.
343 Hederich, Gründliches mythologisches Lexikon, pp. 2438–2439; Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder
mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, p. 685.
344 Schiller, Theoretische Schriften, p. 330.
345 V. 7481.
346 V. 7488.
347 Horst Rüdiger, ‘Weltliteratur in Goethes Helena’, in Goethe und Europa: Essays und
Aufsätze 1944 – 1983, ed. Willy R. Berger and Erwin Koppen (Berlin, New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1990; reprint, Rüdiger, Horst. ‘Weltliteratur in Goethes Helena’, Jahrbuch der
Deutschen Schillergesellschaft, no. 8, (1964): pp. 172–198.), p. 115.
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on Faust’s encounter with Helena, and I analyze Lynceus’s and Faust’s articula-
tions that poetically describe their experience of Helena’s beauty, in the scene
Innerer Burghof.
Distinguished for being lynx-eyed, Lynceus is the first to witness Helena’s
beauty. Further in the scene Innerer Burghof he is also singled out by his ability
to voice his sharp observations in song and rhyming verse. Lynceus’s mono-
logue is the first instance of rhyming verse in act three.348 His proficiency with
rhyme fosters a meeting of world literary elements and contributes to the dra-
matization of Faust’s union with Helena. In his verses, we find the poetic motif
of the presence of the sun in relation to the multiplicity that it illuminates. Here
is how Lynceus describes Helena’s bedazzling beauty by way of an analogy to
the sun:
Harrend auf des Morgens Wonne,
Östlich spähend ihren Lauf,
Ging auf einmal mir die Sonne
Wunderbar im Süden auf.349
Rüdiger and Mommsen both mention this analogy of the sun. In his explana-
tion of these verses, Rüdiger remains within the boundaries of Goethe’s allusion
to Heinrich von Morungen’s lyrical poetry. Goethe was familiar with this poetry
through the edition of Minnelieder translated by Tieck, in which Tieck dedicates
a section to Morungen.350 Yet Mommsen locates the sun analogies within a
wider context of Persian and oriental literary motifs that pave the way for the
dramatization of Faust and Helena’s union; in the dramatization of the union,
Helena’s rhyming verses allude to the legend of Dilārām and Bahrām-i Gūr and
the invention of rhyme.351
348 Christian Wagenknecht, ‘Faust, Helena-Akt’, in Ein Text und ein Leser: Weltliteratur für
Liebhaber, ed. Wilfried Barner (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1994), pp. 116–117.
349 V. 9222–9225.
350 Ludwig Tieck, ed. Minnelieder aus dem Schwäbischen Zeitalter (Berlin:
Realschulbuchhandlung, 1805), pp. 221–238; Rüdiger, ‘Weltliteratur in Goethes Helena’,
pp. 100–101.
351 Here, I am referring to the part of Mommsen’s work that investigates the third act of Faust
II: Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, pp. 264–290. This legend is mentioned in the following:
Daulatšāh Samarqandī, Taḏkarat uš-šuʿarā [892 H./1487 CE], ed. Edward Browne (Tehran:
Asāṭīr, 2004), pp. 28–29. It is important to note that Daulatšāh Samarqandy mentions that this
account is a legend. See also: Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, pp. 264–265. The legend is
also mentioned in the West-östlicher Divan: FA I, 3/1: pp. 92–93; FA I, 3/2: pp. 1260–1261; FK,
pp. 611–612.
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Referring to the Paralipomenon 92 of Dichtung und Wahrheit,352 written
in December 1816, in which Goethe discusses his preliminary plans for Faust II,
Mommsen highlights Goethe’s view that Faust, as a German knight, appeared
bizarre to the Greek heroine – he must therefore find a way to her heart with
flattering words,353 Goethe writes: ‘Sie findet ihn abscheulich, allein da er zu
schmeicheln weiß, so findet sie sich nach und nach in ihn, und er wird der
Nachfolger so mancher Herren und Halbgötter.’354
In this early sketch, Goethe had originally planned for Faust to perform the
eulogizing function that is assigned to Lynceus in the final text. In any case, in the
final text, the key feature of the plan remains unchanged; praise – in word and
action – brings together the two distant worlds. Clarifying the scene’s complicated
dramatization, Mommsen points out that Faust follows the pattern of the oriental
kings of 1001 Nights: having sentenced a culprit to death, the king will show for-
giveness after the intervention of a wise and high-ranking person.355In the final
text Lynceus is an aspect of Faust’s own character: first, Faust dignifies Helena as
the queen and the judge356; second, Lynceus grasps Helena’s magnificence and
voices his adoration. The text highlights the connection between Lynceus and
Faust, who pose the same question – ‘was bin ich nun?’357 – after beholding
Helena’s beauty, as though the experience of her beauty transforms them.
Mommsen draws our attention to the oriental elements of Lynceus’s praise of
Helena; apart from Lynceus’s first song, Mommsen argues, Lynceus’s gift of jew-
els and gold to Helena also exhibits these elements. Furthermore, Mommsen
casts light on the significance of the metaphor of bow and arrow in Faust’s
verses; the metaphor of the beloved’s eyebrows and glance as bow and arrow,
and the lover’s heart and eyes as the target, has a long tradition in Persian and
Arabic poetry.358
To appreciate the specific quality of Lynceus’s first mention of Helena in rela-
tion to the sun, we should consider that, in retrospect, Lynceus’s praise is hyper-
bolic. First, Lynceus likens Helena’s splendor to the sun; he then places Helena
above the sun, since he cannot help but gaze at her alone – ‘Statt der Erd- und
352 Numbering according to: FA.
353 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 266.
354 FA I, 14: (Paralipomenon 92.) p. 983.
355 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 266.
356 ‘So hohe Würde wie du sie vergönnst, | Als Richterin, als Herrscherin [. . .]’ V. 9213–9214.
357 Faust in v. 9264 Lynceus in v. 9277. See Friedrich Oberkogler, Faust II. Teil:
Werkbesprechung und Geisteswissenschaftliche Erläuterung (Schaffhausen: Novalis, 1982),
pp. 448–449.
358 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 268.
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Himmelsweite, | Sie die Einzige zu spähn.’359 And in his second hyperbolic adora-
tion of Helena, Lynceus again places her above the sun: ‘Vor der herrlichen
Gestalt | Selbst die Sonne matt und kalt’.360 The hyperbole explicitly challenges
the logic of the simile; as the highest source of warmth and brightness, the sun
(the vehicle of the simile) first intensifies Helena’s beauty, but the sun is then
subordinated to Helena in order to achieve a hyperbole of cosmic proportions.
Comparisons of the beloved to the sun appear frequently in Morungen’s
songs. For instance, Morungen compares the purity of his beloved’s virtue to
the glow of the sun – ‘Ihre Tugend reine ist der Sonnen geleich’.361 In another
instance, the simile becomes hyperbole as the poet identifies himself with the
moon and his beloved with the sun: ‘Ich muß immer dem geleiche spähen | Wie
der Monde thut, der seinen Schein von der Sonnen Schein empfaht’.362 In
Morungen’s comparison of the beloved to the sun, the sun always remains the
superior element; the beloved is never placed above the sun.363
In West-östlicher Divan – specifically in the Suleika Nameh– comparisons of
the beloved to the sun occur repeatedly. In fact, the book’s epigraph is a quote
from Heinrich Friedrich von Diez’s Denkwürdigkeiten von Asien, attributed to
Sultan Salīm I364: ‘Ich gedachte in der Nacht, dass ich den Mond sähe im
Schlafe. | Als ich aber erwachte, gieng unvermuthet die Sonne auf.’365
In Sultan Salīm’s Persian verses, the comparison with the sun has the same
conventional hierarchy as the ascending logic of Morungen’s simile above. Diez
explains this hierarchy as follows: ‘Mond und Sonne heissen hier Schöne oder
Geliebte, in der Schönheit abgestuft wie beyde Gestirne.’366 In another instance
in Suleika Nameh, a verse that we mentioned earlier in this study in Nachklang,
the poet refers to his beloved as follows: ‘O du mein Phosphor, meine Kerze, |
Du meine Sonne, du mein Licht.’367 In the poem Wiederfinden, Goethe uses the
metaphor of the sun as the star of stars: ‘Ist es möglich, Stern der Sterne, |
359 V. 9228–9229.
360 V. 9352–9353.
361 Tieck, Minnelieder aus dem Schwäbischen Zeitalter, p. 222.
362 Ibid.
363 See and compare to: Sebastian Cöllen, ‘Minne und Metapher. Die Lichtmetaphorik Heinrichs
von Morungen in kognitionslinguistischer Beleuchtung’, Studia Neophilologica, 84, no. 2 (2012),
pp. 215–216. Cöllen analyzes the kind of similes and light metaphors in Morungen’s works beyond
Tieck’s translation.
364 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 267.
365 Heinrich Friedrich von Diez, Denkwürdigkeiten von Asien (Berlin: In Commission der
Nicolaischen Buchhandlung, 1811), p. 254.
366 Ibid. Compare to: FA I, 3/1: p. 73.
367 FA I, 3/1: p. 95.
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Drück’ ich wieder dich ans Herz!’368 In his Buch Suleika, Goethe does not em-
ploy the form of hyperbole that places the beloved above the sun. Rather, we
encounter this rhetorical device in Faust. As I pointed out earlier, this form of
hyperbole is first introduced into the drama as Faust attributes the sun’s
magnificence to the place it illuminates in the scene Abend. In the scene
Spaziergang Mephisto says in Faust’s absence:
So ein verliebter Tor verpufft
Euch Sonne, Mond und alle Sterne
Zum Zeitvertreib dem Liebchen in die Luft.369
In Lynceus ‘der Gottbetörte’,370 a strong attraction to Helena spurs him to reach
for a rhetorical device adequate to the aesthetic moment. The attraction to a phe-
nomenon is articulated in the light metaphors belonging to the drama’s semiotic
context thus far. Notably, in the Divan, Goethe does not use hyperbole that sub-
ordinates the sun to the beloved.371 In Faust, even though Goethe uses the bow
and arrow metaphors of the ġazal tradition, the most exaggerated comparison –
the one that places Helena above the sun – comes from Lynceus, whose keen
vision, divine madness and eloquence makes him well suited to such hyperbole.
The Persian poetic tradition offers numerous examples of such hyperbolic
rhetoric employed in the context of light metaphors. Specifically, the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ contains several examples that operate on the highest level of sophistica-
tion. Hammer-Purgstall’s translation of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, which Goethe was famil-
iar with, successfully conveys several instances of this form of hyperbole. In
the following sub-chapter, I discuss how the comparison to the sun in the
Divan of Ḥāfiẓ is a part of a larger constellation of light metaphors in the Divan.
But first I provide instances from Hammer-Purgstall’s translation that cast light
on this rhetorical device.
Just like in Morungen’s songs, the hyperbolic praise of the sun analogies
can be employed in a non-aesthetic context in which the poet praises someone
for his or her virtues; Ḥāfiẓ, for example, praises the dervishes as true kings:
‘Die Sonne legt die Krone ihres Stolzes nieder, | Vor jenem Scheine der
368 FA I, 3/1: p. 96.
369 V. 2862–2864. See pp. 210f above.
370 Compare to: V. 9257.
371 Goethe’s last conversation with Eckermann (11 March 1832) clarifies that, in Goethe’s
view, the sun is the highest of the natural phenomena: ‘Denn sie [die Sonne] ist gleichfalls
eine Offenbarung des Höchsten, und zwar die mächtigste, die uns Erdenkindern wahrzuneh-
men vergönnt ist. Ich anbete in ihr das Licht und die zeugende Kraft Gottes, wodurch allein
wir leben, weben und sind, und alle Pflanzen und Tiere mit uns.’ FA II, 12: pp. 747–748.
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umstrahlet die Derwische.’372 Most frequently, however, Ḥāfiẓ uses these forms
of hyperbole to praise beauty of an aesthetic nature; the eye and the light meta-
phors contribute to an organic whole:
Nicht mein Aug’ allein betrachtet
Die Liebkosungen der Wangen,
Mond und Sonne machen immer
Diesem Spiegel ihren Kreislauf.373
In the following two couplets, Ḥāfiẓ compares his beloved to a superb polo
player; not even sun dares to win the ball:
Wer unterstände sich, den Ball
Der Schönheit zu entwenden dir,
Die Sonne selber ist kein Held,
Der festen Zügel hat.374
Hammer-Purgstall’s translation clearly captures a metaphor in which the sun
follows the poet’s beloved like a shadow:
Deinen Schimmer sah bei mir
Eines Tags die Sonne,
Seitdem geht dem Schatten gleich
Von der Thür’ sie nimmer.375
These examples show the sophistication of the hyperbole in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, in
which the sun is subordinated to the beloved. This form of hyperbole is absent
from Morungen’s songs, which were available to Goethe through Tieck’s edition.
More importantly, this form of hyperbole does not make an appearance in
West-östlicher Divan; and in Faust, it only appears in Lynceus’s (and not
Faust’s) speeches. Lynceus dares to voice what Faust cannot; as Schöne cor-
rectly mentions, Lynceus ‘faßt zugleich doch an dessen [Fausts] Stelle in Worte,
was an zu sprechen die Etikette dem Burgherren selber zunächst verbietet.’376
Dorothea Lohmeyer also points to this unity between Faust and Lynceus: ‘In
ihm erhielt eine Erfahrung Stimme, die in Faust stumm blieb’.377 Through light
metaphors that are remarkably similar to those in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, Lynceus
articulates the peak of the aesthetic experience of Faust’s last pursuit of love.
372 Hafis, Der Diwan, vol. 1: XVII, p. 69.
373 Ibid., vol. 1: CX, p. 369.
374 Ibid., vol. 1: XXXIII, p. 258.
375 Ibid., vol. 2: VIII, p. 39.
376 FK, p. 609.
377 Lohmeyer, Faust und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung Eine Anleitung zum Lesen des
Textes, p. 316.
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Once again, Lynceus poetically articulates the shift from the direct approach
toward the sun to the visual exploration of aesthetic beauty.
The Faust/Lynceus combination facilitates the dramatic progress of the
scene toward Faust’s union with Helena. In the scene Innerer Burghof the meta-
phors of light, eye and glance have a leading dramatic role. Faust’s metaphors of
bow and arrow belong to a larger constellation of metaphors of aesthetic pursuit
of love; these metaphors poetically illustrate how the beloved’s eye and eyebrow
inspire love, whether cosmic love, divine love or human love – and sometimes
all three. In her explanation of the bow and arrow metaphors, Mommsen remains
limited to the possible influences of the 1001 Nights on Goethe’s work. But these
metaphors also appear in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. Considering that Goethe also uses
the bow metaphor inWest-östlicher Divan,378 it is necessary for us to consider the
presence of these metaphors in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan, which represents the peak of the
Persian literary tradition. Here is one example from Hammer-Purgstall’s transla-
tion of the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ in which light metaphors and metaphors of bow and
arrow come together in praise of aesthetic human beauty:
Die Sonne seines Angesichtes
Ist von dem Flaum des Barts versteckt,
O Herr verleihʼ ihm ew’ges Leben,
Weil er die ew’ge Schönheit hat!
Die Seel’ entflieht nicht seinem Auge,
Denn überall, wohin ich schau’,
Seh’ ich, wie er im Hinterhalte
Die Pfeile auf dem Bogen hält.379
In the two final acts of Faust II before the scene Grablegung, the pursuit of love
and beauty, which had been Faust’s quest since his encounter with Gretchen, has
no presence. The scene Hochgebirg bridges, on the one hand, the dramatization of
the path from an abstract pursuit of the transcendent truth to a pursuit of beauty
as immanence of the divine in the world; and, on the other hand, the drama of
the colonizer Faust, whose pursuit of development is situated against the back-
drop of modernism. Unlike the first two stages of Faust’s life, the last stage cannot
be explained or interpreted in comparison to poems of Ḥāfiẓ, since the two above
mentioned subjects of pursuit – namely, the pursuit of knowledge and beauty –
appear to be abandoned and the terms I developed in this study are not applicable
378 For the presence of this metaphor in Goethe’sWest-östlicher Divan see: FA I, 3/1: p. 37.
379 Hafis, Der Diwan, vol. 1: XXXI, 3–4, p. 254. For other instances in Hammer-Purgstall’s
translation see: vol. 1: XLI, p. 107; vol. 1: XXXIII, pp. 257–258; vol. 1: CXV, p. 377; vol. 2: XII,
p. 21; vol. 2: XIII, pp. 169–170.
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to the modern semiotic horizon. For instance, the terms ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’
cannot be applied to Faust’s act of separating the land from the sea or eliminating
the traces of Philemon and Baucis, regardless of the semiotic context of modern-
ism.380 The scene Hochgebirg marks the transition between Faust in pursuit of
beauty and Faust the colonizer. Thus, verses 10039 to 10067, before Mephisto’s
entrance, are relevant to Faust’s experiences of love and beauty.
In Hochgebirg, Faust recognizes the images of Juno, Leda and Helena in one
of the clouds formed out of the cloud that carried him after Helena. The first
cloud’s metamorphosis illustrates a descending path from the divine to human
beauty. Yet as Joachim Müller rightly mentions, ‘Helena ist in der Erinnerung
nun schon keine feste Individualität mehr, keine abgegrenzte Person, sondern
Symbol und Idee der Schönheit’.381 The other cloud, which Schöne (based on
Paralipomenon 179.3 in his edition) names ‘Gretchen-Wolke,’382 is described and
experienced differently: it moves Faust in a delicate and intimate manner. Müller
explains this difference as follows:
Zuvor war Distanz zwischen dem Schauenden und den erhabenen Modelungen, das
Liebliche wurde zuletzt im Majestätischen, Riesigen, Gebirgig-Aufgetürmten aufgesogen.
Nun ist Nähe, Vertraulichkeit, das Zarte umschmeichelt ihn, erheiternd entspannt es den an-
gespannten Sinn.383
Furthermore, unlike the image of Helena, the image of Gretchen does not dis-
sipate: ‘Löst sich nicht auf, erhebt sich in den Äther hin’.384 From the first
cloud’s metamorphosis to the second one, an ideal, mythological beauty be-
comes a historically experienced one. Faust recognizes this second cloud as
‘längstentbehrtes höchstes Gut’.385 He recalls the first time his eyes met
Gretchen’s eyes. Faust’s description of that glance as outshining all trea-
sure – ‘überglänzte jeden Schatz’386 – resembles Lynceus’s verses: ‘Vor dem
Reichtum des Gesichts | Alles leer und alles nichts.’387
380 See: Hartmut Böhme, ‘Eros und Tod im Wasser – Bändigen und Entlassen der Elemente.
Das Wasser bei Goethe’, in Kulturgeschichte des Wassers, ed. Hartmut Böhme (Farnkfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 218–228.
381 Joachim Müller, ‘Meiner Wolke Tragewerk. Fausts Abschied von Helena’, in Sprachkunst
als Weltgestaltung: Festschrift für Herbert Seidler, ed. Adolf Haslinger (Salzburg & München:
Anton Pustet, 1966), pp. 182–183.
382 FK, p. 645.
383 Müller, ‘Meiner Wolke Tragewerk. Fausts Abschied von Helena’, p. 186 (my emphasis).
384 V. 10065.
385 V. 10059.
386 V. 10063.
387 V. 9354–9355.
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In the final moments of Faust’s pursuit of love in the drama, Gretchen re-
turns; the pursuit of love has been traced back to the divine from Helena to
Leda and Juno, and despite Faust’s ideal love for Helena, he missed Gretchen’s
love. The second ideal experience brings Faust a greater appreciation for
Gretchen and her historical, natural and human love. Faust finds Gretchen’s
love no less sublime than the ideal one, which faces no moral negation because
of its isolated phantasmatic character. This greater appreciation shows itself in
the fact that Gretchen elevates the best part of Faust’s innermost being with her
to the ether; this fact is of great significance, since it leads the reader to modify
his understanding of the love that is dramatized in Faust I.
The dramatization of the inner oneness of the two experiences of love im-
plies that all that was true in case of the ideal beauty is also valid for Faust’s
historical and natural love for Gretchen.
III.2 The World of Reflections in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
The previous chapter traced the anxiety that Ḥāfiẓ expresses when he ap-
proaches the excluded realm of nature. He depicts himself as a wayfarer ready to
taste whatever he finds desirable and reasonable and to question any tradition
that stands in his way. In this sub-chapter, I explore possible instances in the
historical development of Sufism pertaining to questions comparable to those
posed by Ḥāfiẓ when moved by natural and aesthetic beauty and its appreciation
in love. Then I explore the dialogue between the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ and Sufi literature
in ġazals that describe the pursuit of love with regard to aesthetic beauty.
III.2.1 A Historical Account of the Pursuit of Beauty in Sufism
III.2.1.1 Being Moved by Beauty and Its Poetic Representation
From the late ninth and the early tenth century CE onwards, we find accounts
of a group of Sufis, who changed the way they responded to visible and sensi-
ble beauty. Certain Sufis prostrate upon seeing a beautiful person388; they were
known as Ḥulmānīya, the followers of Abū Ḥulmān-i Damišqy (Abū Ḥulmān of
Damascus),389 who believed (according to his followers) that God is directly
388 Compare to: Sattārī, ʿEšq-e ṣūfyāne, pp. 186–187.
389 Abū Ḥulmān was originally from the province of Fārs, a province that includes the city of
Shiraz. See: ibid., p. 186.
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present in beautiful people. These Sufis were labeled as the ḥulūlī – believers of
God’s incarnation in the natural sphere, specifically in people. Harshly reject-
ing the ḥulūlī school, Huǧvīrī disputed that Ḥulmān actually held these views.
Surprisingly, further in Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, Huǧvīrī admits that he does not know
Ḥulmān or what he said; nonetheless, Huǧvīrī insists that the view attributed to
Ḥulmān contradicts monotheism and thus has no place in the religion (dī̄n).390
Despite facing accusations of heresy, the Ḥulmānīya did not turn their
backs to natural beauty. In the section of Taḏkarat ul-aulīyāʾ dedicated to Abū
‘l-Qāsim-i Naṣrābādī (d. 367 H./978 CE), ʿAṭṭār recounts Naṣrābādī’s response
when asked about a group of people (Sufis of different levels of maturity) who
enjoy the companionship of women and claim to be untouched by sin while
looking at them: the Sufi master replies that it is important to exercise control
over the body for as long as it exists and that what is prohibited by religious law
should be shunned.391 Thus, no reconciliation between natural beauty and the
extramundane truth is conceivable at this stage, since inclination to the natural
is identified with divergence from the truth – a sin. No living human being is
exempt from this judgment.
In Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, Huǧvīrī strongly condemns Sufis who would frequently
visit taverns to listen to love poems, accompanied by music and dance.392
Huǧvīrī’s vehement condemnation attests to the fact that turning toward the
realm of the aesthetically moving was not limited to occasional encounters.
Rather, it was conceivable for certain Sufis to leave the ḫānaqāh to experience
integration into the environment. As the manuals of Sufism reflect, from the
tenth century onwards, this practice became more and more common.
Recall that Sufi pupils were distinguished not just by the excluding func-
tion of their ḫānaqāh, but also by their clothes.393 Furthermore, they constantly
purified the body through cleansing rituals and the mind through acts of repen-
tance. Now imagine a Sufi disciple with the Sufi woolen garment in a tavern or
390 See: Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, p. 334; Muḥammad Ǧawād Maškūr, Farhang-e feraq-e
eslāmī (Mašhad: Astān-e Qods-e Raḍawī & Bonyād-e Pažūhešhā-ye Eslāmī, 1996/1357), p. 164;
Compare to: Abū ‘l-Faraǧ Ibn Ǧauzī, Talbīs-i Iblīs, trans. ʿAlīriḍā Ẕakāvatī Qarāgozlū (Tehran:
Markaz-e Našr-e Dānešgāhī, 1368, 1989), p. 192.
391 Compare to: ʿAṭṭār, part II, p. 265. See also Pourjavady’s ‘Bāde-ye ʿešq (2): Peydāyeš-e
maʿnā-ye maǧāzī-ye bāde dar šeʿr-e Fārsī,’ p. 12. This account follows another one that ascer-
tains that the first step to proximity to the Transcendent Truth (ḥaqq taʿālā) is the disciplining
of the lower soul (nafs).
392 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 409.
393 See p. 153 above.
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a brothel (ḫarābāt), where almost everything is impure according to religious
law! In such a radically different space, the Sufi pupil must have experienced
anxiety.394 Furthermore, customers of ḫarābāts or the ordinary passersby
would have viewed the (probably drunk) Sufi pupil in their midst with suspi-
cion. Did these tavern-going Sufis not consider themselves wayfarers on pursuit
of truth (sālik) anymore? Or did they consider themselves Sufis, but with a dif-
ferent understanding of the method of seeking the divine truth?
Huǧvīrī provides the earliest Persian account that these Sufis did not, in fact,
abandon Sufism. They justified their interest in music, poetry and the companion-
ship of beautiful people through a simple argument: ‘we are listening to the Truth
(ḥaqq)’.395 But these practices were harshly condemned by many Sufi masters. Abū
Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ġazzālī (1058–1111 CE) pronounced a fatvā condemning to
death any Sufi in a Sufi garment (whom he callsmuraqqaʿ-dārān) who drinks wine
and practices unlawful deeds.396 This fatvā was a hasty measure taken to protect
the reputation of the institution of Sufism in the eyes of the public and to prevent
the spread of antinomianism397; as I mention later in this study, Muḥammad
Ġazzālī’s harsh judgment in this case was aimed at Sufis who practice what reli-
gious law prohibits.398 While condemning this cruel judgment, Pourjavady juxta-
poses Ġazzālī to the Sufi master Abū ‘l-Qāsim Naṣrābādī, who lived around a
century and a half before him and who reacted completely differently to a
pupil, probably the singer (qavvāl) of his convent, drinking wine.399 ʿAṭṭār men-
tions this in two stages: first, the master hears that ʿAlī (the qavvāl) drinks
wine; he then finds him drunk in the street, but responds with tolerance:
It is narrated that the Šayḫ [Abū ‘l-Qāsim Naṣrābādī] was told the following: ʿAlī the
qavvāl drinks wine at night and attends your [the Šayḫ’s] sessions in the morning’. The
Šayḫ knew it was as they said, yet payed no heed to those words. One day, the Šayḫ acci-
dentally came across ʿAlī the qavvāl so drunk that he had fallen on the ground. From
afar, the Šayḫ pretended he had not seen him, until one of his pupils told the Šayḫ, there
394 See §II.2.6 (‘Anxiety in the Field of Critique of the Old World’).
395 Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, p. 533 (my translation). Nicholson in these cases translates hạqq
as God, but without considering the sensitivity of Sufis’ in using various aspects of the divine
with corresponding names and attributes of the divine. It is not right to translate a multitude
of attributes and names as God, lest we ignore the subtle differences conveyed in each case.
Compare to Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 409.
396 See: Muḥammad Ġazzālī, ‘Do maktūb-e Fārsī az imām Muḥammad-e Ġazzālī’, Maʿāref, 8,
no. 1 (1370/1991), p. 35; ———, Kīmīyā-yi saʿādat, ed. Ḥusaīn Ḫadīvǧam, 9th ed., 2 vols.
(Tehran: Entešārāt-e ʿElmī va Farhangī, 1380/2001), p. 486.
397 ———, ‘Do maktūb-e Fārsī az imām Muḥammad-e Ġazzālī,’ p. 19.
398 Ibid., p. 35.
399 Ibid., p. 20.
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he is! ʿAlī the qavvāl! Then the Šayḫ addressed that very pupil, asked him to carry him
[ʿAlī] on his shoulders and take him to his own house.400
In the cruelty of Ġazzālī, Pourjavady finds evidence of the considerable growth
of these antinomian behaviors around the beginning of the twelfth century. But
there were many Sufis who avoided these two extremes – ascetic Sufism, on the
one hand, and openly violating mores and religious laws, on the other hand.
These moderate Sufis (mostly in Ḫurāsān) neither avoided what moved them in
sensible beauty and its poetic representation nor disrespected the religious law,
which they adhered to with devotion and obedience.401 Within this relatively
moderate approach, excluded elements of aesthetic beauty found a place
where the margins of religious law were unclear.
In the taverns, places of gambling and brothels (ḫarābāt), wine and other
inebriating drinks were served by beautiful cup bearers, and music, dance and
love songs often contributed to the festive atmosphere. Whereas drinking and
dancing were prohibited by religious law, love poetry and music were condi-
tionally allowed. Belonging originally to non-Sufi commoners, these mediums
of artistic expression, as I explain in the following sub-section, found their way
into the Sufi gatherings. But their source of inspiration and the manner of their
reception became controversial issues among Sufi masters. These controversies
gave rise to a new approach in Sufism, within which many Sufis expressed
their views regarding the possibility of the relation between sensory beauty and
the divine in prose and verse.
III.2.1.2 Integration of Love Poetry in Sufi Recitals (samāʿ)
According to the earliest extant Sufi manuals, recital (samāʿ) was a common
practice among Sufis. Literally, the word samāʿ means ‘listening’. Specifically,
in the context of Sufism, samāʿ means listening to something being read aloud
in a soothing voice, which may approximate singing more or less closely, de-
pending on the nature of the recital. Samāʿ can be accompanied by specific mu-
sical instruments; Sufi masters differ on which instruments are permissible. In
Šarḥ at-taʿarruf li-maḏhab it-taṣawwuf, Mustamlī Buḫārī (d. 1042) dedicates a
chapter to samāʿ. He first turns to the Sufi interpretations of the Qurʾān to edu-
cate his readers about the origins of samāʿ and its influence. In surah 7, verse
172, the seeds of all human beings answer affirmatively to the Lord’s question:
400 ʿAṭṭār, p. 264 (my translation). Compare to: Pourjavady, ‘Bāde-ye ʿešq (2): Peydāyeš-e
maʿnā-ye maǧāzī-ye bāde dar šeʿr-e Fārsī,’ p. 14.
401 Ġazzālī, ‘Do maktūb-e Fārsī az imām Muḥammad-e Ġazzālī,’ p. 21.
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‘am I not your Lord?’ (alastu bi rabbikum?).402 In Islamic culture, this event is
known as the covenant (mīsā̱q or ʿahd) of alast – an instance of sealing a cove-
nant between God and humans which was uttered in voice and perceived
through samāʿ. This covenant is regarded as the mark of a relation between the
divine and humans in Sufism based on voice and hearing – whether literally or
allegorically.403 Sufis held that the reminiscence of that first voice is what
moves them in their recitals; Sufis believe that their intellectual as well as their
aesthetic faculties originate from the divine voice – from the knowledge of the
Lord and the beauty of the Lord’s voice, respectively.404 The other Quranic in-
stance which Buḫārī introduces in his manual refers to God’s command ‘kun’ –
‘Be!’ According to five verses in the Qurʾān,405 the divine begetting occurs in
response to God’s command: ‘Be!’ The Sufis held that the power of their recitals
comes from the resonance of that first word.406
After reviewing the divine origins of samāʿ based on the interpretation of
the holy text, Buḫārī turns to the natural aspects of samāʿ by mentioning exam-
ples of the direct influence of musically soothing voices on children, the
mentally ill and animals. However, Buḫārī asserts, the fact this influence is
in accordance with nature does not imply that is beneficial to a Sufi’s self-
development – nature is more prone to corruption than to obedience, Buḫārī
argues. Of all the pleasures of nature and the senses, the Sufis only permit
samāʿ – it helps them survive in the face of ascetic denial of food and sleep.407
Buḫārī repeatedly mentions that samāʿ is only meant to prepare the exhausted
Sufi for the next meditation, prayer or mortification of the body. As Buḫārī ex-
plains, the most important condition is the receptive state of the listener: if the
listener’s receptive state is approved, the recital is approved; otherwise, regard-
less of what is being sung, the recital should be condemned.408 Although the
recipient’s mood and mode of reception are the determining criteria, Buḫārī
402 Abū Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl ibn Muḥammad Mustamlī Buḫārī, Šarḥ at-taʿarruf li-maḏhab it-ta
ṣawwuf, ed. Muḥammad Raušan, 5 vols. (Tehran: Asāṭīr, 1365/1986), vol. 4: pp. 1805–1806.
403 On the allegorical interpretation of this verse see: Nasrollah Pourjavady, ʿAhd-e alast
(Tehran: Farhang-e Moʿāṣer, 1393/2014), pp. 179–180.
404 Compare to: ibid., pp. 139–140.
405 In the Qurʾān see the following surah and verses: (2: 117), (3: 59), (6: 73), (36: 82), (40: 68).
406 Buḫārī, Šarḥ at-taʿarruf li-maḏhab it-taṣawwuf, vol. 4: pp. 1805–1806.
407 See: ibid., vol. 4: p. 1810.
408 See: ibid., vol. 4: p. 1816.
III.2 The World of Reflections in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ 255
believes that the profane and natural descriptions of human love (ġazal)409
should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary.410
Huǧvīrī’s treatment of samāʿ, unlike Buḫārī’s, begins with a brief defini-
tion of the senses – they are the irreplaceable agents that provide the heart
(dil),411 the cognitive faculty, with knowledge.412 The four senses other than
hearing, Huǧvīrī explains, provide knowledge of the natural world which can
guide reason (ʿaql)413 in the dialectical process of tracing the changeable back
to the unchangeable; the effect to its cause; and the finite to the infinite.
Thus, from gnosis (maʿrifat),414 one arrives at the knowledge of the Lord. At
this point in Huǧvīrī’s analysis, hearing is praised as the noblest of senses
(without reference to the Quranic verses discussed above); the knowledge at-
tained through other senses is not ‘binding’ (vāǧib).415 Knowledge attained
through reason and the other senses only becomes binding after hearing the
scripture’s words. Huǧvīrī’s justification of samāʿ testifies to the interwoven
primacy of the religious law and hearing. Having clarified this point, Huǧvīrī
begins a chapter dedicated to the benefits of reciting the Qurʾān among Sufis.
The manuals of Sufism show that the earliest common form of samāʿ was the
recital of the Qurʾān. Second to the Qurʾān, listening to moral poems was com-
mon. Yet the recital of moral poetry encountered resistance. In Kašf ul-ma
ḥǧūb, Huǧvīrī complains that ‘[s]ome declare that it is unlawful to listen
to any poetry whatever, and pass their lives in defaming their brother
Moslems.’416 Huǧvīrī considers certain kinds of poetry to be prohibited, and
certain kinds to be admissible:
[W]hatever is unlawful, like backbiting and calumny and foul abuse and blame of any
person and utterance of infidelity, is equally unlawful whether it be expressed in prose or
in verse and whatever that is lawful in prose like morality and exhortations and inference
drawn from the evidences of the Truth, is no less lawful in verse.417
409 Ġazal and muġāzila literally refer to all the acts that are customary between lovers.
410 See: Buḫārī, Šarḥ at-taʿarruf li-maḏhab it-taṣawwuf, vol. 4: p. 1812.
411 Nicholson’s translation of dil (‘mind’) is a rather good choice in this case. However, in the
translations of Sufi poetry and the ġazals of Ḥāfiẓ we frequently encounter the word ‘heart’ as
a translation for the Persian word dil (or the originally Arabic word ‘qalb’, commonly used in
Persian). So it is more clarifying here to use the word ‘heart’.
412 Huǧvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥǧūb, p. 508.
413 Ibid., p. 509.
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid., p. 510.
416 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 397.
417 Ibid., p. 398.
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Huǧvīrī’s disapproval of Sufis who listen to prohibited poetry provides the first
mention in a Persian Sufi text of love poetry that contains imagery of the belo-
ved’s face and body418: ‘Some on the contrary, hold that all poetry is lawful,
and spend their time in listening to love-songs and descriptions of the face and
hair and mole of the beloved.’419 Huǧvīrī’s categorization of admissible and pro-
hibited poetry contains two points of importance for this study. In Huǧvīrī’s
view, there is a direct relation between actualities and words and their spoken
form: ‘[i]n fine, just as it is unlawful and forbidden to look at or touch a beauti-
ful object which is a source of evil, so it is unlawful and forbidden to listen to
that object or, similarly, to hear the description of it.’420 Just as we perceive the
world through sight, taste and touch, we also perceive the world though hear-
ing – through listening to words, arguments and the Qurʾān or poetry. This
point comes out clearly in the following passage from Kašf ul-maḥǧūb:
Those who regard such hearing as absolutely lawful must also regard looking and touch-
ing as lawful, which is infidelity and heresy. If one says, ‘I hear only God and seek only
God in eye and cheek and mole and curl,’ it follows that another may look at a cheek and
mole and say that he sees and seeks God alone, because both the eye and the ear are
sources of admonition and knowledge; then another may say that in touching a person,
whose description it is thought allowable to hear and whom it is thought allowable to
behold, he too, is only seeking God, since one sense is no better adapted than another to
apprehend a reality; then the whole religious law is made null and void421
Huǧvīrī makes no distinction between an actual act or object and its poetic, me-
diated representation. Thus, no distinction is drawn between an experience
and its poetic articulation. Experience in a mediated manner, whether of a po-
etic productive sort or of a reception of such a mediated representation, is ab-
sent from Huǧvīrī’s analysis. It follows that aesthetic representations of actions
are judged no less harshly than the actions themselves.
Almost four decades after Huǧvīrī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ġazzālī (theolo-
gian, muftī, and Sufi) issued a different judgment regarding the limits of
samāʿ.422 In his Persian work Kīmyā-yi saʿādat (The Alchemy of Happiness),
Ġazzālī introduces samāʿ through its influence on the recipient and the origin of
that influence:
418 Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Šeʿr-e ḥalāl, šeʿr-e ḥarām’, Našr-e Dāneš, no. 35 (1365/1986),
pp. 9–10.
419 Al-Hujwírí, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, pp. 397–398 (my
emphasis).
420 Ibid., p. 398.
421 Ibid., p. 398 (my emphasis).
422 Pourjavady, ‘Šeʿr-e ḥalāl, šeʿr-e ḥarām,’ p. 12.
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The cause of that [samāʿ] is a kinship that the essence of human beings has with the heav-
enly world, which is called the world of the spirits. And the heavenly world is the world of
beauty and pleasance, and the basis of beauty and pleasance is proportionality, and
whatever is proportionate is a locus of disclosure of the pleasance of that world. For all
pleasantness and beauty that are in this sensible world are the fruits of the beauty, pleas-
ance, and proportionality of that world.423
It is important that Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī introduces the incorporeal world in
terms of beauty, rather than truth. He asserts that there is a likeness between
the heavenly world and humans. He then introduces the effect of the reception
of beauty in the perception of a proportionate voice that ‘brings about aware-
ness in the heart, and a movement and a desire, though one might not know
what it is’.424 This movement and desire is the effect of the perception of beauty
through the senses and the recognition of the likeness of the beautiful object of
perception to the incorporeal world of spirits. Regarding songs, Ġazzālī accepts
a relation between sensible and intelligible beauty based on proportionality.
According to Ġazzālī, the senses do not provide knowledge of reality, but rather
perceive a mediated disclosure. The kinship between the essence of humans
and the realm of beauty and pleasantness plays the central role in this shift in
approach. Hence, reception through a mediated presence is given high signifi-
cance in Ġazzālī’s analysis. In contrast to Huǧvīrī, who refuses to differentiate
between a mediated articulation or reception and the actual deeds that can be
penalized, Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī defines the human essence as the locus of a fac-
ulty that has an affinity to the realm of beauty and recognizes the intelligible
beauty in sensible instances.
Regarding love poems that describe the body and face of the beloved or
drinking wine and visiting taverns, Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī is mostly concerned
with one’s state of reception:
But it is not prohibited to write or listen to a poem that describes the tress and mole and
pleasance and gives accounts of union and separation and all that pertains to the moods
of lovers. It becomes unlawful if one in one’s mind compares it to a woman whom he
loves or to a child. Then his thought is unlawful. But if he listens to it while thinking of
his own wife or slave-girl it is not prohibited.425
Regarding the mention of wine and places of pleasure in those poems, Ġazzālī
also judges the matter based on the reception of the listener. Ġazzālī does offer
some suggestions for interpreting the imagery in question, yet as Pourjavady
423 Ġazzālī, Kīmīyā-yi saʿādat, vol. 1: pp. 473–474 (my translation and emphasis).
424 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 474 (my translation).
425 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 484 (my translation).
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rightly mentions, during Ġazzālī’s time, a developed metaphorical and allegori-
cal reading did not exist.426 For Ġazzālī, the most important issue is that the
listener not take the imagery literally.427 He stresses ‘I say here that the verdict
over samāʿ is dependent upon the state of one’s heart, for samāʿ brings nothing
to the heart that is not already there. Rather, it motivates what is in the
heart.’428 In Ġazzālī’s view, the intention of the author is irrelevant, since the
work simply provides a reflecting surface for the spiritual state of the listener.
Hence the poetry of a non-Sufi poet can be received by a Sufi, and love poetry
per se cannot be judged. Ġazzālī’s view resembles the view of the Sufi master
ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt of Hamadān, who was an independent pupil of Aḥmad Ġazzālī,
Abū Ḥāmid’s younger brother. The following is ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt’s general view
on the reception of poetry. In the original Persian text, this passage follows a
quatrain that contains the controversial tropes of love poetry429:
You should take each of these poems as a mirror! You know that the mirror does not have
an image indwelling in it (in itself), but whoever sees into it, can see his own face.
Similarly, know that there is no meaning to poetry in itself, though each person sees by it
the gist of his current state and to the extent of his receptiveness. If you were to say that
the meaning of poetry is that which was intended by the poet, and others make up mean-
ings on their own, it is just as though someone were to say: the face (figure) of the mirror
is the face of the polisher (maker) for his was the first face to appear in the mirror.430
ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt’s view of poetry assigns a high level of significance to mediated
truths: looking in the mirror, one can trace self-development over time (‘current
state’).
III.2.1.3 Aḥmad Ġazzālī: Love as an Existential Relation
As Pourjavady has shown, Sufi love poetry describing the beloved’s body and
face did not exist until the middle of the eleventh century.431 The controversies
mentioned above reveal that profane poetry by non-Sufi poets had a wide-
spread presence in convents and Sufi recitals. Yet those who included non-Sufi
426 Pourjavady, ‘Šeʿr-e ḥalāl, šeʿr-e ḥarām,’ p. 14.
427 Ibid.
428 Ġazzālī, Kīmīyā-yi saʿādat, vol. 1: pp. 474–475 (my translation).
429 Pourjavady, ‘Bāde-ye ʿešq (2): Peydāyeš-e maʿnā-ye maǧāzī-ye bāde dar šeʿr-e Fārsī,’
pp. 8–9.
430 ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt Hamadānī, Nāmahā-ye ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt-e Hamadānī, ed. ʿAlīnaqī
Monzavī and ʿAfīf ʿOsīrān, Falsafe va ʿErfān-e Iran (Tehran: Zawwār, 1362/1983), vol. 1: p. 216
(my translation).
431 Pourjavady, ‘Šeʿr-e ḥalāl, šeʿr-e ḥarām,’ p. 7.
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love poetry into the ḫānaqāh did not give any priority to a clear allegorical re-
ception; even as Sufi-poets began to employ tropes of love poetry in their own
poems, there existed no consensus as to their allegorical meaning.432 This is
not surprising, since the first Persian treatise to modify and define the pursuit
of truth and self-knowledge in terms of love and beauty was Sawāniḥ ul-ʿuššāq,
the work of Aḥmad Ġazzālī (d. 520/1126),433 Abū Ḥāmid’s younger brother.
In Sawāniḥ, Aḥmad Ġazzālī frequently quotes quatrains, by himself and
others, with the same controversial tropes of love and wine. In Sawāniḥ, love
and the soul are depicted as intertwined from the moment the soul passes the
threshold of existence. In a quatrain that uses light metaphors and wine meta-
phors, Aḥmad Ġazzālī articulates this view:
Our steeds started on the road from non-existence along with love;
Our night was continuously illuminated by the lamp of Union.
When we return to non-existence, you will not find our lips dry,
From that wine which is not forbidden in our religion.434
In prose, he then elaborates on this quatrain as follows:
When the spirit came into existence from non-existence, on frontier of the existence, love
was awaiting the steed, the spirit. I know not what kind of combining took place in the
beginning of existence – if the spirit was an essence, then the attribute of that essence
was love. Having found the house vacant, it resided therein.435
Further in the text, the combination between love and the essence of the soul is
conceived as an instance in which an image of the Beloved is cast on the empty
mirror of the soul: ‘When it finds the house vacant and the mirror has become
clean, then a form is reflected and established in the air of the purity of the
spirit’.436 The ontological aspect of the human soul appears as a reflected
image of the Beloved cast upon the receptive surface (the mirror) of the form-
less soul, the ontological ground of the individuated human soul.
In chapter 11, section 3 of Sawāniḥ, Aḥmad Ġazzālī conceives loves as ‘a
connecting band attached to both sides’437 – namely, the lover and the
Beloved. In chapter 40, section 1, he distinguishes between (a) the ‘real nature
432 ———, ‘Bāde-ye ʿešq (2): Peydāyeš-e maʿnā-ye maǧāzī-ye bāde dar šeʿr-e Fārsī,’ p. 6; 13.
433 Compare to Pourjavady’s introduction to: Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World
of Pure Spirits, p. 2.
434 Ibid., p. 17.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid., p. 18.
437 Ibid., p. 33.
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of love’ with respect to which the Beloved doesn’t need the lover’s love; and (b)
what he calls love’s ‘customary generosity’ that ‘binds the lover to the beloved’
such that ‘the lover is always the object of the beloved’s contemplation’.438
Aḥmad Ġazzālī wrote his work in a historical context in which Huǧvīrī and
others (Sufis and theologians) who shared Huǧvīrī’s views held love to be irrele-
vant in relation to the divine. Love could only exist between two things that are
similar: since (they thought) there is no likeness between the divine and the
finite human individual, no love between them is possible.439 Aḥmad Ġazzālī
goes even further than elaborating on the relation of love between humans and
the divine and asserting that the Beloved is constantly contemplating the lover:
he goes so far as to admit that the Beloved needs the lover. Aḥmad Ġazzālī in-
troduces this view by differentiating between two aspects of the Beloved’s
beauty: the self-referential, independent act of ḥusn (which is for itself and
non-communicative) is called kirišma-yi ḥusn; and the communicative aspect
that is no longer for itself is called kirišma-yi maʿšūqī. Here, I introduce these
two attributes untranslated. The words and combinations that Ġazzālī employs
in this treatise are his own; he is the first Sufi writer to ever set out to develop
these terms; therefore, knowing what these terms mean in Persian outside this
context will not further the reader’s understanding of Ġazzālī’s work. Instead of
offering a translation of these two terms, I quote two translations – one in
English and one in German – of the first section of the eleventh chapter, which
is dedicated to defining these two aspects of the Beloved. In each case, in
brackets, I add the original Persian terms, if not provided by the translators:
The (amorous) glance of loveliness (kirishmah-i ḥusn)440 is one thing and the (amorous)
glance of belovedness (kirishmah-i maʿshūqī) is something else. The glance of loveliness
has no ‘face’ turned towards anything ‘other’ (other than love itself) and has no connec-
tion with anything outside (of love). But as to the glance of belovedness, and the amorous
gestures, coquetry and alluring self-glorification (nāz), they are all things sustained by
the lover, and without him they will have no effect. Therefore, this is why the beloved is
in need of the lover. Loveliness is one thing and belovedness is something else.441
Das Liebäugeln der Schönheit [kirišma-yi ḥusn] ist eines, das Liebäugeln des Geliebtseins
[kirišma-yi maʿšūqī] ein anderes. Das Liebäugeln der Schönheit hat kein einem anderen zu-
gewandtes Gesicht und hat nach aussen keine Bindung. Das Liebäugeln des Geliebtseins
438 Ibid., p. 57.
439 Aḥmad’s older brother informs us of the above mentioned historical context in Kīmīyā-yi
saʿādat. He defends love poetry and the possibility of a Sufi reception of profane love poetry:
Ġazzālī, Kīmīyā-yi saʿādat, vol. 1: p. 474.
440 Pourjavady uses a different form of transcription.
441 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 31.
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jedoch, die Ziererei, die Koketterie, die Hochnäsigkeit all dem wird Unterstützung vom
Liebenden zuteil, ohne ihn kommt es nicht zustande. Demnach ist hier der Ort, wo der
Geliebte auf den Liebenden angewiesen ist. Schönheit ist eines, Geliebtsein ein anderes.442
The connection of love is based on the Beloved’s communicative inclination to-
ward the receiving end of the Beloved’s beauty. Loveliness in itself, without the
coquetry of belovedness, is like food without salt; Ġazzālī defines malāḥat
(‘being agreeably salty’)443 in the context of Sawāniḥ. Thus, malāḥat (‘pleas-
ance’) in this work pertains to the communicative belovedness of the Beloved’s
loveliness that needs the lover’s quest.
In chapter 13, Ġazzālī further elaborates on the relation between the non-
communicative, self-referential ḥusn (the beauty of the Beloved and the com-
municative malāḥat – pleasantness) and the Beloved’s need for the lover:
The eye of (the beloved’s) loveliness (ḥusn) is shut to her own beauty (jamāl), for she can-
not perceive her own perfect loveliness except in the mirror of the lover’s love. Therefore,
beauty necessitates a lover so that the beloved can take nutriment from her own beauty
in the mirror of the lover’s love and quest. This is a great secret in itself and the key to
many other secrets.444
The most important aspect of Sawāniḥ is that the author locates love at the on-
tological core of individual souls.
The Beloved needs the lover’s quest in order to take nourishment from Her
or His own beauty. Insofar as the lover’s existence is intertwined with love, the
lover holds a mirror to the beauty of the Beloved. In this context, time (or ‘the
chameleon of Time’ as Aḥmad Ġazzālī names it) plays a central role. The soul
wants to see itself with the ‘eye of inspection’,445 Ġazzālī says; this quest of
self-discovery turns to seeing the Beloved – yet not in Herself, but rather in ‘the
image (paykar) of the beloved or her name or her attribute together with it, and
this changes [according] to (the dictates of) Time (waqt).’446 As long as the indi-
vidual exists and develops itself in self-knowledge through the pursuit of
beauty, one can only know the face of the Beloved in accordance with one’s
own state in time. Each moment of this quest is a color on the surface of the
chameleon.
442 Aḥmad Ġazzāli, Gedanken über die Liebe, trans. Richard Gramlich (Mainz: Akademie der
Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1976), p. 24.
443 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 32.
444 Ibid., pp. 33–34.
445 Ibid., p. 18.
446 Ibid.
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The lovers perceive their being as arising from the Beloved’s continuous con-
templation of Her/His own image, which appears in the mirror of their (the lov-
ers’) souls. Since the lovers conceive their being as the being of an image of the
Beloved reflected in them, their colorful quest can be appreciated in relation to
the Beloved; this colorful quest includes the moments of self-deification.447 Since
the quest of love only unfolds through seeing images of the Beloved (or names
and attributes of the Beloved within the colorations in time), the manifold, timely
colors of the colorless Beloved are the instances in which the Beloved takes nour-
ishment from the communicative aspect that is the Beloved’s belovedness. In
this way, the difference between the term talvīn (‘coloration’) and tamkīn (‘rest in
total annihilation’) acquires more significance. The two terms talvīn and tamkīn
were part of Sufi terminology and are documented in the earliest manuals
handed down to us. In Rūmī’s Mas̱navī-yi maʿnavī, coloration belongs to the
realm of multiplicity and life, whether in the heavenly realm or on earth: ‘All the
colorations spring from the moments, | He who is freed from the moments is
emancipated from coloration’.448 On the relation between the quest and the col-
oration, on the one hand, and abiding in annihilation of the individuation in the
union, Rūmī writes: ‘There are uphills and downhills, o flood in your way | As
you reach the sea, the coloration shall wash away’.449 In the following poem,
Rūmī defines the state of talvīn as the Beloved’s attempts to develop Her lovers in
different states:
He who makes bodies out of dirt, and turns smoke into Saturn
O dirt of the body, you smoke of the heart! See what out of you she shall make
A moment gives you wings, a moment an anchor,
A moment makes you day, a moment night
A moment shakes you, a moment makes you laugh
A moment inebriates you, a moment a goblet she makes out of you
Like a pawn in her hand, once her wine, once inebriated by her
She shall break your pawn, by God she shall make you complete
A moment being this, another moment that, and your end shall be abiding (tamkīn)
Yet by these colorations (talvīnhā) she tames and makes you receptive.450
447 Compare to chapter eighteen of the Sawāniḥ: Ġazzālī, Sawāniḥ, pp. 18–19.; Ghazzālī,
Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, pp. 37–38.
448 Ǧumla talvīnhā zi sāʿat ḫāstast | Rast az talvīn ki az sāʿat birast. Ǧalāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad
Rūmī Balḫī, Masṉavī-yi maʿnavī (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1335/1957), p. 485, III. Book, couplet:
2074 (my translation).
449 Iy siyl dar īn rāh-i tu bālā u našīb ast | Talvīn biravad az tu ču dar baḥr rasīdī ———,
Kollīyāt-e Šams-i Tabrīzī, ed. M. Darvīš (Tehran: Ǧāvīdān, 1341/1962), vol. 2: 1261, couplet 15,
p. 521 (my translationp).
450 Ibid., vol. 1: 543, couplets 5–9, p. 219 (my translation).
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Although his treatise is not written in a systematic and logical manner, Aḥmad
Ġazzālī’s contributions to Sufism in Sawāniḥ pave the way for understanding
the pursuit of love and beauty as the Sufi’s object of pursuit. The treatise be-
came influential, although it was originally meant for his own pupils, and not
the wider public.451 Consequent to this work, Sufis gave greater ontological
significance to love and modified the quest for truth in accordance with the
quest for beauty in love. The greatest of the Sufi-poets – Sanāʾī, ʿAṭṭār, Rūmī,
ʿIrāqī, and Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī – appear after Aḥmad Ġazzālī, and in their
poetry they turn the tropes of non-Sufi poetry pertaining to the description of
the beloved, as well as bacchanalian tropes, to metaphors with allegorical
meanings. In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, as I explain in the section ‘Alliance of Beauty
and Pleasance’, we can trace the influence of Aḥmad Ġazzālī and the term
malāḥat as he defined it – namely, in relation to the communicative aspect of
the beloved’s beauty. In addition to his intellectual and literary contributions
to the development of Sufi love, Aḥmad Ġazzālī contributed to the history of
Sufism through his enjoyment of human beauty as a locus of mediated divine
beauty. While condemning Ġazzālī’s behavior, Ǧauzy recounts the following
story: once, Ġazzālī’s pupils entered his house to find Ġazzālī with a beautiful
young man holding a red rose; Ġazzālī looked at the flower, then at the beauti-
ful person, without paying attention to his pupils.452 Following A. Ġazzālī, the
adorers of beauty (ǧamāl parastān) among the Sufis held that the Infinite ex-
ists in a mediated relation with the finite. Hence, they perceived each beautiful
phenomenon as a reflecting surface upon which divine beauty can be explored
and enjoyed.
III.2.1.4 Seeing the Reflection of the Moon on the Water
Among the Sufi adorers of beauty, Auḥad ud-Dīn of Kerman, a follower of the
school of Aḥmad Ġazzālī, is among the most famous. Considering human
beauty as a shadow, image or reflection of divine beauty, he wrote many poems
(mostly quatrains) describing beautiful young men. Human body as the locus
of disclosure testifies to divine beauty, according to the Sufi adorers of beauty.
Thus, a beautiful person (regardless of gender) was referred to as a šāhid – liter-
ally, ‘witness’. And the aesthetic contemplation of these šāhids was called
šāhid bāzī. However, outside the context of Sufism, and according to the use of
451 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 6.
452 Ibn Ǧauzī, Talbīs-i Iblīs, p. 194.
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this compound verb in Niẓāmī’s (d. 1209) Ḫusrau u Šīrīn, šāhid bāzī refers to the
sensual pleasures that unmarried couples allow themselves.453
Both Aflākī (in Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn) and Ǧāmī (in Nafaḥāt ul-uns) recount a
meeting between Šams of Tabriz (Rūmī’s mentor) and Auḥad ud-Dīn that shows
the importance of the mediated perception of the object of pursuit among Sufis
that pursued beauty in human and natural form. During a musical recital of
love poetry, Šams finds Auḥad ud-Dīn looking at a beautiful šāhid; Šams ex-
presses his disapproval. In the conversation between the two Sufis, human
beauty is metaphorically referred to as the reflecting surface of water, and di-
vine beauty is likened to the moon in the sky.454 It should be noted that, since
Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn was written as a biographical work in praise of Rūmī, the
account of this encounter is biased against Auḥad ud-Dīn:
He [Šams] asked: ‘what is occupying you?’ He [Auḥad ud-Dīn] said: ‘I am watching the
moon on the water in the basin’; he [Šams] said, ‘if you do not have a boil on the back of
your neck why don’t you look at it on the sky? Now find yourself a physician to cure you
so that you see the true object of pursuit in whatever you look at.’455
In Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn’s account, Šams attributes two faults to Auḥad ud-Dīn.
First, Šams holds that Auḥad ud-Dīn has an illness that prevents him from di-
rectly pursuing the truth; the boil represents lust and inclination toward the
bodily. The second fault that Šams attributes to Auḥad ud-Dīn is in tension
with the first one; if Auḥad ud-Dīn were cured of his illness, he would have to
look directly at the moon, rather than at its mediated presence in all he would
look at.
Ǧāmī quotes Aflākī’s work. But Ǧāmī eliminates the second fault that Šams
attributed to Auḥad ud-Dīn and mentions that Auḥad ud-Dīn was, allegedly, ac-
cused of heresy by Abū Ḥafṣ Suhravardī:
It may be that Šayḫ Suhravardī accused him [Auḥad ud-Dīn] of heresy, for it is said that
he [Auḥad ud-Dīn] relied on witnessing [šuhūd] the truth in formal manifestations (visible
world),456 and witnessed the absolute (indeterminate) beauty in the determinate forms
[ṣuvar-i muqayyadāt], and as mentioned before, Šayḫ Šams ud-Dīn Tabrīzī asked him:
453 Dilaš dar band-i ān pākīza dilband | Ba šāhid bāzī ān šab gašt ḫursand. In: Niẓāmī
Ganǧavī, Kollīyāt-e Niẓāmī Ganǧavī (Tehran: Entešārāt-e Zarrīn, 1364/1985), p. 301.
454 Compare to: Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī, Dīvān-e robaʿīyāt-e Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī, ed.
Aḥmad Abū Maḥǧūb (Tehran: Sorūš, 1366/1987), pp. 63–64. See also: Nasrollah Pourjavady,
‘Roʾyat-e māh dar āsemān (1)’, Našr-e Dāneš, no. 55 (Āẕar–Dey 1368/Nov–Dec 1989), p. 13.
455 Aflākī,Manāqib ul-ʿārifīn, vol. 2: p. 616 (my translation).
456 In this translation, ‘form’ and ‘formal’ are opposed to ‘spiritual’ or ‘inward’. ‘Formal’ is
suggested as a translation for ṣūrī, and ‘form’ for ṣūrat. Specifically, in Auḥad ud-Dīn’s
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‘what is occupying you? He answered I am watching the moon in the basin of water’. So
Šams replied: ‘if you do not have a boil on the back of your neck, why don’t you look at
the moon on the sky?’457
In both accounts, the Sufi adorer of beauty is not inclined to defend his views.
Ǧāmī’s cautious words provide a window to Auḥad ud-Dīn’s views, which are
explained in a non-aphoristic manner:
Some greats among the ʿārifs (the gnostic), may the exalted Allah sanctify their souls, say
on the matter of monism (tauḥīd), and verification (taḥqīq), that perfect is he who wit-
nesses with his eyes the absolute beauty of the pure Truth (ḥaqq subḥāna) in the sensible,
begotten manifestations, just as they [the ʿārifs] witness the spiritual manifestations with
insight. [. . .] And the perfect beauty of the pure Truth has two attributes: one unbound
that is the truth of the beauty of essence in respect to what it is in itself, and the ʿārif can
witness this absolute beauty in annihilation in Allah the pure; and the other is bound
(determinate) and is possible due to its descent in the sensible or spiritual manifestations.
So, if the ʿārif sees those of beauty, he sees them in this light, and considers them to be
the beauty of the Truth descended in the graduations of the existents, and the non-ʿārif
who lacks this manner of vision (naẓar), should avoid looking at those of beauty so he
does not fall into the abyss of bewilderment.458
Ǧāmī adduces several quatrains and an ode by Auḥad ud-Dīn’s to help the
reader understand the idea behind Auḥad ud-Dīn’s inclination to human
beauty; Ǧāmī also provides discursive explanation, as in the passage above,
where he uses Sufi theosophical and metaphysical terminology developed by
the disciples of Ibn ʿArabī.
Auḥad ud-Dīn was a friend of Muḥīy ud-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240), com-
monly known as Ibn ʿArabī, one of the most prolific Sufi masters. Ibn ʿArabī
was the founder of theoretical sufism (taṣavvuf-i naẓarī) and wrote many vol-
umes explaining his Sufi theories that later become known as the doctrine of
the Unity of Existence.459 In Futūḥāt al-makkīa, Ibn ʿArabī praises Auḥad ud-
Dīn; in fact, Ibn ʿArabī even entrusted his stepson (and greatest exponent) Ṣadr
quatrains, ṣūrat (form, outward) is frequently used, since the poet plays with the homonymous
ṣūrat, meaning ‘face’.
457 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 590 (my translation).
458 Ibid., pp. 590–591 (my translation).
459 William C. Chittick, ‘Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Isḥāḳ b. Muḥammad b. Yūnus al-Ḳūnawī’
In Encyclopaedia of Islam, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and
W.P. Heinrichs, (Brill, 2012) http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_6431, Access Date:
05.19.2017.
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ud-Dīn Qūnavī (1207–1274) to Auḥad ud-Dīn for a period of time.460 Unlike Ibn
ʿArabī, Auḥad ud-Dīn, despite charges of heresy, did not expound his views re-
garding his adoration of beauty (ǧamālparastī) in prose; these views only ap-
pear in his quatrains. Ğāmī, a follower of Ibn ʿArabī’s school, provides the
explanation above based on his own understanding of Ibn ʿArabī’s theories
gained through the comprehensive commentaries of Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnavī.461
Since Ibn ʿArabī’s oeuvre is written in Arabic, his views did not immedi-
ately influence the Persian Sufi literature that had taken an approach to the im-
manence of the divine in the world expressed in the tropes of non-Sufi love. Ibn
ʿArabī influenced Persian Sufi thought and its literary articulation in stages;
Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnavī played a central role in this process. During the education
he received under the guardianship of Auḥad ud-Dīn, the young Qūnavī trav-
eled to Shiraz and stayed there, with Auḥad ud-Dīn, for two years.462 Through
his contact with Rūmī (who also lived in Konya), Qūnavī was the ideal person
to communicate the views of Ibn ʿArabī to the Sufis of Ḫurāsānī tradition. Faḫr
ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī (d. 1289) integrated the views of Ibn ʿArabī, which he received di-
rectly from Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnavī, into the language of love poetry and the views
of Aḥmad Ġazzālī.
III.2.1.5 A Brief Note on ʿIrāqī’s Life
The Sufi adorer of human beauty who shared the greatest intellectual affinity
to Ḥāfiẓ was Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī. Both used the tropes of wine and the beauty
of the beloved’s face in their ġazals, and Ḥāfiẓ frequently alluded to ʿIrāqī’s
ġazals.463 ʿIrāqī’s work spans both classical poetry (in which he shows the
highest level of mastery) and prose – he authored a famous Sufi treatise titled
Lamaʿāt, which is interspersed with verses, both his own and those of other
Sufi-poets. His life is the subject of several Sufi hagiographies, such as
Nafaḥāt ul-uns of Ǧāmī and Maǧālis ul-ʿuššāq of Gāzargāhī,464 attributed to
Sultan Ḥusaīn Bāyqarā. According to Ǧāmī’s account, one of the main sources
460 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 588. See also: Leonard Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity:
The Sufi Poetry and Teachings of Maḥmūd Shabistarī, ed. Ian Richard Netton, Curzon Sufi
Series (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p. 145.
461 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 556.
462 William C. Chittick, Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Texts, ed.
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Suny Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),
p. 261.
463 Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 460, pp. 322–323.
464 ʿAlīriḍā Ẕakāvatī Qarāgozlū, ‘Taḥlīlī bar ketāb-e Maǧālis ul-uššāq’, Taḥqīqāt-e Eslāmī,
no. 1 & 2 (Spring & Summer of 1370/1991), p. 221.
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of Browne and Schimmel,465 the life of the precocious ʿIrāqī, who lectured in
several important madrasas while he was still young, reached a turning point
when he was seventeen years old and a group of antinomian dervishes took
up residence in his home town Hamadān. Among the guests was a young man
of extraordinary loveliness, to whom ʿIrāqī owed his first experience of love.
When the antinomian dervishes left the town to continue wandering, ʿIrāqī
followed them. His travels led him to India and the city of Multan, where he
met Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Multānī, his Sufi mentor for the next 25 years.
Remarkably, even though Ǧāmī’s account distances itself from ʿIrāqī’s way
of life, it contains more instances of ʿIrāqī being moved by the beauty of young
men or boys than even Maǧālis ul-ʿuššāq, a popular book not written by a Sufi
master.466 ʿIrāqī had been appointed the successor to his mentor; but after his
mentor’s death, as Ǧāmī explains and the writer of Maǧālis ul-ʿuššāq corrobo-
rates, ʿIrāqī instead left Multān – his habit of keeping company with beautiful
men, reported to the governor, disqualified him from the position. Leaving
Multan, ʿIrāqī pilgrimaged to Mecca and Medina. He reached Konya in Asia
Minor, where he received lessons on Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ ul-ḥikam directly from
Ibn ʿArabī’s best commentator and disciple, Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnavī. During this
time, ʿIrāqī composed Lamaʿāt, which he submitted to Qūnavī, who approved
of the work.467 Ǧāmī recounts that Muʿīn ud-Dīn Parvāna, one of Qūnavī’s influ-
ential disciples, offered ʿIrāqī financial support; ʿIrāqī declined the offer, sug-
gesting that Parvāna instead do him the favor of bringing to his ḫānaqāh Ḥasan
Qavvāl, a singer (qavvāl) whose beauty was exemplary. In Nafaḥāt ul-uns, four
instances of love accompany each turn of ʿIrāqī’s life. They are all instances of
ʿIrāqī’s adoration of the beauty of men; in some cases, however, Ǧāmī shows
clearly that ʿIrāqī’s love was of a sublime nature.
ʿIrāqī’s ġazals are colored by the fact that ʿIrāqī was also an accomplished
prose writer. In his lyrics, ʿIrāqī is always illustrating and articulating his com-
plicated views on divine beauty, the world, and the lover, in terms of self-
disclosure and the emanation of beauty.468 In Lamaʿāt, he quotes his own
465 See E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, IV vols. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1951),
vol. 3: pp. 124–127; Annemarie Schimmel, Mystische Dymensionen des Islam (Köln: Diederichs,
1985), pp. 496ff.
466 Compare to: Maǧālis ul-ʿuššāq, (Lucknow: Munshi Naval Kishore, 1293/1876), pp. 119–123.
467 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 603; Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. 3: p. 127.
468 As Izutsu rightly mentions, in the works of the Sufis who were under the direct influence
of Ibn ʿArabī, emanation and self-disclosure of beauty are one and the same. See in: Toshihiko
Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), p. 155.
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ġazals in order to provide a rhetorically perfected articulation of the views he
explains in aphoristic prose. Most modern editions of ʿIrāqī’s works contain a
terminological lexicon, attributed to him, which explains almost all the tropes
and metaphors used by early Sufi-poets. In order to understand several of
Ḥāfiẓ’s most important ġazals, we need to turn to Aḥmad Ġazzālī, ʿIrāqī and
Šabistarī – a Sufi master I will discuss later.
III.2.2 Emanation of Beauty
In the epilogue to Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī acknowledges the thematic connection be-
tween his work and A. Ġazzālī’s Sawāniḥ. Lamaʿāt’s style of prose interspersed
with verse can be traced to Sawāniḥ’s influence, but Lamaʿāt also further devel-
ops specific aspects of Sawāniḥ in accordance with ʿIrāqī’s own views and the
teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, received from Qūnavī.
In the first chapter of Lamaʿāt, love is introduced as the source from which
the beloved and the lover are derived.469 Immediately after this explanation,
ʿIrāqī asserts in the first Lamʿa470 that ‘Love upon Its mighty Throne is purified of
all entification’.471 ʿIrāqī clarifies that there are two aspects to love: one that faces
itself, and one that faces the multiplicity. This distinction is reminiscent of
Ġazzālī’s distinction between two aspects of divine beauty – non-communicative
and communicative. As a historical extension of Sawāniḥ, Lamaʿāt characterizes
self-revealing and self-knowledge of the communicative aspect as different im-
ages of the One cast upon mirrors; thus, although many images appear in the
multiplicity, there is only one being, beyond entification in Itself, that pervades
all existence.
The will of the One (Love) to manifest and appreciate Itself necessitates
that It show Itself in two different mirrors: that of the lover [or loverhood
(ʿāšiqī)] and that of the beloved [or beloved-ness (maʿšūqī)].472
Thus, that It might manifest Its perfection (a perfection identical both with Its own
Essence and Its own Attributes), It showed Itself to Itself in the looking-glass of ‘lover’
and ‘Beloved.’ It displayed Its own loveliness to Its own eyes, and became viewer and
469 Fakhruddin ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and
Peter Lamborn Wilson (New York, Ramsey, Toronto: Paulist, 1982), p. 73; ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye
āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 457.
470 Each chapter of Lamaʿāt (Flashes) is a Lamʿa (Flash).
471 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 73.
472 ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 457.
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viewed; the names ‘lover’ and ‘Beloved,’ the attributes of seeker and Sought, then ap-
peared. When Love revealed the Outward to the Inward, It made the lover’s fame; when It
embellished the Inward with the Outward, It made known the Beloved’s name.473
In ʿIrāqī’s emanative cosmology, the first emanation after the absolute, non-
communicative level is referred to as the beauty of the face of the Beloved. The
rays of beauty emanate in two directions: (a) ‘the viewed’ (Beloved) or, as we
read above, ‘the embellishing of the inward with the outward’474; and (b) the
direction of recipient of the beauty (lover) – ‘revealing of the outward to the
inward’ to beget the viewer. These are two attributes of the One.475
According to ʿIrāqī, in its communicative act, Love discloses itself in count-
less attributes and names. The extension of these names and attributes in the
natural world makes up the realm of multiplicity and aesthetic beauty – or what
ʿIrāqī calls the aspect of being viewed ‘manẓūrī’.476 The Beloved’s malāḥat – ‘the
amorous glance of belovedness’, to use Pourjavady’s translation of Sawāniḥ –
discloses countless aspects of the Beloved’s infinite being by limiting the Beloved
behind the veil of countless attributes and names. In other words, by willingly
limiting itself in the act of veiling, the communicative aspect of the Infinite dis-
closes itself.477 In the seventeenth Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī writes: ‘Each moment from each
of the myriad windows of the Attributes the Beloved shows the lover a different
face’.478 Nature attains its existence in virtue of being the locus of disclosure of
the attributes of the Infinite. The disclosure of the attributes is conceived as the
acts of the Infinite, which are done willingly. This willing act of disclosure ac-
counts for the immanence of the Infinite in the finite realm.
III.2.2.1 Alliance of Beauty and Pleasance
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, there are a number of ġazals that go beyond the familiar
poetic topoi of ġazals from Sanāʾī to Saʿdī – the beauty of a beloved’s face or
473 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 73.
474 Here, we should highlight ʿIrāqī’s assessment of entification in which the inward (the in-
telligible) is not described as descended or denigrated, but is rather embellished by the out-
ward (the bodily).
475 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 73.
476 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 457.
477 In §III.2.2.3 (‘Love as an Artist’), I explain this aspect in connection with the presence of
this view in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
478 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 104.
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body; moments of immense ecstasy, when the beloved is close; and anguish
and lamentation, when the beloved is not. In some of the ġazals that I exam-
ine below, Ḥāfiẓ does not write to entrance his reader; rather, he poetically
describes a theosophical view with ontological, cosmological, and anthropo-
logical aspects. These ġazals are reminiscent of several of ʿIrāqī’s ġazals and
qaṣāʾid.479 In these ġazals, we find Ḥāfiẓ in dialogue with the Sufi adorers of
beauty.
In the following ġazal, we find the terms ḥusn and malāḥat in the context
of pervading and formation of the universe by Love, as conceived by A. Ġazzālī.
Here are the first six couplets of this poem in Wohlleben’s translation:
1 Deine Schönheit hat im Bund mit deiner Anmut die Welt erobert;
ja, (so) verbündet, kann man die Welt erobern.
2 Das Geheimnis unserer Abgeschiedenheit wollte die Kerze ausplaudern;
Gott sei Dank, daß das Geheimnis ihres Herzens die Zunge ergriffen hat.
3 Vom Feuer, welches in meinem Busen verborgen ist,
ist die Sonne nur ein Funke, der den Himmel entflammt hat.
4 Die Rose wollte prahlen von Farbe und Duft des Freundes;
aus Eifersucht [ġayrat] hielt der Morgenwind seinen Atem im Mund.
5 Ruhig spazierte ich – wie der Zirkel – am Rand entlang,
(doch) der Zeitenlauf zwang mich – wie den (Kreis-)Mittelpunkt – am Ende mitten hinein.
6 An jenem Tag setzte meine Liebe zum Pokal meine Lebensernte in Brand,
als ein Feuer vom Widerschein der Schenken-Wange sich darin entzündete.480
Considering the distinction between ḥusn and malāḥat that A. Ġazzālī makes in
Sawāniḥ, we grasp that this ġazal poetically describes the first step of the beget-
ting of the world, as the self-referential aspect of beauty [ḥusn] joins the com-
municative aspect [malāḥat],481 which Wohlleben translates as ‘Anmut’.482 This
479 In this connection, it should be mentioned that this approach can also be recognized in
some of ʿAṭṭār’s works. However, the mythological narrative form of recounting the events of the
past remains the distinguishing characteristic of ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ. The following is an example
from ʿAṭṭār’s ġazals that comes close to what we find in ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ’s ġazals; however unlike
those two, ʿAṭṭār describes the events as if they are occurring in front of him and not in the past:
Farīd ud-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Dīvān-e ġazalīyāt va qaṣāʾed-e ʿAṭṭār, ed. Taqī Tafażżolī, Entešārāt-e
Anǧoman-e Ās̱ār-e Mellī (Tehran: Bahman, 1341/1962), p. 254, couplets: 3096–3098.
480 Wohlleben, 87, p. 152.
481 Regarding the influence of A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī on the differentiation between ḥusn and
malāḥat, see: Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Ḥusn u malāḥat: Baḥsī̱ dar zībāʾī-šenāsī-ye Ḥāfiẓ’, Našr-e
Dāneš, no. 33 (1365 Farvardīn–Ordībehešt/1986 March–April), pp. 7–8. Specifically in these
pages Pourjavady briefly mentions this differentiation in the first verse of above-cited ġazal.
482 This translation successfully conveys the communicative aspect of pleasance beside the
self-referential ‘Schönheit’, which I explained on pp. 240–243 above.
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conjunction makes the disclosure of the Infinite in the multiplicity of the finite
world possible.
Ḥāfiẓ provides two instances of the candle and the rose to show how the
Infinite veils itself to reveal an aspect of itself in nature. Ḥāfiẓ mentions the in-
clination of the Infinite to disclose Its luminosity as one instantiation of can-
dle’s flame, the poet implies that the candle is not allowed to utter the attribute
for which it is an instance – it just instantiates that attribute. The agent that is
allowed to recognize the immanence is actively present in the poet’s (human)
heart, an intellectual light of which the sun is but one flame in the sky. In other
words, the most general form of luminosity resides in the human heart.483
Moreover, the rose’s colorfulness and scent are described as attributes of the
Beloved. The rose exhibits these attributes as though it wanted to name the at-
tributes of being fragrant and colorful. But it can’t; the morning wind that rep-
resents the immanence draws the line between recognizing an attribute in
reference to the One and instantiating it in the multiplicity of entifications.
Thus, the rose remains a specific rose in nature.
Through the distinction that it makes in this ġazal of Ḥāfiẓ, the morning
wind in fact defines the Beloved (viewed) and the lover (viewer). This distinc-
tion is the ground for one of the meanings of ġayrat that is relevant in the
context of self-disclosure of Love.484 Ġayrat literally means ‘otherness’ or ‘ex-
clusiveness’485; it is often translated as ‘Eifersucht’ in German and ‘jealousy’ in
English.486 But these translations do not convey the whole spectrum of mean-
ings of ġayrat in its historical development from A. Ġazzālī to ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ.
No less than Persianate readers, the reader of Ḥāfiẓ in translation needs to be
sensitive to the semiotic variations of this word in different contexts. In
Sawāniḥ, ġayrat is described as the blade ‘of jealousy for cutting the attention
(of the lover) from things “other”.’487 It is a negating, purifying element that
acts between the lover and the world, and between Love and the Beloved. In
the first case, it purifies the lover from all that is other than the Beloved in the
world, and in the second case it confines the Beloved to the nourishment that
483 In the following I return to the significance of the human heart in this world-view.
484 Arabic: ġayra
485 Lewisohn, Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry, p. 53.
486 See Dādbeh’s attempt to explain different aspects and meanings of ġayrat in the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ: Aṣġar Dādbeh, ‘Ġayrat va maʿānī-ye ān dar šeʿr-e Ḥāfiẓ (1)’, Golčehr, 1, no. 4 (1371/
1992); ———, ‘Ġayrat va maʿānī-ye ān dar šeʿr-e Ḥāfiẓ (2)’, Golčehr, 1, no. 5 (1371/1992). Though
these two articles cover all instances of this term in the Divan, Dādbeh does not specify the
meaning of ġayrat in the context of self-disclosure of love among A. Ġazzālī, ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ.
487 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 23.
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He or She takes in His or Her belovedness in relation to the lover.488 With re-
gard to the relation between the lovers and colorations of time, however, ġayrat
confines the lovers to their engagement with various images of the Beloved that
appear to them in accordance with their state. Ġayrat keeps the lovers on their
quest for the Beloved and away from selfish engagement with the self.489 In the
fourth Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī redefines this traditionally excluding element of Sufi love
as an all-inclusive force:
The ġayrat of the Beloved necessitated that the lover does not love anything other [ġayr]
than the Beloved and does not covet [anything] other [ġayr] than Her. Therefore, neces-
sarily, She turned Herself into the essence [ʿayn] of all the existents, so that all that the
lover loves and covets is Her, and nobody loves anything the way they love themselves.
Here, you may know who you are.490
In Lamaʿāt, an all-inclusive formative aspect of ġayrat is described as a force
that diversifies the One by assigning the attributes of the One to the multiplic-
ity. Therefore, with respect to the One, ġayrat has a diversifying function. Since
the attributes of the One, which are assigned to the multiplicity by ġayrat,
make up the ontological ground of the phenomena, ġayrat ontologically unifies
the phenomena. Thus, in respect of the multiplicity of phenomena, ġayrat has a
unifying function.
The ʿayn (essence) of a given phenomenon is an attribute of the One re-
flected in it. It should be noted that ʿayn has many homonyms in Arabic and
Persian: ‘eye’, ‘the sun’, ‘essence’, ‘the likeness’, ‘form’, ‘character’, ‘people’,
‘one’s person’, ‘ring’, ‘spring’ and source of water, and ‘the opening of an arc’
are just a few examples.491 In the meaning of the likeness, which is connected
to a thing’s essence, ʿayn is an antonym of ġayr (other). Hence the above pas-
sage shows the fusion of otherness (ġayrat) and sameness (ʿayn) in the plurality
of essences that have a single ontological identity – the Beloved. The wide se-
mantic spectrum of the word ʿayn is conveyed in the loan translations of that
word into the Persian word čašm. These two words are employed frequently in
Persian literature from the twelfth century onwards. In Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī makes
use of the semantic potentials of this homonym to convey his views. In the first
Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī cites a verse from a qaṣīda of ʿAṭṭār, in which ʿAṭṭār rejects the
existence of anything other [ġayr] than the absolute, ‘for all that exists is a
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 464 (my translation).
491 See: Edward W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. (London: Williams and Norgate,
1863–1893; reprint, 8 vols. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968.), vol. 5: pp. 2214–2217.
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different form [ʿayn] of the One that has made its appearance’.492 Through these
intertextual references, ʿIrāqī contextualizes his world-views in the historical
tradition of Persian Sufi-literature.
In this light, the act of ġayrat (‘Eifersucht’) regarding the rose in the above-
cited ġazal of Ḥāfiẓ can be understood. It assigns to the rose the two attributes
of colorfulness and fragrance, which belong to the Beloved. But the rose is not
allowed to admit that its fragrance and colorfulness is that of the Beloved;
rather the rose is merely the locus of the disclosure of these attributes, which
constitute the rose’s being.
As I have shown, a defining characteristic of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry is that Ḥāfiẓ
will often treat multiple subjects within a single ġazal. Therefore, the subjects
of the intelligible world and the lover emerge in the ġazal 87 from the first verse
of the second couplet, where the intelligible attributes of the One are described
as mysteries of solitude. The third, fifth and sixth couplets exclusively concern
the lover or viewer. In this world-view, as ʿIrāqī stated, the viewer and viewed
are ultimately one, and it would have been a great flaw if Ḥāfiẓ had not men-
tioned these two as one. But for the sake of clarity, I confined my analysis of
this ġazal to the relation between the communicative malāḥat and the multi-
plicity of instantiations of the attributes of the Beloved.
III.2.2.1.1 Disclosure of the Ray of Beauty in Lamaʿāt and Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan
In the second Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī cites one of his own ġazals, which illustrates the
emanation of beauty through a mythological account of the disclosure of ‘the
ray of beauty’ (partau-i ḥusn):
Partau-i ḥusn-i ū ču piydā šud
ʿĀlam andar nafas huvaydā šud
Vām kard az ǧamāl-i ḫud naẓarī
Ḥusn-i rūyaš bidīd šaydā šud
ʿĀryat bistad az lab-aš šikarī
Ẕauq-i ān čun biāft gūyā šud
As the ray of Its Beauty was disclosed,
The universe appeared in one breath.
It borrowed sight from Its Beauty,
It saw the beauty of Her face and became infatuated.
It borrowed sugar from Her lip
Having received Its taste, it became eloquent493
492 ʿAṭṭār, Dīvān-e ġazalīyāt va qaṣāʾed-e ʿAṭṭār, p. 750. See ʿIrāqī’s citation of ʿAṭṭār’s verses
in the end of his first Lamʿa: ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 458.
493 ———,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 459 (my translation).
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In these verses, ʿIrāqī describes the universe (the viewed) as the direct conse-
quence of the self-disclosure of the ray of the beauty of the Beloved. As I ex-
plained above, this self-disclosure is impossible without the collaboration of
the self-referential and communicative aspects of the absolute beauty.
The faculty of appreciation of beauty is conceived as borrowed from the
beauty that discloses itself. In this manner, according to ʿIrāqī, the self-disclosure
of the ray of beauty extends itself to the level of reception (the viewer). In ʿIrāqī’s
ġazal, the light metaphors that once stood for the light of truth now refer to
beauty and the faculty of its reception. This usage of light metaphors also brings
Sufi love poetry, which borrowed imagery from early non-Sufi profane poetry,
closer to a clearer Sufi reconstruction of those tropes as a part of the view of self-
disclosure of the absolute Indefinite.
The most frequently used Persian words for the face of the Beloved are rū
or ruḫ. The face can now be grasped within Sufi poetry as a metaphor for the
whole realm of disclosure; different parts of the face represent different attrib-
utes of the One. After the self-disclosure of the ray of beauty as the viewed, the
faculty of reception of beauty (the viewer) recognizes the face of the Beloved as
the immanence of the Beloved in all the parts contributing to the face of the
Beloved.
In one of the most celebrated ġazals of the Divan,494 Ḥāfiẓ uses ʿIrāqī’s
same words to describe the self-disclosure of ‘the ray of beauty’ (partau-i ḥusn).
Here is Avery’s translation of this ġazal; I include in brackets selected Persian
words in order to shed light on the intertextual relation between Ḥāfiẓ and
ʿIrāqī:
[1] In Eternity before Time, the light of your beauty [partau-i ḥusn-at] boasted of the glori-
ous epiphany [taǧallī];
Love appeared and set the whole world on fire.
[2] Your cheek revealed luster. The Angel saw. It lacked the capacity for love.
Out of jealousy [ġayrat] of this, it turned into a fountain of fire and struck Adam.
[3] Reason was wishing to light a lamp from this flame.
The lightning of jealousy [ġayrat] shot forth and smote the world into confusion.
[4] The Adversary wanted to reach where the mystery might be observed.
The Invisible Hand came and smote the breast of the one excluded from the secret.
[5] Others cast the lot of fate on living the good life;
It was our sorrow-witnessing heart that drew the lot of yearning;
[6] The high-aspiring soul possessed the desire for the dimple in your chin.
It struck out the hand into the ring of those curls of enmeshed tresses.
494 Compare to: Muʿīn, Ḥāfiẓ-e šīrīnsoḫan, pp. 374–375. Also see: Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme,
vol. 1: p. 670.
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[7] Háfiz wrote the song-book of your love that day
When the pen cancelled out the encumbrances of the cheery heart.495
This ġazal is the most celebrated illustration of the events that transpire after the
Infinite emanates a ray of Its beauty.496 In this first disclosure (taǧallī) of beauty,
the poet does not speak of beauty as instantiated or ideated in intellectual attrib-
utes; therefore, he does not mention the beauty of the Beloved’s face and its par-
ticular feature. Rather, he discusses the acts of beauty on a general level. To
denote this first stage of disclosure of beauty, Ḥāfiẓ uses the phrase partau-i
ḥusn, which ʿIrāqī also uses in one of his ġazals quoted in his Lamaʿāt.497 In such
an indeterminate state, the next entification mentioned by Ḥāfiẓ is Love. In
the second couplet, the face (cheek) of the Beloved appears as the next emana-
tion. In its communicative belovedness, the disclosure of the face of the Beloved
is offered to the angels (this communicative act of beauty needs to be appreciated
and received). But the angels were not the proper recipients, since they lacked
the faculty of appreciation of beauty. Finally, the formative aspect of ġayrat turns
to Adam, the archetype of humanity, and forms its faculty of appreciation to be-
come receptive to the image of the face of the Beloved, thereby conveying that
humanity is identical with loverhood.
The negating quality of ġayrat excludes reason and the adversary from ap-
preciation of the beauty of the face of the Beloved. This negation is an act of
diversification, since human and other intelligible beings are specified by this
act. An expert in Qurʾān exegesis, Ḥāfiẓ alludes to surah 33, verse 72, in which
God offers ‘the Trust’ (amānat, which Sufis interpret as ‘loverhood’) to heavens
and earth. But none of them dared to keep it, leaving only humans to become
its keeper.498
In his comment on the third and fourth couplets, Heravī mentions that rea-
son and the adversary are one and the same, and he points out that Sūdī
495 Avery, CXLVIII, p. 201. For other translations see: Wohlleben, 148, p. 223; Clarke, 186,
pp. 354–355; Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 143; Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a
Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell, p. 130.
496 See also the following article: Leili Anvar, ‘The Radiance of Epiphany: The Vision of
Beauty and Love in Ḥāfiẓ’s Poem of Pre-Eternity’, in Religion of Love in Classical Persian
Poetry, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (London & New York: Tauris, 2010), pp. 127; 129. Here, the au-
thor provides a useful commentary on this poem. However, Anvar holds that the pursuit of
beauty in the context of this poem is an anamnestic ascending process; as I will show on
p. 289 below, this description can be revised in light of the active presence of the Beloved in
the lover’s faculty of apprehension of beauty.
497 I provided a translation and a transcription of ʿIrāqī’s ġazal at the beginning of this sub-
section.
498 Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 1: p. 644.
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interprets the adversary as Satan.499 As Heravī mentions and Āšūrī’s comprehen-
sive study in Mysticism and ‘Rindī’ in Poetry of Hafiz confirms,500 the angels and
evil in these verses stand in an intertextual relation to Mirṣād ul-ʿibād of Naǧm
ud-Dīn Rāzī, a contemporary of Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī, Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnavī,
ʿIrāqī, and Rūmy.501 Naǧm ud-Dīn Rāzī’s Sufi interpretation of the Qurʾān was
based on the views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, specifically A. Ġazzālī.502 In his
narrative and mythological account, Naǧm ud-Dīn Rāzī describes Iblīs, before his
fall, as the most inquisitive angel; he enters and explores the body of Adam
while his heart is still being formed. Iblīs observes that every element of the mac-
rocosm (ʿālam-i buzurg) has a corresponding part in the human intellect or body
as a microcosm (ʿālam-i kūčak). But when Iblīs wants to examine the human
heart, he finds it as closed and impenetrable as a citadel without gates; so he
returns empty handed.503 Mirṣād ul-ʿibād depicts Iblīs as unable to access the
heart; in that respect, Iblīs resembles rationality, as Ḥāfiẓ conceives of it. In this
manner, the angels (including Iblīs) and humans are distinguished from each
other. In the fifth couplet, the poet once again mentions that only the human
heart is capable of love, which is described as having experienced care (ġam-
dīda). Avery’s translation (‘sorrow-witnessing’)504 brings out that the heart is
499 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 646; Sūdī, Tarǧome-ye šarḥ-e Sūdī, vol. 2: p. 925.
500 See: Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 1: p. 642. Compare to: Āšūrī, Mysticism and
‘Rindī’ in Poetry of Hafiz: A Hermeneutical Interpretation., pp. 123–124; p. 244.
501 Naǧm ud-Dīn Rāzī, Mirṣād ul-ʿibād, ed. Muḥmmad Amīn Rīyāḥī, Motūn-e Fārsī [series ed.
Ehsan Yarshater] (Tehran: Bongāh-e Tarǧome va Našr-e Ketāb, 1352/1973), p. 27; pp. 49–50.
502 See the introduction of Rīyāḥī to his edition of Mirṣād ul-ʿibād: ibid., p. 60. Also,
Pourjavady in his introduction to Sawāniḥ names Naǧm ud-Dīn as one of the Sufis who were
under direct influence of A. Ġazzālī: Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure
Spirits, p. 8.
503 Rāzī, Mirṣād ul-ʿibād, pp. 75–78.
504 For the translation of ġam in this couplet the following German translations propose
‘Gramm’: Mohammed Schamsed-din Hafis, Der Diwan des großen lyrischen Dichter Hafis im persi-
schen Original herausgegeben, ins Deutsche metrisch übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen
von Vincenz Ritter von Rosenzweig-Schwannau., 3 vols. (Wien: K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei,
1858–1864), vol. 1: p. 488.; Hammer-Purgstall, vol. 1: p. 311. Wohlleben suggests ‘gramvertraut’:
Wohlleben, 148, 5, p. 223. Rückert translates ġam-dīda as ‘weherfahren’ and ġam as ‘Weh’: Šams-
ad-Din Muhammad Hafis, Dreiundsechzig Ghaselen des Hafis, ed. Wolfdietrich Fischer, trans.
Friedrich Rückert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988), p. 45. Arberry in his Immortal Rose offers a
translation of this ġazal in which ġam is translated as ‘sorrow’: Immortal Rose: an Anthology of
Persian Lyrics, p. 143. Bicknell’s suggestion is ‘sadness’: Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his
Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell, p. 130. Clarke offers ‘grief’ as the transla-
tion of ġam: Clarke, 186, 5, p. 355.
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receptive to the seed of a specific care. Therefore, the heart is suitable for what
A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī describe as the Beloved’s desire to see Its beauty in the mir-
ror of the lover’s love.505
In the penultimate couplet, as the poet turns to the descent of the most ex-
alted spirit (translated above as ‘high-aspiring soul’), he mentions the parts of
the face. This descent is due to the desire to fall into a depth that is a part of the
Beloved’s face. The rope that makes this descent possible is the curly, manifold
tress of the Beloved. Further in this study, I investigate the significance of the
Beloved’s hair and its relation to humans.506
In such a primordial state, the quality of caring for and coveting the beauty
of the Beloved is placed in the human heart by the formative ġayrat, thus unify-
ing humanity and loverhood. By claiming that he wrote the book of joy of
his love for his Beloved on the day he abandoned the pursuit of a care-free
heart,507 Ḥāfiẓ conveys that loverhood cannot be realized unless one differenti-
ates between the selfish needs of the individuated self and the desire to recog-
nize and appreciate the One in its disclosures. This paradox of abandoning
selfish joy and living a joyful life of caring for the Beloved is constantly present
in the Divan. It can be understood as the activity of the heart that is formed to
desire the disclosed beauty of the Beloved.
The poet’s choice to leave the metaphors of inebriety out of this ġazal pro-
vides an opportunity to study the description of the emanation of beauty inde-
pendent of other tropes. Yet it is rare that the poet limits himself to a single set
of metaphors. As I explain in the following sub-section, the metaphors of
beauty and inebriety are elaborately connected.
III.2.2.1.2 Interwoven Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty
In the second Lamʿa, after quoting his own ġazal that begins with the illustra-
tion of the disclosure of ‘the ray of beauty’, ʿIrāqī explains the formation of the
faculty of appreciation in the lover: ‘The splendor of Beauty bestowed upon the
505 See Sawāniḥ chapter 13, on page 276 of this study, and the 26th Lamʿa: Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī,
Resāle-ye Lamaʿāt va resāle-ye Iṣṭilāḥāt, ed. Ǧawād Nūrbaḫš (Tehran: Intešārāt-e Ḫāneqāh-e
Niʿmatullāhī, 1353/1974), pp. 45–46. For an English translation see: ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes:
Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 121.
506 See §III.2.2.4 (‘A Separation Willed by the Beloved and the Love of Beloveds’). Especially
on the relation between the lover, the hair and the realm of multiplicity see p. 316 below.
Compare to Anvar, ‘The Radiance of Epiphany: The Vision of Beauty and Love in Ḥāfiẓ’s Poem
of Pre-Eternity’, p. 134.
507 Compare to Lewisohn’s translation of this ġazal in: ibid., p. 125.
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lover’s entity [ʿayn]508 a light with which that very Beauty might be seen; for
only through It can It be perceived.’509 ʿIrāqī continues: ‘[w]hen the lover
grasped the joy of this Witnessing he caught the taste of existence. He heard
the whispered command— “BE!”’510 Earlier, I discussed the significance of the
command ‘Be!’ in the context of the Sufi Quranic interpretation.511 This inter-
pretation unites light, sight and the aesthetic appreciation of beauty [laẕẕat-i
šuhūd], which is followed by a taste of existence [ẕauq-i vuǧūd bičišīd] and life.
Then, ʿIrāqī recapitulates the content of his ġazal in theosophical and mytho-
logical prose. He cites a Quranic verse and a ḥadīṯ of the Prophet:
The Morning of Manifestation sighted, the breeze of Grace breathed gently, ripples
stripped upon the sea of Generosity. The clouds of Effusion poured down the rain of ‘He
sprinkled creation with His Light’ (H) upon the soil of preparedness; so much rain that
the earth shone with the Light of its Lord (XXXIX: 69). The lover, then, satiated with the
water of life, awoke from the slumber of non-existence, put on the cloak of being and tied
round his brow the turban of contemplation; he cinched the belt of desire about his waist
and set forth with the foot of sincerity upon the path of the Search.512
Sunrise is a frequent motif in the works of ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ. In the passage
above, the ‘Morning of Manifestation’ has two aspects: the aspect of the viewed
and the aspect of the viewer (the lover). Both the viewed and the viewer – or
the viewer’s faculty of appreciation of the viewed – are ontologically grounded
in the One being. This ontological emanation is articulated through a combina-
tion of light metaphors, bacchanalian tropes and tropes of the aesthetic pursuit
of beauty. Before Ḥāfiẓ, ʿIrāqī was the greatest poet to articulate these sophisti-
cated views in metaphors. The following is one of ʿIrāqī’s most important
qaṣāʾid, the first few couplets of which he cites in the second Lamʿa:
Cups are those a-flashing with wine,
Or suns through the clouds a-gleaming?
So clear is the wine and the glass so fine
508 The homonymy between ‘entity’, ‘quiddity’, and the word ‘eye’ in Arabic must be noted
here. ʿIrāqī’s constant usage of the word ʿayn (the eye) underscores the significance of aes-
thetic appreciation of beauty extending from this manner of formation of the faculty of appre-
ciation of beauty. See p. 273 above.
509 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 75; ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 460.
510 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 75.
511 See p. 255 above.
512 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 76.
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That the two are one in seeming.
The glass is all and the wine is naught,
Or the glass is naught and the wine is all:
Since the air the rays of the sun hath caught
The light combines with night’s dark pall,
For the night hath made a truce with the day,
And thereby is ordered the world’s array.
If thou know’st not which is day, which is night,
Or which is goblet and which is wine,
By wine and cup divine aright
The Water of Life and its secret sign:
Like night and day thou mayst e’en assume
Certain knowledge and doubt’s dark gloom.
If these comparison clear not up
All these problems low and high,
Seek for the world-reflecting cup
That thou mayst see with reason’s eye
That all that is, is He indeed,
Soul and loved one and heart and creed.513
The first couplet, ʿIrāqī’s translation of an Arabic poem attributed to Ṣāḥib ibn
ʿAbbād of the tenth century, introduces the parallel tropes of light and wine to
describe emanation.514 In this poem, ʿIrāqī stresses immanence through de-
scriptions of three dualities: rays of light and the masses of clouds; wine and
the cup; and day and night. These metaphors stand for form (soul) and the re-
cipient of form (matter) – the body is the perfect union of the two.
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ we find the same combination of wine metaphors and
light metaphors – wine and the cup represent the sun and the world, which
receives the sun’s light. In the following ġazal, the beloved wine-bringer (sāqī)
brings the (illuminating) wine at dawn; like in the above passage of the
Lamaʿāt, the lover will soon wake up to the taste of this vivifying wine. But
Ḥāfiẓ does not restrict the semiotic horizon of wine to the Sufi’s allegorical
wine; he extends the metaphor even further:
[1] ’Tis morn, O Sáḳí; fill the wine-cup high!
Be quick: the heavens delay not as they fly.
[2] Ere yet this Fading World to ruin goes,
My senses ruin with thy wine of rose.
513 Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. 3: p. 130. See also the poet’s two poetic attempts
starting with similar couplets: ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, pp. 132–134; 224–225.
514 In its Arabic form, this couplet appears in Persian literature from the thirteenth century
onwards in the context of immanence of the divine in its emanations. See Muḥtašam’s note in
her edition of the Lamaʿāt: ———, Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 460.
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[3] The sun of wine has the cup’s East made bright:
Abandon slumber, dost thou seek delight.
[4] When Fate at last makes flagons of my clay,
With wine, forget not, fill my skull that day.
[5] No zeal, no scruples, no remorse are mine:
Speak with a goblet full of limpid wine.
[6] Wine-worship, ḤÁFIZ̤,
Is to Virtue dear:
Arise; to Virtue
Let thy will adhere.515
Importantly, both ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfiẓ view emanation as the constant, timeless
source of being; it is not an event in the past. The light of dawn reminds Ḥāfiẓ
of the constant self-disclosure of the One through its ray of beauty; and Ḥāfiẓ
finds the same symbolism in the image of red wine being poured into a color-
less glass. The influence of wine on the human body and mind can be seen in
its likeness to the effusion of existence into the multiplicity (according to the
views of ʿIrāqī and the Sufi adorers of beauty).
In another ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ begins the poem by comparing wine and the sun. In
the second verse of the first couplet, he transitions from light metaphors and
tropes of wine to the imagery of the face of the beloved: ‘Whenever in the east
of the cup the sun of wine comes up, | In the garden of wine-server’s cheeks a
thousand tulips bloom.’516 Since all the events in this context concern the wine-
bringer who pours the wine and drinks it, the poet shows us a single existence
at work in the universe – the beings, here represented as tulips, are different
moments or aspects of the face of the Beloved on the level of multiplicity. In the
following poem, we find another articulation of this view:
[1] When your face’s reflection fell onto the mirror of the wine-bowl,
Because of the wine’s laughter the mystic fell into raw desire.
[2] Beneath the veil, on the Day of Eternity without beginning your cheek displayed a
splendour:
All these images fell onto the mirror of illusions;
[3] All this reflection in wine and these contrasting figures that have appeared,
Are a single light fallen into the bowl from the wine-boy’s cheek.517
To understand how the multiplicity of phenomena can be grasped by the viewer
as different aspects and images of the One, we need to return to the last verse
515 Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman
Bicknell, p. 235. See also Ḫānlarī, 388.
516 Avery, CCXXX, 1, p. 295.
517 Avery, CVII, 1–3, p. 151.
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of ʿIrāqī’s poem above, which instructs us to seek the world-revealing cup and
find its relation to the human faculty of appreciation of the Beloved’s beauty. In
the following sub-section, I discuss the formation of the faculty of appreciation
of beauty and I trace the metaphor of the world-revealing cup in the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ.
III.2.2.1.3 The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup
A cup in which the beholder can see the world has deep roots in Iranian myth
and legend. In the Šāhnāma, Firdausī claims that this cup was in possession of
the Kayānī King Kay Ḫusrau. Other sources from the twelfth century onwards
claim that this cup was possessed by the mighty Pīšdādī King Ǧamšīd, who is
often identified with the prophet Solomon. In addition to the presence of the
abovementioned legends, the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ reflects the cultural influence of a
further legend that attributes the cup to Alexander.518
This remarkable cup is an allegorical object of pursuit in Sufi literature. In
the last poem by ʿIrāqī that I discussed above, ʿIrāqī advises his reader to seek
the world-revealing cup in order to view in it the immanence of the One. The
Sufi-poet ʿAṭṭār, a predecessor of ʿIrāqī, mentions the world-revealing cup in
the following ġazal:
You are the mirror of Her beauty,
And your mirror is the whole world.
O Wine-Bringer of our feast be quick and rise;
Give wine, for I am heavy-headed with wine.
Pour in our world-revealing cups,
That wine which is the elixir of life 519
In this ġazal, ʿAṭṭār mentions two mirrors: humans are the mirror for the
Beloved (in which the Beloved sees her beauty) and the universe is the mirror
for humans (in which they see the Beloved). Yet in order to appreciate human-
ity and the world, the wine that gives existence to us must first be poured in
our cups. It is clear that humans, the Beloved and the world are connected
through the mediation of the Beloved’s reflections: there is only one true entity,
which is reflected differently in different mirrors. In the following quatrain,
ʿAṭṭār describes the world-revealing cup while praising humanity. He asserts
that the world-revealing cup exists in the human heart:
518 Muḥammad Muʿīn, ‘Ǧām-e ǧahānnomā’, Dāneš, 1, no. 6 (1328/1949), pp. 300–303.
519 ʿAṭṭār, Dīvān-e ġazalīyāt va qaṣāʾed-e ʿAṭṭār, p. 58 (my translation).
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You wondrous bird! the stars are your grain,
From Pre-eternity, this has been your lot.
If it’s the world-revealing cup you seek:
It is in a safe, placed in your chest.520
The quest for the world-revealing cup has a complex presence in the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ. The poet dedicates an entire ġazal to the nature and meaning of this ob-
ject of pursuit. In the first three couplets, Ḥāfiẓ describes the problem and
seeks the advice of his fictive mentor:
[1] Years the heart was seeking Jamshíd’s cup from us:
That which it itself possessed, it was desiring of a stranger.
[2] A pearl that is outside the shell of time and place,
From the lost in the ocean main it was seeking.
[3] Last night I took my problem to the Elder of the Magians,
Because with the help of vision he was for solving the riddle.521
In these verses, Ḥāfiẓ specifies that the problem concerns the heart, since the
heart is what seeks the cup. In the second verse of the first couplet, before pro-
viding an account of his meeting with the mentor, Ḥāfiẓ conveys the result of
his consultation: the fault of Ḥāfiẓ’s quest, the mentor says, is that Ḥāfiẓ’s heart
already has what it seeks. Ḥāfiẓ then describes his meeting with Pīr-i Muġān:
[4] I found him smiling and heart-elated, wine-cup in the hand,
In that mirror, enjoying a hundred varieties of spectacle.
[5] I asked, ‘When did the All-wise give you this world-seeing cup?’
He replied, ‘The day He was fashioning this azure dome’ [gunbad-i mīnā].522
Ḥāfiẓ encounters Pīr-i Muġān holding a cup that has all the qualities of Ǧam’s
cup. Ḥāfiẓ describes the cup as qadaḥ-i bāda – a goblet of wine –, thereby im-
plying that the cup in question can be interpreted literally. But a literal reading
of the poem is hard to justify, given that Ḥāfiẓ later (in consultation with the
mentor) describes the (same) cup as ǧām-i ǧahānbīn – the world-revealing cup.
By challenging both literal and metaphorical interpretations, Ḥāfiẓ leads the
reader to reconcile the sublime and the mundane – an approach that harmo-
nizes with Ḥāfiẓ’s view of the sensible world and the immanence of the One.
The joyful mentor imparts two pieces of knowledge. First, he received the cup
through the same divine force that created the heavens, and on the same day
520 ———, Maǧmūʿe-ye robāʿīyāt [Muḫtārnāma], ed. Muḥammadriḍā Šafīʿī Kadkanī (Tehran:
Tūs, 1358/1979), p. 61 (my translation).
521 Avery, CXXXVI, 1–3, p. 185.
522 Avery, CXXXVI, 4–5, p. 185.
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(ān rūz). (In other words, he did not acquire the cup through any particular
qualification on his part.) The second point is illustrated through the imagery
of the second verse of the fifth couplet, in which two cups face each other: the
cup held by Pīr-i Muġān and the dome of the sky. This ġazal extends ʿAṭṭār’s
view that the world-revealing mirror is not outside of humans. Without men-
tioning the image of the Beloved in the cup that Pīr-i Muġān holds, Ḥāfiẓ de-
scribes the two mirrors in this ġazal as ‘facing each other’; he juxtaposes the
cup to the dome of heaven and stresses that the two were formed simulta-
neously. Ḥāfiẓ refers to the heavens by alluding to the intelligible content of
the universe, which had been the object of his quest for years; now the mentor
reveals to him that the faculty of grasping this intelligible content is at the core
of his being (his heart). The appearance of the face of the Beloved in the mirror
of the cup is mentioned in other ġazals in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
Following A. Ġazzālī’s view expressed in the thirteenth chapter of
Sawāniḥ523 ʿIrāqī defines the heart as a mirror for the Beloved. The image of the
Beloved’s face is the ontological ground of humans and their faculty of appreci-
ation of the beauty of the Beloved:
Bestow a light of vision
Upon the mirror of my heart;
In it so I may see
Your heart alluring face.
My world-revealing cup,
Is your exulting face
Though my very essence
Is your world-revealing cup.524
The relation between the communicative aspect of the non-entified Being (the
belovedness of the Beloved, as A. Ġazzālī formulates it) and the world is
based on reflections in mirrors. Yet ʿIrāqī does not hold that there is a duality
between the mirror and the One; in ʿIrāqī’s view, the mirror has no ontological
reality without an image of the Beloved. The mirror without an image of the
Beloved is absolute non-existence (ʿadam) without any direction or exten-
sion – i.e., it is absolute privation which can reflect the images of the One.
The following verses by ʿIrāqī articulate what I have elaborated on from
A. Ġazzālī to ʿAṭṭār and ʿIrāqī:
523 See p. 262 above.
524 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 239 (my translation).
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[1] If the sun of your face casted a shadow upon the dust,
The terrestrials all would rise to the firmament.
[2] Look at me, for through me the beauty of your face becomes disclosed.
The ray (of the sun) could not become visible without dust [in the air].
[3] My heart is your mirror keep it clean,
For a clean mirror shows a clean face.
[. . .]
[6] It is for the sake of your own face that you look my way
Otherwise you would never look toward the non-existence, never!
[7] You embellish me with the ornament of your existence
So, through me you can perceive your beauty.525
On multiple occasions in the Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī mentions that the faculty of appreci-
ation of the Beloved constitutes the essence (ʿayn) of humans. In the seventeenth
Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī asserts that the ray of beauty of the Beloved provides the inner core
(ʿayn) of the lover (human) – a light with which to see the light of beauty. By
emanating different aspects of beauty, the Beloved thus expands the humanity
of humans and their faculty of appreciation of the Beloved. According to ʿIrāqī,
this faculty is immanent in the lover and cannot be acquired. It corresponds to
the Beloved’s perpetual act of self-disclosure.526
In the Divan, the following ġazal recounts events that took place ‘last
night’, a phrase that Ḥāfiẓ often uses to signal that the events in question are
timeless and concern humans on an archetypal level. Here are the first two cou-
plets of this ġazal in Clarke’s and Avery’s translation527:
[1] Last night, at morning time, me freedom from grief, they (Fate and Destiny) gave.
And, in that darkness of night, me the water-of-life they gave.
[2] Through the effulgence of the ray of His essence, me senseless (and full of love for Him),
they made:
(In the world) from the cup of splendour of His qualities, me wine they gave.528
[1] Last night as dawn broke I was salvaged from sorrow
And in that darkness of night, given the Water of Life.
[2] By the radiance of the ray from True Existence, I have been taken outside myself:
They’ve given me wine from the chalice of the epiphany of the Attributes.529
525 Ibid., p. 331. Verses 1–3 and 6–7 (my translation).
526 Ibid., pp. 498–499. See p. 270 above.
527 See Ḫānlarī, 22; 178; 179; 307.
528 Clarke, 218, 1–2, p. 400.
529 Avery, CLXXVII, 1–2, p. 237.
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The image of the water of life betrays the ontological aspect of the poem and
puts the reader in mind of receiving the images of the attributes of the One. In
the second couplet, Ḥāfiẓ is careful not to claim that he has been exposed to
the very Essence of the Absolute; rather, Ḥāfiẓ has been given wine from the
cup of the disclosure of attributes (ǧām-i taǧallī-yi ṣafāt). This wine is intro-
duced as the water of life, which leaves no space for self-interest. Becoming in-
ebriated represents the moment one is influenced by the all-encompassing
Being; there is no place for grief that stems from ignorance of the immanence of
the One. The freedom from selfish concerns is mentioned at both the beginning
and the end of this poem. In the last verse, the poet specifies the general grief
(ġuṣṣa) of the first verse as ġam-i ayyām – concerns of everyday life as opposed
to the care (ġam) that comes from being in love.530
Throughout this ġazal, the poet describes himself as passive. In fact, the
only attribute Ḥāfiẓ assigns to himself (before dawn) is being destitute enough
[mustaḥaqq] to receive alms [zakāt]. In other words, the only quality that can be
assigned to him before the reception of the attributes of the One is privation: ‘If
I have become gratified and happy at heart, no wonder– | I was deserving, and
these as righteous alms they gave me.’531
In the following verses, Ḥāfiẓ describes being in the world after drinking
the water of life. Here is Avery’s translation followed by my own (literal)
translation:
[4] After this, it’s a case of my face and the beauty-reflecting mirror,
Because then news of the unveiling of the Divine Being was given.532
[4] Henceforth my face shall be turned to naught but the illustrative mirror of pleasance,
For therein they have informed me of the disclosure of the Essence.533
In just a few words, Ḥāfiẓ articulates an important aspect of his world-view.
Ḥāfiẓ continues to face the mirror, in which the Essence discloses Itself to hu-
mans. He introduces the action of the first couplet as the consequence (‘hence-
forth’) of the conditions described in preceding couplets regarding the wine
and the cup. In other words, as he explores the diversification of the One in the
world, Ḥāfiẓ turns his gaze toward the reflections, which he perceives as
though they were reflected in a mirror. But this form of appreciating the sensi-
ble through the mirror of the Beloved’s pleasance does not entail an exclusive
approach toward the world; on the contrary, as the bearer of this mirror, the
530 See pp. 277f above.
531 Avery, CLXXVIII, 5, p. 237. See also: Clarke, 218, 7, p. 401.
532 Avery, CLXXVIII, 4, p. 237. See also: Clarke, 218, 5, p. 400.
533 My literal translation of Ḫānlarī, 178, 4.
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poet is connected to the multiplicity and experiences joy in recognizing the One
in its diversifications.
III.2.2.2 The Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover
In the two preceding sub-sections, I showed that Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan mentions two
related mirrors (or two cups): in the first mirror, the One diversifies itself
through its attributes; and in the second, it recognizes its own diversification.
In the ġazal we examined above, receiving wine from the cup of disclosure of
attributes is a metaphor for the formation of the heart (the lover’s coming into
existence). In this sub-section, I address how Ḥāfiẓ illustrates his life as facing
nothing but the illustrative mirror of pleasance534; I also examine the aesthetic
aspect of this reception of the world through the eye and the heart.
In the seventeenth Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī explains the formation of the essence
(ʿayn) of humans ([bandagān] servants), and then clarifies the relation between
the human essence and sensible phenomena (ʿālam-i šahādat) as follows:
The Transcendent Truth [ḥaqq taʿālā] in the world of the unseen (intelligible realm
[ʿālam-i ġayb]) manifested a potentiality [istiʿdād] in the essence [ʿayn] of the servant
[banda] with which he receives the (intelligible) essential disclosure [taǧallī-yi ʿaynī].
Then upon mediation of that disclosure [ba vāsita-yi ān taǧallī], the servant finds another
potentiality in the sensible world [ʿālam-i šahādat], so with the latter potentiality he be-
comes receptive of the existential visible disclosure [taǧallī-yi šahādatī vuǧūdī]; and then,
in accordance with his state each moment, the servant attains another potentiality535
This fragment from the Lamaʿāt integrates the potentiality of grasping the One’s
attributes into the humanity of humans – their ʿayn, both in its concrete meaning
(eyes) and its abstract meaning (essence). But this potentiality is not something
that can be acquired; rather, it is intrinsic to humanity. Furthermore, recognizing
the One in phenomena is ultimately an act of the One itself – and not of the indi-
vidual. In fact, based on the idea that there is only One being, in the fourth
Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī alludes to a ḥadīṯ of the Prophet;536 and in the seventh Lamʿa, he
paraphrases that same ḥadīṯ to support his view that the senses of human beings
are in reality those of the One.537
In the nineteenth Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī addresses the heart of the lover. He de-
scribes the heart as the locus of the intelligible attributes (baḥr-i ġayb) of the
One, which interact with sensory perceptions (baḥr-i šahādat) to form the
534 See my translation of Ḫānlarī, 178, 4 above.
535 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, pp. 502–503 (my translation).
536 Ibid., p. 465. ‘For you are my hearing, and my sight’ (či samʿ u baṣar-i man tuīy).
537 Ibid., p. 477.
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experience of the lover. According to ʿIrāqī, the heart is ‘that place where the
seas of the Seen and Unseen flow together.’538
I have already elaborated on the formative, inclusive aspect of ġayrat
(otherness) in the fourth Lamʿa,539 in which ʿIrāqī uses ʿayn in its two inter-
related meanings of ‘essence’ and ‘the likeness.’ ʿIrāqī introduces ʿayn near
ġayrat in order to show that the all-inclusive One does not admit ġayr (others),
an antonym of ʿayn. Thus, through the force that negates otherness (ġayrat),
the One diversifies Itself through the attributes that are Its likenesses –
‘lāǧaram ḫud rā ʿayn-i hama kard’.540 In the diversity of aʿyān (essences/like-
nesses), the One forms the multiplicity, and in the eye (ʿayn) of the lover It
recognizes Its own unity diversified.
This structure of understanding the relation between the One and the
many, as well as the recognition of the former in the latter, has a central posi-
tion in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, on both ontological and epistemological levels. In
the following verses from the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ shows that his heart and his eye lead
him through life as a lover in the natural visible world; the heart and the eye
are both defined in relation to the Beloved.
[1] The pavilion of his love is the heart,
The holder of the mirror to his countenance, the eye.
[2] I who do not bow down to either of the two worlds,
My neck is under the burden of obligation to him.
[3] You and the paradisial Túbá tree, and we, and the form of the friend —
Everyone’s idea is commensurate with their devotion.541
In the first couplet, the eye and the heart are described in relation to each
other: the heart is the dwelling place of Love, and the eye stands before the vis-
ible, which it recognizes as the mirror held to the Beloved’s face. The second
and the third couplets articulate Ḥāfiẓ’s preference for the pursuit of Love over
the rewards of this world and the next one. Even the Tūbā tree, the tallest tree
in paradise, appears to the lover to be just one instantiation of the attribute of
tallness. The lover’s quest for beauty is not directed solely toward the discovery
of the most intense instantiation of a given attribute; rather, the quest for
beauty consists in appreciation of each instantiation of each attribute of the
538 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 109.
539 See p. 273 above.
540 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 464. See also p. 226 couplet 2671.
541 Avery, LX, 1–3, p. 97. See also: Clarke, 22, p. 75, as well as Friedrich Rückert’s translation
of this ġazal in: Hafis, Dreiundsechzig Ghaselen des Hafis, p. 29.
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One. Therefore, being aware of the tallness of the Tūbā tree is not the end of the
activity of the lover’s faculty of recognizing the One in the many. Thus, answer-
ing the zealot ascetic who chides him for being tainted with the natural, Ḥāfiẓ
acknowledges that he belongs to the natural realm, while ironically reminding
the ascetic about the medial immanence of the One: ‘What is the loss if I am
stained? | The whole world is witness to his innocence’.542
At this stage, we can recognize the epistemological aspect of Ḥāfiẓ’s con-
ceptions of the faculty of sight, the object of sight and the cognitive activity of
recognizing the One in the all. The active immanence of the One in the faculty
of Its appreciation in humans guides the observer in his exploration of nature
and recognition of the intelligible attributes of the One that are disclosed in na-
ture. Importantly, Ḥāfiẓ does not mention possessing beauty; he is concerned
exclusively with appreciating beauty in its numerous forms: ‘Every leaf of the
book in the meadow tells of a different state. | It would be a pity if you were
neglectful of the state of all.’543
This epistemological view differs from the doctrine of anamnesis by claim-
ing that intelligible content resides in both the viewer and the viewed; the One
is active both inwardly and outwardly. The act of diversification unfolds
through the viewed, and specific instances of immanence are recognized by the
viewer as disclosures of the Beloved. Thus, as in the couplet cited above, lam-
entations over separation become experiences of rejoicing in beauty: ‘Each
freshly blossomed flower which rose to be an embellisher of the meadow |
Bears the mark of conversing with Him in color and fragrance’544 Ḥāfiẓ recog-
nizes the Beloved while enjoying the instantiation of each specific fragrance
and color. In a further step, Ḥāfiẓ introduces himself as a successor of Maǧnūn.
The time is limited, he warns. Now it is our turn to be lovers; soon, we will
leave the world to the next generation of lovers, to whom Love will show other
instances of belovedness in natural and human form: ‘The time of Maǧnūn has
passed, now the turn is ours | As short as five days each one’s turn is.’545
In the beginning of another ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ once again illustrates the relation
between the eye and the heart: ‘Mein Augenmann hat nur dein Angesicht im
Blick, | mein wirres Herz gedenkt nur deiner.’546 Wohlleben’s translation of
542 Avery, LX, 4, p. 97.
543 Avery, CCCCXLVII, 4, p. 538.
544 Qazvīnī & Ġanī, 56, 7, p. 40. My literal translation. See also Esteʿlāmī’s comment on this
couplet: Esteʿlāmī, Dars-e Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 1: p. 214.
545 Ḫānlarī, 60, 6. My literal translation
546 Wohlleben, 71, 1, p. 131.
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mardum-i dīda as Augenmann547 (pupil of the eye) can be traced back to
Hammer-Purgstall’s translation. Rosenzweig-Schwannau also uses this transla-
tion.548 The modern reader may overlook the intellectual significance and po-
etic potential of mardum-i dīda, which appears to be an archaic variant of the
commonly used word mardumak-i čašm (pupil of the eye). On closer inspection,
however, it becomes clear that this word combination is a calque of the Arabic
insān ul-ʿayn.549 Bearing this fact in mind allows us to better understand the
couplet cited above.
The loan-translation is constructed as follows. The first component, insān, is
translated as mardum, based on the literal meaning of the Arabic word –
‘human’. Along the same lines, the word ʿayn is translated as čašm or dīda. In his
lexicon, Lane glosses insān ul-ʿayn as follows: ‘The image that is seen [reflected]
in the black of the eye’ and ‘what is seen in the eye, like as is seen in a mirror,
when a thing faces it’.550 Then Lane offers the following translations: ‘pupil’ or
‘apple of the eye’.551 The same explanation can be found in lexicons from the
ninth century onwards, such as Adab al-kātib (ninth century), Kitāb at-talḫīṣ fī
maʿrifat-i asmāʾ al-ašyāʾ (tenth century) and Šarḥ maqāmāt ul-ḥarīrī (thirteenth
century). Exploring these lexicons further clarify the image that Lane mentions
in his lexicon: the reflection on the black mirror of the pupil of the eye is the
image of the person who looks into it.552
In the first chapter of Fuṣūṣ ul-ḥikam, Ibn ʿArabī describes the self-
disclosure of the One as Its casting of Its own image upon the mirror. In this
547 In the following case, ‘Augenmann’ is also Wohlleben’s choice, although he mentions
‘Pupille’ in the footnote: Wohlleben, 69, 2, p. 129. In another case, he translates mardum-i
čašm as ‘Pupille’. Wohlleben, 385, 6, p. 494.
548 Hammer-Purgstall, vol. 1: p. 115; Hafis, Der Diwan des großen lyrischen Dichter Hafis im
persischen Original herausgegeben, ins Deutsche metrisch übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen verse-
hen von Vincenz Ritter von Rosenzweig-Schwannau., vol. 1: p. 183.
549 Compare to Avery’s brief note in: Avery, LXXI, p. 109.
550 Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. 1: p. 115.
551 It is worth mentioning that the word ‘pupil’ in English, which comes from the Latin pupilla
(little doll), also contains a reference to the image of oneself reflected on another one’s eye.
See: James A. H. Murray, The Oxford English Dictionary: Being a Corrected Reissue with an
Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography of A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles,
Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society, 12 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1933; reprint, 1961), vol. 8: p. 1608.
552 Ibn Qutaybah, Adab ul-kātib, ed. Muḥammad ad-Dālī (Beirut: Muʾassisat ar-Rasāla, 1420/
1999), p. 146; Abū Hilāl ʿAskarī, Kitāb at-talḫīṣ fī maʿrifat il-asmāʾ il-ašyāʾ, ed. ʿIzzat Ḥasan, 2
vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1413/1993), vol. 1: p. 30; Abī ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd ul-Muʾmin
ibn Mūsā al-Qaysī aš-Šarīšī, Šarḥ maqāmāt ul-ḥarīrī, ed. Ibrāhīm Šams ud-Dīn, 3 vols. (Beirut:
Dār ul-Kutub ul-ʿIlmīya, 1427/2006), vol. 1: p. 220.
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image, the relation between humans and the One is likened to the relation be-
tween the pupil of the eye (insān ul-ʿayn) and the eye; the pupil is the window
through which sight is possible.553 In a qaṣīda,554 ʿIrāqī describes the primor-
dial state in which his being is formed. In the penultimate couplet, he poses a
rhetorical question: ‘If I am not the pupil of the eye of that Beloved, | Why of all
the world I bear the name human.’555 In another verse in one of his famous stro-
phic poems, he asserts, ‘I am the pupil of the eye of the world’.556 At first, this
may appear to mean simply that humans are the creatures most dear to the uni-
verse – the apple of its eye. Yet the verse has a deeper meaning. We can better
understand this verse by consulting Šabistarī’s Gulšan-i rāz. (Šabistarī was a
Sufi master contemporary to Ḥāfiẓ and the work in question was written in
verse.) This book clarifies the principles of Sufism and gives an allegorical in-
terpretation of some of the tropes found in Sufi love poetry.
In Gulšan-i rāz, Šabistarī illustrates the world as the place where one can
explore the truth in a mediated manner. Šabistarī uses the sun as a metaphor
for the truth557:
Since the eye of the head has not strength enough,
You may look on the brilliant sun in the water.
Since its brightness shows less brightly therein,
You can bear to look on it for a longer space.
No being [non-being] is the mirror of absolute Being,
Therein is shown the reflection of ‘The Truth.’558
Šabistarī suggests that the One’s reflection, cast upon the mirror of non-being
(ʿadam),559 generates the image of the whole universe in the shape of a person.
Each atom of this cosmic image contains the same image, but there is only one
553 Šayḫ-i Akbar Muḥīy ud-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, Matn va tarǧome-ye Fuṣūṣ ul-ḥikam, ed.
Muḥammad Ḫvāǧavī (Tehran: Maulā, 1387/2008), pp. 8–9.
554 ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 309. Verse 3660. This qaṣīda starts with
the following couplet: Hanūz bāġ-i ǧahān rā nabūd nām u nišān | Ki mast būdam az ān maī ki
ǧām-i ūst ǧahān. This couplet can be translated as follows: There was neither trace nor name
yet of the garden of the world, | As I was inebriated by that wine the cup of which is the world.
555 Ibid., p. 310. Couplet 3686. Vagarna mardumak-i čašm-i ān nigār manam | Čirāst nām-i
man az ǧumla-yi ǧahān insān.
556 My literal translation of the first verse of the following couplet: Man mardum-i dīda-yi
ǧahān-am | Dīda nabuvad sizā-yi parda. In: ibid., p. 288. Couplet 3466.
557 Saʿd ud-Din Mahmud Shadistari, The Gulshan Ráz of Najm ud Din, Otherweise called Saʿd ud
Din Mahmud Shabistari Tabrizi, trans. E. H. Whinfield (Calcutta: Wynam & Co, 1876), pp. 17–18.
558 Ibid.
559 It should be noted that ʿadam, or hayūlā in this context goes back to the reception of the
Aristotelian, Neoplatonic hyle.
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mirror (in the cosmic image itself) capable of reflecting the image in its en-
tirety – i.e., the pupil of the eye of this cosmic image. This dark mirror in the
cosmos is humanity: ‘Non-being is the mirror, the universe, the image and the
human | Like the pupil of the image in which the person is concealed’.560
Šabistarī describes the image of the Beloved in the pupil of the eye as the light
by which the eye perceives; what it sees is the face that is in front of it. Finally,
he mentions: ‘If you take a deep look into this matter, | It is He who is the seer,
the eye and the sight’.561
ʿIrāqī claims that the human is the insān ul-ʿayn of the Beloved as well as of
the world; the likeness humans bear to the whole image of the Beloved is their
essence (ʿayn), and this image is active in their eyes (ʿayn) perceiving the world
of the diversifications of the One through the light that is again the image of
the One itself. This claim is another articulation of the inner connections be-
tween the humanity of humans, the heart (ʿayn in the meaning of ‘essence’ and
‘likeness’), and the eye that perceives the One in Its diversifications.
The relation between the eye and the heart allows us to appreciate Ḥāfiẓ’s
couplet quoted above, in which he claims that the pupil of his eye gazes upon
nothing but the face of the Beloved and that his heart, as an intellectual faculty,
is ruled by nothing but the images of the Beloved.
This view of the sight and perception of the phenomena corresponds to
Ḥāfiẓ’s turn toward natural and human beauty, which he understands as a
noble act that entails going beyond one’s limited selfish interests and recogniz-
ing the Beloved as the only source of Beauty. In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ
describes his view of being a lover. He personifies the image of the Beloved in
his pupil (mardum-i čašm) while his heart actively explores the garden of the
world (bāġ-i ʿālam): ‘Was ist das Ziel des Herzens bei Betrachtung des Welt-
Gartens? | Mit Hilfe [mit der Hand] der Pupille von deiner Wange Rosen zu
pflücken.’562 The image of the Beloved comes to life, extending His or Her Hand
beyond the reflecting surface of Ḥāfiẓ’s pupil (mardum-i čašm) to gather flowers
from the garden of the world, which is identified with the face of the Beloved.
Ḥāfiẓ thereby becomes what he claims to be in the opening verse of this ġazal
(385) – the famous lover in the city of Shiraz. The pupil of the eye extends its
560 Muḥammad Lāhīǧī, Mafātīḥ ul-iʿǧāz fī šarḥ-i Gulšan-i rāz taʾlīf-e Šayḫ Muḥammad Lāhīǧī
az ʿorafā-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keīvān Samīʿī (Tehran:
Ketābforūšī-ye Maḥmūdī, 1337/1958), p. 730 (my translation).
561 Ibid.
562 Wohlleben, 385, 6, p. 494. The explanation in brackets comes from Wohlleben’s footnotes.
Avery translates this couplet as follows: ‘What, gazing on the garden of the world, does the heart
desire? | With the pupil of the eye to pluck a rose from your cheek.’ CCCLXXXV, 6, p. 470.
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activity between the heart that is formed by the Beloved (and that desires the
Beloved) and the world that reflects the Beloved.
The emphatic praise of ogling (naẓar-bāzī) in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ can be appre-
ciated in light of the connections between the heart; the humanity of humans
(i.e., their ʿayn); and the human faculty of sight. Here is Arberry’s translation of
the passage from the Divan that contains Ḥāfiẓ’s most famous praise of ogling:
[1] When I exchange the amorous glance
The ignorant look all askance;
Yet am I as I seemed to be—
And all the rest they know of me.
[2] The man of Mind the centre is
Of Being’s pair of compasses;
Yet Love doth know, that in this wheel
The minds of many thinkers reel.
[3] It is not in my eye alone
The image of his face is shewn;
The moon and sun alike delight
To hold a mirror in his sight.563
Unlike the followers of abstraction, the lovers explore the phenomena with the
active image of the face of the Beloved in their eyes. In each phenomenon, they
find an aspect of that image; the moon and the sun are also recognized to be
holding mirrors to the face of the Beloved. Through this capability, human
sight detects the disclosure of the Beloved’s beauty in the most unexpected pla-
ces. Ḥāfiẓ proudly and daringly announces that he perceives the light of God in
the pleasure house of the magi, a place where no one expects it to be perceived:
‘I see the light of God in the Magian Tavern. | Behold this marvel, from where I
see such a light!’564 In Ḥāfiẓ’s view, the images of the Beloved’s face lead the
lovers through their quest of beauty:
[5] The highway robber of my imagination is every moment a vision of your face.565
To whom can I tell what things I am seeing behind this veil?
[. . .]
[7] Friends, do not fault Háfiz’s eye-playing,
Because I see him as belonging to your loved ones.566
563 Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 162. See the Persian verses in Ḫānlarī,
188.
564 Avery, CCCXLIX, 1, p. 429.
565 It should be noted that the word naqš in the Persian verse does not mean vision; rather, it
is a visible object of sight – an image, shape or figure connoting a multi-colored trace. This
becomes clear in the second verse: ‘what things I am seeing’, Ḥāfiẓ says.
566 Avery, CCCXLIX, 5 & 7, p. 429.
III.2 The World of Reflections in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ 293
III.2.2.3 Love as an Artist
In the couplets cited above, in addition to illustrating the activity of his eye
(ogling) in recognizing the images of the face of the Beloved, Ḥāfiẓ describes the
experience of being in the world as one of looking at a scrim. Ḥāfiẓ explicitly
states that his experience of beauty relates to the images of the face of the
Beloved. In other words, his relation to his object of pursuit is mediated through
images. Whereas the early Sufis wished to approach the truth by casting aside
the veil of the world of mixture and transience, the Sufi adorers of beauty, and
specifically ʿIrāqī, viewed the mediated presence of the Beloved in the world as
valuable in itself.
In the prolog to Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī cites one of his own ġazals in which Love
appears as a minstrel (muṭrib), whose music guides lovers through their pursuit
of beauty.567 In the third Lamʿa, while quoting a couplet from Auḥad ud-Dīn
Kirmānī,568 he describes Love as the ‘Painter’ (naqqāš), who is deeply infatu-
ated with His own paintings. Further in this Lamʿa, the whole of existence is
described as a painting of this Painter, and the different aspects of the multi-
plicity of beings are likened to the painter’s face:
[E]ach image painted
On the canvas of the existence
is the form
of the artist himself.
Eternal Ocean
spews forth new waves.
‘Waves’ we call them;
but there is only the Sea.569
In the sixth Lamʿa, Love is described as a Beautifier (maššāṭa), an expert in col-
oring who begets truth in the hue of images that cause lovers to fall in love.570
Finally, in the sixteenth Lamʿa, a relatively short but important section of the
work, ʿIrāqī further elaborates on the relation between Love and Its act as an
artist. He characterizes Love as the master shadow artist, whose acts, move-
ments and decrees constitute the world.571
This definition of Love as an artist, who delights in communicating aspects
of Its indeterminate Self under the limitations of finite images, calls for a
567 ʿIrāqī,Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 453.
568 Ibid., p. 462, l. 111. See also Muḥtašam’s note on line 111.
569 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 77.
570 ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 471, l. 190–191.
571 Ibid., pp. 497–498.
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reevaluation of the finite. The limitations that constitute the attributes of the
Beloved and the natural and bodily sphere are no longer understood as limita-
tions imposed on the Infinite; rather, they are conceived as choices of the
Artist, who limits Himself in order to communicate an intelligible, aesthetically
pleasing aspect of His infinite Self.572 ʿIrāqī concludes the sixteenth Lamʿa with
a reminder: ‘[t]he source of the activity is one, but everywhere displays new col-
ors and is called by a different name.’573
According to ʿIrāqī, the images and colorations of the Beloved have their
effect even if the lover does not know that they are acts of the Beloved. In the
seventh Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī explains:
It is not so much wrong as impossible to love other than Him, for whatever we love (aside
from that love which springs from the very essence of the lover, the cause of which is
unknown), we love either for its beauty, or its goodness—and both of these belong to Him
alone.574
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, there are passages in which Love is rendered as a ‘min-
strel’ (muṭrib), who moves lovers with melodies. In the following ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ
describes the wailing of lovers, who covet their beloveds, as part of the Minstrel
of Love’s music:
[1] Love’s minstrel has a wonderful song and tune;
The theme of every chord he’s struck finds a home.
[2] May the world never be empty of lovers’ wailing,
For it has a secret note and a joy-imparting echo.575
A minstrel himself, Ḥāfiẓ viewed his songs as an extension and culmination of
the divine song of love. In fact, he never aggrandizes himself, except for with
regard to his work as a minstrel and poet. He boasts that his songs move people
of all nationalities, as well as the heavens and angels:
To the poetry of Háfiz of Shíráz they are dancing and pirouetting,
The dark eyes of Kashmír and the Turks of Samarqand.576
Spread the rumour of love in the Hejáz and ‘Iráq:
572 Compare to: Ganǧīne-ye ʿerfān: Ašaʿat ul-lamaʿāt-e Ǧāmī, Sawāniḥ-e Ġazzālī, ed. Ḥāmid
Rabbānī (Tehran: Ganǧīne, 1352/1974), pp. 31–34; 94.
573 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 109.
574 Ibid., p. 85 (my emphasis). See also: ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 474,
l. 209.
575 Avery, CXIX, 1–2, p. 165. See also: Wohlleben, 119, 1–2, p. 190.
576 Avery, CCCCXXXI, 9, p. 520.
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The singing and the voice of the lyrics of Háfiz of Shíráz.577
There’s no wonder if, at the words of Háfiz, in the heavens
Venus’s ecstasy makes the Messiah dance!578
At the time of morning, a chorus was coming from the Throne [of heaven].
Reason said: ‘It seems angels chant poems of Háfiz by heart.’579
Ḥāfiẓ describes the maker of the natural world as a beautifier (maššāṭa) in the
following couplet: ‘The decker-out of creation’s pen will record no gratification |
For any who have not acknowledged this God-given beauty.’580 Through this
warning, Ḥāfiẓ emphasizes that recognizing the aesthetically moving work of
the divine is the prerequisite for grasping the advantages of whole macrocosmic
creation. In another ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ praises the Painter (naqqāš) of the universe and
the multiplicity of images that emerge through His artistic production: ‘Get up
so that for that limner’s pen we may sacrifice the soul, | Because he has all this
marvellous imagery in a compass’s twirling.’581 These passages, in which the
multiplicity is depicted as a work of art produced by the Artist, should be consid-
ered in relation to the couplet mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section.582
There, too, Love acts as a master shadow artist, perpetually disclosing different
images of the face of the Beloved. Love constantly leads Ḥāfiẓ through experien-
ces of beauty and enables him to recognize the light of the divine in the pleasure
house of the magi. The presence of light – no matter where – testifies to the
Artist’s activity.
III.2.2.4 A Separation Willed by the Beloved and the Love of Beloveds
In the fourth chapter of Sawāniḥ, A. Ġazzālī defines union in the negative tra-
dition: ‘Since union (with love) is partition (from the self), partition (in this
sense) is nothing other than union. Therefore, parting from one’s self is the
same as union.’583 In the fortieth chapter, however, we recognize an inclu-
sive aspect as the consequence of abandoning the self. Furthermore, this
move from exclusion to inclusion is only conceivable if we allow for a com-
municative aspect of Love. Here are the two first sections of this chapter of
Sawāniḥ:
577 Avery, CCLII, 7, p. 321.
578 Avery, IV, 8, p. 24.
579 Avery, CXCIV, 10, p. 254.
580 Avery, CXXXVIII, 7, p. 188. See also: Wohlleben, 138, 7, p. 211.
581 Avery, LXXIX, 5, p. 119.
582 Avery, CCCXLIX, 5, p. 429.
583 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 24.
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(1) From the point of view of the real nature of love,584 the beloved acquires no gain and
suffers no loss by (the lover’s) love. However, in virtue of its customary generosity, love
binds the lover to the beloved. The lover is always the object of the beloved’s contempla-
tion through the binding of love.
(2) This is why separation willed by the beloved is more union than union willed by
the lover. For when separation is willed by the beloved, then (there is a duality of contem-
plator and that which is contemplated; so) the lover becomes the object of contemplation
for the beloved’s heart, and the object of her will and intention. On the other hand, when
the lover wills union, there is no contemplation of the beloved and she does not take him
into account at all.585
In this passage, A. Ġazzālī introduces another aspect of abandoning the self,
which is based on the communicative, formative aspect of Love that binds the
lover to the Beloved. Within this communicative aspect, the lover is the object
of the Beloved’s contemplation, since (as I explained earlier) the Beloved takes
nourishment from Her beauty through the lover’s being and desire. If the lover
seeks an intentional union, however, the formative contemplation of the
Beloved is interrupted.
ʿIrāqī alludes to these chapters of Sawāniḥ in the twenty-first and twenty-
second Lamʿa. In the twenty-fourth Lamʿa, he explains his view of the signifi-
cance of a separation that is willed by the Beloved. In the twenty-first Lamʿa,
ʿIrāqī declares that lovers must abandon all desires belonging to their limited
self: ‘[w]hat you get by wanting is only as big as your capacity for desire.’586
Then in the twenty-second Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī asserts that the lover should love what-
ever the Beloved loves, whether union and closeness or remoteness and separa-
tion: ‘After all, in nearness and Union the lover is merely qualified by his
own desire, while in exile and separation he is qualified by the will of the
Beloved.’587 Thus, ʿIrāqī interprets ‘being the object of contemplation of the
Beloved’ as ‘being qualified by the Beloved’. Based on this reading, ʿIrāqī takes
a significant step toward a shift from negation of the lovers’ qualities to an in-
clusive approach: ‘Know then that the cause of the lover’s remoteness is his
own attributes—but that these attributes are the Beloved Himself.’588 In this
584 Real nature of love is Pourjavady’s translation of ḥaqīqat-i kār-i ʿišq, which pertains to
Love in Itself and in Its Essence.
585 Ghazzālī, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 57. The numeration fol-
lows that of the source. See also Pourjavady’s edition of the work in original Persian: Ġazzālī,
Sawāniḥ, p. 35.
586 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 114.
587 Ibid., p. 116.
588 Ibid.
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Lamʿa, the abandoning of the self goes beyond negation of the attributes that
form the lovers; it leads to the recognition that the attributes that constitute the
lover belong to the One. In this knowledge, the lovers recognize their individu-
ated beings as willed and intended by the Beloved. This view is articulated in
the twenty-fourth Lamʿa:
The lover’s search and desire is [sic] but a sign of the Beloved’s aspiration. Indeed, all his
attributes—shame, desire, taste, and laughter—everything he ‘owns’ belongs in truth to
the Beloved. The lover but holds it in trust; he cannot even be called a partner, for part-
nership in attributes would demand separate essences. But in the lover’s contemplative
eye there exists in all reality but a single existent Essence.589
Having abandoned the false conviction that they have a self of their own, the
lovers can appreciate that they are attributes of the One – instances capable of
recognizing the attributes of the Beloved in all beloveds, each of which is a
work of the Artist Love, who communicates an aspect of Its infinite Self in the
multiplicity of veils of finite works of art.
Throughout Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī carefully argues that choosing a separation
willed by the Beloved over a union is a compromise: the lovers no longer seek
to purify themselves from the attributes that form them; rather, in the process
of self-knowledge, they realize that these attributes belong to the Beloved
(the only being that can have attributes).590 In Mystical Dimensions of Islam,
Annemarie Schimmel mentions that ʿIrāqī’s view goes ‘beyond the early formu-
lation that love means staying at the friend’s door even if sent away’.591 Yet
Schimmel does not go further than highlighting the importance of the articula-
tion of this view in Lamaʿāt.
An Arabic couplet cited by ʿIrāqī in the twenty-second Lamʿa provides one
of the most beautiful poetic articulations of the compromise described above.
Here is Chittick’s translation:
589 Ibid., pp. 118–119.
590 The realization that all the attributes belong to the One does not mean that one can harm
others or remain passive to harmful deeds of others. The human faculty of appreciation of
beauty sees the face of the Beloved everywhere, even in unpleasant deeds; however, this is a
face of disapproval. ʿIrāqī asserts that the lover can harmonize the attributes that pertain to
the disclosure of wrath with those that pertain to the disclosure of pleasance. Compare to the
twenty-first Lamʿa in: ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye āsā̱r-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, pp. 514–516. Also see:
ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, pp. 114–115.
591 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1975), p. 354.
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I want Union with Him
He wants separation for me—
so I abandon my desire
to His.592
The Arabic couplet as cited in Lamaʿāt is ‘Urīdu wiṣālahu wa yurīdu hiǧrī | Fa-
ʾatraku mā urīdu limā yurīd’.593 And Ḥāfiẓ’s graceful Persian translation: ‘Maīl-i
man sūy-i viṣāl u qaṣd-i ū sūy-i farāq | Tark-i kām-i ḫud giriftam tā barāyad kām-
i dūst’594:
My leaning, towards unity; his intention, separation:
My inclination I have forgone, to achieve the purpose of the friend.595
Meine Neigung zielt ab auf den Liebesbund, und sein Bestreben zielt auf Trennung,
auf meinen Wunsch habe ich Verzicht getan, damit sein Wunsch in Erfüllung gehe.596
In his translation of this Arabic verse, Ḥāfiẓ employs the identical noun viṣāl
(union). He masterfully integrates the Arabic verb for ‘abandoning’ (from the
root t-r-k) in the Persian compound verb that includes this verb (tark giriftan).
To translate the noun hiǧr (separation), Ḥāfiẓ uses a close synonym – farāq.
A. Ġazzālī uses the word farāq in the fortieth chapter of Sawāniḥ, and ʿIrāqī
uses farāq much more frequently than hiǧr in his Persian expositions of this
particular Arabic verse.
Ḥāfiẓ’s acceptance of the Beloved’s remoteness cannot be appreciated with-
out considering ʿIrāqī’s contextualization of the Arabic couplet above in his
views in the twenty-first to the twenty-fourth Lamʿa. We also need to consider
the allegorical symbolism of the imagery of the face of the Beloved in the
poems of the Sufi adorers of beauty – specifically, the Beloved’s mole, face,
down and tress.
592 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 115.
593 ʿIrāqī, Maǧmūʿe-ye ās̱ār-e Faḫr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 516. The author of this couplet is not known;
without attribution of authorship, the couplet is found in Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī’s Iḥyāʾ-y ʿulūm ad-
dīn, rubʿ al-munǧīyāt, bayān ul-faḍl un-niʿma ʿal al-balāʾ. See: Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ġazzālī,
Iḥyāʾ-y ʿulūm ad-dīn, ed. Ḥusaīn Ḫadīvǧam, trans. Muʾaīyad ud-Dīn Muḥammad Ḫvārazmī
(Tehran: Entešārāt-e Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran, 1357/1978), p. 372.
594 Ḫānlarī, 63, 7.
595 Avery, LXIII, 7, p. 100.
596 Wohlleben, 63, 7, p. 123.
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III.2.2.4.1 A Note on Allegorical Meanings of the Mole, Face, Down and Tress
of the Beloved
The profane love poetry that was integrated into Sufi recitals would often de-
scribe the beloved’s facial features – for instance, the mole, down and hair –
and their influence on the lover (or the lover’s subjective world). More often
than not, the mere mention of the beloved’s hair or cheek suffices for the reader
to form a mental picture of the beloved. On their heroic quests, therefore, lovers
would face the arrows of coquetry from the bow of the eyebrow; endure en-
snarement in the beloved’s hair – or in the noose of its curls; reach for the foun-
tain of life of the beloved’s lip and mouth of the beloved; and much more. In
this mode of articulation, the person of the beloved is conceivable only as a
suggested identity.
Earlier in this chapter, I briefly traced the controversies among Sufis sur-
rounding the turn toward adoration of human beauty and the poetic articula-
tion of human love.597 In both Huǧvīrī and Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī’s works, love
poems are characterized as ‘those poems that describe the face, mole, and
hair of the beloved’.598 The tropes of love poetry retain their recognizable
form, rhetorical power and popularity from the earliest extant poems to the
time of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry – and even to the beginning of the twentieth century.
For instance, both Ḥanẓala Bādġīsī (ninth century) and Rūdakī (tenth century)
use imagery and similes found in ġazals of Ḥāfiẓ.599 Yet in the course of three
centuries, the imagery that was once reserved for the description of human
beauty underwent an allegorical transformation, after which Sufi poets pro-
duced a greater volume of love poetry than non-Sufi poets. Ǧāmī’s account of
ʿIrāqī as a young man documents this remarkable turn. If the early Sufis in-
cluded the poetry of the taverns into their convents, now the direction of in-
fluence was reversed – Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Multānī, ʿIrāqī’s mentor, was informed
that a ġazal composed by the young ʿIrāqī in seclusion had become popular in
the taverns.600 A relatively clear explanation of the allegorical Sufi interpreta-
tion of the metaphors of the parts of the face of the beloved (as well as other
tropes of Sufi love poetry) emerges in Gulšan-i rāz, written two years after
Ḥāfiẓ was born.
597 See §III.2.1.2 (‘Integration of Love Poetry in Sufi Recitals (samāʿ)’).
598 See in this section the citations relevant to the footnotes 419 and 425.
599 Pourjavady, ‘Šeʿr-e ḥalāl, šeʿr-e ḥarām,’ p. 7. Of the two extant quatrains of Ḥanẓala
Bādġīsī, one is a love poem that contains poetic mention of the ‘mole’ of the beloved. See:
Muḥammad ʿAwfí, Lubábu ʾl-Albáb, ed. Edward. G. Browne, 2 vols., Persian Historical Texts
(Leiden & London: Brill and Luzac, 1906), vol. 2: p. 2.
600 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 602.
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Šabistarī’s Gulšan-i rāz was composed in 1317 in response to a list of ques-
tions posed by the renowned Sufi from Ḫurāsān, Amīr Ḥusaīn Ḥusaīnī Hiravī,
in a letter written in verse.601 Ǧāmī rightly notes that these questions provide
the foundation of Gulšan-i rāz.602 The questions are designed such that a dis-
cussion of the basic principles of Sufism precedes the explanation of the alle-
gorical meaning of the imagery of love poetry.
This allegorical interpretation takes its point of departure from a question
that juxtaposes the seeker of inner intellectual content (mard-i maʿnī) to those
who use poetic tropes of love and beauty. In a related question, Hiravī asks:
‘[w]hat does he indicate by “curl”, “down” and “mole?”’603 The answer to this
question will cast light on the meaning of the imagery of the face of the
Beloved that Ḥāfiẓ employs in the context of describing his choice of a separa-
tion that is intended by the Beloved.
Šabistarī’s answer starts as follows:
Whatsoever is seen in this visible world,
Is a reflection from the sun of that world.
The world is as curl, down, mole and brow,
For everything in its own place is beautiful604
Šabistarī uses the metaphor of the sun (familiar to us, of course, from the
Platonic tradition) to describe the communicative aspect of the One in the ema-
native relation between the Beloved (the totality of the face) and the world of
multiplicity (the image of the face). Using the macrocosm/microcosm argu-
ment, he asserts that the world, like the human face, has many parts, each with
a distinguishable form. Taken together, these parts make up the beauty of the
whole. Developed by Ibn ʿArabī and integrated into the Persian tradition of Sufi
601 Šabistarī explicitly mentions that the questions were originally in verse; he cites each
question from Hiravī’s letter: Lāhīǧī, Mafātīḥ ul-iʿǧāz fī šarḥ-i Gulšan-i rāz taʾlīf-e Šayḫ
Muḥammad Lāhīǧī az ʿorafā-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keīvān
Samīʿī, p. 725.
602 Ǧāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 605. It must be mentioned that Hiravī’s Sufi mentor, according
to Ǧāmī’s Nafaḥāt ul-ns, was Bahāʾ ud-Dīn Multānī (who was also ʿIrāqī’s mentor); yet Ǧāmī
also mentions that other sources name Bahāʾ ud-Dīn’s descendants as Hiravī’s mentors. See
also Samīʿī’s introduction in: Lāhīǧī, Mafātīḥ ul-iʿǧāz fī šarḥ-i Gulšan-i rāz taʾlīf-e Šayḫ
Muḥammad Lāhīǧī az ʿorafā-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keīvān
Samīʿī, pp. LXXV–LXXVII.
603 Shadistari, The Gulshan Ráz of Najm ud Din, Otherweise called Saʿd ud Din Mahmud
Shabistari Tabrizi, p. 88.
604 Ibid.
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love through ʿIrāqī,605 the cosmological emanative view of disclosure of the
One that asserts the similarity between the microcosm and the macrocosm
provides the key to the allegorical reception of these tropes of love poetry.
Consistent with this cosmological image, a specific level in the hierarchical em-
anative structure is assigned to each part of the face.
The mole on the Beloved’s cheek (face) is described as the metaphor for the
center point of absolute Oneness. Hammer-Purgstall’s translation of the follow-
ing couplets is sensitive to the meaning of basīṭ, which stands for ‘being simple’
(as opposed to ‘being mixed or composed of parts’) in the Platonic tradition:
Einfacher Punct [sic] ist in dem Angesicht das Maal,
Der Einheit Mittelpunct, der Kreis der Vielheit Zahl,
Aus diesem Punct geht aus der Kreis der Doppelwelt,
Geht aus das Lineament, wodurch das Herz zerfällt.606
In his fifteenth century commentary, Lāhīǧī notes:
Know that the origin and the extremity of multiplicity is oneness, and the mole denotes
it, for the dot of the mole due to its being dark is analogous to the dot of the Essence [ẕāt]
which is the state of nullification of sense, disclosure, and cognition; this is represented
by [metaphors of] darkness, while the manifest disclosures [taǧallī-yi ẓuhūrī] are repre-
sented by metaphors of light.607
In other words, the mole symbolizes the Beloved’s non-communicative as-
pect, which stands at the very center of the whole – beyond intelligibility
or entification.
The cheek (that has the down grown around it) stands for of the Beloved’s
communicative aspect. Lāhīǧī writes: ‘know that the cheek (face) connotes the
divine Essence in respect to the disclosure of the multiplicity of names and at-
tributes from It.’608 And the down, resembling the first intelligible attributes,
grows around the cheek. Lāhīǧī writes: ‘know that just like the down grows
upon the cheek, the entifications [taʿayyunāt] of the realm of the intelligible
[ʿālam-i arvāḥ] grow around the divine Essence [ẕāt-i ilāhī].’609
605 As I showed earlier, Šabistarī’s explanation of the place of humanity as the pupil of the
eye of the Beloved in the reflected image of the Beloved on the macrocosmic level was influ-
enced by Ibn ʿArabī and ʿIrāqī.
606 Mahmud Schebisteri, Mahmud Schebisteri’s Rosenflor des Geheimnisses, trans. Hammer-
Purgstall (Pesth: C.A. Hartleben, 1838), p. 18 (my emphasis).
607 Lāhīǧī, Mafātīḥ ul-iʿǧāz fī šarḥ-i Gulšan-i rāz taʾlīf-e Šayḫ Muḥammad Lāhīǧī az ʿorafā-ye
qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keīvān Samīʿī, p. 593 (my translation).
608 Ibid., p. 587 (my translation).
609 Ibid., p. 588 (my translation).
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The hierarchical relation between the curls of the hair and the down is ex-
plicitly articulated in the following couplet: ‘From the curl learn the affair of
the world, | In the down read at large the “the hidden secret!”’610 On this cou-
plet Lāhīǧī comments:
Know that by the hair the multiplicity, variety, and the scattered nature of the world are
meant, and by the down of the Beloved – the nebulous mystery, that is – the growth of
the down of the multiplicity on the face of the oneness is meant, which is the mediator
between the absolute unseen and the absolute sensible. [. . .] Know that the down and the
hair are similar in regard to their being analogous to the multiplicity; however, since the
inclusiveness of the hair is vaster, it is identified with the absolute multiplicities and enti-
fications. And sometimes, it is reserved for the visible realm, and the down is reserved for
the entifications of the spiritual (intelligible) realm611
In the opening (maṭlaʿ) of the only ġazal in the Divan with ḥusn (beauty) as its
fixed rhyme, Ḥāfiẓ illustrates the mole, face and down in a hierarchical order
corresponding to the allegorical semiology of Sufi love: ‘O Thou, whose face,
moon in appearance, (is) the fresh spring— of beauty; | Whose mole and down
(are), the center of grace and the circle― of beauty!’612
III.2.2.4.1a The Mole of the Beloved and the Eye of the Lover
I mentioned that the mole stands for the Beloved on its most infinite non-
entified level. I also pointed out that ʿIrāqī, uniting the traditions of A. Ġazzālī
and Ibn ʿArabī, holds that the Beloved has a direct presence in the lover’s fac-
ulty of appreciation of beauty – one of the fundamental principles of the Sufi
adoration of beauty. Next, I examine whether this relation extends to the rela-
tion between the mole of the Beloved and the eye of the lover.
Ḥāfiẓ illustrates the relation between the mole of the Beloved and the eye
of the lover in the following verses:
Savād-i dīda-yi ġam-dīda-am ba ašk ma-šūy
Ki naqš-i ḫāl-i tu-am hargiz az naẓar na-ravad
Do not with tears wash out the black of my grief-experienced eye,
Because the reflection of your mole should never leave my sight.613
Īn nuqṭa-yi sīyāh ki āmad madār-i nūr
610 Shadistari, The Gulshan Ráz of Najm ud Din, Otherweise called Saʿd ud Din Mahmud
Shabistari Tabrizi, p. 94.
611 Lāhīǧī, Mafātīḥ ul-iʿǧāz fī šarḥ-i Gulšan-i rāz taʾlīf-e Šayḫ Muḥammad Lāhīǧī az ʿorafā-ye
qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keīvān Samīʿī, p. 590 (my translation).
612 Clarke, 447, 1, p. 749. See also: Ḫānlarī, 386, 1.
613 Avery, CCXIX, 3, p. 284.
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ʿAksīst dar ḥadīqa-yi bīniš zi ḫāl-i tu
This black spot that has become the pivot of light,
In vision’s garden-plot is a reflection of your mole.614
As we see in these verses, the mole is mentioned in direct relation to the eye.
The pupil (or insān ul-ʿayn) of the lover is repeatedly described as a reflection of
the mole of the Beloved. This reflected image is repeatedly referred to as a per-
manent mark. Furthermore, this image of the mole is described as the source of
light and sight. Early instances of these two metaphors can be found in works
of Sanāʾī and ʿAṭṭār.615
III.2.2.4.1b The Mole of the Beloved and the Heart of the Lover
The other pivotal principle in Sufi adoration of beauty that finds articulation in
ʿIrāqī’s work is the relation between the eye and the heart of the lover. Both
contain an image of the Beloved, which unites the faculty of appreciation of
beauty (the eye) and the ontological ground of humanity (the heart). But the
relation between the eye and the heart of the lover, I argue, is mediated by the
(distinct) connection that each has to the mole of the Beloved. In the previous
sub-section, I discussed the first of these connections – the connection between
the mole of the Beloved and the eye of the lover. In this sub-section, I show that
the heart of the lover likewise bears a connection to the Beloved’s mole.
In the two following couplets in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ expresses in a cerebral
manner the view that the Beloved is directly present in the heart of the lover.
Ḥāfiẓ’s expression of this view can be elucidated by following the poetic logic
that links the similes and metaphors Ḥāfiẓ employs to unite literary beauty
with sophisticated intellectual content:
Čun lāla maī mabīn u qadaḥ dar mīyān-i kār
Īn dāġ bīn ki bar dil-i ḫūnīn nahādaīm
Do not see the tulip-like wine and the cup in the forefront of things.
See this brand-mark that we have impressed on our blooded heart.616
614 Avery, CCCC, 9, p. 485. See also: Wohlleben, 400, 9, p. 509. Wohlleben adds the following
remark: ‘Beispiel der oft wiederkehrenden Vorstellung von der innersten Korrespondenz zwischen
der Pupille des Liebenden und dem Schönheitsfleck im Antlitz des Geliebten.’ (my emphasis).
615 Šud ḫāl-i ruḫ-i tu iy nigārīn | Šūr-i dil u nūr-i dīdagānam. In: Sanāʾī, Dīvīn, p. 937, 235, 10. In
ʿAṭṭār, Maǧmūʿe-ye robāʿīyāt [Muḫtārnāma], p. 186., we read the following quatrain:
Ḫāl-i tu ki ǧāvidān ba dū bitvān dīd | Bar rū-yi tu rū-yi ǧān ba dū bitvān dīd
Gar mardumak-i dīda-yi zībāʾī nīst | Pas čūn ki hami ǧahān ba dū bitvān dīd?
616 Avery, CCCLVI, 6, p. 437.
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Schau nicht dauernd auf uns wie auf die Tulpe, die mitten im Treiben den Becher
(hochhält).
Dieses Brandmal schau an, das wir uns aufs blutende Herz gesetzt haben!617
Ču lāla dar qadaḥ-am rīz sāqīyā maī-u mušk
Ki naqš-i ḫāl-i nigār-am namīravad zi żamīr
Boy, into my tulip-like cup pour wine and musk,
Because the image of the mole of my idol won’t leave the mind.618
Ganz wie bei der Tulpe, o Saqi, gieß Wein und ein Moschuskorn in meinen Kelch;
das Abbild vom (Schönheits-)Mal des Bildschönen geht mir nicht aus dem Sinn.619
In the first couplet above, Ḥāfiẓ compares a red tulip to a cup of wine. He then
directs our attention to the dark mark inside the tulip, which he compares to
the dark brand-mark that he believes to have on his heart. Thus, the reader is
led from the natural image of the tulip to the cerebral image of the heart with
its permanent dark brand.
In the second couplet’s first verse, Ḥāfiẓ revisits the similarity between a tulip
and a cup of wine. Seen from above, the tulip resembles a cup in which wine is
served with small, dark, grain-like pieces of musk added for fragrance.620 Ḥāfiẓ
likens the tulip and the cup of wine to his heart (żamīr), which contains the image
of the mole of the Beloved that resembles the dark marks inside the tulip and the
musk of the wine cup. While other translators translate żamīr (in the second
couplet cited above) as ‘mind’ (English) and ‘Sinn’ (German), Hammer-Purgstall’s
choice – ‘Innern’621 – comes closer to the meaning of żamīr in this poetic context.
In both instances, this mark is described as permanent: in the first example, it is a
brand-mark; and in the second, its permanence is explicitly mentioned through
its identification with the image of the mole of the Beloved.
Cast in the depth of the human heart, the image of the mole of the Beloved
is the ontological ground of the human being (zȧmīr). The image of the mole
also forms the pupil of the eye, which allows the human being to recognize the
unity (of the mole) in the multiplicity (of the down and tress).
III.2.2.4.2 Ḥāfiẓ’s Compromise and Its Articulations in the Imagery of the Face
of the Beloved
Having explained the state of the semiotic field in which Ḥāfiẓ employs the
tropes of love poetry, I now turn to the context in which Ḥāfiẓ voices his
617 Wohlleben, 356, 6, p. 460.
618 Avery, CCLI, 6, p. 318.
619 Wohlleben, 251, 6, p. 337.
620 Compare to: Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 2: p. 1067.
621 Hammer-Purgstall, vol. 2: p. 21.
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compromise in choosing a separation willed by the Beloved. First, I return to
that ġazal that contains Ḥāfiẓ’s translation of the Arabic couplet quoted by
ʿIrāqī in the twenty-second Lamʿa.622 Here is Avery’s translation of the full
ġazal:
[1] Welcome messenger to those who long! Deliver the message of the friend,
So that in desire I might sacrifice the soul, in the name of the friend.
[2] Woeful and forever distracted, like a nightingale in a cage, is
My parrot-nature, because of yearning for the sugar and almonds of the friend.
[3] His curls are a snare and his mole the grain in it, and I,
In hope of a grain, have toppled into the snare of the friend.
[4] Not till Resurrection Day morning do any leave off drunkenness,
Who, like me, in Eternity without Beginning drank a draught from the cup of the friend.
[5] I was telling a small part of the description of my passion, but
I am anxious no more than this to importune the friend.
[6] If the chance were granted, as tutty to the eyes would I apply
The dust of the road that has been honoured by the steps of the friend.
[7] My leaning, towards unity; his intention, separation:
My inclination I have forgone, to achieve the purpose of the friend.
[8] Go on burning, Háfiz, in grief for him and put up with lack of a cure,
Because there is no remedy for the unremitting longing for the friend.623
The ġazal begins with the poet’s welcoming of the morning wind,624 the mes-
senger of the divine that pervades the natural world as an intermediary agent.
In the second couplet, Ḥāfiẓ compares his poetic taste (ṭabʿ) to a parrot. This
metaphor for Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic taste is likened to a nightingale in a cage, which
is, in turn, a metaphor for the soul in the body. According to the Divan, the
source of poetic taste and practice is the Beloved: just as parrots are trained
to speak, so too is poetic taste developed medially by the Friend625 – the
Friend’s eye (almond) and lips (sugar) develop the poet’s faculty of sight and
eloquence. There is a striking correspondence between this couplet and the
ġazal by ʿIrāqī that opens with an illustration of the disclosure of ‘the ray of
622 See p. 299 above.
623 Avery, LXIII, p. 100.
624 Heravī, Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 1: p. 285.
625 During Ḥāfiẓ’s time, the trainer would speak to the parrot from behind a mirror in which
the parrot would see its own image. Imitating the trainer, the parrot would think that it was
imitating another parrot. Compare to: Ḫorramšāhī, Ḥāfiẓ–nāme, vol. 2: pp. 1074–1075. In the
following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ describes this manner of training parrots. Here is Wohlleben’s transla-
tion: ‘Hinter einen Spiegel hat man mich wie einen Papageien gesetzt; | was der Lehrer der
Urewigkeit mir vorsagte – “Sag” –, das sage ich.’ In: Wohlleben, 373, 2, p. 480.
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the beauty’ of the Beloved, and which explains the influence of the Beloved
on the human faculty of appreciation of beauty.626
In the third couplet, the poet describes the hair of the Beloved as a snare and
the mole as the grain (bait) that attracts lovers. The image of the Beloved’s mole
in the lover’s pupil and its mark in the inner part of the lover’s heart represent
(in this allegorical context) the faculty that recognizes the mole of unity in the
diversity of the Beloved’s hair; therefore, Ḥāfiẓ bravely steps inside the realm of
the many, of which he is a part. Thus, lovers are defined by partaking in the level
of diversification (the hair) that is furthest from the Infinite (although ultimately
unified with it). The ultimate unity between the ineffable mole and the hair be-
comes clear if we consider that they are parts of one identity – the Beloved.
In the fourth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ explains his loverhood in connection with the
events of pre-eternity, when humans were formed. This allusion is made
through the metaphor of tasting wine from the cup of the Friend. In the fifth
couplet, Hafiz expresses his longing for unity with the Beloved; however, the
Beloved accuses Hafiz of being importune.
In the seventh couplet, Ḥāfiẓ announces that he will abandon his unrequited
desire for union with the Beloved. The metaphors of the third couplet (the hair
and mole as the snare and grain) provide the key to understanding this couplet,
in which the Beloved’s hair gains its significance from the Beloved’s mole. The
third and seventh couplets articulate the view of turning from direct pursuit of
union with the Beloved toward an indirect adoration of Her in the multiplicity of
Her hair.
The Beloved extends Her unifying Being through all Her parts. Describing
Her hair, which stands for the realm furthest from the ineffable, Ḥāfiẓ employs
an oxymoron to show the uninterrupted immanence of the unifying Being in
the multiplicity of phenomena. He illustrates the hair in this way in the second
verse of the following couplet: ‘Hidden techniques of sorcery in your sultry
drunken eye, | In your disordered tress, beauty’s fixity manifest.’627 The allegory
of grain and snare appears again in the same ġazal, suggesting a metonymical
relevance between this oxymoron and the allegory in question: ‘Because of
your tress’s snare and the grain of your mole | In the world no single bird of the
heart is not left beauty’s prey.’628 In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ wishes to rec-
ognize that his nature is integrated into the multiplicity of the Beloved’s hair;
626 See p. 274 above.
627 Avery, CCCLXXXVI, 2, p. 471 (my emphasis). Here, ‘disordered’ and ‘fixity’ are translations
of bī-qarār (restless) and qarār (rest/composedness).
628 Avery, CCCLXXXVI, 5, p. 471 (my emphasis).
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he once again uses the oxymoron of ‘assembly of dispersion’ (maǧmaʿ-i
parīšānī): ‘With kindness, tranquillise Ḥāfiz’̤s heart, | O Thou, whose (beaute-
ous) tress-coil (is) the assembly-place (perfection) of dispersion!’629 Thus, the
hair of the Beloved represents the immanence of the One in the multiplicity of
phenomena, which includes the lovers. This all-encompassing inclusion is
voiced in the oxymoron that unites the changeable and the never-changing. In
other words, the allegory of the grain (the mole, the One) and the snare (the
hair, the multiplicity) is in fact another expression of the immanence of the
One, which is alluded to by the oxymoron of assembly of dispersion.
In another instance in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ again expresses his decision not to
bother the Beloved with his persistent quest for unity, which (in this context)
we may equate to the annihilation of his individuated self in the Beloved;
rather, he opts to keep his distance: ‘No more than this will your street’s dust
put up with our importunity: | O idol, you have shown kindnesses. I abate the
importuning.’630 This couplet, does not seem to be an articulation of Ḥāfiẓ’s
abandoning of loverhood; it is immediately followed by the anticipation of the
difficulties that a lover ensnared in the hair of the Beloved must endure after
abandoning the direct pursuit of union with the Beloved: ‘The heart stealer’s
tress is the snare in the Way, and his glance, temptation’s arrow; | Remember,
heart, the sundry counsels I am making yours.’631
In another instance in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ revisits the metaphor of hair and
mole:
[4] Since the tress of the holder of the heart demands the pagan girdle,
Go away, O Shaikh: the dervish gown is unlawful for our body.
[5] The bird of my spirit that was singing from Lote Tree
The grain of your mole in the end cast into snare.632
In these verses, the hair of the Beloved rejects the Sufi garment and the purity it
represents. The Beloved orders the poet to move in the direction of inclusion –
i.e., to go beyond the conventional confessional boundaries. Through the alle-
gory of the mole and the hair, Ḥāfiẓ alludes to the story of the Fall.
Metaphorically identifying with Adam, Ḥāfiẓ describes the story of the Fall as
one in which he himself was the protagonist, since he was motivated by the
desire for the mole of the Beloved. Ḥāfiẓ’s interpretation of the story of the Fall
629 Clarke, 568, 13, p. 921 (my emphasis). See also: Ḫānlarī, 464, 11.
630 Avery, CCCXLIV, 5, p. 423.
631 Avery, CCCXLIV, 6, p. 423. Compare to Schimmel’s remark on ʿIrāqī’s 21st, 22nd, 24th
Lamʿa p. 298 above.
632 Avery, CCCIV, 4–5, p. 378.
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leaves no doubt about the significance of the hair of the Beloved; and the unity
of humanity and loverhood.
The allegory of the grain and snare is, therefore, a cosmic image of the rela-
tion between the human and the ineffable One. The lover realizes that he be-
longs in the multiplicity, since he is an entification of the One. Furthermore,
the lover realizes that, like all the entifications in the multiplicity, his (the lov-
er’s) entification is willed by the One. As a consequence of this self-knowledge,
the lover/human chooses remoteness and resides within the intended entifica-
tion that loves, in a mediated manner, the mole of unity by the active presence
of the image of the mole in him. This form of self-knowledge modifies the nega-
tive self-annihilation and leads to a definition of the lover that states that the
lover is distant from the Beloved and resides in the realm of beloveds.
For Ḥāfiẓ failing to appreciate the beauty of the beloveds is a sign of a per-
son’s ignorance of the immanence and activity of the Beloved in the beloveds
and the lover. According to Ḥāfiẓ, the negative pursuit of union with the One
springs from an egoistic impulse that is directly opposed to being a lover. Given
that loverhood constitutes humanity, therefore, negative egoism appears to be
a quality of the Devil. In the following couplet, the egoist is equated to both the
adversary and the person who is ignorant about love: ‘Don’t tell the contentious
the mysteries of love and intoxication, | So that unenlightened he may die in
the pain of self-worship.’633
In addition to being the ontological ground of humanity, being a lover,
Ḥāfiẓ writes, is the only way to grasp the final purpose of existence: ‘Become
a lover, otherwise the business of the world will be over, | The intended plan
of being’s workshop undeciphered.’634 In accordance with this view, Ḥāfiẓ
deems erotic rejoicing in human and natural beauty a condition of appreciat-
ing the intelligible sublime beauty promised in paradise635: ‘From Paradise’s
fruits what relish might find | He who hasn’t bitten the apple of a darling’s
chin?’636 It is important to differentiate the metaphor of the apple, which rep-
resents part of the beloved’s face, from the other imagery that love poetry
shares with Sufi literature. By clearly referring to ‘a darling’ and not ‘the
Darling’, Ḥāfiẓ conveys to the reader that he is describing the desire for a
human beloved. Furthermore, the poetic articulation of the poet’s desire to
take a bite out of the apple (of the beloved’s chin) brings into relief the vivid,
633 Avery, CCCCXXVI, 1, p. 514.
634 Avery, CCCCXXVI, 5, p. 514.
635 Esteʿlāmī, Dars-e Ḥāfiẓ, vol. 1: p. 634.
636 Avery, CCXXIV, 9, p. 289 (my emphasis).
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erotic tone of the couplet.637 Other ġazals in the Divan leave no doubt about
Ḥāfiẓ’s erotic longing for human beauty, which he expresses through a non-Sufi
analogy – a desire to pluck the fruits of pleasure from the garden of a beloved’s
beauty: ‘Were I to pick one fruit from your garden, would it matter? | Were I to
see clearly by your lamp, would it matter?’638
The interwoven adoration of sublime and natural beauty in the Divan has
its roots in the recognition of the immanence of the Beloved in the belovedness
of all the beloveds. This recognition is made possible through the active imma-
nence of the Beloved in the human being – a quality that constitutes humanity.
Thus, the bodily sphere gains its significance as the locus of disclosure of the
One, which wills this disclosure in each instance. Moreover, the particular in-
stantiations of the One deserve adoration and attention, since the human ob-
server only has a limited time to appreciate the unique image of the Beloved
that appears in each being.639
Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic dialogue with the Sufi philosophy of love represents the peak of
the poetic articulation of the views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, which were devel-
oped from Aḥmad Ġazzālī to the time of Ḥāfiẓ. In a historical context dominated
by radical asceticism, these Sufis charted a Sufi path of their own by embracing
beauty. Balancing the body and soul (the mundane and the sublime), this view of
Sufi love provided an important intellectual framework for Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
III.3 The World of Reflections in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan
of Ḥāfiẓ
III.3.1 Beauty as the Object of Pursuit
In the previous chapters, we followed Faust’s forays into the world outside his
‘Studierzimmer’. We saw that he rejected the carefree life of Auerbachs Keller,
637 Compare to Faust II; the Gardner’s song articulates the distinction between the connota-
tion of fruits and other tropes of beauty and desirableness. It juxtaposes an aesthetic, sublime
rejoicing in beauty to a sensual, erotic one: ‘Über Rosen läßt sich dichten, | In die Äpfel muß
man beißen.’ V. 5168–5169.
638 Avery, CCXXII, 1, p. 287. On the non-Sufi tone of this ġazal see: Esteʿlāmī, Dars-e Ḥāfiẓ,
vol. 1: p. 608.
639 See my explanation of the seventeenth Lamʿa on p. 270 above. Another instance of the
articulation of this view in the Divan is explained on p. 289 above.
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where beauty and love are absent.640 In Hexenküche, the beauty that Faust saw
in the mirror became his next object of pursuit. That first experience in front of
the mirror prompted Faust to reconceive his earlier world-views; he sought to
explain how the sublime and sensual aspects of his love are intertwined.641 In
the form of soliloquies, monologues and disputations with Mephisto, Faust’s at-
tempts to construct a new world-view are reflected in his pursuit of Gretchen and
Helena. I explored how these moments in Faust connect to views that Goethe
expressed in other literary and theoretical works. I also referred to Herder’s Übers
Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele, which viewed aesthetic sense
perception as interlaced with attaining intellectual knowledge – a view that
Goethe adopted.
In the previous sub-chapter, I first explored a precedent (within the history
of Sufism) for a turn toward beauty and love, despite that these views met with
condemnation from orthodox and ascetic Sufis. I argued that the school of the
Sufi adoration of beauty developed, over the course of four centuries, from the
views and experiences of this earlier group.642 Furthermore, I argued that
Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan is remarkably consistent with the theoretical and theosophical
views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, specifically A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī, whose
works contributed to the conception of loverhood that the Divan praises.
In this sub-chapter, I review several similarities and differences, discussed
in the third chapter, between the respective representations of the pursuit of
love and beauty in Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.
III.3.2 The Mediated Immanence of the Infinite
In both texts, the pursuit of beauty and love emerges subsequent to a rejection of
the view of Truth (as well as Beauty and the Good) as absolutely transcendent.
This view is replaced by an understanding of the One as immanent, according to
which the One has a mediated immanence in the multiplicity of phenomena. The
world-view that emerges from this mediated immanence of the One in the multi-
plicity extends itself in an organic manner in its different aspects. By revisiting
this theme on multiple occasions, and highlighting (each time) the connections
between components of their views, Goethe and Ḥāfiẓ are able to articulate this
640 See p. 194 above.
641 The importance of maintaining equilibrium between the sublime and sensual experience
of love can be observed in Faust’s inner activity in front of the magic mirror (v. 2431;
2436–2440), as well as in his first encounter with Gretchen (§III.1.2.1).
642 See §III.2.1.1 (‘Being Moved by Beauty and Its Poetic Representation’).
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entire view in their respective literary works. This technique of revisiting the
same subject from different angles is more clearly present in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. But it
is present in Faust as well; in addition to Faust’s two love stories – the two in-
stances where Faust becomes receptive to the experience of love643 – we also
find Faust revisiting his views on love and beauty in multiple other occasions
and from different angles. After exploring the two texts separately, it becomes
clear that the respective immanent world-views of Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
exhibit profound similarities. These views are rooted in the authors’ respective
historical contexts. I have not argued that the texts contain identical elements.
Rather, they resemble each other in virtue of a common intellectual theme – the
turn from a transcendent world-view to an immanent one, in which beauty is
conceived as the mediated immanence of the One in the world.
III.3.3 The Communicative Aspect of the Infinite
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, the One has two aspects: a self-sufficient aspect that is in
itself and for itself; and a communicative aspect oriented toward the realm of
multiplicity. The essence of the divine cannot be comprehended, but through its
communicative aspect – its actions, disclosures and images – it moves humans
to pursue love and beauty. Following A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī,644 Ḥāfiẓ differentiates
between the self-referential Beauty in its essence and the communicative pleas-
ance of the Beloved. He explains the One’s disclosure in the many in relation to
this communicative aspect. In section III.2.2.1, I explained this aspect in reference
to my previous explanation of the tradition with which Ḥāfiẓ was in dialogue.
Chiron’s distinction between ‘Schönheit’ and ‘Anmut’ is based upon the
distinction between the non-communicative and communicative aspects of
beauty. In section III.1.6, I argued that Goethe had a universal and cosmic con-
ception of ‘Anmut’, according to which ‘Anmut’ is a communicative force en-
compassing the natural and the human realm, including the realm of art; in
both of these realms, ‘Anmut’ influences humans, bringing them to rejoice in
beauty. I observed the influence of this aspect of beauty in Anmutige Gegend
and in Faust’s pursuit of Helena. But this influence appears in all instances in
the drama in which Faust experiences the moving force of beauty, both natural
and human, as well as the influence that his theatrical creation on the stage
has on him in the scene Rittersaal.
643 See p. 201 above.
644 See pp. 260–262; 269–270 above.
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III.3.4 The World as Diversification of Attributes of the One
In both texts, the phenomenal world represents different images of the One; in
its disclosures, the One instantiates itself in different aspects in the realm of
multiplicity. In Wald und Höhle, the exalted spirit, to whom Faust addresses his
thanks-giving soliloquy, is credited with begetting all natural beings, described
as Faust’s brothers. This brotherhood, which cuts across species, is based on a
unifying Identity that Faust recognizes in the natural realm. In the scene
Marthens Garten, Faust introduces his divine ‘Allumfasser’ (or ‘Allerhalter’) in
relation to its diversifications in attributes instantiated in natural phenomena. I
also located this conception of the world in Goethe’s Prooemion and in the last
poem of Book of Suleika, in West-östlicher Divan. Furthermore, Faust considers
the human individuals to be diverse images of the divine; in Gretchen’s room,
Faust refers to Gretchen as ‘Götterbild’, and Lynceus addresses Helena as ‘gott-
gegebene Frau’.645
In case of the reception of Faust, we are able to take into account the au-
thor’s experimental explorations of nature; in a reading of the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ,
on the other hand, such a level of engagement with the examination of nature
cannot yet be deemed relevant, given the absence of any extant autobiographi-
cal documents. In his comment on the verses in Wald und Höhle concerning
Faust’s brothers in nature, Schöne draws our attention to Goethe’s comparative
osteological studies and his inclusion of humans into the general category of
animals.646 But we should note that Goethe’s remarkable discovery does not en-
compass all natural entities; it is limited to the demonstration of morphological
unity among the organic beings. (Thus, it excludes entities such as wind and
water.) The extended all-encompassing variation of this view that we find in
Wald und Höhle can be traced back to Goethe’s non-experimental speculative
world-views.
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, the communicative aspect of the divine is described
as the ray of Beauty of the Beloved (partau-i ḥusn), which discloses Itself in
countless attributes and images. I showed that Ḥāfiẓ regards the qualities that
specify each phenomenon as contributing to a unique instantiation of the intel-
ligible attributes of the Beloved disclosed through the communicative aspect of
Beauty. In Ḥāfiẓ’s view, the fragrance and color of flowers; the straight growth
of the cypress tree; the beauty of the narcissus; and the luminosity of the can-
dle’s flame are all unique instantiations of attributes of the One, disclosed in
645 See §III.1.3 (‘The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion’).
646 See p. 217 above.
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phenomena.647 This view, as I demonstrated, is consistent with ʿIrāqī’s view of
Love in Lamaʿāt, according to which Love’s self-disclosure begets the multiplic-
ity of phenomena that have their ontological ground in the One.648
In accordance with this immanent world-view, the metaphor of the sun
also undergoes modifications. In ġazals that engage with the world-view of ado-
ration of beauty, Ḥāfiẓ follows ʿIrāqī in interweaving metaphors of sun and
light with metaphors of wine and beauty.649 The sun’s influence on the world is
likened to the wine’s influence on the body; the sun invigorates the world and
brings forth flowers, which resemble the rosy cheek of the inebriated Beloved,
drunk on the same wine that She or He passes around.650
III.3.5 The Active Presence of the One in the Human Being
An important dimension of immanent world-view in Faust and the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ is the view that the One is immanent both in the diversifications in the
realm of multiplicity, and in the human faculty of recognizing the One in its
diversifications. In the scene Hexenküche, I argued, Faust’s inner active role
relates to the views developed in Farbenlehre regarding the physiological col-
ors.651 Faust’s journey to the realm of Mothers also exhibited this activity.652
With regard to the Divan, we cannot refer to such intertextual aspects relevant
to the study of nature; nonetheless, the intellectual aspect of Goethe’s views
expressed in Farbenlehre accords with the immanent views that we also find
in the Divan.
In Wald und Höhle, we find an explanation of the immanence of the One in
humans that is closer to Ḥāfiẓ’s own episteme. Faust defines his faculty of ap-
preciation of beauty and knowledge of phenomena as a gift given to him by an
exalted spirit. Presenting the phenomena before Faust, this spirit gives Faust
the capability to recognize them as his brothers. I demonstrated that this active
immanence in Faust is what enables him to recognize all phenomena as mem-
bers of his family. I referred to Goethe’s letter of January 1775 to Auguste zu
Stolberg, in which Goethe describes the human being as an image of the
Infinite. This image recognizes other images of the same Divine – in other
647 See pp. 272–274 above. See also the verse cited on p. 289 above.
648 See p. 269 above.
649 See §III.2.2.1.2 (‘Interwoven Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty’).
650 See p. 281 above.
651 See pp. 198f above.
652 See pp. 202ff above.
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human beings – as its brothers. This recognition accounts for the feeling of
love. In Wald und Höhle, every entity is conceived as an image of the One, but
only humans reflect an aspect of the One’s image that is capable of recognizing
and loving the One in all; in his soliloquy, Faust expresses his gratitude for this
gift.653 The active immanence of the One in the human faculty of perception en-
ables it to recognize the Indeterminate in each instance. The epistemological
component of this world-view differs from Faust’s earlier anamnestic world-
view, which was rooted in an exclusive, ascending approach toward the tran-
scendent truth.
I traced the development of the ideas of the Sufi adorers of beauty from
A. Ġazzālī and Ibn ʿArabī to ʿIrāqī, and I showed how the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ re-
flects these ideas. I explained in detail that the immanence of the Infinite
being in humans constitutes their ontological ground as well as their faculty
of recognizing the One in the many.654 Based on these two aspects of this im-
manence in humans, being human is identical with being a lover. The heart of
the lover, therefore, which holds up the mirror in which the Beloved views
Her or His own attributes, is the locus of this ontological ground. The signifi-
cance of the eye and its relation to the heart is evident from Ḥāfiẓ’s frequent
mentions of his pupil and its activity. I situated the metaphor of the pupil in
the Divan within its larger allegorical context – namely, Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ,
ʿIrāqī’s poetic works, and Šabistarī’s Gulšan-i rāz, which describes the phe-
nomenal world as an image of the Beloved cast upon the mirror of non-being
(hyle).655 In that image, the Beloved’s pupil represents humanity, uniquely re-
ceptive to the whole image of all the attributes of the Beloved and able to re-
flect on the One that is facing it – in the mirror’s reflected image, only the
pupil is still a mirror. (That is why the pupil is the apple of the eye of the uni-
verse.) The inner connection between the heart and the eye shows that the
human being’s appreciation of beauty and pursuit of love are the activities of
the immanent image of the One, capable of recognizing that all phenomena
share a likeness to the One Beloved. This active faculty also constitutes the
humanity of humans and accounts for Ḥāfiẓ’s ability to perceive the divine
acts of diversification in everything he perceives. This perception accounts for
his constant practice of ogling (naẓar-bāzī) – literally, ‘glance-playing’ –,
which makes him the eternal lover that he is.656
653 See pp. 216f above.
654 See §III.2.2.1.3 (‘The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup’) and §III.2.2.2 (‘The
Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover’).
655 See pp. 291f above.
656 See pp. 289–292 above.
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III.3.6 Veils as the Medium of Disclosure
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, Love is described as an Artist who veils Itself in order to
disclose an aspect of Itself in Its diversifications. Through the active immanence
of the Infinite within them, the lovers (humans) recognize this mediated, pleas-
ing presence and explore these veils. This approach to the veil is different from
that of the excluding direct pursuit of the transcendent, which seeks to lift the
veil of phenomena and reveal what is limited by it. The turn from a negative, di-
rect pursuit of the transcendent to exploring the mediated immanence of the One
is based on the view that the veils are not imposed on the Infinite; rather, Its
communicative aspect wills the veils as the medium of self-disclosure, just as ar-
tists limit themselves in order to articulate beauty. Thus, Ḥāfiẓ not only praises
the beauty of the human and natural realms as works of art made by his
Beloved; he also takes pride in his own work as a poet and minstrel, believing
that his songs move the heavenly bodies and whoever else listens to them.657
Near the end of the scene Anmutige Gegend, after turning his back to the
blinding sun, Faust describes the realm that he gazes upon as the realm of the
most youthful of veils. He turns away from the direct pursuit of the transcen-
dent and toward its mediated presence in the veils. Referring to an aphorism of
Goethe’s, I showed that Goethe himself does not consider the veils to be limita-
tions imposed upon the Infinite; rather, he considers them chosen in order to
facilitate the disclosure of the Infinite in a specific image: ‘Wie das Unbedingte
sich selbst bedingen, | Und so das Bedingte zu seines Gleichen machen
kann.’658 In Suleika Nameh, I traced this form of understanding of the veils, ac-
cording to which the veils are mediums of disclosure that enable the lover to
recognize the One in the many and rejoice in its beauty. In the scene Rittersaal
and the theatrical performance that Faust prepares for the Kaiser and his cour-
tiers, Faust personally experiences love through the mediation of a work of art,
a veil that leads him to his beloved.659
III.3.7 Abandoning the Self and Rejoicing in the Multiplicity
In the first chapter, I observed that the ultimate stage of the ascending process
of exclusion toward union with the transcendent truth is conceived in both
657 See §III.2.2.3 (‘Love as an Artist’).
658 FA I, 13: p. 60.
659 See pp. 235f above.
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texts as the annihilation of the particularized self; both texts conceive of indi-
viduation and particularization as consequences of a descending process in
which the transcendent truth, step by step, mixes with matter and becomes im-
pure. In the third chapter, after the turn toward an inclusive, immanent world-
view, I discussed the modified form in which the concept of abandoning the
particularized self appears.
Throughout Faust’s pursuit of Gretchen, the pursuit of love and beauty took
primacy over the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. But this shift toward the pur-
suit of beauty does not signify a fundamental break with the pursuit of knowl-
edge. The thematic similarity between Faust’s expressed conception of love and
Goethe’s metaphysical, epistemological and ethical views, as they appear in his
lyrical works, testifies to this fact.660 The subject of abandoning the self and
being moved by the pleasance of the immanence appears for the first time in
Faust’s dialogue with Gretchen. In the Wald und Höhle scene, this subject is fur-
ther developed, and the drama presents a specific form of self-knowledge as the
first step toward recognizing the immanence in nature. In Anmutige Gegend,
Faust has a passive presence throughout the night in which the holy light is re-
turned to him. After observing the inclusion of the natural world in the light of
the sun and recognizing the influence of the earth’s vivid pulses on his revival,
Faust’s gaze ascends to the sun itself. Faust faces a choice: being blinded and
annihilated by the light of the sun; or turning toward the realm of the light’s me-
diated immanence (the youthful veils) and observing the act of the light in the
multiplicity of its images in the droplets of the rainbow.
Faust articulates his twofold realization concerning his self and the world
through the oxymoron of ‘Wechsel-Dauer’. The sight of the rainbow pleases
him; it reminds him that his self is but an image of the sun, which constantly
discloses its passing images in the multiplicity of phenomena. The abandoning
of the self is no longer an annihilation of the self; rather, it represents self-
knowledge gained within a knowledge of the world. This self-knowledge moti-
vates Faust to turn toward the realm of the reflected images and explore,
through the direct, active presence of the Infinite in humans,661 the pleasance
and grace (‘Anmut’) immanent in the multiplicity of phenomena.
In section I.3.5, I discussed the issue of the annihilation of the self in
union with the transcendent truth with regard to the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. In the
third chapter, I traced – from A. Ġazzālī to ʿIrāqī – the modification of this
issue within the immanent world-view of the Sufi adoration of beauty. Further
660 See §III.1.3 (‘The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion’).
661 See §III.1.3.2 (‘Abandoning the Self’) and p. 233 above.
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developing A. Ġazzālī’s theory,662 ʿIrāqī asserts that the pursuit of annihila-
tion of individual attributes is a sign of ignorance – individuals have no attrib-
utes, ʿIrāqī argues, since all attributes belong to the One.663 The rejection of
seeking annihilation in the Infinite is a compromise that one makes after at-
taining this knowledge. The Sufi school of adoration of Beauty expresses this
thought as follows: The Beloved intends this separation and entification on
both the level of the viewed (natural and human beauty) and the level of the
viewer (the lover); moreover, the Beloved takes nourishment when humans
(lovers) appreciate of the beauty of Her own mediated instantiations in the be-
loveds. The lover faces the paradox of pain and pleasure that arises from the
mediated love of the Beloved in the realm of multiplicity; according to the
Divan, those who do not love (the Beloved in the beloveds) are egoists – ador-
ing their limited selves, they hinder the active immanence of Love within
them, which is the basis of their humanity. Furthermore, egoists fail to realize
that the final cause of Being is relevant to them – i.e., that humans are entities
that adore and recognize the One Beloved in the many beauties in the natural
and human spheres.664
After explaining the historical and literary background of the Divan, I dis-
cussed a ġazal in the Divan in which Ḥāfiẓ translates an Arabic poem quoted by
ʿIrāqī in the same section of Lamaʿāt in which he elaborates on opting for a sep-
aration intended by the Beloved.665 In the same ġazal, Ḥāfiẓ makes use of the
metaphor of the mole and tress as grain and snare, which (I argued) allegori-
cally expresses the mediated pursuit of the Beloved in the multiplicity of belo-
veds.666 I then showed that Ḥāfiẓ always employs a variation of this metaphor
in the Divan when he articulates the choice of such a separation. Thus, Ḥāfiẓ’s
separation must be understood in reference to ʿIrāqī’s.667 While discussing the
metaphor of the mole and tress, I argued that Ḥāfiẓ, as a lover, seeks the mole
(the One) in a mediated manner – namely, by exploring the tress, which repre-
sents the realm of diversifications as images of the mole. These metaphors per-
meate the Divan. The immanence of the mole, as a brand or image, is active in
the poet’s heart (his ontological ground) and in his eyes (his sight). By the
662 See pp. 296f above.
663 See pp. 297–299 above.
664 See p. 309 above.
665 See p. 299 above.
666 See §III.2.2.4.1 (‘A Note on Allegorical Meanings of the Mole, Face, Down and Tress of the
Beloved’).
667 See §III.2.2.4.2 (‘Ḥāfiẓ’s Compromise and Its Articulations in the Imagery of the Face of
the Beloved’).
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activity of this image of the One in the poet, he recognizes the One in the multi-
plicity of its images.668
Furthermore, I showed that the tress of the Beloved is described through
two oxymora: ‘the assembly of dispersion’ (maǧmaʿ-i parīšānī) and being rest-
less (bī-qarār) in the state of composedness (qarār, translated by Avery as ‘fix-
ity’).669 Through this rhetorical device, Ḥāfiẓ expresses the immanent, inclusive
aspect of his world-view,670 which he owes to A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī. This imma-
nent world-view encompasses four levels: the One in itself; the communicative
aspect of the One; the multiplicity as diversifications and instantiations of the
One; and the active immanence of the One in humans. Thus, in contrast to a
world-view based on radical transcendence, which views the realm of multiplic-
ity as polluted and a source of confusion, in Ḥāfiẓ’s immanent world-view, this
realm becomes the object of exploration and adoration.
668 See §III.2.2.4.1a (‘The Mole of the Beloved and the Eye of the Lover’) and §III.2.2.4.1b (‘The
Mole of the Beloved and the Heart of the Lover’).
669 See the following verse Avery, CCCLXXXVI, 2, p. 471, cited on p. 307 above.
670 See pp. 306–308 above.
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Conclusion
In the first chapter, I explored Faust’s wish to attain knowledge. At first glance,
this wish takes the form of the desire to grasp the immanence of the divine forces
that hold the world (universe) together. Yet the immanence of the transcendent
divine truth in nature appears not to have deep roots in Faust’s view of the
world. The constant presence of the heavenly bodies in Faust’s speculative fanta-
sies provides the first clues about the roots of Faust’s Neoplatonic wish for ascen-
sion beyond the realm of matter. The wish for ascent – the wish to fly directly
toward the heavenly bodies, as in verses 391–397, 418 and 702–705 – clearly in-
dicates Faust’s desire to leave the earthly realm behind. The heavenly bodies are
metaphors for Faust’s Neoplatonic approach to the transcendent, which pre-
scribes ‘cleansing’ the soul and the senses of all that is mundane and material.
But Faust’s excluding world-view in the early part of the drama is not shared by
Goethe, whose poetic translation of the Ennead I. 6. 9 conspicuously omits one of
the central elements of Plotinus’s philosophy – the process of purification. After
failing to grasp the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust finds the fault in his human condition. His
Platonic conception of the human condition reveals the deep roots of a negative,
excluding method of attainment of knowledge. Faust’s body – the material com-
ponent of his being – is the greatest obstacle on his path of ascent to knowledge.1
Vividly articulated near the end of the scene Vor dem Tor, when Faust (famously)
describes himself as possessing two souls, this view of the body accords with
Plotinus’s notion of ‘secondary evil’, which states that the body hinders the di-
vine nucleus of the human being from separating itself from its corporeal compo-
nent. In the scene Vor dem Tor, the sight of the setting sun kindles Faust’s desire
for ascent, which Faust justifies in reference to the doctrine of anamnesis, ac-
cording to which the sight of the elevated and the sublime activates an inborn
memory of a home, to which one can ascend only by separating the soul from
the corporeal sphere.2
In the Divan, I discussed ġazals 334 and 478 as examples of the dominance
of the ascending, negative view of approaching the transcendent truth. In con-
trast to the pāšān style of many of Ḥāfiẓ’s poems, these two poems, written
without irony or sarcasm, are characterized by the linear development of a sin-
gle theme.3 Both poems describe the body and its desires as impediments on
the ascending path toward truth, and prescribe negation and purification of the
1 V. 634–639.
2 See pp. 65ff above.
3 On the pāšān style of Ḥāfiẓ’s ġazals, see pp. 9f above.
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soul. Like Faust, Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan describes the heavenly bodies as the destination
of ascent, and the sight of the heavenly bodies as the impetus to ascend.
Anamnesis appears to be a component of this view in the Divan; Ḥāfiẓ describes
his soul as a bird (a nightingale or a falcon) trapped in the cage of the body
with a memory of its homeland, the source of goodness and truth.4 In both
texts, the journey of the descended individuated soul back to its place of origin
ultimately entails the elimination of the individual. But neither Faust nor the
narrator of the Divan takes this radical step: in Faust, the song of the angels
and childhood memories of feeling close to the divine pull Faust back from the
ledge; and in the Divan, the poet conveys that he does not consider his life to
be at his disposal. I argued that Ḥāfiẓ’s arguments in this case resemble those
of Socrates in Phaedo. In addition, Ḥāfiẓ argues that offering one’s life to the
unchanging origin of being is pointless; by definition, the unchanging realm is
unaffected by the sacrifice. Thus, the human being does not ascend to the tran-
scendent realm on the basis of merit; he does so only through mercy, which is
best exemplified by Christ, who is purified from the mundane by the grace of
the divine – only Masīḥā and whomever else the divine chooses can ascend to
the most transcendent truth. In the section ‘Masīḥā (Christ) and the Sun’, I ex-
plained the role of mercy through the poet’s use of the sun as a metaphor for
the purest extramundane object of pursuit.
In the scene Nacht, we find Faust trapped in a vicious cycle: pain leads him
to seek escape in speculative fantasy, which quickly turns to disillusionment –
and more pain. Eventually, Faust attempts to escape this cycle once and for all
through suicide. In the Divan, this dramatic illustration of the state before
change cannot be expected.
In the Divan,5 Ḥāfiẓ uses sarcasm and irony to refute ascetic abstraction of
the sublime from the mundane. Expressions of acceptance and appreciation of
the human condition in the Divan mark Ḥāfiẓ’s rejection of an excluding ap-
proach to the bodily realm. In ġazal 399, we find the poetic narrator – a mouth-
piece for Ḥāfiẓ himself – critique the hypocrisy of asceticism and glorify the
human condition. In ġazal 351, the pārsāyān are differentiated from the tāzyān
through their sympathy for the human condition and ability to introduce joy
into Ḥāfiẓ’s pursuit of truth. The pārsāyān bear a strong resemblance to the
magi, and specifically the Pīr-i Muġān, who appears as the mediating figure in
the Divan, as I discussed in the second chapter of this study.
4 Avery, XXXVII, 4–5, p. 68. See also pp. 70ff above.
5 Except for the two ġazals 334 and 478.
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In chapter two, I explored the shift from an excluding approach to the
bodily and the natural sphere toward an embrace of life and nature. I demon-
strated that the institution of knowledge that Faust criticizes in the scene
Nacht is based on the practice of exclusion in accordance with the negative
view of transcendence. I argued that Faust’s study excludes him from the out-
side world; in place of the living natural phenomena outside its walls, Faust’s
study contains lifeless representations of nature as never-changing objects of
exploration.6 Faust’s academic degrees exclude him from the realm of nature
and act as subjective extensions of the walls of his study; thus, even when
Faust leaves his study in the scene Vor dem Tor, he is still metaphorically
trapped within it. In contrast to his descriptions of his study in the scene
Nacht, Faust describes his study in Studierzimmer [I] as a hermitage in which
the inner light of the extramundane source of life can be appreciated. This
scene opens a window to Faust’s past. While Faust suppresses his experiences
of pain, on the theatrical level, the struggling poodle casts light on the exclud-
ing function of Faust’s study.
To show Ḥāfiẓ’s turn from an excluding world-view toward life and natural
beauty, I discussed the respective representations of nature in Persian literature
before and after the dominance of Sufism by comparing the poetry of Rūdakī
and Manūčihrī to Saʿdī’s ġazals and several poems in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. Whereas
the works of the earlier poets contain vivid illustrations of natural phenomena,
the latter poets juxtapose the space of ḫalvat (solitude) to the perishable beauty
of nature. This space is described as a refuge for the ideal forms of ephemeral
beauty, where the wise can enjoy their liberation from the pain of perishable
beauty of the world. After demonstrating the relevance of Sufi views to the con-
cept of ḫalvat, I briefly explained several of the elements and terms of ascetic
Sufism: the subjective elements of tauba (repentance) and ṭahārat (purifica-
tion); and the objective elements of ḫānaqāh (convent) and ḫirqa (the Sufi tat-
tered frock). With respect to the Divan, I demonstrated that the experience of
nature – and specifically, spring – leads the poet to recognize an immanent,
invigorating force present in all beings. I argued that Ḥāfiẓ articulates his inte-
gration into the natural sphere through an anthropomorphic analogy; he de-
fends his inclination to enjoy natural beauty on ground that this inclination is
universal.7 Having experienced nature, the poet uses irony to express his skep-
ticism toward the excluding elements of the ascetic Sufi method, specifically
6 See pp. 102f above. The description of Faust’s house and the impression it makes on the
new student (verses 1881‒1887) are explained on p. 137 above.
7 Compare to Ḫānlarī, 338, 4 (explained on p. 163 above.) In Ḫānlarī, 414, 8, we find the same
logic at work; see p. 174 above.
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the notion of repentance. Alluding to the poetry of Rūdakī, Ḥāfiẓ refers to the
‘repentance-shattering spring’, whose cosmic display of immanence refutes the
logic of exclusion; the poet finds it irrational to prefer solitude over celebrating
the beauty of spring.8 Spring provides the backdrop for ġazal 338, in which
Ḥāfiẓ places his human condition above the heavenly sun; instead of wishing
to ascend to the sun, Ḥāfiẓ describes descending into a bottomless sea, which
he compares to a wine-house, in pursuit of the pearl of love. Again, in ġazal
414, Ḥāfiẓ struggles to decide between inclusion and exclusion in a bizarre set-
ting – in front of a pleasure house. He reminds the ‘youthful vintner’, who
plays the role of the reproachful ascetic, that spring itself is an argument
against a negative approach to truth.
In Faust, too, the arrival of spring has a significant role. Faust’s monologue
in verses 903–940 extends the uninterrupted immanence of the divine to the
natural and the human realms. I argued that, in this monologue, Faust modifies
his view of the relation between the colors and the light of the sun in accor-
dance with the immanent world that he envisions; he no longer views color as
polluted light. It is also in the spring that Faust recognizes that his knowledge
fails to grasp the dark unknown of the excluded natural realm. Based on
Blumenberg’s theory of the experience of horizon, I explained Faust’s self-
description of his state in verses 1064–1065 as one in which he is submerged in
a sea of errors; his entire accumulated knowledge is cast into doubt.
In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, I showed how the poet’s inner struggles emerge from
his rejection of the values that had shaped his world previously – namely, the
values of ascetic Sufism and Platonism. Unable to ignore the beauty of spring,
Ḥāfiẓ sarcastically attacks the theory of purification and exclusion of the natural
realm; he describes the ḫānaqāh as a snare and a trap, rather than a fortress of
spiritual and intellectual safety. Symbolically, he wishes to wash with wine the
parchments filled with false knowledge. He discredits the Sufi mentors, faqīhs
and muftīs as agents of the ḫānaqāh and madrasa, corrupt institutions in which
charlatanism and hypocrisy masquerade as knowledge and self-development.
Regarding the rejection of negative world-views, another important topic of this
study has been the role of mediating figures, which appear in both texts.Whereas in
Faust, Faust’s process of reevaluation of his conception of mediation is dramatized
in several steps,9 the Divan does not contain a linear representation of Ḥāfiẓ’s
changing approach to mediation. On many occasions, the Divan emphasizes the
8 See Ḫānlarī, 342, 1–3 and Avery’s translation on p. 161 above.
9 See §II.1.1.1 (‘Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation’).
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role ofmediation in the process of turning toward an inclusive approach to the natu-
ral realm. In the case of Faust, I argued that it is necessary to differentiate between
Mephisto’s deeds and intentions. Mephisto’s evil traits, I argued, must be under-
stood in reference to the negative views of Faust’s old world and the anxieties that
arose from them. This connection becomes clear when we compare Mephisto’s
speeches directed to the audience (in Faust’s absence) to Wagner’s cautionary
monologue at the end of the sceneVor dem Tor.10 I also discussedMephisto’s acts of
mediation, which lead Faust to leave the house that symbolizes his old way of life.
Mephisto’s conflict with Faust’s house dramatizes the symbolic opposition between
the mediator (Mephisto, both as poodle and person) and the excluding space (the
house). Finally, Faust and Mephisto’s departure from Faust’s study at the end of
Studierzimmer [II]marks Mephisto’s success as a mediator and his victory over the
excluding elements of Faust’s world. In case of the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ’s mediating figure
takes the form of Pīr-i Muġān, an eclectic fictive mentor based on theological, philo-
sophical and Sufi views known to Ḥāfiẓ. The mediating figure in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
contrasts to the mediating figures of both Sufis and philosophers:Ḥāfiẓ’s mediating
figure is neither the personal mentor envisioned by the Sufis nor the anthropomor-
phic representation of the Active Intelligence envisioned by philosophers such as
Ibn Sīnā and Suhravardī. In both Faust and theDivan ofḤāfiẓ, themediating figures
use paradox and oxymora to nullify the binary logic that is the basis of the process
of purification. In Faust, this process begins in Studierzimmer [I] with Mephisto’s
paradoxical self-presentation. In Studierzimmer [II], Mephisto actively leads Faust
to partake in life and accept both pain and pleasure. Mephisto also leads Faust to
abandon his self-deifying wish for death and to accept his human condition as the
combination of the spiritual and material spheres (‘Tag und Nacht’) in accordance
with divine will.11 In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor helps him transcend the duality of
purification and pollution.12 He teaches Ḥāfiẓ that the human notions of good and
evil are not valid from the perspective of the divine (ʿināyat). Hence, one cannot
achieve ascension by means of ascetic purification and self-mortification, since
these are practices grounded in human values. In light of Ḫorramšāhī’s discussion
of Īǧī’s remarks on the issue of the presence of evil in the sublunary realm, I further
explained thatḤāfiẓ’s mentor argues that evil contributes to the totality of phenom-
ena; as contributing parts, evil and goodness coexist in particular phenomena – but
the evil part never outweighs the good part.13 Aided by his mentor, Ḥāfiẓ attests to
10 See pp. 109f and compare to §II.1.3.3 (‘Differentiating between Mephisto’s Intentions and
Deeds’).
11 V. 1784.
12 See pp. 184ff above.
13 See pp. 182ff above.
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the beauty of nature (which also contains pain) and thus abandons his excluding
views.
A conspicuous difference between Faust and the Divan is that Faust chal-
lenges his mediating figure, whereas the narrator of the Divan does not. This
difference can be explained in light of different genres of the two works. Faust’s
struggle with Mephisto dramatizes his critique of his old world-views and his
difficulty leaving his old world. In the Divan, on the other hand, the relation
between Ḥāfiẓ and his mentor, Pīr-i Muġān, is nurturing, rather than hostile.
Pīr-i Muġān educates Ḥāfiẓ intellectually and spiritually. As a pupil of Pīr-i
Muġān, Ḥāfiẓ articulates his critiques of ascetic exclusion through ironic self-
criticism and sarcastic attacks on the institutions of the madrasa, ḫānaqāh and
the intolerant morality police (muḥtasib).
In the third chapter, I explored the immanent world-views that, in both
texts, replace the exclusive world views discussed above. The first consequence
of the turn from an exclusive to an inclusive world-view is the increased impor-
tance of the beauty as the object of pursuit. The first decisive event in Faust’s
new ‘Lebenslauf’14 is his experience of beauty in the magic mirror of the
Hexenküche – this is the moment in which Faust becomes a lover. In the Divan
of Ḥāfiẓ, we find the poet’s praise of beauty constantly intertwined with his sar-
castic critiques of ascetic Sufi views. Moreover, Ḥāfiẓ’s poems on love and
beauty justify the significance of beauty and explain the relation between the
divine and the one who appreciates beauty. In Goethe’s Faust, the sublime as-
pect of that which is aesthetically moving is inseparable from its worldly as-
pect. In his pursuit of beauty and love, Faust constantly explains why the
beautiful appears beautiful to him; how it affects him; and how love and beauty
have their ground in the immanence of the divine. The investigations of the
third chapter yield the following result: in both works, love and the apprecia-
tion of beauty are informed by an organic immanent world-view based on the
constellation of (a) the world, (b) humans and (c) the divine. By repeatedly re-
visiting this theme from various perspectives, Goethe and Ḥāfiẓ are able to ar-
ticulate different aspects of the connection among these three components of
the immanent world-view. In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ employs numerous metaphors
and allegories in order to illustrate and justify the appreciation of beauty. But
his use of different sets of metaphors and allegories,15often in an interwoven
14 V. 2071.
15 The sets of metaphors in question are those of intoxication (wine, goblet, the vintner, the
wine bringer, the drunkard); the imagery of the beauty of the beloved (eye, eyebrow, mole,
cheek, down, tress); and the light metaphors.
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manner, presents a challenge for the reader. I discussed ġazals in which Ḥāfiẓ
brings one set of metaphors (and one component of his world-view) to the fore-
ground, while leaving others in the background. By analyzing these ġazals, as
well as others in which more than one set of metaphors (and more than one
component of Ḥāfiẓ’s world-view) are present, I was able to illuminate the im-
manent world-view that finds articulation in the Divan16; understanding the
Divan’s intertextual relations with other relevant texts also advanced that goal.
In Goethe’s Faust, Faust’s soliloquies, disputations with Mephisto and conver-
sations with Gretchen reveal Goethe’s own theories of love and beauty.
Furthermore, the theme of the pursuit of love is dramatized twice in Faust –
first in the case of Gretchen, and second in the Helena act. Gretchen’s love is
further alluded to in the scenes Hochgebirg and Bergschluchten.
The core principle of the immanent world-views in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ and
Goethe’s Faust rests in the recognition that the One contains two aspects. The
first aspect, the absolute essence of uniqueness, is in itself and for itself; the sec-
ond aspect is oriented toward multiplicity and diversification. This second aspect
is the basis of the One’s uninterrupted active immanence, which operates on two
levels in both the Divan and Faust: (a) the active, mediated immanence of the
One in the world as Its self-diversifications and self-disclosures through Its nu-
merous attributes, images and reflections that instantiate beauty; and (b) the ac-
tive, mediated immanence of the communicative aspect of the One in humans.
The non-communicative aspect of the divine lies beyond the reach of the
intellect and aesthetic appreciation. In the Divan, this non-communicative as-
pect of the One is referred to as ẕāt (‘the essence’). In the metaphorical imagery
of love, the non-communicative aspect is represented by the mole of the
Beloved, and the communicative aspect is represented by the face of the
Beloved. The face of the Beloved is compared to the sun as the source of emana-
tion. Like the sun, the face cannot be seen directly, but its mediated immanence
can be appreciated in the world. I elaborated on this point in the Divan in refer-
ence to A. Ġazzālī’s distinction between the beauty (ḥusn) and belovedness
(malāḥat) of the Beloved; I showed that this distinction appears in Ḥāfiẓ’s
work.17 Regarding the essence of the One, I showed that Faust’s admission of
the ineffability of the source of his love for Gretchen accords with Goethe’s
view, expressed in Prooemion, that the essence of the Infinite, too, is ineffa-
ble.18 In his monologue praising the arrival of spring, Faust expresses the sun’s
16 See my explanations of ġazal 147 on pp. 275–278 above, and §III.2.2.1.2 (‘Interwoven
Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty’).
17 See my analysis of ġazal 87 §III.2.2.1 (‘Alliance of Beauty and Pleasance’).
18 See v. 3059–3065; 3433 in Faust. Also see p. 219 above.
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willingness to diversify its light in colors and to extend its being into the multi-
plicity of nature. On another level, the sun’s influence also extends to human
beings.19 The communicative act of the sun illustrates Goethe’s universal con-
ception of ‘Anmut’, according to which the quality of ‘Anmut’ applies (univer-
sally) to nature, humans and art. The scene Anmutige Gegend dramatizes the
influence of ‘Anmut’ (immanent in nature) on Faust’s body and mind; in the
scene Rittersaal we observe the influence of ‘Anmut’ working within the work
of art; and, finally, in Chiron’s description of Helena, the human form of
‘Anmut’ is described as having an effect on Faust.
One of the corollaries of the communicative aspect of the One is the medi-
ated immanence that is communicated from the One to the world and that uni-
tes the One with its many reflections and images.20 Both texts consider the
image of the One in a given phenomenon to be the ontological ground of that
phenomenon. I argued that the ‘disclosure of the ray of beauty of the Beloved’
in ʿIrāqī’s poetry modifies the Neoplatonic view of the emanation of the
Intellect; I also showed that Ḥāfiẓ in ġazal 148 uses the ‘disclosure of the ray of
beauty’ in the same sense as ʿIrāqī does in his poem. In ġazals 87 and 148, I
explained the diversification of the One in instantiations of Its attributes using
ʿIrāqī’s definition of ġayrat. ʿIrāqī does not define the phenomena as entities
other (ġayr) than the One (a definition that belongs to the exclusive Sufi doc-
trine). Rather, he defines them as many likenesses (aʿyān) of the One, each of
which instantiates an attribute or several attributes of the One. Thus, whereas
in ascetic Sufism ġayrat is a force of exclusion, in ʿIrāqī’s Lamaʿāt it becomes a
formative force that diversifies the One in the multiplicity of Its attributes.21 I
then showed that Ḥāfiẓ grasps perceivable qualities of phenomena – the fra-
grance and colors of flowers, the straight growth of a cypress tree, the light of a
candle – as instantiations of the attributes of the One, whose likeness (ʿayn) in
a given phenomenon constitutes its ontological ground.22 In Faust, each entity
that Faust recognizes as beautiful is conceived by Faust as an image of one in-
determinate entity. Furthermore, Faust defines the influence of beauty of each
image as an extension of the influence of that indeterminate entity.23 In the
scene Marthens Garten, Faust frames his view of the divine in terms of Its
19 V. 911–913. See §II.1.1.2.2 (‘Colorful Lives and the Sun’s Will to Animate’).
20 The component mentioned above as (a).
21 See p. 273 above.
22 See p. 274 above.
23 For instance, the image in the mirror is recognized as ‘ein himmlisch Bild’ (v. 2429) and
‘Inbegriff von allen Himmeln’ (v. 2439) and Gretchen is referred to as ‘Götterbild’ (v. 2716). See
also my explanation of Faust’s reaction to the phantom of Helena on p. 206 above.
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inclusion of the multiplicity; the divine is the ‘Allumfasser’ and ‘Allerhalter’,
whose immanence constitutes the qualities of phenomena and enables humans
to recognize the All in everything.
The immanence of the One is the ontological ground of finite phenomena;
this is true of human beings as well. The image of the One that is the ontologi-
cal ground of humans is at the same time the human faculty that recognizes the
diversifications of the Indeterminate in Its determinate instantiations.
Both Goethe’s letter to Auguste zu Stolberg of 1775 and the scene Wald und
Höhle describe recognizing natural phenomena as one’s own brethren. Through
comparing these two texts, I argued that this epistemological aspect of imma-
nence is extended from being limited to recognizing the likeness in other humans
(Goethe’s letter) to an all-inclusive faculty of recognition of the likeness of the
One in natural phenomena (Wald und Höhle). Faust recognizes nature as his
brethren, since natural phenomena also contain an image of the divine – similar
to the image that he contains. This image constitutes humanity and actively ap-
preciates and loves the beauty of similar images. I located this epistemological
immanent world-view in Herder’s Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschli-
chen Seele and argued that Herder also viewed the image of the divine as the on-
tological ground of the human being.24 The active immanence of the One in
human beings has another articulation in Faust – one that can be appreciated in
reference to Goethe’s view, expressed in his Farbenlehre, of the inner activity of
the eye in the context of physiological colors. I showed this active immanence in
Faust’s inner activity in front of the magic mirror and in his inclusion of the dark-
ness and absolute emptiness of the abode of Mothers. The physiological compo-
nent of Goethe’s immanent world-view has no direct parallel in the Divan of
Ḥāfiẓ. Yet, as I have argued, this component is an extension of the ontological
and epistemological components of Goethe’s immanent world-view, which do
find parallels in the Divan.
In my discussion of the Divan, I explained the metaphor of the world-
revealing cup, and I introduced the active immanence of the One in the human
heart as the faculty of recognizing the Beloved in all the beauties (beloveds) in
the world.25 I explained this active immanence in reference to Sawāniḥ, Lamaʿāt
and ġazal 178 of the Divan.26 I then demonstrated that the eye and the heart are
intimately connected in the Divan; in many cases they appear to be almost identi-
cal. The image of the Beloved that resides in the human heart is actively present
24 See p. 230 above.
25 See §III.2.2.1.3 (‘The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup’).
26 See p. 284 above.
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in the eye, which recognizes the likeness of the Beloved in the multiplicity of
phenomena. In my explanation of the phrase ‘mardum-i dīda,’ a calque of the
Arabic ‘insān ul-ʿayn’ (pupil of the eye), I argued that the image of the Beloved
reflected in the pupil of the eye is a metaphor for the immanence of the One in
human beings. This notion is conveyed through the word ʿayn, meaning ‘es-
sence’, ‘likeness’, and ‘the eye’. On the basis of this analysis,27 I clarified the
poet’s anthropomorphic illustration of the insān ul-ʿayn (pupil) in the sixth cou-
plet of ġazal 385 in the Divan. Using anthropomorphism, Ḥāfiẓ tersely depicts the
connection between the eye and the heart, which is the space where the Beloved
is active in the lover (the human being) and recognizes Her own diversifications
in the beloveds of the world.28
Whereas anamnestic epistemology defines the body as an obstacle to at-
taining truth, the immanent world-views that find articulation in both texts
view the body as the field in which the transcendent extends its active imma-
nence by way of images and reflections. Unlike the anamnestic wish to ascend
beyond the phenomenal world, the immanent epistemology in our two texts is
based on the mediated activity of the One in humans, which recognizes partic-
ulars as instantiations of the attributes of the One.
Based on the communicative aspect of the One and Its will to disclose Itself
in the multiplicity of phenomena, I showed that the two texts offer similar as-
sessments of veils. In the Divan, I explained the extension of the communicative
aspect of the One in reference to ʿIrāqī’s argument in Lamaʿāt: the One, ʿIrāqī
argues, cannot be limited by the finite; rather, It limits Itself, as an artist does,
in the veils of the finite in order to communicate particular aspects of its
Indeterminate Self. Thus, the world is a work of art, and humans are its specta-
tors. In this context, Love is depicted as a minstrel; as a painter, constantly
painting self-portraits from countless different perspectives; and as a beautifier
that conveys Itself in phenomena and appreciates Itself through Its active im-
manence in humans (lovers). In the Divan, human art is praised in reference to
the works of the divine artist. Extolling his mastery in minstrelsy and poetry in
hyperbolic terms, Ḥāfiẓ describes the influence of his work on humans, heav-
enly bodies and angels.
In the scene Anmutige Gegend, Faust describes the landscape before him as
the realm of ‘the most youthful veils’.29 I explained this phrase in reference to
Goethe’s aphorism: the Indefinite willingly limits Itself in order to render finite
27 See pp. 290ff above.
28 See p. 293 above.
29 V. 4714.
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beings in Its likeness.30 I also pointed to another instance of grasping the veil
as a medium of unveiling in West-östlicher Divan – namely, in Suleika’s ability
to recognize ‘das Allgegenwärtige’ behind its ‘magical veils’.31
In both works, I argued, the pursuit of unity with the transcendent that ne-
cessitates self-annihilation is replaced by the pursuit of the mediated presence of
the One in the multiplicity of phenomena, and particularly in humans them-
selves. The emergence of this new, immanent world-view represents a compro-
mise, which is articulated in both texts through oxymora: ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ (in
Faust) and the ‘assembly of dispersion’ (in the Divan).32 ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ repre-
sents Faust’s self-knowledge in his realization that he is an image of the sun – a
quality that he shares with other phenomena. Referring to the realm of multiplic-
ity as the colorful reflections of the sun is a clear instance of the modification of
light metaphors in accordance with the immanent world-views explained thus
far. Faust’s integration in the ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ resembles Hafiz’s conception of
the world as the multiplicity of likenesses of the Beloved in the Divan.33 In chap-
ter three, I showed the modifications made to the light metaphors in Faust, in
which Gretchen and Helena are elevated above the sun and the heavenly bodies;
I demonstrated that this representation of the beloved is similar to the sun analo-
gies in the Divan, specifically in Purgstall’s translation, which Goethe read.34
In this study, I limited my comparison between Goethe’s Faust and the
Divan of Ḥāfiẓ to the parts of Faust relevant to the turn from a transcendent to
an immanent world-view – namely, Faust’s quests for knowledge, beauty and
love. Acts four and five of Faust, which dramatize his colonialist reincarnation,
did not fall within the scope of this study. Furthermore, my study was limited
to a comparison between the two texts, rather than the two authors. In light of
the lack of information about Ḥāfiẓ’s life, generalizing the findings of this com-
parative study to the two authors themselves would be purely speculative.
The detailed findings of this study provide a basis for critically evaluating
Goethe’s attempts to understand the intellectual world of Ḥāfiẓ in the Noten
und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans; they
also provide a basis for further analysis of Ḥāfiẓ’s reception in the writings of
the nineteenth-century orientalists and philosophers.
30 See p. 235 above.
31 See pp. 220–221 above.
32 See §III.3.7 (‘Abandoning the Self and Rejoicing in the Multiplicity’).
33 See §III.2.2.2 (‘The Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover’), and
Ḫānlarī, 107 cited in Avery’s translation on p. 281 above.
34 See pp. 247–249 above.
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Throughout this study of Faust, we encountered the concept of God-likeness
(‘Gottesebenbildlichkeit’) on multiple occasions and in various forms – being the
equal of gods35; being a god36; and being an image of the divine.37 This notion ap-
pears frequently in the Divan; it relates to the image of the Beloved in the mirror of
the lover’s heart and the image of the Wine-Bringer in the cup. Furthermore, the
frequently used metaphor of the pupil of the eye (insān ul-ʿayn) in the Divan also
alludes to the concept of God-likeness.
In this study, I mentioned the importance of the concept of God-likeness to
the immanent world-views of the two works. But a thorough comparison of the
concept of God-likeness in the two works is a project for a future study. This
future study should be carried out in reference to the two cultural contexts in
question and should take into account, the theological and intellectual exten-
sions of this Judeo-Christian notion and its Neoplatonic parallel, both of which
are actively present in Sufism and thus in the cultural space of the Divan.
35 V. 500.
36 V. 439.
37 V. 516, 614, 2716.
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Goethe, J. W. Faust: der Tragödie erster und zweiter Teil: Urfaust. Edited by Erich
Trunz. München: Beck, 1991.
Goethe, J. W. Faust Texte und Kommentare. Edited by Albrecht Schöne. 2 vols. Frankfurt am
Main: Insel, 2005.
Goethe Wörterbuch. Edited by Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR; Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Göttingen und der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: W. Kohlhammer, 1978.
Goethes Faust: zweiter Band Kommentar und Erläuterungen. Edited by Georg Witkowski.
7th ed. 2 vols. Vol. 2. Leipzig: Hesse & Becker, 1924.
Goethes Leben von Tag zu Tag: Eine dokumentarische Chronik von Robert Steiger und Angelika
Reimann. IX vols. Vol. VI. Zürich: Artemis, 1993.
Goharīn, Ṣādiq. Šarḥ-e eṣṭelāḥāt-e taṣavvuf. Edited by Ṣādiq Goharīn. 10 vols. Tehran:
Zawwār, 1368/1989.
Green, Jane. ‘Figures of Speech: IX. Paradox and Oxymoron.’ Notes and Queries. 182, no. 11,
(1942), pp. 144–145.
336 Bibliography
Gutas, Dimitri. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in
Baghdad in Early ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries). London: Routledge, 1998.
Hafis, Mohammed Schamsed-din. Der Diwan. Translated by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall.
Hildesheim New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973.
Hafis, Mohammed Schamsed-din. Der Diwan des großen lyrischen Dichter Hafis im persischen
Original herausgegeben, ins Deutsche metrisch übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen
von Vincenz Ritter von Rosenzweig-Schwannau. 3 vols. Wien: K. K. Hof- und
Staatsdruckerei, 1858–1864.
Hafis, Šams-ad-Din Muhammad. Dreiundsechzig Ghaselen des Hafis. Translated by Friedrich
Rückert. Edited by Wolfdietrich Fischer. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988.
Hafiz. Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman
Bicknell. Tehran: Imperial Organization for Social Services, 1976. Reprint, London 1875.
Hafiz. Die Ghaselen des Hafiz: Neu in deutsche Prosa übersetzt mit Einleitung und Lesehilfen.
Translated by Joachim Wohlleben. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004.
Ḥāfiẓ. The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell. Translated by Gertrude Lowthian Bell. Bethesda,
Maryland: Iranbooks, 1995.
Ḥāfiẓ, Ḫvāǧa Šams ud-Dīn Muḥammad. Dīvān-e Ḫvāǧa Šams ud-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ. Edited
by Qāsim Ġanī; Muḥammad Qazvīnī. Tehran: Zawwār, 1320/1941.
Ḥāfiẓ, Ḫvāǧa Šams ud-Dīn Muḥammad. Dīvān-e Ḥāfiẓ ġazalīyāt, qaṣāʾed, mas̱navīyāt, qaṭaʿāt
va robāʿīyāt. Edited by Parvīz Nātel Ḫānlarī. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Tehran: Ḫvārazmī, 1362/1984.
Ḥāfiz,̤ Khwāja Šamsu-d-Dīn Muḥammad. The Dīvān: Written in the Fourteenth Century by
Khwāja Shamsu-d-Dīn Muḥammad-i Ḥāfiz-̤i Shīrāzī otherwise known as Lisānu-l-Ghaib
and Tarjumānu-l-Asrār. Translated for the first time out of the Persian into English prose,
with critical and explanatory remarks, with an introductory preface, with a note on Ṣūfī,
ism, and with a life of the author by H. Wilberforce Clarke. Translated by H. Wilberforce
Clarke. London: Octagon Press, 1974.
Hamadānī, ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt. Nāmahā-ye ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt-e Hamadānī. Edited by ʿAlīnaqī
Monzavī and ʿAfīf ʿOsīrān, Falsafe va ʿErfān-e Iran. Tehran: Zawwār, 1362/1983.
Han, Chol. Ästhetik der Oberfläche, Epistemata: Würzburger Wissenschaftliche Schriften.
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007.
Haris, R. B. ‘Preface.’ In Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought. Edited by Parviz Morewedge, vii-x.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Hederich, Benjamin. Gründliches mythologisches Lexikon. Edited by Johann Joachim
Schwaben. Leipzig 1770.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Werke: Vorlesungen über die
Ästhetik I. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. Vol. 13. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970.
Heravī, Ḥusaīn ʿAlī. Šarḥ-e ġazalhā-ye Ḥāfiẓ. 4 vols. Tehran: Našr-e Nau, 1367/1988.
Herder, Johann Gottfried. Aus der Schrifft: ‘Johannes’ 1774. Edited by Bernhard Suphan.
33 vols. Vol. 7, Herders Sämtliche Werke. Berlin 1877–1913: Weidmannsche
Buchhandlung, 1884.
Herder, Johann Gottfried. ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774].’
In Sturm und Drang: Weltanschauliche und ästhetische Schriften. Edited by Peter Müller,
pp. 399–432. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1978.
Ḫorramšāhī, Bahāʾ ud-Dīn. ‘Oslūb-e honarī-ye Ḥāfiẓ va Qurʾān.’ In Ẕehn va zabān-e Ḥāfiẓ,
pp. 5–27. Tehran: Našr-e Nau, 1361/1982.
Bibliography 337
Ḫorramšāhī, Bahāʾ ud-Dīn. ‘Hamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast.’ Zībā šenāḫt. no. 1,
(1378/1999), pp. 122–141.
Ḫorramšāhī, Bahāʾ ud-Dīn. Ḥāfiẓ–nāme. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Tehran: ʿElmī va Farhangī, 1384/2005.
Ḫorramšāhī, Bahāʾ ud-Dīn. ‘Ḥāfiẓ dar farhang-e mā va farhang-e mā dar Ḥāfiẓ.’ In Ḥāfiẓ ḥāfeẓe-
ye mā-st. Tehran: Našr-e Qaṭre, 1385/2006.
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